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ABSTRACT
The central issue which is considered in this thesis is the meaning of the constitutional
guarantees of religious rights and freedoms in South Africa. In other words, it is concerned
with the functions of the state, through its laws or conduct, in respect of religion and with its
relationship towards the institutional church or religious community.
It is argued that religious freedom is, in fact, a bundle of rights and freedoms. The "essential
rights and freedoms of religion" which constitute this "bundle" are identified in the context of
the historical development of religious rights. It is shown that religious rights theories have
developed in the West which include concepts of freedom of conscience, the right to freely
exercise religion, accommodation of pluralism of a confessional and institutional nature,
equality of all religions before the law, nondiscrimination on the grounds offaith, institutional
separation of church and state and some separation of state (or law) and religion.
It is maintained that no single principle could by itself guarantee religious freedom and that
these rights and freedoms are mutually. supportive of and mutually subservient to the highest
goal of guaranteeing religious freedom. These essential rights and freedoms are therefore
treated as constituting minimum standards for the protection of religious freedom and it is
argued that religious freedom as protected in the South African Constitution should be
interpreted to incorporate these multiple principles.
It is shown that, prior to the promulgation of the interim Constitution the essential rights and
freedoms of religion were not adequately protected in South Africa and that the constitutional
entrenchment of these essential religious rights was necessitated by various factors in the
preconstitutional South African society.
The position with regard to religious rights and freedoms in post-Constitutional South Africa
is considered by briefly sketching the broader constitutional context and by assessing the
constitutional clauses protecting religious rights to determine whether the essential rights are
protected. The religious rights provisions in the Constitution are analysed in detail in order to
determine how they should be interpreted and implemented to ensure adequate protection of
the essential rights and freedoms of religion in South Africa.
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OPSOMMING
Die sentrale vraagstuk wat in hierdie proefskrif ondersoek word is die betekenis van
godsdiensregte en vryhede wat in die Grondwet verskans word. Dit ondersoek die funksie van
die staat, hetsy deur wetgewing of staatsoptrede, ten opsigte van godsdiens en ten opsigte van
kerke of godsdiensgroepe.
Daar word geargumenteer dat godsdiensregte inderdaad uit 'n aantal regte, oftewel, 'n bondel
regte, bestaan. Die essensiële regte en vryhede van godsdiens wat hierdie bondelopmaak word
geïdentifiseer met verwysing na die historiese ontwikkeling van godsdiensregte. Teorieë van
godsdiensregte het in die Weste ontwikkel wat die volgende essensiële regte en vryhede
insluit: vryheid van gewete, die reg om godsdiens vrylik te beoefen, akkommodasie van
pluralisme, gelykheid van alle godsdienste en nie-diskriminasie op grond van godsdiens,
institusionele skeiding van kerk en staat en gedeeltelike skeiding van staat en godsdiens.
Die argument lui verder dat 'n enkele beginsel nie opsigself godsdiensvryheid kan waarborg
nie en dat hierdie regte en vryhede mekaar wedersyds ondersteun en tesame die doel van
godsdiensvryheid dien. Die essensiële regte en vryhede van godsdiens word daarom behandel
as minimum standaarde vir die beskerming van godsdiensvryheid en daar word 'n saak
uitgemaak dat godsdiensvryheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet geïnterpreteer behoort te
word as synde hierdie veelvuldige beginsels in te sluit.
Die proefskriftoon dat die essensiele regte en vryhede nie voor die inwerkingtreding van die
interim Grondwet in Suid-Afrika genoegsame beskerming geniet het nie en dat die
konstitusionele verskansing daarvan deur verskeie faktore in die pre-konstitusionele Suid-
Afrika genoodsaak is.
Die posisie na die inwerkingtreding van die Grondwet word geëvalueer deur kortliks die breë
grondwetlike konteks te skets en vas te stelof die artikels in die Grondwet wat met godsdiens
handel, inderdaad die essensiele regte en vryhede van godsdiens beskerm. Hierdie artikels
word in diepte geanaliseer ten einde te bepaal hoe hulle geïnterpreteer en geïmplementeer
behoort te word ten einde die essensiele godsdiensregte en vryhede genoegsaam te beskerm.
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
The central issue to be considered in this thesis is the meaning of the constitutional guarantees
of religious rights and freedoms in South Africa. It is clear that there is no consensus on the
meaning of religious freedom in South Africa. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Court! do not yet have even broad agreement on the meaning of the religious freedom
provisions found in the South African Constitution.' This is not surprising given the complex
history of the right, the complex nature of the right, the complexity of the sections themselves
and the complexity of the South African society in which these rights are exercised.
In the process of interpreting the religious rights provisions in the Constitution, the following
questions, amongst others, therefore arise:
How did religious rights emerge and what is the historical content of the right?
What are the essential elements of religious rights and freedoms?
Were religious rights and freedoms adequately protected in South Africa before 1994?
What is the effect of the history of religious rights in pre-1994 South Africa on the
interpretation of the constitutional clauses protecting religious rights?
Smith 2001 SALI 2-5 shows that Sachs J's comment in Christian Education South Africa vMinister
of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 18 to the effect that there was no dissent in SvLawrence;
Sv Negal; Sv Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) on the definition of freedom of religion, is misleading
because the Constitutional Court was, in fact, markedly divided on the very nature of freedom of
religion in the Lawrence case. Five of the nine justices who decided the latter case did not hold
Chaskalson P's view on the extent of the right as evidenced by the decision of O'Regan J at par 128 and
the decision of Sachs J at par 79. See the discussion of the Christian Education and Lawrence cases
in eh 5 and 6.
2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996. This Constitution will be referred to as
"the Constitution" or the "new" or "[mal" Constitution in this thesis. The Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa 200 of 1993 will be referred to as "the interim Constitution".
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What is the effect of the new constitutional dispensation on the protection of religious rights?
How are religious rights protected in the Constitution and how did this come about?
Are the essential elements of religious rights and freedoms protected under the new
Constitution?
How are the complex sections protecting religious rights in the Constitution to be interpreted?
The mm of this thesis is to answer these questions III order to, in the end, reach an
understanding of the religious rights guarantees in the South African constitutional context.
2. Delimitation
2.1 Legal nature of study
Religious rights issues can be researched at many levels' and by means of a variety of methods.
This thesis is of a legal nature. The central issue is the constitutional protection of religious
rights in South Africa. In other words, it is concerned with the functions of the state, through
its laws or conduct, in respect of religion and with its relationship towards the institutional
church or religious community.
However, it is obvious that the existence of religious freedom is also influenced by other
factors in society. Durham," for example, states that in any generalised reflection on religious
freedom one should first recognise that there are certain "threshold conditions" that should be
met before religious freedom can materialise. According to him
3 A report was prepared by the Work Committee: Religion of the HSRC Religion which was appointed
on 30 November 1981 by the Main Committee of the Human Sciences Research Council Investigation
into Intergroup Relations. The report was published as Oosthuizen GC, Coetzee JK, de Gruchy lW,
Hofmeyr JH and Lategan BC Religion, Intergroup Relations, and Social Change in South Africa (1988
Connecticut). This Work Committee compiled the following nonexhaustive list of possible research
themes (at p 2-3 of the report): Religiosity in South Africa; The function of religious communities in
South Africa; Pluralism as religious phenomenon; Relationship between church and state; Ideology and
religion in South Africa; Religion and economic aspects; The role of religion in motivating socio-
political action; Concepts of man in South Africa; Methodology of the study of religion; and Religion
and change.
4 Durham Perspectives 12-15.
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... there must be some measure of(1) pluralism, (2) economic stability, and (3) political
legitimacy within the society in question. In addition, (4) there must be some willingness
on the part of differing religious groups and their adherents to live with each other.
A comprehensive discussion of social, political and economic inequalities and patterns of
intolerances does not fall within the scope of this thesis since religious rights issues are here
assessed from a legal and constitutional perspective. It is clear that, without the necessary
empirical studies, the question of whether these threshold conditions are defacto satisfied in
South Africa, cannot be addressed here.
However, the "threshold conditions" will be discussed in this thesis in the sense that the
constitutional entrenchment and implementation of certain fundamental human rights can
enhance the achievement or fulfilment of the threshold conditions which are necessary
preconditions for the true protection of the essential rights and freedoms of religion. In tum,
as will be shown, the constitutional and legal protection of the essential rights and freedoms
of religion can have a positive or negative impact on patterns of intolerance, economic stability
or political legitimacy in the country.
2.2 Hermeneutical study
Although a variety of methods are used in this thesis, it remains a hermeneutical study. The
following approaches are used to determine the meaning and scope of the religious rights
guarantees in the Constitution: a historical approach is used to determine the essential features
of religious rights and to sketch the circumstances in which the constitutional religious rights
guarantees emerged in South African; a teleological approach is used by taking into account
the underlying purpose and objectives of the provisions; a grammatical approach is used to
5 Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 81, 84-86 states that: " 'Discrimination' is a term used in the
three major anti-discrimination treaties ... and it has a clear legal significance. This is not the case with
the term 'intolerance', a rather imprecise and vague term which has been used to describe emotional,
psychological, philosophical and religious attitudes that may prompt acts of discrimination or other
violations of religious freedoms, or manifestations of hatred or persecutions against persons or groups
of a different religion or belief." On the relationship between political intolerance and religion in South
Africa, see Du Plessis and Gouws 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 657-698.
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determine the meaning of the words and concepts which appear in the religious rights clauses;
a systematic approach is used by interpreting theses clauses with reference to the other
provisions of the Constitution and the existing legal order; and comparative discussions of
provisions and case law from other systems are used on an ad hoc basis to support certain
interpretations of the religious rights provisions.
3. Central theoretical argument
In essence, this thesis is about what freedom of religion means in South African law. Itwill
be argued that religious freedom is, in fact, a bundle of rights and freedoms. The "essential
rights and freedoms of religion'" which constitute this "bundle" will be identified in the
context of the historical development of religious rights. It will be shown that "no single
principle could by itself guarantee such religious liberty'? and that these rights and freedoms
are "mutually supportive and mutually subservient" to the highest goal of guaranteeing
religious freedom. These essential rights and freedoms will therefore be treated as constituting
minimum standards for the protection of religious freedom and it will be argued that religious
freedom as protected in the South African Constitution should be interpreted to incorporate
these multiple principles. The thesis will assess the religious rights provisions in the South
African Constitution to determine whether and how these essential rights are protected and
how, as standards, they should be interpreted and implemented in the South African
constitutional context to ensure adequate protection of religious freedom.
4. The structure of the thesis
The thesis has three main parts: a historical analysis of the emergence and content of the
essential rights and freedoms of religion (chapter 2), an overview and evaluation of the legal
protection of religious rights in South Africa prior to 1994 (chapter 3) and an analysis and
assessment of the constitutionally entrenched guarantees of religious rights and freedoms in
6 The phrase "the essential rights and liberties [ofreligion]" was first used by Elisha Williams as quoted
and referred to by Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 514. See their discussion at
514-531 on the essential rights and liberties of religion in the American constitutional context.
7 Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 530.
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the South African Constitution (chapters 4-7).
The thesis commences with an investigation of the emergence of the essential rights and
freedoms of religion. Chapter 2 distills the most widely accepted principles for the protection
of religious freedom from the diverse theological and political traditions of the West. It is
shown that, in the course of history and as a result of certain theological and political tensions,
religious rights theories have developed in the West which include concepts of freedom of
conscience, the right to freely exercise religion, accommodation of pluralism of a confessional
and institutional nature, equality of all religions before the law, nondiscrimination on the
grounds of faith, institutional separation of church and state and some separation of state (or
law) and religion. These essential rights and freedoms of religions came to be regarded as the
minimum standards of religious freedom. It will be argued that these "essential rights and
freedoms" deserve acceptance in the South African constitutional context.
Chapter 3 analyses the position with regard to church and state, and law and religion in South
Africa prior to the promulgation of the interim Constitution in the context of the above
mentioned essential rights and freedoms of religion. It is shown that the essential rights and
freedoms of religion were not adequately protected in South Africa before the commencement
of the interim Constitution and that the constitutional entrenchment of these essential religious
rights was necessitated by various factors in the preconstitutional South African society.
Chapters 4 to 7 consider the position with regard to religious rights and freedoms in post-
Constitutional South Africa by sketching the broader constitutional context, assessing the
constitutional clauses protecting religious rights, interpreting and refining the essential rights
and freedoms in view of the particular South African constitutional context where they will
be implemented, and assessing the constitutional practice in view of this refined interpretation
of religious rights and freedoms in South Africa.
Chapter 4 first looks briefly at the genesis of the new constitutional dispensation in South
Africa and the emergence of constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. The second part
of the chapter contains a number of observations on constitutional interpretation, by way of
introduction to the chapters in which the constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom
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are considered.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the religious rights provisions contained in the final Constitution
with a view to ascertaining whether the essential rights and freedoms of religion, as identified
in chapter 2, are constitutionally protected in South Africa. Chapter 5 focuses on the specific
(essential) rights to freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion and religious pluralism,
and chapter 6 deals with the separation of state (or law) and religion, equality of religion, and
the institutional separation of church and state. Once it is clear that these essential rights are,
in principle, protected by the Constitution, the relevant religious rights provisions in the South
African Constitution are analysed in detail in order to reach a refined understanding of the
meaning and role of the essential rights in South Africa and how they should be implemented
to ensure adequate protection of religious rights and freedom in the South African
constitutional context.
Reliance on and the implementation of the general interpretation, g application and limitation
provisions in the Constitution, known as operational provisions, form an instrinsic part of the
process of interpreting and implementing the provisions on religious rights. Chapter 7
considers the (possible) effects of these operational provisions on the understanding of the
constitutional sections entrenching religious rights and freedom. The discussion in that chapter
is in effect a continuation of the discussion in chapters 5 and 6 but occurs, for practical
reasons, in a separate chapter. Chapter 8 constitutes the conclusion to this thesis.
5. Terminology
In the last instance, an important terminological distinction should be highlighted at the outset.
As mentioned above, the thesis is concerned with the functions of the state, through its laws
or conduct, in respect of religion and with its relationship towards the institutional church or
religious community. A distinction will be drawn between the issues of "state and religion'"
8 The general interpretation clause is discussed in eh 4.
9 In this thesis,"state and religion" is also sometimes referred to as "law and religion". "Law" in this sense
only refers to state laws ("staatlike reg") and do not include nonstate laws such as church laws.
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and "state and church" .10 This terminological distinction can be illustrated with brief reference
to Dooyeweerd's" doctrine of sphere sovereignty. Dooyeweerd's theory is accepted here only
for purposes of showing, by way of introduction, that church and state, as institutions, have
different competency spheres and different roles to play in respect of law and religion.
According to Dooyeweerd, church and state are essentially different types of institutions or,
in the words of Van der Vyver, 12 "distinct social entities" .13 This, simply speaking, implies that
neither institution is subject to the other, that each has its own internal structure and that each
has original inherent powers not derived from the other. In other words, both have internal
legal rules to which members would be subject, and the competency to form such law inheres
in the specific social entity.
There is, however, a symbiotic interrelationship between the fundamentally different societal
structures. In the social environment, for instance, law and religion are distinct aspects in
respect of which both the church and the state (or any other distinct social entity) have a role
to play which is determined by their respective "leading functions" .14 This, in tum depends on
the structure and typical nature of the state and the church respectively.
Dooyeweerd typifies the state as a body politic, constrained as a result of its particular,
distinctive nature to establish and maintain a legal order within its defined territory. The state's
duty is therefore to regulate the legal relationship between itself and its citizens and among
10 When the phrase "church and state" is used in this thesis, the word "church" should be understood to
also include religious institutions, communities and groups.
Il As set out in his work, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-36).
12 See the exposition of Van der Vyver Juridiese Funksie van Staat en Kerk 63-99. For a brief English
explanation of the theory see Van der Vyver Introduction xli-xliv. Whilst it is acknowledged that this
is a Calvinist theory, it nevertheless remains an acceptable and valuable scientific theory explaining the
interaction of church and state, and of state and religion. The theory was initially developed specifically
with a view to explaining the legal relationship between church and state. This thesis is, however, not
concerned with any other application of the theory.
13 The Afrikaans term is "samelewingskringe".
14 In Afrikaans, "bestemmingsfunksie" .
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citizens inter se. Religious communities or churches, on the other hand, are essentially charged
with fostering faith.
Each social entity is therefore directed by its own typical nature and purpose in the
performance of all its functions, including the "nontypical" functions. In the case of the church,
its typical nature is to foster faith, but it also makes internal rules and church laws for its
members. Although it thus performs a function at the juridical level, the exercise of this
function is directed by its inherently confessional nature. The typical function of the state, on
the other hand, is juridical, but it also performs a function in respect of religion. However, the
distinctively juridical nature and purpose of the state limit and determine the performance of
its religious function.
Whereas the issue of "state and religion" is concerned with one of the functions of the state,
namely the conduct and laws ofthe state in respect of religion, the issue of "church and state"
is concerned with the competency spheres of different institutions. In this thesis, the phrase
"church and state" will be used whenever church and state as two distinct (and distinctive)
institutions are referred to. Although the phrase "church and state" usually covers all instances
of state involvement with religion, especially in American jurisprudence, 15 it will here be used
in its narrower, institutional connotation.
The distinction between "church and state" and "state and religion" is important for a proper
understanding of two of the principles contained in the bundle of essential rights and freedoms
of religion, namely "the (institutional) separation of church and state" and the "separation of
state (or law) and religion" respectively. Itwill be shown that although institutional separation
of church and state is possible, complete separation of state and religion is neither possible nor
constitutionally required. On the contrary, the state would be in breach of its constitutional
duties if it refrained from performing any functions in respect of religion.
15 In American religious rights discourse the constitutional prohibition of the "establishment of religion"
is understood to mandate both the separation of church and state and of politics and religion.
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EMERGENCE OF THE ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF RELIGION
1. Introduction
As set out in the introductory chapter, this thesis is mainly concerned with freedom of religion
in South African law.' But, the first questions that come to mind and that need to be addressed
in a study such as this are how the constitutional entrenchment of religious rights and freedoms
originated; what the essential features of freedom of religion are and what the core meanings
of these rights and freedoms are. An overview of history can throw light on these questions
and enhance our understanding of the present-day concept of religious rights, as eloquently
explained by Randall:'
... it is of the utmost importance, for one who wishes to understand the life about
him, to comprehend its intellectual forces, to discern the probable drift of the
current, and perchance to take his place at the oar. Ideas are much more lasting
than anything else in man's civilization, and those which find themselves in
modern minds have roots going back into the immemorial past.. ..
This chapter provides no more than an overview' of the basic models of church-state relations
Sections 9, 15 and 31 of the South African Constitution, which will be discussed in more detail in eh
5 and 6, entrench a number of rights and freedoms of religion.
2 Making of the Modern Mind 4-6.
3 It is emphasised that this chapter contains only an overview, and a selective one at that. To stand at
the end of the second millennium and summarise 2000 years of history of church and state and law
and religion, is too ambitious a task for a chapter in a thesis. The idea here is not to give a full
exposition of historical events that shaped us, but rather to highlight certain significant historical
aspects in order to promote understanding of contemporary religious rights discourse. Berman and
Witte Church and State 502 point out: "In general, however, the great struggles, and the great
compromises, between ecclesiastical and civil authorities that dominated Western politics from the
eleventh to the nineteenth centuries came, in the twentieth century, to be a kind of ancient history,
(continued ...)
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in Western history,' the emergence of the concept of religious rights in this context and the
development of the rights and freedoms which can today be regarded as the essential rights and
freedoms of religion. It will be shown that certain religious tensions in the course of history
gave rise to the entrenchment of basic guarantees of religious freedom in certain peace treaties'
and, in the eighteenth century, in constitutional texts." This paved the way for the eventual
entrenchment of certain religious rights in the constitutions of most countries' as well as in
international human rights instruments.'
Since the historical overview in this chapter is meant to enhance our understanding of
developments that have shaped the basic guarantees in the protection of religious rights and
freedoms today, it cannot claim to be a thorough analysis professing to engender a true
understanding of each historical era "in its own terms"."
3 (...continued)
tremendously significant as a source of understanding and inspiration but no longer a vital factor in
the resolution of current tensions between religion and politics."
4 See Berman and Witte Church and State 489ff for an overview of "the interrelationships of
ecclesiastical and civil authorities in certain critical periods in the history of the Roman Empire and
of Europe."
5 For example at the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and at the Peace of Westphalia (1648), as will be shown
below in this chapter.
6 See for example s 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776; the Austrian Act on Religious Tolerance
of 1781; the Virginia Bill Establishing Religious Freedom of January 1786; the Pruss ian Edict on
Religion of 1788; s 1-4 of the Allgemeines Landrecht flïr die preussischen Staaten Part II Title II; the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution; and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen.
7 The entrenchment of religious rights in different national constitutions are by no means identical. In
different countries with different traditions, there exist a considerable range of church-state
configurations and different degrees of religious freedom. See, for example, Durham Perspectives 36.
8 Religious rights and freedoms are protected in leading international human rights instruments, such
as in art 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in art 18( I) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and in regional human rights instruments such as in
art 9( I) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950), art 12(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and in art 8 of the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981). See the discussion below in this chapter.
9 See Tierney Religion, Law, and Constitutional Thought 8-13 who refers to Claude Lévi-Strauss who
(continued ...)
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The historical overview in this chapter is moreover deliberately confined to developments in
the West. The "West" traditionally included ancient Palestine, Greece and Rome, but today it
generally refers to Western Europe and the Americas. By limiting this discussion to the West,
developments in at least three quarters ofthe world are omitted, for example the entire Eastern
Orthodox Christian tradition, the Jewish tradition, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and African
traditions." Nevertheless, this limited scope can be justified by the fact that religious human
rights, as currently entrenched in international human rights instruments, are typically Western
in origin. Il In this regard, Tierney" points out that:
The Western experience that I want particularly to consider is in some ways
paradigmatic, since a doctrine of natural rights - or human rights as we say
nowadays - first grew up in the Christian West. Of course, all the great religious
cultures of the world have given expression to ideals of justice and right order in
human affairs, but they have not normally expressed those ideals in terms of
subjective natural rights. (It would be hard, for instance, to imagine a Confucian
Hobbes or Locke.)
9 (...continued)
drew the distinctionbetween a "synchronic" and "diachronic" approach to the study of societies. In
view of this distinction Tierney Religious Rights 30 (quoting Butterfield Whig Interpretation of
History 18)warns against extreme "present-mindedness", or the telling of a "winner's history" in the
study of history. Pelikan Vindication of Tradition 65-82 at 69 in similar vein warns against
"traditionalism" in the study of history. He quotes Alfred North Whitehead speaking about how to
discern "the philosophy of an epoch", namely, not by chiefly directing "your attention to those
intellectual systemswhich its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend," but rather by fmding
"some fundamental assumption which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch
unconsciously presuppose...".
10 In this historical overview,reference will be made to the position of some of these groups asminority
groups.
11 An interesting aspect that emerges from a historical study of religious rights, is the interrelationship
between the development of human rights, as we know them today, and religious rights. Witte
Introduction xxii n 18shows that the most important prototype for Western-style human rights was
the medieval canon lawof the Catholic Church. This subject, however, doesnot fall within the ambit
of this thesis.
12 Tierney Religious Rights 17,43-45.
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It should be noted here that Western perceptions of human rights and the universality" of the
liberal individualistic human rights ideology as devised and understood in the West, are
increasingly being questioned." As a result a debate has ensued in the United Nations as to the
universality" of "Western style" human rights." However, the full problem of universality,
indivisibility and interdependence of human rights justifies a separate study and will not be
dealt with in this thesis. The United Nations' approach to the practical application of human
rights principles so as to accommodate ethnic, cultural and religious peculiarities is subscribed
to for purposes of the present study. This approach allows for a "margin of appreciation" in the
application of human rights principles, albeit within the boundaries of basic human rights
values."
The emergence of religious rights and freedoms will be traced in this chapter by looking at
13 The principle proclaiming the universality of human rights is founded on the notion that all human
rights apply uniformly and with equal force throughout the world. It thus opposes the doctrine of the
"relativity" of human rights, which maintains that in the application of human rights in concrete
situations allowance should be made for particularities that attend cultural, ethnic or religious
varieties.
14 See for example Arjomand Religious Human Rights and the Principle of Legal Pluralism in the
Middle East 331-348.
15 See for example Robert Traer Faith in Human Rights (1991) 216 (as quoted by Van der Vyver
Introduction xii) who set out to demonstrate that "human rights are the center of a global moral
language that is beingjustified, elaborated, and advocated by members of different religious traditions
and cultures." He goes on to proclaim: "This is true not only in the West, but also in Africa and Asia.
It is true not only in the First and Second Worlds, where liberal and socialist human rights have
evolved, but in the Third World as well. Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and advocates
of religious traditions indigenous to Africa and Asia fundamentally agree about human rights."
16 Van der Vyver Introduction xi states that it is true that governments and religions alike would not
want to be seen to contradict the salient appeal of human rights but points out that this universal
adherence to its demands to a large extent signifies no more than rhetorical consensus.
17 See in this regard the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, UN Doc AlCONF
157/23, Part 1 par 5 (also referred to as the "Vienna Final Act") which concludes: "All human rights
are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights."
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periods in the history of the West during which, according to Witte," important paradigm
shifts in the relationship between church and state and law and religion occurred. They will
be discussed in chronological order owing to the rather "unsystematic" development of
religious rights. The first such period was the fourth and fifth centuries, the time in the Roman
Empire when Christianity was established by virtue of Roman law. The first important
paradigm shift took place in 313 AD when the Edict of Milan was issued. In the eleventh to
thirteenth centuries (the papal revolution), the prevailing theocratic monism was challenged
by the Pope who claimed undisputed papal authority and the freedom of the church. This
found expression in the establishment of the Christian (Roman Catholic) religion by canon
law. During the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, the authority of the Roman
Church was challenged and this led to a number of new theories on the relationship between
church and state and a re-establishment of the Christian (Roman Catholic) religion by civil
law. The wars of religion during the seventeenth century gave rise to agitation for religious
toleration by religious dissidents; and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the rise of
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.
It will be shown in this chapter that, during these periods, different models of church-state
relations developed (which models still exist today) and that these relations have profoundly
influenced (and are still influencing) the role of the state in respect of religion. The emergence
and development of the essential rights and freedoms of religion will be investigated against
the background of the church-state relations in these periods. Itwill be shown that certain basic
guarantees of religious freedom were introduced by the Edict of Milan, and the development
of these guarantees will be traced up to the point where they had become entrenched in
constitutional texts and in international human rights instruments.
18 As set out by prof John Witte's course, "History of Church and State Relations in the West", at Emory
University in 1995. I am indebted to prof Witte whose course contributed greatly to my understanding
of the historical material discussed in this chapter and whose course material has been a valuable
source for this chapter.
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2. The Roman Empire in the first three centuries AD
2.1 Church and state
In the centuries before the Edict of Milan (313 AD) the Roman Empire was the central and
dominant force in all walks oflife. The concept of a separate church did not exist. The empire
itself was in fact considered to be holy and worthy of worship: the city of Rome was held to
be divine, the Emperor the divine authority (sometimes even the son of God) and Roman law
the divine liturgy which included numerous formal acts and rituals performed by the pontiffs.
This became known as the imperial cult. Local laws and government structures were allowed
to exist only in so far as they did not interfere with Roman governance.
2.2 Law and religion
In the first three centuries AD, Roman law as a form of celebration of the Emperor was used
to establish the imperial cult, and defamation laws were passed in due course to protect the
Emperor's name, honour and dignity. The public liturgy, for example, was prescribed by law,
as were holy days, rest, leisure, public baths and oaths, and the formalities to be observed
especially at the imperial court. Other laws prescribed a private liturgy with regard to such
things as marriage, property, contracts, wills and the rituals of Roman law. There were laws
dealing with the public property of the Empire, regulations against the violation of sacred
buildings, and laws governing the pontiffs'" discipline, clothes, office and conduct. The
"imperial cult" was established as the religion of the Roman Empire and as such formed the
first prototype of religious establishment by law. It will be shown that this pre-Christian
pattern of establishing religion by law would be repeated in different forms in later centuries.
2.3 Religious tolerance
In the first three centuries the Christian church and Jewish communities were largely isolated
19 The "clergy" of the Roman Empire.
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from official Roman society and received virtually no support and protection." Christians did
not regard the emperor as a divine being but as a persecutor of the true faith, and before long
the cardinal features of Christianity led to conflict with the state. The church taught obedience
to authority (limited only by the Christian conscience), separation from the secular world, and
a sense of mission." As a consequence, Rome launched a systematic persecution of the
Christians."
Jewish groups were also persecuted. The Romans destroyed Jerusalem in 70 AD, killed and
enslaved many of the leaders and forbade the rest to teach Jewish law. After the demolition
of Jerusalem, many Jews lived in diaspora."
3. The Edict of Milan
The year 313 constituted a turning point in European history. The fourth century opened with
vicious persecution of Christians, but after the conversion of the Emperor Constantine, the
execution of Christians was stopped. In 313, a year after his conversion, Constantine issued
the Edict of Milan. It expressed the relationship between the Roman empire and the church in
a novel way. As will be shown, the Edict is a classic source of religious freedom. It provides
as follows:"
We, Constantius and Licinius the Emperors, having met in concord at Milan and
having set everything in order which pertains to the common good and public
20 See Berman and Witte Church and State 489.
21 See Tellenbach Church, State, and Christian Society 25-37 for an exposition of the attitude of
Christianity towards the world during the first to fifth centuries.
22 See Ehler Twenty Centuries of Church and State 1-10 for a discussion of "The Church against Pagan
Rome". The author mentions that: "The attitude of the Roman state toward the primitive Church falls
into three stages. The State fust ignored the new religion, then persecuted it, and fmally accepted it."
23 See Dorff and Rossett Roots and Growth of Jewish Law 265-275 for an exposition of the situation
in Israel at the end of the fust century and at the beginning of the second.
24 Owing to the importance of the Edict, it will be quoted extensively. The translation of the Edict of
Milan on the Toleration of the Christian Religion (313) is by Ehler and Morrall Church and State
through the Centuries 4-5.
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security, are of the opinion that among the various things which we perceived
would profit men, or which should be set in order first, was to be found the
cultivation of religion; we should therefore give both to Christians and to all others
free facility to follow the religion which each may desire, so that by this means
whatever divinity is enthroned in heaven may be gracious and favourable to us and
to all who have been placed under our authority. Therefore we are of the opinion
that the following decision is in accordance with sound and true reasoning: that no
one who has given his mental assent to the Christian persuasion or to any other
which he feels to be suitable to him should be compelled to deny his conviction,
so that the Supreme Godhead ("Summa Divinitas") whose worship we freely
observe, can assist us in all things with his wonted favour and benevolence.
Wherefore it is necessary for your Excellency to know that it is our pleasure that
all restrictions which were previously put forward in official pronouncements
concerning the sect of Christians would be removed, and that each one of them
who freely and sincerely carries out the purpose of observing the Christian religion
may endeavour to practise its precepts without any fear or danger. We believed
that these points should be fully brought to your attention, so that you might know
that we have given free and absolute permission to practise their religion to the
Christians. Now that you perceive what we have granted them, your Excellency
must also learn that for the sake of peace in our time a similar public and free right
to practise their religion or cult is granted to others, so that every man may have
free opportunity to worship according to his own wish. This has been done by us
to avoid any appearance of disfavour to anyone religion.
First, it is clear from this passage that freedom of conscience, including the concept of
voluntarism, is granted. Christians and all other religions are free to profess any religion they
may rationally and voluntarily desire. It is further decreed that anything that encumbers the
religious conscience should be removed. In other words, any legal discrimination which people
might have suffered in consequence of their religion has been removed by the Edict.
Secondly, the freedom to practise religion, in other words, free exercise of religion, is granted
expressly. It is proclaimed that no one should be prevented from discharging the obligation of
his or her religion. This right extends to public manifestations of religious beliefs.
Thirdly, the Edict recognises religious pluralism by extending freedom of conscience and free
exercise of religion "both to Christians and to all others".
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Fourthly, the principle of equality is introduced by the phrase: "to avoid any appearance of
disfavour to anyone religion".
The Edict continues as follows:
We have decided furthermore to decree the following in respect of the Christians:
if those places at which they were accustomed in former times to hold their
meetings (...) have been at any previous time acquired from our treasury or from
any other person, let the persons concerned be willing and swift to restore them to
the Christians without financial recompense and without trying to ask a price. Let
those who have received such property as a gift restore whatever they have
acquired to the Christians in similar manner. If those who have bought such
property or received it as a gift, seek recompense from our benevolence, let them
apply to the Vicar, by whom their cases will be referred to our clemency. You are
to consider it your duty that all these things shall be handed over to the Christian
body immediately and without delay by your intervention. And since the aforesaid
Christians are known to have possessed not only those places at which they are
wont to assemble, but others also pertaining to the law of their body, that is of the
churches, not of private individuals, you are to order in accordance with the law
which we have described above the return of all possessions to the aforesaid
Christians, that is to their bodies and assemblies without any further hesitation or
argument.
In the fifth place, the Edict grants individual and corporate restitution for past offences against
religious freedom. Effective provision is made for the restitution of lands and buildings
confiscated during the persecutions, including property which had been sold or given to private
persons. It also undertakes to indemnify those who would resign the property without
objection."
The Edict did not establish Christianity as such; it ordered the right of free exercise of religion
to be restored to Christianity and all other religions. There is no reference to orthodox
Christianity or a Trinitarian God. The reference is to a divine God only. The Christians seem
25 Themodem principle of restitution as applied to the Jews, in Eastern Europe and in SouthAfrica, has
its roots here, but will not be dealt with further in this thesis.
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to be singled out for restitution because they had been persecuted."
The Edict introduced four basic principles of religious freedom: freedom of conscience, free
exercise of religion, pluralism and equality. It is remarkable that the idea of individual
religious rights and equality between religions was conceived thus early in the Western
tradition. However 64 years later, in 380 AD, the Edict was revoked by the Edict Establishing
Catholicism, and the protection of religious rights came to an end. Or so it seems. Witte"
shows, as discussed below, that after the "window" of individual religious freedom had been
closed, religious rights were perceived as the rights of a group of people.
4. The Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries
4.1 Church and state
Almost all the Roman emperors after Constantine" were Christians, and the Christian faith"
was established as the state religion in 380.30 The Edict of 380 provides as follows:
We desire all people ...to tum to the religion ...this faith is that we should believe,
in accordance with apostolic discipline and Gospel teaching, that there is one
Godhead, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in an equal Majesty and a holy Trinity.
26 Cochrane Christianity and Classical Culture 177-180 notes that the specific purpose of the Edict of
Milan was "to secure for Christianity the privileges of a 'licensed cult' (religio licita)". Also see his
remarks on the provisions of the Edict.
27 Introduction xxii.
28 See Cochrane Christianity and Classical Culture 177-180,213-216,221-223,254-256,259,294-299,
318, 321-337 on Constantine, Constantius and Theodosius.
29 From the first to the third centuries, the Christian Church became more organised, obtaining a legal
character. Its first internal law was the Didache (c.l70) which contained mainly teachings of the
twelve apostles. See Schaff Teachings of the Twelve Apostles 162-218.
30 This was done by the Edict of the Emperors Gratian, Valentian II and Theodosius I establishing
Catholicism as the State Religion, February 28,380. It forms part of the first title of the Theodosian
Code. For a translation of the original document, see Ehler and Morrall Church and State through the
Centuries 7 and Pharr Theodosian Code 438.
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Inother words, the "window" of religious freedom opened up by the Edict of Milan was closed
by the Edict of 380 AD which established the Christian faith as the state religion. The
Christian church now received the direct support of the imperial authority." The traditional
Roman cult was gradually Christianised, and prevailing Roman doctrines and Christian
teachings were intertwined so that the Roman Church became the universal "state" which
embraced all peoples. The Christian Church of the fourth and fifth centuries seems to have
succeeded the Western Roman Empire as the political force." In the thus established corpus
Christianum, the (Christian) Roman emperor - the head of the Holy Roman Empire - was also
the head of the Church." The emperor was regarded as God's appointee on earth. Despite all
the emperor's authority, he nevertheless remained a layman, with no authority to administer
the sacraments. He also had to accept the authority of the church in spiritual matters."
At this stage the church appeared to be a "department of religious affairs" in an imperial
theocratic church-state. However, as the imperial power crumbled in the West, the independent
role of the church was vigorously reasserted by Pope Gelasius 1. In 494 the "Gelasian" theory
was enunciated by Pope Gelasius with his separation of two spheres of authority in the world,
namely the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal power." The Gelasian formula of
the two powers was later copied and interpreted in a variety of ways, but it remained the
31 Berman and Witte Church and State 490.
32 After the death of Theodosius I (395 AD) the empire was divided into the Western and the Byzantine
empires. The last Western Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476 AD, in other words,
the Western Roman Empire "fell" in 476 AD when invaded by Germanic tribes. The eastern Roman
Empire came to an end in 1453 when it was invaded by the Turks.
33 Berman and Witte Church and State 490 point out that, although the emperor was no longer
worshiped as a god, he remained the "supreme ruler of both civil and religious affairs". Constantine
namely declared: "I am emperor and I am priest". At a later stage this system of imperial dominion
within the church was denounced as "caesaropapism" (which means both caesar and pope).
34 This could be illustrated by referring to the fact that Ambrose, bishop of Milan, excommunicated
emperor Theodosius in 390 AD for massacring the people of Thessalonika. He was only readmitted
to Communion after he had publicly repented.
35 Pope Gelasius (492-496) wrote in his letter to emperor Anastasius, "Two there are, August emperor,
by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal power ... ".For
a translation of the letter of Pope Gelasius I to Byzantine Emperor Anastasius I (494) see Ehler and
Morrall Church and State through the Centuries 10-11.
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accepted statement ofthe relationship between church and state for nearly 600 years. lts most
important consequence was the entrenchment of a certain dualism of authority in the West. 36
4.2 Law and religion
In the fourth and fifth centuries Roman law became a vehicle for establishing Christianity just
as it had formerly been used to establish the imperial cult. Civil laws defined the church,
orthodoxy, doctrine, liturgy and religious teaching. On the ecclesiastical side, civil laws set the
standards for the clergy" who were also granted privileges, exemption from civil laws,
immunity from prosecution by municipal councils (civil courts) and sanctuary." Civil laws
also regulated the acquisition, use, maintenance and alienation of sacred church property. With
regard to polity, imperial laws ordered the division of the church into bishopdoms and
prescribed the times when councils would gather and make decisions on basic clerical
appointments to higher offices.
4.3 Religious tolerance
The establishment of Christianity by law also implied a tightening of the law against
"heretical" groups." The Edict of 380 which established Catholicism proclaimed:"
36 Ehler and Morrall Church and State Through the Centuries 1-2.
37 See Justinian Nove/lae Constitutiones (c.548 AD) title 3, 5, 6. Translation in Scott Civil Law vol 16.
38 Numerous examples can be found in the Theodosian Code (380) Title 2 and in the Sirmondian
Constitutions. Translation in Pharr Theodosian Code 439-450.
39 See the Theodosian Code (380), especially titles 4 ("Those persons who contend about religion"); 5
("Heretics"); 6 ("Holy baptism shall not be repeated"); 7 ("Jews, Caelicolists, and Samaritans") and
10 ("Pagans, Sacrifices and Temples") and the Sirmondian Constitutions par 4,6 and 12 in Pharr
Theodosian Code 438-476.
40 Translation of Ehler and Morrall Church and State through the Centuries 7. The translation of Pharr
Theodosian Code 438 reads as follows: "We command that those persons who follow this rule shall
embrace the name Catholic Christians. The rest, however, whom we adjudge demented and insane,
shall sustain the infamy of heretical dogmas, their meeting places shall not receive the name of
churches, and they shall be smitten first by divine vengeance and secondly by the retribution of Our
own initiative which We shall assume in accordance with the divine judgment."
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We order those who follow this doctrine to receive the title of Catholic Christians,
but others we judge to be mad and raving and worthy of incurring the disgrace of
heretical teaching, nor are their assemblies to receive the name of churches. They
are to be punished not only by Divine retribution but also by our own measures,
which we have decided in accordance with Divine inspiration.
Initially, Rome's attitude towards the Jews, especially those living in Palestine and elsewhere
in dispersed communities, was one of indifferent toleration." In the third century, Jews enjoyed
religious toleration to the extent that the state (by law) exempted them from certain duties (for
example from liturgies which were offensive to their religion) and upheld certain privileges
(for example those which exempted Jews from profaning their Sabbath and religious festivals).
Judaism was explicitly declared to be a "permitted religion".
After the Edict of Milan, Rome's policy towards Christians changed, but the feeling of anti-
Semitism became stronger. This later became official Roman policy. Laws similar to those
which had been used to persecute Christians were enacted against "heretic" individuals and
groups. Harsh persecution of Jews followed in the fourth century.
Theodosius (364-395), under the influence of Chrysostum and Athanasius, changed Rome's
policy towards the Jews. Theodosius saw the Jews as "half-Christians" and translated this into
legal terms by granting them "second class" citizen status. This "half' status led to the granting
of a series of effective minimum group rights. But, as the hostility towards the Jews increased,
many more restrictions against Jews were entrenched in various legal codes" and in
legislation." This situation continued after the division of the Roman Empire into the Western
41 Since the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD.
42 Such as in the Code of Theodosius (380) title 8. See the translation in Pharr Theodosian Code 439-
450.
43 See the systematic and detailed exposition of Linder Jews in Roman Legislation 67-89 who groups
and discusses the laws relating to Jews in three main categories: "(1) those concerning relations
between the Jews and the government; (2) those concerning relations between Jews and non-Jews;
(3) those concerning relations between Jews and other Jews." He furthermore maintains that over a
very long period of time, distinct legal traditions were created in each of these three areas. Also see
Schreiber Jewish Law 283; Elliot and Rossett Roots and Growth of Jewish Law 265-275.
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and Eastern empires." In fact, the pattern which had been introduced in the fifth century
persisted in the West until the nineteenth century."
5. The High Middle Ages
5.1 The relationship between church and state
The system of imperial rule prevailed in the West until the late eleventh century. Between
1050 and 1150 the Papal Revolution altered the relationship between church and state
dramatically." The prevailing theocratic monism was challenged by Pope Gregory VW7 who
claimed undisputed papal authority and the "freedom of the church"." This led to the
44 After 476 AD, Justinian's legal code applied particularly to the East (Justinian's Code also contained
anti-Jewish legislation). In the western part of the Empire, some Germanic leaders (as successors to
the Western Roman Empire) compiled a kind of code of Roman law for the Roman citizens in their
states (for example the Visigothic Code). According to the principle of personality, every person lived
according to the law of his own tribe or country and was judged accordingly. The circumstances of
the Jews improved temporarily in these Germanic states in which general toleration was granted to
religious minorities so that they were free to follow their traditions. Visigoth Spain was different. As
Schreiber Jewish Law puts it at 281: "There the intensive drive for the unification of the country, plus
the extreme views held by the local Catholic clergy, resulted in the persecution of ethnic minorities
and harsh measures taken against them. This included both Jews, Moslems and heretical Christians."
The Visigothic Code (Lex Romana Visigothorum) was compiled in 560 AD at the instigation of Alaric
II, the ruler of the Visigoths, and contains far-reaching provisions on Jews under the heading
"Concerning the Eradication of the Errors of All Heretics and Jews". See the translation of Scott
Visigothic Code 362-382. It is interesting to note that codes of Roman law such as this was a
contributory factor in the preservation of the dormant Roman law during the Middle Ages.
45 Parkes The Jew in the Medieval Community 101.
46 On the revolutionary character of the Papal Revolution and as an overview, see Berman Law and
Revolution 85-119.
47 The problem of appointing the Pope was an acute one. Between 950 and 1050 more than 80 popes
had been appointed. Gregory was the first Pope since 950 to be appointed by a church council.
48 In his revolutionary document Dictatus Papae (The Dictates of the Pope) (March 1075) Gregory
decreed, for example: "(7) That for him [the Pope] alone it is lawful to enact new laws ... ; (12) That
he may depose Emperors; (22) That the Roman Church has never erred, nor ever, by the witness of
the Scripture, shall err to all eternity." See the translation in Ehler and Morrall Church and State
Through the Centuries 43-44. There is controversy about the document. Ithas been said that it might
(continued ...)
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investiture contest" between Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII (1075-1122).50 The Church
maintained that, if the church were to set itself free from all secular control and gain control
of its own mission and sword, the imperial power had to be shifted from the Emperor (Henry
IV) to the Pope. The prevailing practice of lay investiture moreover had to be forbidden. This
view was justified with reference to Gelasius's doctrine (of 494) which in due course became
a "two-swords" doctrine."
The two-swords doctrine of Pope Gregory represented a total philosophical shift. This doctrine
was acceptable on account of its religious implications. Itwas assumed that in the nature of
things there was continuity between God and the world. According to the God-given natural
law, everything had its place in the hierarchy of things that emanated from God; the pope held
the highest rank with direct access to God. It was believed that human nature had lost its
perfect community with God as a result of sin. To regain access to God, an individual needed
someone to unlock the gates of heaven and lock the gates of hell. The power of the key was
held by the clergy who acted as God's agents in administering grace in the form of the seven
sacraments. 52 This gave the church and canon law enormous power, since the salvation of the
48 (...continued)
be a fourteenth century forgery, but Witte's theory is that Gregory decreed it early in his reign,
summarising his revolutionary programme.
49 In a nutshell, the investiture conflict arose because, for six centuries, a lay person - the King - had
the power to vest clergy with the necessary power of office. This was now (1076) denied by Pope
Gregory who declared that only the Pope or his agent could do it. The King, Henry IV, sent a letter
back to Gregory saying that he (Gregory) had usurped the authority of his office and declared him a
heretic. Gregory in his turn excommunicated the King, who did penance, upon which he was absolved
by the Pope. A civil war raged for 40 years before a compromise was reached in a series of
Concordats. See Tierney Crisis of Church and State 51-73, 91-92 for the correspondence between
Gregory and Henry.
50 See Tellenbach Church, State, and Christian Society 25-37.
51 For early papal variations of the two-power theory, see Humbert Three Books Against Simony (1054-
1058); Peter Damian Letter to King Henry IV (1065); Honorius Augustodunensis Summa Gloria
(c.IIOO). For early imperialistic versions of the two-power theory, see the letter of Henry IV
summoning the German Bishops to the Diet of the Worms (1076); The Anonymous York Tractates
(c.llOO).
52 On the power of the keys, see Tierney Origins of Papal Infallibility 39-45, 82-86, 115-121; Thomas
(continued ...)
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souls of the laity was in their hands. The political exposition of this notion served to establish
church superiority vis-á-vis the state and the superiority of canon law vis-á-vis civil law.
The investiture conflict between Pope Gregory and Henry IV eventually resulted in a
compromise peace embodied in the concordat of Worms (1122), which deprived secular
authority of the power to appoint priests and bishops. The Roman Catholic church of the
twelfth century thereby established itself as a "unified, hierarchical, autonomous, politico-legal
entity"." Because neither side could make good its more extreme claims, a dualism of church
and state persisted in medieval society. This meant that both secular and ecclesiastical
authorities ruled in the same territories and over the same people with overlapping
jurisdictions. Many works on political theory have endeavoured to rationalise this dualism."
The persistent dualism in medieval society is not to be equated with the modem notion of a
"wall of separation" between the church, on the one hand, and the state, religion and politics
on the other. In the Middle Ages, the powers of church and state constantly overlapped, but
as Tierney 55 puts it, "the church remained committed to a limitation of state power in the
sphere of religion". 56
5.2 Law and religion
Inthe eleventh century, one of the implications of Gregory's goal of the freedom of the church
52 (...continued)
Aquinas Summa Theologica Part III Questions 17, 18.
53 Berman and Witte Church and State 492.
54 See Berman and Witte Church and State 494 for a brief exposition of the prevailing theoretical
interpretation inspired by the dual character of church and state in the period from Gregory VII to the
Protestant Reformation. For an overview see Gierke von Political Theories of the Middle Age 7-21.
Also see Ewart Lewis Medieval Political Ideas vol 2 506-538 who discusses the relation between
kingship and priesthood.
55 Tierney Religious Rights 24.
56 By the end of the Middle Ages, the Catholic Kings had again acquired a large measure of control over
church appointments, but in the Reformation era the theory of royal divine right was challenged by
new forms of protest, as will be discussed below.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER2 25
was that the church did not tolerate civil laws which regulated its internal or external affairs.
The church itself thus became a state-like legal entity with a corporate structure resembling
that of the Roman Empire, and canon law effectively governed all levels of government. Itwas
the one source of both legality and morality.
5.3 Religious tolerance
At the end of the tenth and in the early eleventh century, Jewish communities, religion and law
experienced marked growth. 57 But from the twelfth century onwards there was no longer any
question of tolerance towards Jews. The theological response from the Catholic church was
that Jews were outsiders, outcasts from the corpus Christianum by reason oftheir participation
in the killing of Christ, and that they existed on sufferance of the ecclesiastical and political
authorities. 58 This manifested in both canon and civil law restrictions on Jews individually and
collectively. 59 The translation of hatred and intolerance to legal terms was indeed sinister. In
canon law numerous restrictions were enacted, for example, restrictions on interpersonal
relations with Christians, commercial restrictions, limited access to church courts and a variety
of taxes," After 121561 Jews were even made to wear distinctive markings when travelling
57 See Schreiber Jewish Law 281-291 for a discussion of the position of the Jews from 313 AD in the
Western and Eastern Empires up to the tenth century which saw growth and prosperity for Jews until
the crusades which inaugurated a prolonged era of religious persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe.
58 Parkes The Jew in the Medieval Community 102 writes that church legislation regarding the Jews
"turned consistently on two points ... :the prevention of Jewish influence or authority over Christians,
and the relegation of the Jews to the status of social inferiority befitting a deicide people." See
examples of different conciliar and synodical decrees to this effect in Grayzei Church and Jews 315,
319,323,333,335,337.
59 See Parkes The Jew in the Medieval Community 101-123, 128-136 who states: "The three pillars on
which was raised the structure of medieval Jewish society were Roman law, Canon law and Germanic
Custom." He deals in tum with the restrictions on and protections of the Jews in each system.
60 There are also examples of certain protections in canon law (although still within the paradigm of
seeing Jews as perfidious), such as Innocent III An Edict in Favour of the Jews (1199), and in
medieval Spanish law Las siete partidas Title 24 (1265).
61 The Fourth Lateran Council, an international conference of Catholics was summoned by the Pope in
November 1215 and assembled in the Lateran church in Rome. See the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran
Council of 1215 concerning the Jews in Marcus The Jew in the Medieval World 137-141, who under
(continued ...)
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outside their segregated communities." The civil authorities had extensive authority over Jews.
The insulated communities were almost always "chartered". These "charters" regulated the
relationship between the civil authorities and the Jews." The feudal lords could (subject to
canon law only) claim civil taxes or human labour for payment. These charters became
progressively stricter until they were revoked at the end of the twelfth century when the Jews
were expelled. So many of them were killed or died in transit that this period has become
known as the medieval holocaust."
The church's reaction to Islam was more unsystematic because this faith was not well
understood. It was accepted that Muslims were heathens and strangers to Christendom. During
the great crusades, Christians marched to the Middle East to open up the way to Jerusalem to
convert souls and to annihilate the enemies of the church."
Heresy was regarded as the ultimate sin. It was described as a voluntary defiance of God's
word as interpreted by the church in contradistinction to heathens who did not have God's full
word and intentionally rejected it. Heresy was also viewed, legally, as the worst crime. The
61 (...continued)
the auspices of Pope Innocent III adopted many anti-Jewish provisions.
62 See Grayzei Church and Jews 49-59, 72-82.
63 Germanic custom allowed either the king or a local magnate to assume the protection of a "stranger"
(the status acquired by Jews in Germanic communities). Charters were granted by kings, cities, and
clerical and secular princes who lay down varying conditions of Jewish settlement. See Parkes The
Jew in the Medieval Community 101-123. See also for example the Charter of the Jews of the Duchy
of Austria (1244); Charter of John to the Jews of England and Normandy (1201); Charter of Edward
I to the Jews of England (1275).
64 See Riley-Smith First Crusade and Persecution of Jews 51-72. The Oxford Dictionary defmes
crusade as any of several military expeditions made by Western European Christians in the 11th to
13th centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Saracen Muslims. As to the crusaders' motives in
attacking Jews, Riley-Smith writes at 56: "There is evidence for the wish to get supplies by extortion
and looting, for attempts to convert Jews by force and for a desire for vengeance on them." He regards
the last of these as the worst. He further writes at 67: "It is clear that in respect of the desire for
vengeance a significant number of crusaders did not distinguish between Muslims and Jews and could
not understand why, if they were called upon to take up arms against the former, they should not also
persecute the latter."
65 For an overview, see Bray The Mohammaten and Idolatry 89-99.
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restrictions against heretics came largely from fourth century Roman law to which new laws
were added. The inquisition, which was superior to local civil and ecclesiastical courts, was
initially appointed by the papal curia (later even by Bishops) to enquire into heresy. They had
far-reaching powers to subpoena witnesses and to indict blindly. Judges participated actively
in the inquisition by way of interrogation, and torture was an accepted means of inquisition.
5.4 Development of religious freedom in the Middle Ages
Tierney" mentions three aspects of medieval religion that eventually contributed to the
expansion of religious freedom. In the first instance, the medieval church insisted on the
freedom of the church from state control. This, as shown above, resulted in a struggle between
popes and kings over many centuries. Sometimes a pope would claim a theocratic role for
himself, and at other times a king would acquire extensive control over church appointments.
Tierney states:"
Freedom of the church from control by the state is one important part of modem
religious liberty. But it is only part. The libertas ecclesiae that medieval popes
demanded was not freedom of religion for each individual person but the freedom
of the church as an institution to direct its own affairs. It left open the possibility,
all too fully realised from the twelfth century onward, that the church might
organize the persecution of its own dissident members.
Secondly, medieval canonists and moral theologians often upheld the value of the individual
conscience as a guide to proper conduct; the duty to obey one's conscience. Tierney" shows
that "an emphasis on the primacy of the individual conscience was an important element in
later theories of religious rights".
Thirdly, Tierney discusses the idea emerging in medieval times that everyone had natural
rights which would play an important role in subsequent theories of religious freedom. He
66 Religious Rights 22-27.
67 Religious Rights 24.
68 Religious Rights 24-25.
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refers to the fact that little or no consensus exists about the origin of the doctrine or how it
relates to the Christian tradition. However, he writes:"
(t)he origin of the later natural rights theories is to be found in the Christian
jurisprudence of the late twelfth century, especially in the work of the canonists
of that era ...(t)he crucial development was that the new personalism in religious
life, and the everyday concern with rights in secular society, infected the language
of the canonists when they came to discuss the concept of ius naturale, natural
right. Earlier the phrase ius naturale had been understood in an objective sense to
mean natural law or "what is naturally right." But the canonists who wrote around
1200, reading the old texts in the context of their more humanist, more
individual istic culture, added another definition. Intheir writings, ius naturale was
now sometimes defined in a subjective sense as a faculty, power, force, ability
inhering in individual persons. From this initial subjective defmition, the canonists
went on to develop a considerable array of natural rights.
6. The era of the Protestant Reformation
6.1 Church and state
The reformations of the sixteenth century (1510-1540) defied the fundamental ideas
underlying medieval society." These reformations commenced during the fifteenth century
when the authority of the Roman Church was challenged at theological, legal and political
level. The theological authority of the pope was challenged by the conciliar movement", as a
result of which it became increasingly difficult to see canon law as divine. The legal rule of
69 Religious Rights 27.
70 For an overview of the Reformation era, see Harbison Age of Reformation 3-46; Berman and Witte
Church and State 495-498; Ehler Church and State 54-68.
71 Conciliarism concerned the theory of the church councils. Their criticism, in a nutshell, was that
although the pope was the fust member of the council, he was also one of the members. He thus had
to yield to the collectivejudgment of the council. The idea that the office is infallible but the officer
not, was concretised in fifteenth century conciliarism. (It still lies at the heart of modem political
theory.) See Ehler and Morrall Church and State Through the Centuries 96-144 for their chapter on
"The conciliar period and the age of discovery".
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the church was attacked by scripturalists" who maintained that the church should not add laws
to the Bible, that the power of the sword was vested in civil authority and that the church
should confine itself to exercising the power of the Word. The international rule of the church
was undermined by the existence and growth of independent (national) polities, increasing
support for these federal structures by both the civil authorities and the clergy and the
increasing power of civil authorities." The fundamental assumptions of canon law were
challenged by nominalistic" and humanistic 75 philosophies." Thus, there no longer existed one
world (corpus Christianum), one church, one ruler or one law. Yet, notwithstanding the
enormous changes in philosophy after the Protestant Reformation," there was some continuity
in the theories on church-state relations.
72 Scripturalism is also known as Marsilianism, after Marsilius of Padua who wrote Defensor Pacis in
1324.
73 See for example the Statute ofPraemunire enacted by Richard II, King of England (1393) which gave
the crown certain powers vis-á-vis the church, for example the power to appoint local clergy (cf lay
investiture contest of 1130), to impose limitations on taxes, rates, annates and tithes to Rome, and on
all matters outside the technical jurisdiction of the church. Also see the Pragmatic Sanction of
Bourges, enacted by Charles VII, King of France (1438) which, in addition to the three above-
mentioned restrictions, subjected church property to civil taxes and refused immunity from
prosecution on common law crimes (crimes had to be prosecuted in French courts). The Concordat
of Bologna between Pope Leo X and Francis I, King of France (1516) was a cause of protracted
tension between the popes and the French kings. By this law the French monarchy openly reorganised
the Conciliar theory of the Council's superiority over the pontiff and deprived him of the majority of
his rights and revenues in France.
74 Nominalism (writers such as William ofOckham, Sectus, Biel, followed by such authors as Hobbes
and Locke) inspired reformation by criticising and "flattening out" the hierarchy of the "chain of
being" cosmological assumption of canon law.
75 Humanist philosophies in this context advocated a return to the first principles, freeing the church
from its medieval traditions.
76 See Berman and Witte 1989 Southern Californian LR 1573 et seq.
77 The term "Reformation" refers to different movements in the sixteenth century which challenged the
authority, structure and doctrine of the Roman Catholic church. The four broad movements are, the
Lutheran Reformation, the English Reformation, the Anabaptist Reformation and the Calvinist
Reformation.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER2 30
6.1.1 The Evangelical Reformation
Martin Luther (1483-1546) attacked the concept of a visible, hierarchical and corporate church
which exercised both political and legal jurisdiction." Luther replaced the Gregorian (1075)
"two swords" theory with a theory of two kingdoms." Yet, in Luther's Two Kingdoms theory
one can detect certain aspects of the Gelasian (494) two powers theory, namely that there are
two realms, the earthly and the heavenly. According to Gelasius's theory, Christ was the head
of the universal church, but since one human officer could not bear the burden of representing
the power on earth, Christ had divided it into two. God empowered the emperor to govern
temporal affairs as the vice-regent, and the clergy would have to give account of spiritual
matters (including the conduct of the emperor). In Lutheran polities the emperor was replaced
by a Christian prince, so to speak, and the strong advisory role of the church was retained."
(Obviously, the theological premises on which this theory was based, differed substantially
from the earlier Gelasian theory.) According to the Lutheran model, the prince would rule by
virtue of natural law and be restrained by the responsibilities of his own confession. The effect
of Luther's separation of the earthly and heavenly kingdoms was that the civil ruler exercised
all legal and political authority on earth. The implications for church-state relations were that
supreme authority over the church vested in the Christian monarch. Lutheranism established
itself territorially and became the established religion in most parts of Germany and
Scandinavia."
As mentioned above, the theological premise of papal authority was replaced by more
78 See Martin Luther Ninety Five Theses (1517); Martin Luther On the Burning of the Canon Law Books
(1520). For an exposition of the relationship between canon law and civil law during this time and
Luther's attack on canon law, see Witte Law and the Protestants.
79 On the theory of two Kingdoms, and church and state see Witte and Berman 1989 Southern
Californian Law Review 1573 et seq.
80 For Luther's view on the temporal authority, to what extent it should be obeyed and how far secular
authority extends, see Dillenberger Martin Luther 382-392 and Porter Luther 53-57.
81 For the rise of the established church in Germany and Scandinavia, see Bainton Reformation 141-159;
Skinner Foundations of Modern Political Thought vol 2 p 81-90. This stage was unfortunately
followed by religious intolerance. See for example Mueller Church and State in Luther and Calvin
60-72.
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nominalistic theories during the Lutheran Reformation." Luther declared that the true church
was the invisible community of believers or the heavenly kingdom. Roman Catholicism
rejected the notion of an invisible church in favour of the visible institutional structure and a
priesthood which mediated grace to the baptised. However, Luther maintained that whilst the
church on earth assumed a visible form, it retained its divine government and that, in the
earthly church, everyone was priest, prophet and king. The consequence of his theory was that
the sacraments and the mediatory role of the clergy became superfluous since everybody had
direct access to God. In terms of this theory, canon law was likewise unnecessary since the
legal view of the church as an independent legal and political power was replaced by the
simpler notion of the church as a community of saints with the Bible as their only source of
authority (sola Scriptura),"
6.1.2 The English Reformation
The English Reformation of the sixteenth century, as a result of which the Anglican church
was established, followed about a decade after the Lutheran or Evangelical Reformation in
Germany." Anglicanism established itself nationally. King Henry VIII broke all contact
between the church in England and the pope by passing a series of reform statutes." His aim
82 For the theological and political premises of Lutheran legal philosophy, see Witte and Berman 1989
Southern Californian LR 1573.
83 See Pelikan Spirit versus Structure 5-31.
84 It is analogue to the Lutheran reformation in its defiance against papal authority, which resulted in a
truncation of church jurisdiction and a vesting of great power in civil authority and in its viciousness
against religious outsiders. There are however more differences: Lutheranism began as a theological
movement and developed into politics, while with Anglicanism the opposite is true; Lutheranism
resulted in a complete review of Catholicism, while Anglicanism retained much of that doctrine; and,
Lutheranism rejected the ecclesiastical structure of the Catholic church, while Anglicanism retained
the whole structure. For an overview see Lecler Toleration and Reformation vol2 329-379; Berman
and Witte Church and State 497.
85 Proclamation Against Erroneous Books (1530), Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533), Act Concerning
Ecclesiastical Appointments andAbsolute Restraint on Annates (1534),Act Concerning Peter's Pence
and Dispensations (1534), Supremacy Act (1534) and Statute of Six Articles (1539). See the acts in
Stephenson and Marcham Sources of English Constitutional History 387-388,304-312. See Lecler
Toleration and Reformation 329-379 for an exposition of the Anglican schism (1534-1547).
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was to wipe out papal power in his kingdom, to replace it with royal authority and to
completely subject the church in England to the state." In doing so, the church in England
became the church ofEngland, with the king of England as its supreme head." In the Anglican
Reformation one thus finds a resurrection of the imperialist versions of the two swords
theory." Henry VIII's caesaropapisrn" was entrenched in civil laws, which established
Anglicanism and introduced radical changes in religious doctrine, liturgy and morality."
However, English Protestants kept the offices of pastor and prince distinct. The pastor's office
was to preach God's word and administer the sacraments, and it was the prince's duty to rule
the church. Mary Tudor (1553-1558) tried to restore Roman Catholicism by repealing Henry's
laws and killing dissenters," but Elizabeth I (1558-1603) re-established the Church of
England." After the Elizabethan era certain doctrinal shifts took place, but until today the
English monarch is the head of the Anglican church.
6.1.3 The Anabaptist movement
Anabaptism was a kind of pan-western movement, not confined to one geographical area, and
it consisted of different groups (Mennonites, Amish, Hutterites and Baptists) who had certain
principles in common, namely adherence to the early apostolic church, the principles of the
86 Ehler Church and State states 57: "The Anglican Reformation did not originate in any mass movement
or popular passions stirred up by forceful preachers. It sprang from the personal passions of the
autocratic ruler of England, Henry VIII, and consolidated itself owing to a no less personal,
psychological complex of his equally notorious daughter, Elizabeth I."
87 For Anglican theories of church and state see Sommerville Politics and Ideology 203-216.
88 See Hughes Theology of English Reformers 235-253.
89 Such complete subordination of church government to the supreme secular ruler later became known
as "Erastian ".
90 Ehler Church and State 58 states: "As a result, the church of England became a mere department of
state administration, to a degree which had never been reached before in any other instance of
Christian caesaro-papism."
91 First Statute of Repeal (1553), Act Concerning Regal Power (1554), Second Statute of Repeal (1555).
See these acts in Stephenson and Marcham Sources of English Constitutional History 317-329.
92 Act of Supremacy (1559), Act of Uniformity (1559), Act Prohibiting Bulls from Rome (1571). See
these acts in Stephenson and Marcham Sources of English Constitutional History 384-387,344-353.
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Schleitheim Confession" and principles of voluntarism and separatism." The Anabaptists
believed that the real church was constituted by a separate group who underwent true baptism
for the first time. They did not consider the members of the state church as true Christians.
They thought that the church had to be a voluntary group of Christians, and that it should be
an international organisation. The intrusion of the state in the internal life of the church as an
organisation could therefore not be tolerated." The Anabaptists, like Luther, used a two
kingdom theory as the theoretical basis of their theology. The grounds for a separated church
were set out in their Schletheim Confession of Faith (1527). They believed that all men
belonged to only one of two kingdoms, namely that of God and that of the devil." According
to Luther's theory, the dialectic between church and state implied that "both church and state
are the battle grounds of God and Satan"." The Anabaptists altered Luther's theory by placing
the church at the centre of God's activity, and assigning the rest of the world to control by the
demonic.
The Anabaptists viewed themselves as disciples of Christ, and argued for the unconditional
acceptance of certain key elements of the New Testament ethic. This inevitably resulted in
tension with the state. The Anabaptists defined the church as a community of regenerated
believers who had voluntarily entered the church by baptism upon confession of faith. The
93 For the Schleitheim Confession, see Lumpkin Baptist Confessions of Faith 25-30, and for a discussion
thereof see Friedman Theology of Anabaptism 38-47.
94 Anabaptists internally adhered to the principles of self-government, discipleship, fellowship and
simplicity. Externally, they related to the world by withdrawing (asceticism), obedience,
nonresistance, hospitality and mission.
95 For the view of Anabaptist writers such as Hubmaier, Sattler, Schiemer, Rothmann, Stadler, Simons,
Riedeman, Philips, Denck and Hutter on the church and on government, see Klaassen Anabaptism in
Outline 101-115,244-257.
96 The Schleitheim Confession of Faith (1527) states in its third article: "All those who have fellowship
with the dead works of darkness have no part in the light. All who follow the devil and the world have
no part with those who are called unto God out of the world. All who lie in evil have no part in the
good." And in the fourth article: "For truly, all creatures are but in two classes, good and bad,
believing and unbelieving, darkness and light, the world and those who have come out of the world,
God's temple and idols, Christ and Belial, and none can have part with the other."
97 See Sanders Protestant Concepts 75-96.
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visible state church (accepted by both Roman Catholics and Protestants), was rejected as being
no church at all."
6.1.4 The Calvinist Reformation
In the Calvinist reformation" certain aspects of Luther's theology were affirmed. However, the
Calvinists argued that the visible church was not subordinate to the state in any way; the
church was an institution equal to and independent of the state. Some aspects of Pope
Boniface's version of the two swords theory can be found in Calvinism. The theocratic claims
of the papacy which culminated in Boniface's "mature" version of the two swords theory as
incorporated in the Bull, Unam Sanctam (1302)100 during the High Middle Ages were (inter
alia) that every human creature had to be subject to the Roman pontiff.'?' Calvin maintained
that the church, a corporate identity, had its own "sword", separate from that of the state, and
had received its authority from God. It could be stated that, with regard to the relationship
between church and state, Calvin started out with Luther's (horizontal) two kingdoms theory
and later (after 1541) superimposed a form of (vertical) two swords theory on it.102
Theoretically, Calvinism implied the institutional separation of church and state (two powers),
but in practice it came close to the two swords theory and a sort of theocracy.
98 See Friedman Theology of Anabaptism Part II 38-47.
99 For an overview, see Bainton Reformation 110-122, and for the plight of French Huguenots 160-172.
100 For the Bull "Unam Sanctam" of Pope Boniface on the plenitude of the papal power (18 November
1302), see Sidney and Morrall Church and State through the Centuries 89-92.
101 Ehler Church and State 75 sums up the three principal points of Boniface VIII's formulation in the
Bull Unam Sanctam as follows: "1. all power, spiritual and temporal, belongs in principle to the
Church (the theory of the two swords); 2. while she herself keeps the direct exercise of the first, she
leaves that of the second to the kings; 3. the Pope has a general right of supervision, jurisdiction, and
punishment over the secular power, including the right to depose kings." The third point was evidently
not present in Calvin's theory.
102 See Calvin Institutes Book IV eh 1,6,8, 10, Il and 20. For a discussion of Calvin's view on church
and state and religious freedom, see Witte 1995 Calvin Theological Journall-27.
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6.2 Development of principles of religious freedom
In the Protestant era certain principles of religious freedom were inspired by the above-
mentioned new theologies and concomitant theories on church-state relations.
6.2.1 Luther
Luther triggered the transformation of the law by introducing a nominalistic, egalitarian
theology in Germany. This was reflected in the law. All the special rights, privileges and
immunities of the clergy were withdrawn. The distinction between clergy and laity
disappeared, and was translated into a denial of the church's legal and political authority at the
executive, legislative and judicial levels. Luther taught that the state, an institution of the
earthly kingdom with no divine qualities, ruled by virtue of natural law, which found its
sources in reason, conscience and the Bible. It has been stated that: 103
The Protestant Reformation inaugurated by Martin Luther in 1517 was, at its core,
a fight for religious liberty - liberty of the individual conscience from intrusive
canon laws and clerical controls, liberty of political officials from ecclesiastical
power and privilege, liberty of the local clergy from central papal rule and
oppressive princely controls.
6.2.2 Elizabethan England
A system of legal restraints was introduced in Elizabethan England. First, certain traditional
clerical functions were restored to the clergy in their capacity as a semiautonomous religious
department of the state. This led to the granting of special privileges and exemptions to the
body of clergy. The civil law expression of this limited (corporate) religious freedom later
formed the basis for the extension of these group (corporate) rights to all religious groups.
Secondly, parliament created ecclesiastical courts and, more specifically, the Court of High
Commission, with the responsibility to review or initiate changes in doctrine or liturgy.'?'
103 Witte 1995 Calvin TheologicalJournaI24-25.
104 See Elton Tudor Constitution 218-226.
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Thirdly, the medieval doctrine of papal infallibility, according to which the papal council could
nullify papal decrees if they conflicted with tradition, was introduced into common law in the
period 1590-1600. The Catholic doctrine of papal infallibility, together with the English
practice of the Court of High Commission, introduced a system of checks and balances in
terms of which the ecclesiastical judge could weigh new ecclesiastical laws against precedent
and equity and invalidate them. This system was initially used as a corporate remedy of the
church but later developed into the doctrine of judicial review.
6.2.3 Anabaptists
The Anabaptists contributed substantially to the idea of religious freedom. Their resurrection
of the ancient Judaic idea of a church completely separate from the world introduced the
notions of the separation of church and state and of state and religion and voluntarism. The
notion of a "wall of separation" between the church and the world has its origin in Anabaptism
writings, but it embodied the idea of protecting the church from the state, not the state from
intrusions of the church. Sanders'" maintains that, since the Anabaptists' understanding of the
separation of church and state was the result of their controversy with Zwingli over the
freedom of the church within the political order, they did not necessarily anticipate a formal
"disestablishment" of religion by law. It is nevertheless clear that they rejected the state
religion of their time and, as is evident from the writings of Denck and Menno Simons,'?'
anticipated a pluralistic society. The Anabaptist constitutional ideas about the separation of
church and state, freedom of conscience and the "wall of separation" between church and state
are at the heart of the present American constitutional dispensation of church and state.
The Anabaptists were singled out by the civil authorities of sixteenth century Europe for a fate
of imprisonment, torture, banishment, hanging and drowning.'?' There were some instances
105 Protestant Concepts 79, 91.
106 See excerpts from their writings in Klaassen Anabaptism in Outline 290-301.
107 See Kreider Anabaptists and the State 180-193 who discusses the reasons for this by looking at the
state's view of the Anabaptists and the Anabaptists' view of the state. On the prosecution of the
Anabaptists see Klaassen Anabaptism in Outline 290-301 and Estep Anabaptist Beginnings 47-53.
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of de facto toleration as a result of the good work of the Anabaptists in communities.!" but
in general they were viciously persecuted.?" Kreider'" advances as possible reasons for this
persecution that the authorities believed that the Anabaptists were "dismembering the church,
the very body of Christ, and thus shattering the ideal of a unified civil and religious
community." The authorities furthermore feared that the Anabaptists were "undermining the
authority and prestige of the magistracy" and that their "civil disobedience would produce an
epidemic of contempt for governmental authority." They also feared the missionary expansion
of the movement. This harsh persecution, however, gave rise to inspired appeals for religious
toleration and freedom by Anabaptist writers in a century of intolerance. I II Cogent arguments
for and sophisticated defences of religious freedom contributed richly to the development of
religious rights. It has been stated that.!"
This despised group thus became the first Protestant advocates of a separation of
church and state, not on rational, pragmatic, or political grounds, but as a
consequence of a theology of discipleship and the church as a community of
disciples.
6.2.4 Calvin
Calvin also contributed substantially to the development of ideas on religious freedom.'!'
108 Many of the civil authorities were willing to work out a modus vivendi with the Anabaptists and
offered them immunity from arrest if they would only remain quiet, attend church, baptise their
children, and cease to evangelise overtly.
109 Sanders Protestant Concepts 75.
110Kreider Anabaptists and the State 181.
111 See excerpts from Anabaptist writings on religious toleration in Klaassen Anabaptism in Outline 290-
301.
112 Sanders Protestant Concepts 79.
113 Calvin's thoughts are reflected in various confessions offaith, for example article 36 of the Confessio
Belgico. This article expresses belief in a theocracy, in terms of which the state recognises one
Christian Church and roots out all other "false" doctrines by means of the sword. This view had to
be reinterpreted in the twentieth century in view of such principles such as the concept of religious
freedom.
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Although he did not draw a clear distinction between religious and political freedom, his views
formed the basis for the institutional separation of church and state.!"
Witte'" highlights the fact that a perennial theme in Calvin's writings is that religious freedom
must always be exercised with becoming moderation. Calvin believed that freedom and law,
freedom and order, and toleration and discipline were all meant to function together and to
constantly balance one another to achieve the ideal of "moderate religious freedom". Witte
illustrates clearly why Calvin "is a controversial candidate for the honour roll of religious
liberty in the West", but maintains that neither wholly negative nor wholly positive
interpretations of Calvin in this context do justice to him.!" He concludes that Calvin's
political ideas "were sufficiently protean and provocative to inspire a wide range of both
totalitarian and democratic tendencies":
Calvin's most original and lasting contribution to the Western tradition of religious
liberty lay in his restructuring of the liberty and order of the church. Calvin was
able to find a way between both the Erastian tendencies of Lutherans and
Anglicans that subordinated the church to the state, and the ascetic tendencies of
Anabaptists and radicals that withdrew the church from the state and society. He
did so by combining ingeniously within his ecclesiology the principles of the rule
oflaw, democracy, and liberty and giving the church a moral responsibility within
the entire community .... This integrated theory of the church and state had obvious
114 A number of Calvinistic groups were formed internationally, in Switzerland, France, the Netherlands,
Scotland, England and New England where they were referred to as Calvinists, Huguenots, Pietists,
Presbyterians, Puritans and Congregationalists respectively. At the end of the sixteenth century, all
these groups belonged to one basic movement inspired by Calvin. Later, these forms took on an
independent development.
I15 1995 Calvin Theological Journal3.
116 Witte 1995 Calvin Theological Journal2 writes: "It is easy to select from these scattered sentiments
quotations to support both positive and negative impressions of Calvin. Calvin often wrote with a
strong rhetorical flourish, and in unguarded moments or on particularly controversial subjects, he was
not above the bombast and hyperbole that typified sixteenth century humanist literature. Calvin's
champions can find many strong statements in his writings on separation of church and state, liberty
of conscience, free exercise of religion, and make Calvin out to be the father of modem religious
liberty and political democracy. Calvin's critics can assemble an equally high pile of quotations on
religious bigotry, chauvinism, prejudice, repression, and officiousness, and make Calvin out to be a
rigid and unbending theocrat."
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implications for the theory of the state .... What Calvin adumbrated, his followers
elaborated. In the course of the next two centuries, European and American
Calvinists wove Calvin's core insights into the nature of corporate rule into a
robust constitutional theory of republican government, which rested on the pillars
of rule of law, democratic processes, and individual liberty.
7. The religious wars of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe
7.1 Divergence in religion and law
Very little unity existed in Europe by 1600. Both religion and law had become seriously
fragmented. After the Reformation there were a number of rival religious groups and, as some
groups became more fundamentalist, intolerance was spreading. The result was religious
warfare. After the Council of Trent in 1545 which tried to imbue the old institutions with a
fresh dynamism, the Roman Catholics ardently tried to recover the support they had lost, and
the Protestants were no less eager to gain new ground. Ehler'" emphasises that, as a
consequence, civil wars inside many European countries were characterised by extreme
fierceness and cruelty.
The notion of common law was also lost. Formerly, canon law with all its branches covered
nearly all transactions, but by 1600 the Catholic church no longer had universal jurisdiction
and the universal common law (or ius commune) had disappeared. In southern Europe, an
attempt to find a public international law which all people could customarily obey and which
would unite the Catholic polities resulted in a return to canon law. This did not happen in
northern Europe. Treaties and alliances which had been concluded were constantly breached,
and civil and religious wars raged.!"
7.2 Germany
In Germany, where Luther had begun his Evangelical reformation with a call for the freedom
of the church and the state and with advocating religious freedom, his writings after 1530
117 See the chapter on "The Impact of the Enlightened Monarchs" by Ehler Church and State 69-85.
118 For an overview, see Dunn Religious Wars 32-40,82-92, 164-178.
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showed evidence of increasing intolerance towards "dissenters", whether they were
Anabaptists, Zwinglians or Calvinists.!" The same applied to the Jews.120 Luther had initially
been very solicitous towards the Jews and had accommodated them in his theology, 121 but three
years before his death in 1543, his changed attitude culminated in radical antisemitist
propaganda, evidencing hatred and contempt.!" By 1550 the openness and toleration of the
Germany which used to be a haven for dissenters, had changed drastically.
7.3 England
In Elizabethan England, all dissent was looked upon with hostility by the state, whether it
emanated from Catholics, from other reformation movements or consisted merely of
differences in worship within the Anglican church itself. Catholics were the worst off and had
to contend with draconic laws intended to destroy Catholicism throughout the kingdom. They
were branded as heretics, convicted of high treason, coerced not only to attend Anglican
services, but also to receive communion there. In 1585 all subjects were ordered to denounce
Jesuit and other missionaries, and the death penalty could be incurred for persuading someone
to return to the Roman Catholic Church. In the 1585 Act,123Catholic priests were ordered to
leave the kingdom within forty days. In 1593124 it was laid down that no Catholic over sixteen
was allowed to travel more than five miles from his home. It has been stated that "[t]he
measures taken since 1559, as a whole, set up against Catholics in England a legislative
119 See Mi.iller Church and State in Luther and Calvin 60-72 for an exposition of Luther's changing
attitude towards dissenters and Jews.
120 See Marcus The Jew in the Medieval World 165-169 on Martin Luther and the Jews 1523-1543.
121 Luther That Jesus Christ was a Born Jew (1523).
122 Of which Concerning the Jews and Their Lies (1543) is the most notorious. It starts with the phrase:
"What then shall we do with this damned, rejected race of Jews? Since they live among us and we
know about their lying and blasphemy and cursing, we can not tolerate them if we do not wish to share
in their lies, curses and blasphemy."
123 Act against Jesuits and Seminarists (1585).
124 Act against Papists (1593).
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apparatus of surpassing perfection." 125
The Anabaptists were also fiercely prosecuted. Puritans, and especially Separatists,
experienced bloody persecutions, vexations by the police, and imprisonment, though to a lesser
degree than the Catholics. The Puritans, who were suppressed by the queen in 1577,126 wished
to eliminate from Anglican usage everything that was not based on Scripture, in other words,
they wanted the church reformed in the Calvinist sense, and saw the church and the state as
two distinct organisms.!" Separatist leaders, who sought to found Christian communities that
depended on neither the church nor the government;" were imprisoned. After 1590, the
position of dissenters became even more precarious when new acts were passed in 1593
against both the "Papists" and the "Puritans" .129 According to these Acts, any person who
resisted royal authority, misled others or took part in illicit religious services, was liable to
imprisonment, and afterwards would be given the choice of either leaving the country or
conforming to the official religion. As Lecler'" puts it: "Elizabeth's reign was, even with regard
to Protestant dissenters, a period of unremitting intolerance."
7.4 France
During the second half of the sixteenth century, France was virtually tom apart by forty years
125 See Leder To/eration and Reformation 380-395.
126 All clergy had to subscribe to the following three points" (1) The queen possesses supreme power in
the Church of England; (2) The Book of Common Prayer contains nothing that is contrary to the
Word of God; (3) The whole of the Thirty-nine Articles is in accordance with the Word of God." See
Lecler Toleration and Reformation 380-395.
127 Before 1570 their attack focused mainly on liturgical ceremonies, but after that it was directed to the
hierarchical organisation of the church and they demanded the equality of all its ministers. Thus began
Presbyterianism.
128 Separatists, like the Anabaptists, saw the church as a voluntary association of believers in a sinful
world. Congregationalism flowed from this movement.
129 Act against Sectaries (1593) and Act against Papists (1593).
130 See Leder Toleration and Reformation 380-395.
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of destructive religious war.!" Jesuits and others who opposed the royal domination of the
Roman Catholic church were outlawed. The French Huguenots (French Calvinists) in
particular.!" who denounced the theology of the Roman Catholic church and the monarchy,
were harshly persecuted. Denounced as heretics, their communities were condemned as illegal
associations, their leaders were executed and their literature was banned. The Calvinists
retaliated by attacking convents and desecrating Catholic churches, smashing the holy relics
and statuary. In 1561 Catherine de Medici tried to reduce the tension by formulating a policy
oftoleration and proclaiming the Edict of January 1562, which granted the Huguenots freedom
of public worship beyond walled towns and of private assembly within. But, an incident when
the Duke of Guise killed 63 Huguenots which he found worshipping in a barn, set off the wars
again. After ten years of inconclusive war, at least 3000 Huguenots (some contemporaries
estimate it at 10 000) were killed on 24 August 1572 during the St Bartholomew massacre in
Paris.
8. Sixteenth and seventeenth century peace treaties which protected religious
rights
After the religious wars in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, several
treaties followed which incorporated clauses that guaranteed certain rights to groups with a
religion different from that of the majority. Among the most important were the Peace of
Augsburg (1555), the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).133
8.1 Peace of Augsburg
131 For a discussion of the fight for recognition of the Calvinistic faith, see Bainton Reformation 160-172;
Dunn Religious Wars 32-40.
132 In 1559 the Huguenots held their first national synod in France.
133 Also see the Treaty of Oliva (1660) in favour of the Roman Catholics in Livonia, ceded by Poland
to Sweden; the Treaty ofNimuguen (1~78) between France and Spain; the Treaty of Ryswiek (1697)
protecting Catholics in territories ceded by France to Holland; and the Treaty of Paris (1763) between
France, Spain and Great Britain, in favour of Roman Catholics in Canadian territories ceded by
France. See Lerner Group Rights and Dicrimination 7.
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The conflict between Lutherans and Catholics in Germany was eventually resolved at the
Peace of Augsburg in 1555,134 according to the principle cuius regia eius religio. This
principle meant that each prince could establish Catholicism or Lutheranism within his own
territory and, in the imperial cities, Lutheranism and Catholicism were to have equal rights'"
and dissenters had to be permitted to emigrate. However, non-Lutheran Protestants were totally
banned from Germany.
The Peace of Augsburg was thus one of the first documents in which religious rights were
protected in that Catholic and Protestant groups were granted limited rights to establish their
faiths. The first "individual" religious right which was extended at this occasion was the
minimum religious right, the right to emigrate or leave the group (to vote with your feet).
8.2 Edict of Nantes
In 1598 Henry IV (the King of France) and Philip II (the Emperor of Spain) finally made
peace. The Edict of Nantes (1598)136 ended the war in France between Roman Catholics and
Huguenots. This treaty espoused important principles of religious freedom. Although the edict
established Gallican Catholicism (Gallicanism) as the official religion, Huguenots who lived
outside Paris were granted religious freedom. Those Huguenots who lived in Paris were only
permitted to worship privately, and public worship continued to be banned.'" This treaty was
a unique document in its time in that it was the first document to grant religious freedom in
this manner.
8.3 The Peace of Westphalia
134 The Religious Peace of Augsburg was entered into on 25 September 1555. See Ehler and Morrall
Church and State through the Centuries 164-173.
135 Berman and Witte Church and State 496.
136 The Edict of Nantes was enacted by Henry IV, King of France, on 13 April 1598. See Ehler and
Morrall Church and State through the Centuries 183-188. It remained in force for 87 years, until 1685
when Louis XIV eliminated the threat of ecclesiastical pluralism by revoking the Edict of Nantes with
the Edict of Fontainebleau.
137 Berman and Witte Church and State 498.
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At the tum of the sixteenth century the division in Western Christendom had crystallised into
a defacto Protestant North and a Catholic South. But, as Ehler'" states, "the dynamism ofthe
two hostile religious ideologies however, was not content with any de facto crystallization"
and in 1618 the 30 years war broke out and developed into a major international conflict.!"
After these bitter religious wars between Roman Catholics and Protestants in the latter part of
the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, the peace treaty of
Westphalia was concluded in 1648.140 This treaty is of particular importance to religious rights
issues since it contained important principles of religious freedom.": At Westphalia the
principles of the Peace of Augsburg and the Edict of Nantes were confirmed by stating that
each ruler could establish Catholicism, Lutheranism or Calvinism in his domain.'? The
principle of cuius regia eius religio, coined by the Peace of Augsburg, became a general rule
practically all over Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nonestablished groups,
though forbidden to worship in public, were granted permission to exercise their religion
privately. They were to suffer no further violations of their political and civil rights.
Despite severe papal condemnation of the treaty, it remained the fundamental
religious law of Europe until the nineteenth century. lts policy of establishment
and toleration was gradually accepted by most Protestant and Catholic leaders.'?
8.4 Church-state relations and religious freedom after the Peace of Westphalia
138 Ehler Church and State 70.
139 See the chapter on the thirty years' war (1618-1648) by Dunn Age of Religious Wars 82-92.
140 For the religious clauses of the Peace of Westphalia (Treaty of Osnabrock of 24 October 1648), see
Ehler and Morrall Church and State through the Centuries 193-198.
141 Ehler Church and State 71 puts it as follows: "...by the peace treaties of Westphalia the disruption of
Christianity [by the Reformation] was finally recognized and legalized in International Law, and its
recognition was put on contractual basis between the signatory powers."
142 In 1685 Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and Peace of Westphalia and discarded the principles
enunciated therein in the Edict of Fontainebleau. See Ehler and Morrall Church and State through
the Centuries 208-213.
143 Berman and Witte Church and State 499.
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The patterns of church-state relations and religious freedom that existed in seventeenth-century
Europe provided the temp let for Western church-state relations for centuries to corne.!" In
addition, seventeenth century Europe expanded to include various colonies, and transplanted
the European theories of church and state to these new territories.
In Lutheran polities (in Germany and Scandinavia) church and state were separated and all
legal and political authority vested in the state. The principle of cuius regia dus religio was
strictly applied, allowing the right of emigration to religious dissenters, but only a few
limitations were imposed on the power of the ruler. The princely or city council ruled over
doctrine and liturgy and had title interests in church property. This absolute control of the ruler
was sometimes benevolent, but sometimes not. There also existed pockets of strong anti-
Semitism, and intolerance against Anabaptists.
In England the Anglican church was established as the official religion. The church was equal
to the commonwealth and there was, subject to certain limitations, a conflation of church and
state. The monarch was the supreme head of the church and the commonwealth. By 1600 there
were equal numbers of conformists and nonconformists, but increased repression of
Protestants during the early seventeenth century led to the 1649 establishment of a Puritan
Commonwealth, which tolerated both Protestants and Anglicans (but not Roman Catholics)
without establishing Anglicanism. In 1660 Anglicanism was re-established as the state
religion. Growing tolerance of Protestants culminated in the Bill of Rights and the Toleration
Act of 1689. Parliament granted freedom of association and worship to all Protestants and
removed many legal and political restrictions on Protestants, but Roman Catholicism remained
to be proscribed.
In Gallican France there existed a separation of and rivalry between church and state.
According to an abridged version of the two-swords theory, canon law was subject to the
papacy and civil law subject to the royalty. The national establishment of Gallicanism initially
tolerated Calvinism, but gradually abandoned the toleration policies of Nantes and Westphalia.
Strong antipapal sentiments also existed within the Gallican party. Supported by theories of
144 See Hyma Christianity and Politics 221-262.
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absolute monarchy (expounded for example by Jean Bodin), the French monarchs organised
a national Catholic church. Louis XIV restricted the freedoms of Huguenots and other
dissenters (Protestant or Catholic) and imposed harsh taxes on them. In 1685 the growing
intolerance of Calvinists culminated in the Edict of Fontainebleau in which Louis XIV
repealed the Edict of Nantes. He ordered all Protestant churches and schools to be destroyed,
proscribed all theologies that deviated from official Gallicanism and banished all dissenting
clerics from France.'?
In what was later known as the Netherlands, the greatest degree of religious freedom existed.!"
Hyma'" remarks:
This republic had in the midst of the terrific conflict acquired the finest colonial
empire in the world, the largest merchant marine, the bulk of the carrying trade in
European waters, a policy of religious freedom (with certain limitations in our
eyes, but not in the eyes of contemporaries), an excellent system of representative
government, and such high social and intellectual standards that all other nations
were astonished.!"
The Netherlands had formerly been a feudal colony of the Holy Roman Empire, bound by
charters for rights, duties and taxes. As the distant sovereign became more greedy and
145 Berman and Witte Church and State 499.
146 See Hyma Christianity and Politics 234-262 who discusses the ideas of freedom, representative
government and democracy in Dutch writings of the sixteenth century (for example by Emmius and
especially, in the political theories of the Dutch Baptists) and their influence on, for example
Althusius ("who for all practical intent formed a part of Dutch Calvinism from 1604-1634") and
Grotius. He maintains that such authorities as Hooker, Milton, Hobbes and Locke, in developing their
ideas on democracy and political institutions, "drew heavily upon sources beyond the sea." Although
a great degree of religious freedom existed in the Netherlands, it has to be kept in mind that the
principle of theocracy still existed, as expressed in the Confessio Belgico, which principle was often
abused by the state.
147 Hyma Christianity and Politics 224.
148 In this respect, note can be taken of the writings ofUbbo Emmius (Liberates), the foremost historian
and authority in political science in the northern provinces of the Dutch Republic in the second half
of the sixteenth century, which account for the enthusiasm for civic freedom in the northern
Netherlands.
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extracted more taxes and manpower, the people in Holland started reacting against the Spanish
Emperor. As the Emperor, Philip II, heard about the reformist literature, he sent the duke of
Alva with Inquisitorial powers to put in place the bloodiest inquisition in Western Europe.
William the Silent (Prince of Orange) resolved to aid the oppressed heretics in the
Netherlands. Under his influence, the Dutch organised resistance and the seven northern
provinces formed the Union of Utrecht in 1579, creating a confederated government. The
Union of Utrecht document is one of the most powerful instruments in history which
contributed to the establishment of the present conception of religious toleration. Itwas drawn
up in an age of almost universal religious intolerance and of growing absolutism. Article XIII
of the Union of Utrecht document declared:
...every private citizen must remain free in his religion, and that no one may be
brought before inquisitors to be examined as to his religious beliefs, in accordance
with the terms of the Pacification of Ghent.
The Union of Utrecht went much further than the Pacification of Ghent'" in extending
complete freedom of worship and religious belief to the people (although some preference was
given to Calvinism.) This constitutional document remained in force for almost 150 years.
By the end of the seventeenth century reasonably adequate theories of religious rights existed
which included some degree of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion, religious
pluralism, equality and separation of church and state.
9. Constitutional entrenchments of religious freedom in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provisions in favour of religious minorities
were incorporated in the domestic law of some countries. This protection of religious groups
was to a large extent the result of the protection afforded to religious groups in the
149 William the Silent drafted the Pacification of Ghent in 1576.
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international treaties mentioned above. ISO
In addition, philosophers of the enlightenment in the eighteenth century stressed the autonomy
of the individual. They also advocated the religious neutrality of government and (civil) law.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many countries were influenced by the
revolutionary democratic ideas of the French Revolution. Tierney'" states that:
In this new climate of opinion, when persecution was increasingly condemned as
contrary to the teachings of Jesus, all the old medieval strands of argument about
the freedom of the church from secular control, the overriding authority of
conscience, and the existence of natural rights were taken up again and woven into
new patterns.
He states that the freedom of the church from secular control had come to mean that the civil
magistrate had no right to interfere with any person's choice of religion. The authority of the
individual conscience developed into freedom of conscience as of right and led to a degree of
religious toleration.
The final outcome of all the new argument about conscience was a fusion of the
new ideal of religious liberty with the older doctrine of natural rights. Freedom of
conscience came to be seen as one of the natural rights of man, guaranteed by
natural law and discernable by the "light of reason" or "light of nature". 152
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a number of (individual) religious
rights were entrenched in various national constitutions.!" The United States Constitution of
1791 explicitly guaranteed religious freedom and forbade state support of religion. It is stated
in the first amendment: "Government shall make no law establishing any religion or curtailing
the free exercise thereof." In France the concordat between Pope Pius VII and the First French
Republic in 1801 guaranteed the free exercise of religious beliefs. However, the French
150 See Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 7.
151 Religious Rights 39. Also see the discussion at 36-42.
152 Tierney Religious Rights 42.
153 See the overview by Berman and Witte Church and State 500-502.
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Catholic church formally remained the established church of France throughout the nineteenth
century. In 1905, the Law of Separation of Church and State removed the church from state
control and support. In Belgium the 1831 constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and
restricted state support thereof. However, the state continued to remunerate the clergy of the
Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist churches. In Prussia the constitution of 1850 alleviated the
strict state control of churches imposed by Friedrich II. In the Austro-Hungarian empire,
concordats between the pope and the emperor reduced the state control of churches. In Italy
the Italian Law of Guarantees of 1871 guaranteed religious freedom for all citizens and the
autonomy of the church in spiritual matters and ecclesiastical education and appointments. In
England the Anglican church remained the established church. The Catholic Emancipation Act
of 1829 permitted Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament, and the Universities Act of 1820
opened public schools and universities to Catholics. By the end of the nineteenth century, all
remaining instances of legal discrimination against Catholics had been removed.
Today, most Western counties have adopted laws, policies or guarantees in their constitutions
to protect a plurality of religious groups and beliefs.!" Most Western countries have also
adopted legal measures to insulate the state from the church.!"
10. Religious rights and freedoms in international human rights law'"
10.1 Group rights versus individual rights
As we have seen above, "international human rights law actually began, rather timidly, as an
attempt to protect discriminated groups, particularly religious minorities, through initial
154 Berman and Witte Church and State 502 however point out that "constitutional battles between
church and state continue to be waged in some countries over such matters as government taxation
of churches, government support of religious schools, and the giving of religious instruction in state-
supported schools."
155 Establishment policies are still in effect to some extent in the United Kingdom, France, Scandinavia,
Germany and Austria in the form of financial support and special protection.
156 Extensive commentaries exist on the international protection of freedom of religion or belief. For a
detailed discussion of (and references to) international human rights standards and activities
addressing freedom of religion or belief, see Tahzib Freedom of Religion or Belief 63-247.
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emphasis on tolerance more than on rights" .157 In 1815, the historic Congress of Vienna
expanded the protection of minority groups beyond the purely religious field, 158 thus reflecting
the influence of the new egalitarian principles.!" But it was only after the First World War that
a minorities protection system was established. 160 After the Second World War'" the emphasis
in the protection of international human rights shifted from group protection to the almost
exclusive protection of individual rights and freedoms.!" The new approach was that,
whenever a person's rights were violated or restricted because of a group characteristic (race,
religion, ethnic or national origin or culture), the matter could be resolved by protecting the
rights of the individual, on a purely individual basis, mainly through the principle of
nondiscrimination. Such was the method followed by the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Proposals for inclusion of an article on national minorities in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights were rejected.
10.2 International human rights instruments
157 Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 7. Also see Alessandra Luini del Russo International
Protection of Human Rights (1971) 14, as quoted by Lerner Group Rights 7 who states that, initially
"not the individual, but groups of individuals, minorities, within one political community appeared
to the conscience of civilized nations as in need of protection at the international level" .
158 It could be stated that the protection of individual international human rights followed in the wake of
religious group rights.
159 Thereafter, for example, the Treaty of Berlin (1878) contained provisions in favour of Turks, Greeks
and Romanians under Bulgarian rule, and the International Convention of Constantinople (1881)
protected Muslims in territories that came under Greek control.
160 See Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 11-19 for a discussion of the minorities treaties system
established between the World Wars.
161 See Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 14-16 for the position after World War II.
162 This could lead one to conclude that individual protection is a full and systematic form of protection,
which presupposes and includes corporate protection. But, the international community realised that
the nondiscrimination rule and the individual-centred approach alone were not enough to protect the
rights of individuals as members of a group, and certainly not of the group as such. This was
particularly evident in the case of multiethnic, multireligious or multicultural societies and resulted
in new legal instruments to protect "minorities", now called "communities", "peoples" or "groups".
See Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination 16.
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Religious rights and freedoms are nowadays protected in most international human rights
instruments.!" As Durham'" states, these international human rights instruments reflect-
the strata of older, narrower conceptions of religious liberty that have been
deposited in the course of the historical broadening of religious freedom over time
until the modem expansive protections have been attained.
10.2.1 The Charter of the United Nations
The United Nations Charter:" does not contain any explicit reference to freedom of religion
or belief'" but does propose that fundamental freedoms be available to all (pluralism) without
distinction (equality). In terms of article 1(3), the purposes of the United Nations are:
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;
While the Charter was being drafted at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco in 1945, a clear expectation emerged that an international bill
163 See Lerner Religious Human Rights under the United Nations 79-134 for an overview of clauses in
the leading international human rights instruments which in general endorse the principle of religious
freedom and nondiscrimination on the grounds of religious persuasion and a discussion of issues such
as gender issues, educational demands, employment practices and the plight of indigenous
populations.
164 Perspectives on Religious Liberty 26-30. Also see the discussion below in eh 6.
165 Unanimously approved on June 25, 1945, signed June 26, 1945, entered into force Oct 24, 1945 (in
Accordance with Art 110) (last amended in 1971), 1UNTS xvi; 59 Stat. 1031; TS No 993, 3 Bevans
1153, 1976 YBUN 1043.
166 The preamble and articles 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76 contain references to human rights and
fundamental freedoms in general. Article 55(c) and 56 spell out the basic obligations of the United
Nations and the Member States in achieving the purposes of the United Nations in the field of human
rights.
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of rights would be created under the Charter. 167
10.2.2 The International Bill of Rights
(a) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights'" at its third session on 10 December 1948. This declaration constitutes the first part
of the five part international bill of rights."? Article 18 specifically pertains to freedom of
religion or belief and protects freedom of conscience, the right to practise religion freely and
pluralism:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.I"
Equality and pluralism are protected by article 2(1):
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
167 This was mentioned by US President HS Truman in his address at the fmal plenary session of the San
Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945.
168 Adopted Dec 10,1948, GA Res 217A (iii) UN GAOR, 3d Sess, pt 1, 183d plen mtg at 71, UN Doc
A/810 (1948).
169 The constituent parts of the international bill of rights are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Optional Protocol and the Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Only the first three documents contain
provisions of religious freedom. There are several other international human rights instruments
pertaining to freedom of religion or belief. They include rights regarding religious minorities and
groups, the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and the religious
education of children. See the discussion by Tahzib Freedom of Religion or Belief 94-121.
170 See the discussion of this provision by Tahzib Freedom of Religion or Belief70-81.
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(b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'" is directly concerned
with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.!" The four paragraphs of this
article reiterate the concepts embodied in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and amplify them by adding three specific implications to the general provision. The
concepts of thought, conscience and religion, however, remain undefined.!" Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads as follows: !74
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
other and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion belief of his choice.
171 Adopted Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976 (in accordance with Art 49(1), GA Res
2200A (XXI), Annex UN GAOR 21 st Sess, Supp No 16, 14961h plen mtg at 52, UN Doc A/6316
(1967).
172 Art 2,4, 8,29,24, 26 and 27 also contain provisions pertaining to freedom of religion or belief.
173 With regard to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, also see: Art III of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948); Art 9 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); Art 5 of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); Art 18(1) and (2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); Art 12( 1) and (2) of the American
Convention on Human Rights (1969); Principle VII of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (1975); Art of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981);
Art 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981); and Principles Il and 16 of the Concluding
Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States ofthe Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (1989).
174 See the discussion of this provision by Tahzib Freedom of Religion or Belief81-92.
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3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.
4. The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions.
Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms'" is virtually identical to article 18(1) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Article 12(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights'" in turn
closely parallels article 9 of the European Convention.
Article 26177 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects equality and
pluralism:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.
In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Similar provisions appear in article 1 of the American Convention and article 14 of the
European Convention.
(c) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
175 Nov 4, 1050,UNTS 213:333, entered into force Sept 3, 1953, as amended by Protocol No 3, entered
into force Sept 21,1970 and Protocol No 5, entered into force Dec 21, 1971.
176 Nov 22,1969, OAS Treaty Series No 36 at 1, OEAlSer.LNIII.23 doc rev 2 entered into force July
18, 1978.
177 Also see art 2, 4 and 20.
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The provisions regarding freedom of religion or belief in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'" are contained in articles 2 and 13. Article 2(2)
includes a comprehensive guarantee that the rights stipulated in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be exercised without discrimination on the
grounds of religion. It reads as follows:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
10.2.3 The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (1981)
A lengthy process preceded the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
oflntolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Beliefwhich comprises a preamble
and eight articles."? Although it is not a convention and therefore does not have the binding
effect of a convention, it is not without legal effect. At least some of its provisions are
normative and are regarded as part of customary international Iaw.!"
Article 1 protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, pluralism and the
right to practise religion, but has not retained the same level of protection contained in earlier
correspondin~ provisions. Article 8 (the savings clause), however, prevents the 1981
Declaration from restricting or derogating from any right defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Article 1 provides:
178 Adopted Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976 (in accordance with Art 27( 1), GA Res 2200A
(XXI) Annex UN GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp No 16, 1496th plen mtg at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1967).
179 For the full text see Tahzib Freedom of Religion of Belief Appendix A 495-498. Also see the
discussion at 165-189.
180 See Tahzib Freedom of Religion or BeliefI87.
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1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public and in private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
a religion or belief of his choice.
Articles 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with equality and nondiscrimination on the grounds of
religion or belief. Article 2 provides:
I. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of
persons or person on the grounds of religion or belief.
2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression "intolerance and
discrimination based on religion or belief" means any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its
purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an
equal basis.
10.3 The Vienna Concluding Document
Durham!" points out that the principles of religious freedom enunciated in Principles 16 and
17 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of the
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Vienna
Concluding Document), which were promulgated in 1989, contain a remarkable list of specific
requirements needed to avoid encroachments on religious freedom. These principles serve as
a useful summary of concrete religious freedom norms that have won acceptance in Europe,
including the former Soviet bloc and in the United States and Canada in the Helsinki process.
One can agree with Durham that these principles, which are particularly sensitive to modem
problems, constitute an invaluable contribution and deserve acceptance throughout the world.
Principles 16 and 17 are worth quoting in full:
181 Perspectives 37.
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16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practise
religion or belief the participating States will, inter alia,
16a take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination against
individuals or communities, on the grounds of religion or belief in the
recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in all fields of civil, political economic, social and cultural life,
and ensure the effective equality between believers and non-believers;
16b foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of
different communities as well as between believers and non-believers;
16c grant upon their request to communities of believers, practising or prepared
to practise their faith within the constitutional framework of their states,
recognition of the status provided for them in their respective countries;
16d respect the right of religious communities to
establish and maintain freely accessible places of worship or
assembly,
organize themselves according to their own hierarchical and
institutional structure,
select, appoint and replace their personnel in accordance with
their respective requirements and standards as well as with any
freely accepted arrangement between them and their State,
solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions;
16e engage in consultations with religious faiths, institutions and organizations
in order to achieve a better understanding of the requirements of religious
freedom;
16f respect the right to everyone to give and receive religious education in the
language of his choice, individually or in association with others;
16g in this context respect, inter alia, the liberty of parents to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions;
l6h allow the training of religious personnel in appropriate institutions;
16i respect the right of individual believers and communities of believers to
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acquire, possess, and use sacred books, religious publications in the
language of their choice and other articles and materials related to the
practice of religion or belief;
16j allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce and import
and disseminate religious publications and materials;
16k favourably consider the interest of religious communities in participating in
public dialogue, inter alia, through mass media.
17. The participating States recognize that the exercise of the above mentioned
rights relating to the freedom of religion or belief may be subject only to
such limitations as are provided by law and are consistent with their
obligations under international law and with their international
commitments. They will ensure in their laws and regulations and in their
application the full and effective implementation of the freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief.
11. Conclusion
11.1 Church-state models
A number of basic church-state models presented themselves through Christian theologies in
the West. In the first three centuries, there was an identification of church and state and law
and religion in Roman law. The establishment of the "imperial cult" by Roman law, however,
formed the first prototype of religious establishment by law. This pattern was followed when
the Christian faith was established as the state religion in 380. The Christian church was then
directly supported by the imperial authority and the Roman Emperor was also the head of the
Church. This system of imperial rule prevailed until the late eleventh century when the Roman
Catholic Church established itself as a unified, hierarchical, autonomous, politico-legal entity.
The church itself became a state-like legal entity with a corporate structure resembling that of
the Roman Empire, and canon law effectively governed all levels of government. The Roman
model of church and state relations thus proclaimed the superiority of canon law and subjected
the state to the church.
During the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century the authority of the Roman
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Catholic Church was challenged at theological, legal and political level. This led to new
theoretical expressions of the relationship between church and state. Luther maintained that
the (Christian) civil ruler exercised all legal and political authority and that the authority over
the church vested in the Christian monarch. The Lutheran model thus implied jurisdiction of
the state over the church, but awarded a strong advisory role to the church.
In England papal power was replaced with royal authority and the church was subjected to the
state, with the King as the head of the Church. The Anglican model thus implied strong
political authority over ecclesiastical authority.
The Anabaptist movement maintained that there are two kingdoms, that of God and that of the
devil. The church was seen as a voluntary community of believers, ascetically dissociated from
the secular. The Anabaptist or Free Church model thus introduced the idea of a wall of
separation between church and state.
Calvin's views formed the basis for the institutional separation of church and state and the
recognition of church and state as equal institutions. In simple terms, the Calvinist model
implied covenants between church and state to form one greater community, without the
notion of superiority.
These basic models of church-state relations which developed historically can thus be divided
into the following broad categories, that is, models in terms of which (1) there is complete
identification of church and state (2) the church reigns supreme over the state; (3) the state
reigns supreme over the church; (4) covenants between church and state exist and (5) a
complete separation of church and state exist. 182 The discussion in this chapter showed that a
certain measure of institutional separation between church and state came to be regarded as
one of the essential requirements for the protection of religious rights and freedoms.
182 Van der Vyver Introduction XX -XLIV identified four distinct dogmatic presuppositions reflected in
the modem constitutions of the world: As extreme positions (1) the American notion of the wall of
separation between church and state, and (2) the Islamic Shari'a proclaiming the identity oflaw and
religion; and somewhere in between, (3) the scholastic adage of subsidiarity and (4) the typical
Calvinist doctrine of sphere sovereignty.
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It is also clear that each of these church-state models has a particular implication for the role
of the state (law) in respect of religion. However, there does not seem to be a single universal
formula for reconciling religious rights and state authority. It is apparent from this chapter that
religious freedom is not necessarily directly parallel to the degree of separation between state
and church and state and religion which exits in a country. Total religious freedom does not
necessarily occur in the case of complete separation between state and religion (or
"nonidentification" of the state with the church and "nonestablishment" of religion by law),
nor is religious freedom necessarily totally absent in the case of identification of the state with
the church or the establishment of religion by law.!" But, both strongly positive and strongly
negative identification of state and church and state and religion appear to correlate with low
levels of religious freedom, because in both cases the state adopts a sharply defined attitude
towards one or more religions, leaving little room for dissenting views.
11.2 The emergence of religious rights
Against this background of church-state relations in the West, the concept of religious right
emerged. The Edict of Milan introduced four core principles of religious freedom, namely
freedom of conscience, freedom to practice religion, accommodation of religious pluralism and
equality of all religions. The Edict of Milan provided not only rights, but also the ability to
exercise them. Moreover, the Edict granted corporate and individual restitution for
Christians 184 and most importantly, gave individual litigants standing to claim exemptions from
Roman law.
In medieval times, religious rights were only de facto present in canon law'" in the form of
183 See Durham Perspectives 15-25 and the further discussion in ch 6.
184 This affirms the existence of the rights at that stage because ubi ius ibi remedium ("where there is a
right, there is a remedy").
185 Witte Introduction xxii note 18 explains this in a nutshell: "The most important prototype for Western
style (religious) human rights was the medieval canon law of the Catholic Church. This law defmed
the rights of the clergy to their liturgical offices, their exemptions from civil taxes and duties, and their
immunities from prosecution and compulsory testimony. It defined the rights of ecclesiastical
organizations like benefices, monasteries, and charities to form and dissolve, to accept and reject
(continued ...)
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exemptions, immunities, privileges and protections of certain groups such as the clergy. These
exemptions, immunities, privileges and rights were thus put into practice as group rights by
canon law. In granting these rights to the clergy, a class of people with special religious rights
was created, which rights were enforceable in ecclesiastical courts.
Three aspects of medieval religion also contributed to the development oftheories of religious
rights. In the first instance, the medieval church insisted on the freedom of the church as an
institution from state control. Secondly, medieval canonists and moral theologians often
upheld the value of the individual conscience as a guide to proper conduct which was an
important element in later theories of religious rights. Thirdly, the idea emerged in medieval
times that everyone had natural rights. This would play an important role in subsequent
theories of religious freedom.
The plight of religious dissidents contributed substantially to religious freedom. The concept
of religious pluralism was already envisaged by the Edict of Milan of313, which came as an
answer to the persecution of Christians. During medieval times, de facto protection of
dissidents or minorities and protection of minority groups contributed to the evolution of
religious freedom. Judaism was, for example, outlawed in the fourth and fifth centuries but
Theodosius changed Rome's policy to the Jews and gave them "second class citizen" rights.
These rights included that their property would not be subjected to special taxes, that their
worship services would not be interrupted and that they were allowed to have their own
schools, charities, welfare, rituals and ceremonies. They were, in other words, effectively
granted minimal religious group (corporate) rights. Certain individual rights were also granted,
for instance that Jewish persons could litigate in civil courts and participate in any activity
which did not involve the swearing of oaths. Although these rights were revoked and the Jews
185 (...continued)
members, to establish order and organization, to acquire, use, and alienate property. It defmed the
rights of religious conformists to worship, proselytize, maintain religious symbols, travel on religious
pilgrimages, and educate their children. This elaborate system of religious rights - though devised for
the governance of the established church alone - was, after the Protestant Reformation, incorporated
into the heart of Western laws governing religion and the church. The gradual expansion of religious
toleration after the sixteenth century did not destroy the Roman law and canon law systems of
religious rights. Rather, it extended its protections and privileges to an ever greater variety of religious
groups and individuals - and today forms many of the basic guarantees of a religious rights regime."
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subjected to many canon and civil law restrictions in the High Middle Ages, the fact remains
that, at times, religious pluralism was de facto tolerated.
During the protestant reformations the divine papal authority was challenged by forms of
protest that led to new ways of asserting religious rights. After the reformations and the
philosophic shift to a more nominalistic paradigm (in which society is seen as a collection of
individuals), these privileges could no longer be confined to the clergy by reason of their
superiority. According to the new theologies, these privileges and rights belonged to every
Christian by reason of the fact that all are created equally by God (the "priesthood of all
believers"), as explained by Luther and Calvin.
After the religious wars in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, the de facto protection
of religious rights eventually culminated in the de jure recognition of certain religious rights
in peace treaties. Religious pluralism was recognised at the Peace of Augsburg (1555) by
granting the limited right to establish their religion to Catholic and Protestant groups (cuius
regia eius religio) and a minimum religious right, the right to emigrate, to religious dissenters.
This right to leave the faith or political community was in place in Catholic and Protestant
polities by 1600. This right forms the core of the concept of voluntarism.
The Edict of Nantes (1598) ended the war in France between Roman Catholics and Huguenots
(French Calvinists). The rights of Calvinists were defined in this document so that they could
have their own communities outside Paris and the freedom to do what they wanted to,
provided they stayed separate, for example by not entering the city centres or proselytising.
Thus, a kind of right to be "separate but equal" was granted. This right was, however, revoked
in 1685 and the communities were banned.
The seventeenth century religious wars culminated in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) in which
document the principles of the Peace of Augsburg and the Edict of Nantes were confirmed.
Religious pluralism was protected by granting each ruler the right to establish Catholicism,
Lutheranism or Calvinism in his domain. A free exercise right in the sense of religious
freedom of hearth and home was also granted, as long as the exercise was private,
nonproselytising and noncorporate.
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In eighteenth century writings one finds a mixture of elements of religious freedom, collected
from previous millennia. These included freedom of conscience (including concepts of
voluntarism), the right to free exercise of religion, religious pluralism, equality, and separation
of church and state and of law and religion. In enlightenment thought the class of persons
entitled to religious rights was extended to include not only Christians but all religious people.
The above-mentioned principles of religious freedom thus developed into the essential rights
and freedoms of religion and were, in varying degrees, constitutionalised in the West during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
During the twentieth century, some of these principles of freedom of religion or belief have
been incorporated in international instruments protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms and their contents have been refined. It is clear that the international norm setting
with regard to religious rights has not been brought to a close yet. There is, however, an
emerging consensus on international standards for the protection of religious rights, including
(a) freedom of thought, conscience and religion, (b) the freedom to practise (exercise) religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, (c) the idea of pluralism, (d) equality
and nondiscrimination on the grounds of religion or belief (e) institutional separation of church
and state and (f) some separation of law and religion.
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CHURCH AND STATE, AND LAW AND RELIGION
IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 1994
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter the development of the concepts of freedom of conscience, free
exercise of religion, religious pluralism, equality, institutional separation of church and state
and separation of law and religion were analysed and it was argued that these concepts could
be regarded as the essential rights and freedoms of religion. This chapter will therefore proceed
from the premise that adequate constitutional or statutory protection of religious freedom
includes these concepts in some form.
This chapter is concerned with the legal (constitutional and statutory) protection of these
essential rights and freedoms of religion in South Africa before the 1993 Constitution I came
into effect. As has been stated,
...while religious freedom may claim theological and moral motivations ...the
exercise of it is a resolutely social and judicial matter and is generally decided by
the state. The nature of a state, its constitution and laws have a direct bearing on
religious liberty. When constitutions and laws change, the extent of relig;ious
liberty may be expanded or restricted. The state is therefore the main actor on the
scene of religious liberty in the modern period.'
It will be shown, with reference to the history of religious rights in South Africa,' that the
South Africa's first supreme constitution with a bill of rights, the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa 200 of 1993 ("the interim Constitution") came into operation in February 1994. The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 ("the fmal Constitution" or "the
Constitution") was adopted on 8 May 1996.
2 Koshy Religious Freedom 33.
3 Plekhanov History 224 states that "Every society lives in its own particular historical environment,
which may be, and very often is, in reality very similar to the historical environment of surrounding
(continued ...)
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essential rights and freedoms of religion had not been adequately protected in South Africa in
the period prior to 1993. Many historical factors precluded such protection and it was therefore
essential to guarantee the constitutional protection of people's basic religious rights.
The position in South Africa with regard to religious freedom prior to 1994 will first be
analysed with reference to the relationship between church and state and the establishment'
of religion by law in the eras of the Dutch East India Company (1652-1795), Batavian
Republic (1803-1806), British rule (1806-1910), the Boer Republics and post-Union South
Africa, the latter including the Union of South Africa (1910-1961) and the Republic of South
Africa from 1961 until 1994.5
The relationship between church and state in the preconstitutional era was mainly determined
by the relationship of the state with the Christian churches, and the focus of the discussion of
church and state will therefore be mainly on the law relating to Christian churches."
With regard to the relationship between law and religion, it will be shown that, after 1652, the
Christian foundations of South African common law were amplified by a variety of statutory
provisions aimed at entrenching certain Christian principles.' In this way the legislator, instead
3 (...continued)
other nations and peoples, but can never be, and never is, identical with it.
4 "Establishment" in this sense broadly refers to state law supporting or favouring one religion or one
religious group over others.
5 It should be kept in mind that the first three periods describe the position in the Cape of Good Hope;
the fourth, the position in the Transvaal and the Free State; and that the fifth and sixth periods include
the whole of South Africa.
6 See Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 232-273,290-300 for an overview of the
development of Christianity in South Africa from 1487-1990.
7 Although not part of the subject matter of this thesis, it has to be pointed out that law itself is not
neutral. Underkuffler-Freund 1997 SAPL 50 states in this regard: "We have been assuming that the
law is, itself, 'neutral' - that it is not itself the expression of particular moral (religious) values and
beliefs. In fact, it can be persuasively argued that all law is the 'choice' or 'establishment' of one belief
system or 'religion' to the exclusion of others - that choice being, in itself, a violation of principles of
equality. This question of the implicit favouring of governmentally-participating religions or beliefs
(continued ...)
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of protecting religious rights, compelled all citizens to live according to Christian principles.
Secondly, the position with regard to religious freedom prior to 1994 will be analysed with
reference to the legal position of religious minorities, namely black Christian Groups, Muslims
and Jewish groups in South Africa. The position of black Christian groups will be discussed
because of the unique racist laws which applied (inter alia) to them, and to show that these
prejudices were stronger than the Christian religious affiliation. The position of Muslims will
be discussed to illustrate the convergence of racial and religious discrimination. The position
of Jewish groups, which have long been discriminated against in the West because of their
"non-Christian" beliefs will, on the other hand, be discussed to show that, despite certain
religious discriminations, they have had a relatively secure position in South Africa for racial
reasons.
In chapter 1 reference was made to the theory of Durham that certain "threshold conditions"
had to exist in a society before true religious liberty could emerge in a society. As already
pointed out in that chapter, the existence of the threshold conditions will not be analysed in
depth in this thesis since political plurality, political legitimacy, economic stability,
sociopolitical factors" and an empirical evaluation of religious tolerance do not form part of
this study which is mainly concerned with the legal dimensions of religious rights. It will,
7 (...continued)
over non-participating ones is particularly difficult. If religion remains ...a part of individual and
collective life, it is impossible to avoid the 'choice' or 'endorsement' of those particular religions by
government whose beliefs, exercises, symbols, or values are a part oflaws and government practices. II
Church laws and religion had a definite influence in the formative stages of Roman-Dutch law: on
Roman law, canon law and indigenous Dutch law. South African common law is deep-rooted in
Roman-Dutch law. It could thus be said that, to the extent that Christian principles influenced canon
law and Roman law, and to the extent that Roman-Dutch law was influenced by (reformed)
Christianity, the South African common law was influenced by certain Christian principles in its
formative stages. Also see Van der Vyver 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 781-783 on what he calls
"religiously inspired radiation of secular legal institutions ".
8 It should, for example, be kept in mind that the Colony at the Cape was also influenced by, to name
but a few, the ideas of the Enlightenment, the Eighty Years War (1568-1648), and the patriotic
movement in the Netherlands, and the ideas of the French Revolution (1789). In the Cape itself
several sociopolitical factors influenced the relationship between church and state and the position
of religious minorities.
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however, become evident in the course of this chapter that, apart from the inadequacy of the
legal protection of religious rights, the threshold conditions of Durham were in fact, and in
varying degrees, absent in preconstitutional South Africa and that a variety of reasons
necessitated the constitutional entrenchment of religious rights and freedoms in this country.
2. A historical overview? of the relationship between church and state, and the
establishment of Christianity in South Africa prior to 1994
2.1 The Dutch East India Company (1652-1795)
2.1.1 The relationship between church and state
This paragraph deals with church-state relations during the period of Dutch rule at the Cape."
During the first thirteen years (1652-1665) after the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape,
spiritual matters were looked after by a "sick-comforter" ("sieketrooster") under the
supervision of the Political Council ("De Politieke Raad")." There was no church councilor
consistory at that stage, and spiritual matters were under "state" control; for example, punitive
measures were imposed by the Council if someone failed to attend religious services," the
council proclaimed fast days and days of prayer, and it even punished misconduct by the
curate. It is also clear that the Council enforced the tenets of Christianity by means of these
9 For an insightful overview of the evolution of church-state relations in South Africa, see Van der
Vyver 1999 BYU-LR 635-672.
lOOn the relationship between church and state from 1652-1795, see Booyens Verhouding tussen Kerk
en Staat (1652-1795). Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 235-247 discuss the
establishment of Christianity in the early period of settlement (1665-1804), from a church history
perspective.
Il The political council initially consisted of the Commander and the captains of the ships with which
they came, but this was later changed to the Commander, Vice-Commander and a secretary. After
1675 one of the freemen also had a seat on the council. See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat
37-48 for a discussion of the position during the first thirteen years at the Cape.
12 The first time when a person did not attend the religious services on a Sunday he was punished by
withholding six days' wine rations; the second time, one month's wages were withheld, and the third
time, he was punished by one year hard labour without pay, in chains. See Jooste Verhouding tussen
Kerk en Staat 242-243.
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measures."
In 1665 the directors of the East Indian Company (the Council of Seventeen) appointed the
first minister, who was to be solely in their service. He installed a church council, on which
a representative of the Political Council also had a seat in order to look after the interests of
the government. Although all ministers received their appointment from the Council of
Seventeen, they first had to be appointed by the Political Council before they could serve at
the Cape. The ministers were political appointees 14 and operated under strict government
control.
As the Cape expanded and more congregations were established, a need developed for a
church order to regulate church government and the relationship between the churches. 15 The
state did not officially endorse any church order, however, it seems that the church councils
followed the guidance of the Reformed Church Order of Dordrecht (1618-1619), a Church
Order of the Reformed Church in the Netherlands."
In 1746 a Combined Church Meeting was held for the first time ("Gekombineerde
Kerkvergadering"), thus integrating the congregations of the Cape. However, the
representative of the Political Council was also to be present and the government expected the
13 The Council justified these provisions as follows (as quoted by Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en
Staat 243): "Ende vermits wij sien datter veele sijn die hun dagelijckx uijt het gebet ende uijt
Sonndaeghse Christelijcke oefeningen ende vermaningen absenteren ende vrij weinigh op haren
Godsdienste letten, die alle ware Christenen van eonseientien wegen nochtans principalijk ende voor
all saecken behoorden in achtinge te nemen in gevalle den segen des Heeren over dese plaetse ende
van sijn Heer de genade over onse sielen niet willen ontbloot blijven". When a comet appeared in
1665, the Council made these provisions on Sunday observance even stricter in fear of punishment
by the Lord in the form of long-tailed stars.
14 Norman Christianity 103 states that the Company appointed 900 ministers in the period of its rule at
the Cape.
15 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 49-66 for a discussion of the church organisation at the
Cape until the end of the eighteenth century.
16 On the Synod of Dordrecht of 1618 and South Africa, see Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat
28-31; Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 234, 250.
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Meeting to submit all their decisions to the Political Council for approval. 17 Although the
respective church councils, in terms of Reformed church law, governed the congregations, the
Political Council intervened freely in church affairs."
2.1.2 The establishment of religion by law
The church at the Cape did not have an official name," but it was obviously the Reformed
(State) Church of the Netherlands that had been transplanted to the Cape." It followed that the
favoured church in the Netherlands would also be the favoured church at the Cape. As early
as 1642, the Statuten van Batavia provided that no other religion than the "gereformeerde
christelycke relegie" would be allowed in the Netherlands." Transgression of this provision
could be punished by loss of property, banishment, corporal punishment or even the death
sentence. The statutes also provided that the state would protect this true religion against other
sects and attitudes and that public offices would be reserved for members of the Reformed
17 In 1759 the Political Council abolished the Combined Meeting due to a decision of the Combined
Meeting to correspond with the synod of South-Holland which was not duly approved by the Political
Council. Regardless of several requests to reinstate the Meeting, the Political Council insisted that the
Meeting did not serve any purpose. Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 77 maintains that this
attitude can be attributed to the increasing independence of the congregations and the fact that the
Political Council would have had to relinquish their authority in certain matters.
18 Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 69-70 mentions that the Political Council intervened in true
church matters such as baptism (it made a decision on who had to be baptised), religious services (it
decided on new Psalms to be sung and even that the congregation had to sing faster) and disciplinary
proceedings (it interfered with and changed disciplinary findings of congregations).
19 During the period 1665-1842 this church is referred to in different ways; sometimes as the "ware
Christelike Gereformeerde Kerk" or "Gereformeerde Godsdienst", and towards the end of the
eighteenth century, as the "Hervormde Kerk". In this chapter it will be referred to as the "Dutch
Reformed Church" or "Reformed Church". After 1842 is was known as the "Nederduits-
Gereformeerde Kerk" (NG Church). A few years after this, however, this church split into three
sections, respectively known as the "NG Church", "Gereformeerde Church" and "Hervormde
Church".
20 See Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives 236-239.
21 See Booyens Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat (J 652-1795) 26.
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religion. However, these measures were not strictly enforced."
In 1651 "De Groote Vergadering" (a meeting of representatives of the different states after the
death of Prince William) confirmed that the true Christian Reformed religion, as defined by
the Synod of Dordrecht 1618-1619, would be the state religion of the states of the
Netherlands."
In terms of the charter granted by the States-General to the Dutch East India Company, the
company was duty bound to promote and extend the true Christian Reformed religion in the
areas under its jurisdiction. The Reformed Church was therefore the only Church recognised
by the Government, and only members of the Reformed religion could hold public office. This
was the state of affairs when Jan van Riebeeck left the Cape. The East India Company
supported the Dutch Reformed Church and afforded them preferential treatment at the Cape."
For several years (until 1779) the Reformed Church was the only acknowledged church at the
Cape."
2.1.3 The position of Christian minorities
(a) The Lutheran Church
The first reference to Lutherans occurs in a decision by the Cape Church Council in 1665.26
They were initially permitted to participate in Holy Communion in the Reformed Church. In
1742 the first attempt was made to constitute a Lutheran church, but the Church Council of
(the Reformed Church of) Cape Town strongly opposed the attempt.
22 Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives 239.
23 See quotations from the decisions of the "Groote Vergadering" to this effect in Jooste Verhouding
tussen Kerk en Staat 31-33.
24 See Booyens Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat (1652- 1795) 25-30 for a discussion of the preferential
treatment afforded the Dutch Reformed Church.
25 The Lutheran church was not allowed to exercise their religion in Batavia until 1743. It took much
longer at the Cape, where the Lutheran church was only acknowledged in 1779.
26 Quoted in Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 220.
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InBatavia, the Lutheran Church obtained permission to exercise their religion freely in 1743.
After several attempts by the Lutherans in the Cape, the Council of Seventeen decided in 1778
that they could exercise their religion publicly, on the same footing as in Batavia. The Political
Council was therefore instructed to recognise the Lutheran Church in the Cape." Du Plessis"
writes:
...in 1780, the Lutherans in Cape Town, after a contest which had lasted more than
half a century, at length succeeded in obtaining permission to erect a church and
call a minister of their own ...The principle of "Cui us regio, iIlius religio" had thus
received its death-blow, and the way was open for other church denominations
than the Dutch Reformed Church to enter South Africa.
Although the Political Council had the say on how the Lutheran church Council had to be
composed," a Political Commissioner was not appointed. Since the Lutherans exercised their
religion at the Cape on the same footing as in Batavia, the provision that certain offices were
reserved for members of the Reformed Church, the "praedomineerende kerk"," also applied
to them. Attempts were made to prevent the operation of this provision in the Cape, but
eventually members of the Lutheran church had to resign from the Political Council and
Council of Justice. These provisions remained in force until the Church Order of De Mist
changed the position."
(b) The Roman Catholic Church
The situation in Europe and in the Netherlands, where a number of adverse provisions
regarding Roman Catholic citizens had been proclaimed, also influenced the position of the
27 On the Lutheran Church at the Cape during this period, see Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat
218-232; Booyens Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat (1642-1795) 25-30; Pillay and Hofmeyr
Perspectives on Church History 239-241.
28 Du Plessis History of Christian Missions 71.
29 One of the elders had to be in the service of the Dutch East India Company and the LutheranCouncil
had to submit an annual fmancial report to the Political Council.
30 The predominating church.
31 See the discussion in the next paragraph on the Church Order of De Mist.
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Roman Catholic church in South Africa. For instance, in the Netherlands,"De Grote
Vergadering" decided in 1561 that the Placards which had previously been proclaimed against
Roman Catholics would stay in force. Jooste" states that this decision most probably referred
to a placard of 1573 which provided that the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion should
be prohibited." However, there are no indications that, during the period 1652-1795, the
Roman Catholics were asked to keep their religious exercises separate at the Cape. Jooste, for
example, refers to a decision by the Cape Town Reformed Church Council of 1674 that
children of Roman Catholics could be baptised by them on certain conditions. It should be
noted, however, that the Roman Catholics did not have their own church at the Cape at that
stage.
2.2 The Batavian Republic (1803-1806)
2.2.1 The relationship between church and state
In 1795, as a result of the civil war being waged in their country since 1785, the Netherlands
asked Britain to protect the Cape. The Cape remained under British protection until 1803 when
the administration of the Cape was returned to Dutch rule for a few years. In 1806 the second
British occupation occurred, and the Cape was formally ceded to Great Britain in 1814.
In 1803, when the Cape had been returned to Dutch rule under the Batavian Republic,"
commissioner-general JA de Mist was sent to effect certain reforms with regard to the
relationship between church and state. Although Dutch rule of the Cape ended in 1806, the
Church Order of De Mist, formally known as the "Provisional Ecclesiastical Decree of the
Batavian Settlement at the Cape of Good Hope"," effectively regulated the relationship
32 Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 233.
33 The placard of 1573 provided "dat men de uitoefening der roomsche religie zou schorsen en
verbieden" (as quoted in Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 233).
34 The Dutch East India Company, who had administered the colonial possessions of the Netherlands
for 200 years, was dissolved by the Constitution of 1798 in the Netherlands.
35 The Church Order of De Mist was called "provisional" since it still had to be fmally approved by the
(continued ...)
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between church and state by statute, until 1843.
Separation of church and state was, in principle, part of the new dispensation in the
Netherlands." De Mist, in his own words, supported this principle." But, contrary to the
principle of separation of church and state, he imposed a church order on the churches at the
Cape on behalf of the government without consulting them." Despite the so-called freedom
of the church, the state could now interfere substantially with church affairs. This was
especially curious in view of the fact that the "old" relationship of church and state had been
dissolved in Holland in 1795.
Furthermore, according to the new guiding principle of separation of church and state, the
privileged position of the Reformed Church would no longer prevail." But, this was in part
obviated by the fact that the Church Order singled the Reformed Church out for special
treatment. 40
35 (...continued)
Batavian Republic. The original Dutch name is "Provisionele Kerkenordre voor de Bataafsche
Volksplanting aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop".
36 Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 80 quotes Ypey en Dermput Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche
Hervormde Kerk Deel IV 147: "Men moest een Staatsregeling ontwerpen, gegrond op ware
beginselen, en onder dezelve ook op dat der scheiding van Staat en Kerk".
37 Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 82 quotes De Mist as stating: "Zoo wij vasthouden, en wie
onzer zou daaraan kunnen of durven twijfelen dat geene staat zonder Godsdienst bestaan kan, is het
onzer eerste, onzer duurste verplichting voor de instandhouding en bevordering van den Godsdienst
te zorgen. Of die na de wijze en byzondere begrippen van den Roomsehen Stoel, van Calvijn, Luther,
Menno Simons of Anninius geleerd wordt - daar mag ik als Christen myne eigene keuze omtrent
maaken - maar als Staatsman mag ik na de thands aangenomen beginsel aan geene deezer
verschillende begrippen eenige voorkeur geeven. "
38 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 78-92.
39 De Mist also gave the Reformed Churches at the Cape their independence from the Classis of
Amsterdam.
40 De Mist's Provisional Church Order of 1804 consists of two parts: The first part (l8 sections)
regulates general matters relating to church and state; the second part (sections 19-52) contains special
provisions on the Reformed Church.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER3 74
This dichotomy is evident in the whole of De Mist's church order. The first three sections of
the Church Order guarantee adherence to the principles of separation of church and state, free
exercise of religion, equality and (limited) pluralism. Section 141 provides for equal protection
by the law of all church groups; section 242 provides for the free exercise of religion in the
sense that every church group would be allowed to freely confess its own beliefs; and section
343 provides that no special civil privileges would be connected with any religious belief or
confession (as had previously been the case). The order of De Mist thus officially ended the
position of the Dutch Reformed Church as the established church."
However, the remaining provisions in part I of the church order (sections 4 to 18) refute these
objectives in toto:" Section 4 provides that church groups, other than those which existed at
the time of the repossession of the Cape, could not perform public religious exercises nor
assemble for religious purposes without the express permission of the Governor. Itappears that
the state aimed to regulate the number and kind of religious associations which were formed
at the Cape, thereby restricting free religious exercise. Section 5 reflects the dichotomy which
typifies this church order to an even greater extent. The first part of section 5 guarantees
government neutrality with regard to religious doctrine, but the second part stipulates that the
state retains the inalienable right to evaluate the effect of a religious doctrine, and should it be
found to be detrimental to society, the state would be forced to either oppose, prohibit or
moderate it." In terms of this section, the state usurped the doctrinal power of the church and
41 "Alle Kerk-genoodschappen, welke ter bevordering van deugd en goede zeden een Hoogst Wezen
eerbiediegen, genieten in deze volksplanting eene gelyke bescherming der Wetten."
42 "Elk Kerk-genoodschap belydt desselfs gevoelens opentlyk, zonder die van andere onbehoorlyk te
taxeeren, en vergunt aan een iegelyk den vrye toegang tot desselfs byeenkomsten. "
43 "Geene uitsluitende voorrechten in de Burger-Maatschappy zyn aan eenige Godsdienstige
Geloofsbelydenis verbonden."
44 Later cases found that the Dutch Reformed Church was never regarded as an established church in
the Cape Province. This could only refer to the position under British rule. See Loedoljf and Smuts
v Robertson (1863) 4 S 128 143; Burgers vMurray (1865) IR 258265; De Waal v Van der Horst
1918 TPD 277 281; Brede// v Pienaar 1922 CPD 578 581-582.
45 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 93-99 on the first part of De Mist's church order.
46 Ministers were, for example, specifically instructed to subject themselves (in their teachings) to the
(continued ...)
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in effect nullified the first three sections of the Church Order.
The remainder of the first part of the Church Order continue in this vein. Sections 6-7, for
example, provide that existing buildings cannot be used for religious gatherings nor new ones
erected except with the express permission of the Governor and that no religious gathering can
be held on days other than Sundays or religious feast days without the express permission of
the Governor. These sections reinforce the restrictions on new church groups, as expressed in
section 4. Sections 8-15 contain numerous provisions for ministers" of churches other than
the Reformed Church." It is clear that part I of the Church Order by no means complied with
the principles of separation of church and state and free exercise as set out in sections 1 to 3.
Part II regulated matters pertaining to the Reformed Church." This in itself was unacceptable,
since a degree of favouritism on the part of the state was evident from the fact that a specific
church was singled out for special regulation and protection. 50 From the church's point ofview,
such regulation was not necessarily favourable since this implied a degree of state intervention
in religious matters. It was, in addition, in direct contrast with section 1 which guaranteed
equal protection by the law of all churches. On the one hand, there was the establishment of
the Reformed Church by the state, thereby excluding other religious groups from recognition
46 (...continued)
government's decisions and it was provided that all opposition in this regard would be m
contravention of the law.
47 It was, for example, provided that the practice of remunerating ministers with state funds was
abolished without, however, extending this principle to the Reformed church, the largest church at
that stage; that a church group could only increase the number of ministers in its service with the
express permission of the Governor; that ministers wishing to do service at the Cape should first
obtain a right of residence from the Governor; and that people wishing to do religious work at the
Cape were not allowed to do so unless they had obtained a right of residence and passed an
acknowledged examination.
48 As mentioned, matters relating to the Reformed church are contained in the second part of the church
order.
49 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 99-107 on the second part of De Mist's church order.
50 S 20 stipulates: "Het Hervormd Kerk-genoodschap, by verre hettalrykste, en ten platten Lande in deze
Volksplanting het eenigste zynde, behoeft overzulks byzondere voorsieningen, bepalingen, en hulpe
van het Gouvernement."
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and support, while on the other hand, the state limited the free exercise of religion by the
Reformed Church by intervening freely in church matters."
The position of ministers of the Reformed Church was, for example, regulated in detail in part
II.52 Without discussing all these provisions here, one can conclude that the position of the
ministers under the Batavian Republic did not differ much from their position under the East
Indian Company, where they had in effect been nothing more than civil servants."
De Mist had tried to create some order in church matters, especially in the Reformed Church.
However, his efforts culminated in a dichotomous, anomalous document in which the
promises of a separation of church and state, equal protection of the law and free exercise of
religion made for "paper law". Although this Church Order attempted to officially end the
unequal treatment afforded to other churches, it in fact perpetuated this inequality by singling
out the Dutch Reformed Church for special regulation. It is furthermore impossible to
reconcile his goal of a separation of church and state in sections 1-3 with the total subjection
of the church to the state in the rest of the Church Order. He in fact created a state-church and
restricted free exercise of religion to the extent explained above.
51 See, for example, sections 19,37-45 and 46-51 of the Church Order in this regard. In sections 46-51
De Mist provisionally approved of the holding of a combined church meeting, but the meeting had
to serve the government, and was only permitted to convene on a probationary basis at first.
Moreover, all the items on the agenda for such a meeting had to be submitted for approval by the
Governor, the Governor had to be represented by two representatives at such a combined meeting,
and their opinion had to be obtained before any decision could be taken.
52 S 21,22,25-33.
53 Ministers were, for example, to be appointed by the state, remunerated by the state and, according to
s 5 (as discussed above), could even be reprimanded by the state for the doctrine they preached. The
church councils were to be chosen in a manner determined by the church order (the church order of
Dordrecht, s 20) but subject to the approval of the Governor who could reject someone and appoint
another person, and in new congregations the church councils were to be appointed by the magistrate
of the district.
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2.2.2 The position of Christian minorities
(a) The Lutheran Church
As seen above, section 1 of De Mist's Church Order provided that all church groups would
enjoy equal protection of the law, and section 3 provided that no exclusive privileges would
be afforded to anyone merely by reason of his or her religious affiliation. These provisions
ended the unequal treatment of (amongst others) the Lutheran church. 54 Nevertheless, the other
provisions mentioned above in the first part of De Mist's Church Order also applied to the
Lutheran Church and interfered with its ecclesiastical affairs.
(b) The Roman Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic Church also received the above mentioned rights and was subjected to
the same interference under the Church Order of De Mist." The Roman Catholic Church had
not, however, constituted their own church at the Cape at that stage. The Governor appointed
two chaplains to conduct services for Roman Catholic soldiers, and later a third was appointed
for services to the burghers.
2.3 British rule (1806-1910)
2.3.1 Separation of church and state
When the British occupied the Cape in 1795, they undertook to recognise the Dutch Reformed
Church as the official religion. In 1806, when the Cape was annexed by British forces for the
second time, the Capitulation, under which the Cape was surrendered, guaranteed the
preservation of existing religious rights. Consequently there were initially no drastic changes
with regard to the relationship between church and state. In fact, the English applied the church
54 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 227-231.
55 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 232-236.
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order of De Mist even more strictly than their Dutch predecessors. 56 This demonstrated their
obligation towards maintaining the existing religious establishment, and perpetuated the
principle of established religion into the nineteenth century. However, practical acceptance of
religious pluralism had the effect of widening the narrow establishment principle.
The church started to assert itself against this form of Erastianism. At the first combined
church meeting of the Dutch Reformed Church with the status of a synod in 1824 (65 years
after the previous combined meeting), the synod integrated all the Reformed congregations
and, in the light of the deficiencies of De Mist's church order, designed and adopted a General
Regulation." This document mainly regulated internal church matters, according to the
example of the general regulation of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands of 1816. Yet
De Mist's church order remained the legal and lawfully enacted code of the Reformed churches
at the Cape and could not be set aside by the churches. The synod attempted to overcome the
problem by declaring the order of De Mist as the basic order, and the later General Regulation
as a modification and amendment thereof. This did not solve the problem, since some of the
provisions of De Mist's order conflicted with the General Regulation. The main point of
contention was the fact that, according to the General Regulation, the Synod had the highest
56 The British governors, for example, insisted upon the appointment of a Commissary Politic over
church affairs, a practice which had not been enforced under Dutch rule. In fact, after a dispute over
this fact with the church council of Cape Town, the Governor brought out twelve more instructions
on the role of the Commissary Politic which further limited the powers of the church council. These
instructions, inter alia, proclaimed the Political Commissioner to be the Church Master, under the
superior authority only of the Governor, who was to be the upper Church Master. After 1814, the
Governor appointed the magistrates of districts as Political Commissioners in all the other church
councils. The British Governor thus exercised his power over the Reformed Church by placing the
church councils under strict control of the Political Commissioners. He even enforced his powers
under De Mist's Church Order of selecting appropriate deacons himself. The other provisions of De
Mist's Church Order ordering the appointment of church council members in new congregations by
magistrates and submitting of fmancial statements to the Governor annually, were also strictly
enforced. He also exercised his right to allocate congregations to the ministers who arrived at the
Cape, and even transferred them to other without consulting the churches. In a few instances he went
so far as to suspend ministers, which right he did not have under the church order. See Jooste
Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 108-133, 151-173 for a discussion of the application of De Mist's
church order under British rule; also see Norman Christianity 104 for examples.
57 For the provisions of the General Regulation, see Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 142-150.
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authority in church matters" whereas, according to De Mist's order, the Governor was the head
of the church. 59 During the synods of 1837 and 1842 the church increasingly asserted their
rights against the state.
At the 1837 synod a commission was appointed to revise the existing church laws, including
the church order of De Mist. However, since this Church Order was a normal civil act, none
of the commission's decisions could affect its validity. The commission" nevertheless let
themselves be led by a declaration" of the Governor in 1840, and consequently revised and
even omitted certain parts of De Mist's order which conferred rights on the Governor.
After a meeting between the Governor, the Political Commissioners and a deputation ofthe
Dutch Reformed Church, the synod was duly authorised to revise the existing Church
Regulations, including the Regulations promulgated by De Mist. The parties agreed that any
58 S 16 provides: "Het hoogste Kerkelyk Bestuur is opgedragen aan het Synode".
59 This point of contention was clearly illustrated by the Shand case. After disciplinary proceedings
against a certain rev. Shand (of Scotland), according to which the church suspended him, he was
reinstated by the church, but the Governor upheld his suspension. The answer of the Governor to a
letter written by Shand clearly sets out the position: "The Scottish Ministers of the South African
Church do not bear in mind the material difference between that Church and the Kirk of Scotland.
Here they are stipendiaries of the Government of the Colony, there they are maintained out of the
Revenue of the Church itself. The Colonial Clergy have a code for their own guidance - the
Regulations of De Mist - quoted by Mr. Shand; and it is clear that by that code the Governor by virtue
of the power vested in him by the Sovereign, is the Head and Chief of their Church. It is by his
permission alone, that the Synod assembles, and without his consent and approval, no question can
be introduced or debated at its sittings." See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 151-173 for a
discussion of this case.
60 See the report of the commission as quoted by Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 178-179.
61 The Governor namely stated: "His Excellency ... so far from desiring to lessen the authority of the
Church in its internal management - he is indeed most anxious to free it from the trammels of secular
interference, in all spiritual or purely Ecclesiastical matters, - and of substituting in all other matters,
of which she cannot dispose of her own sole authority, that of the highest Civil Tribunal for the
authority, which he conceives to have been so undesirably continued in the Governor, the abolition
of whose appellate Jurisdiction in Civil and Criminal procedures, ought in his opinion to have been
followed up by the extinction of that anomalous relation, in which he still appears to be placed by the
ancient Regulations of a Church whose principles repudiate all interference in matters concerning its
own internal Ecclesiastical Concerns."
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER3 80
regulations which the synod might prepare and propose to substitute for all or any of the
existing regulations could not, through this act of the synod, obtain any intrinsic legal force
and that they would therefore require the prior sanction of government in so far as the new
regulations changed the law as spelt out in the old Order.
The most important change that the new revised" regulations would bring about was that the
highest authority of the Reformed Church in church matters would vest in the General Meeting
(Algemene Kerkvergadering) which replaced the synod. This was contrary to De Mist's order
which appointed the Governor as the highest authority in church matters.
The result was Ordinance 7 of 1843 which abrogated De Mist's church order and created a new
relationship between church and state." Section 8 recognised the voluntary nature of religious
associations," and section 9 the independent spiritual jurisdiction of the church." It did not,
however, effect a complete separation of church and state. This is evident from the following
facts:
(i) The law freeing the church from state interference and enacting the church laws was,
ironically, a civil law. This was inevitable to the extent that the previous church order
of De Mist, an enacted civil law, could only be repealed by another law.
(ii) The state (Crown) retained the power to appoint ministers of the church."
62 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 181-188 for an abridged version of these revised church
laws.
63 Although the Ordinance of 1843 had already been in force at the Cape, it was only confirmed by the
Queen in 1851 (with Ordinance 2 of 1851).
64 See Pienaar's view Gemeenregtelike Regspersoon 12-51,207-216,245,255.
65 Norman Christianity 106 comments that this was "a measure of disestablishment without raising the
ultimate principles of constitutional theory".
66 S 5 of Ordinance 7 of 1843 awards the Crown the "sole and unrestricted right of filling up such
vacancy ...", but it also acknowledges the church to some extent by further providing: "... may select
from amongst the number of such ministers as shall by the rules and regulations of the said church
for the time being be competent to be appointed to supply vacancies in the ministry thereof'.
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(iii) Even though the Ordinance provided that the state would have no financial
obligations to any religious community or denomination, and that all sums granted
from time to time would be deemed to be merely voluntary and revocable, the state
I
did not, in fact, withdraw their financial support to the church."
(iv) The most important provision of the Ordinance granted the church the right to
formulate their own internal rules and regulations, but it did not have unlimited
authority. The Ordinance provided that any rule or regulation repugnant to or
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Ordinance would be null and void."
This applied even if the provisions in question concerned church matters.
(v) Section 6 determined the fundamental principles of the Dutch Reformed Church by
stating that this Church should remain a Presbyterian church in both doctrine and
discipline." This restricted the authority of the Synod to change the constitution of
the Church in either doctrine or discipline. In addition, it seems that the power to
enforce this section was awarded to the highest civil tribunal. In case of a conflict
between two parties, such a court would have to investigate the whole doctrinal
dispute in order to make a pronouncement on the question as to which party complied
with the section.
67 In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, the Governor wrote: "To prevent, however, any misunderstanding
of the intentions of Government ..., I judged it expedient to issue, simultaneously with the Ordinance
a Proclamation ... declaring that the aid and support hitherto granted to the church will not be
withdrawn, but all the payments will continue to be made from the Colonial Treasury until her
Majesty shall see fit to direct the contrary" (quoted by Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 207).
It should be noted that grants were also made to other denominations.
68 S 4 of Ordinance 7 of 1843 provides: "And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for the General
Assembly or Synod of the said Church ...to add to, annul, alter, enlarge or improve the rules and
regulations contained in the said Schedule, and any further or other rules and regulations which may,
from time to time, be successively established: Provided, always, that any rule or regulation of the said
General Assembly or Synod repugnant to, or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Ordinance
shall be null and void."
69 S 6 provides: "And be it enacted that the Dutch Reformed Church shall be and remain a church
exercising its discipline and government by consistories, presbyteries, and a general assembly or
synod and acknowledging, receiving, and professing in regard to the doctrine thereof the doctrines
contained in the confession of the Synod of Dort and in the Heidelberg catechism ...".
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Such interference in doctrinal matters did not signify a true separation of church and state.
During the period of English rule between 1806 and 1875, the Reformed Church (NG Church),
the Anglican Church and certain other churches were supported by and subordinate to the Cape
government," thereby widening the basis of the establishment. But, even on this basis, it was
becoming plain to many that the establishment principle was an anomaly. A series of
confrontations between the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions convinced most parties that
total separation of church and state was desirable."
In 1875 the Voluntary Bill was finally passed which made all the churches in the Cape free
churches." All state payments to religious bodies were to cease, although existing life interests
were to be preserved.
70 The British gave fmancial assistance to different denominations: a pragmatic concurrent endowment
of the larger churches. In the 1830's the Cape Dutch Reformed Church received over £4,000 in
payments for the maintenance of its clergy, the Church of England (Anglican Church) got nearly
£2,000 and the Roman Catholics and Presbyterians received £200 each. By the 1860's the allocation
to the Dutch Reformed Church had risen to nearly £9,000. In Natal similar state payments were made
to the clergy. The government also gave substantial financial subsidies to the churches to conduct
education, especially in missionary districts. It was not until 1841 that the state began to undertake
direct educational work and even then it was restricted to the white populations. The Ordinance of
1843 slowly changed this position. At the Cape, after 1851, and in Natal, after 1866, no new grants
were made to pay the clergy of the different denominations, although existing arrangements were
respected. See Norman Christianity 106-109.
71 For example, a court ruling that a decision of the Dutch Reformed Synod of 1862 to admit clergy from
outside the borders of the Cape Province was u/tra vires, had a far-reaching effect on church-state
relations. It was clear that the civil courts had overruled the spiritual autonomy of the church as
defmed in the 1843 Ordinance. This was followed by complex heresy trials involving both the
Anglican and Dutch Reformed churches - the Colenso, Kotzé and Burger trials. In these cases the
Supreme Court ruled that the expulsion by the Synod was illegal. These churches became increasingly
uncomfortable with the close relationship with the state and supported Saul Solomon who promoted
legislation for a complete separation of church and state in the Cape Parliament.
72 Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 260.
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2.3.2 The establishment of Christianity by law
Many laws were enacted at the Cape aimed at the establishment of Christianity," as illustrated
by the many instances of Sunday observance legislation." Not all of this pre-Union legislation
has been repealed."
The first Sunday observance enactment under British rule at the Cape" appears to be a section
of the Game Law of 1822, which imposed a penalty on "the employment of the Sabbath day
for the amusement of shooting"." In 1828 the Governor passed an ordinance" instructing the
73 Van der Vyver Religion par 223 states that "The rules of Roman-Dutch law that have their base in
religion have since 1652 been supplemented by a variety of statutory enactments which purported to
uphold, through the agency of legal coercion, certain particular tenets of reformed Christianity."
74 On pre-Union Sunday observance legislation, see the thorough exposition of Downer Sundays par
145-149 and critical observations of Van Niekerk 1969 SALJ 33-50.
75 Van der Vyver Religion par 223 maintains that these Sunday observance laws have been repealed by
the Pre-Union Statute Laws Revision Act 24 of 1979. However, this act repealed most pre-Union
legislation in s 1Cl) by providing that "... all laws enacted before 31 May 1910 by any legislative
authority in any area which at present forms part of the Republic, are hereby repealed" but, in s 1(2)
certain laws, as specified in the schedule, are explicitly stipulated to remain in f~rce to the extent set
forth. The acts which are still in force will be mentioned below where they are discussed. Although
some of the legislation to be referred to has not been repealed, none of the pre-Union Sunday
observance legislation has been assigned to the provinces nor adopted by any province under the 1996
Constitution. Downer Sundays par 145 remarks: "If regard is had to the wording of the Constitution
(108 of 1996, schedule 6), the prudent approach to adopt is to treat the legislation as current, binding
and enforceable, but at the same time to have regard realistically to the fact that they have long ceased
to be applied."
76 Pre-Union Sunday observance legislation in the Cape will be discussed in this paragraph and in the
Boer Republics in par 2.4. In pre-Union Natal the position was regulated by the Natal Law to Provide
for the Better Observance of the Lord's Day Act 24 of 1878 s 1-2, as amended by the Lord's Day Act
(Natal) Amendment Act 8 of 1917. The pre-Union Statute Laws Revision Act provided that Act 24
of 1878 (Natal) remains in force, but both these Natal acts have subsequently been repealed by the
Businesses Act 71 of 1991 s 7( 1)(b) read with sch 3. Post-Union Sunday observance legislation will
be discussed below in par 2.5.
77 S 13 of the Game Law, proclamation of Zl " March, 1822. Repealed by Act 36 of 1886.
78 Ordinance of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in Council establishing an Executive Police in
Cape Town and the districts thereof and for consolidating and amending the laws and regulations
(continued ...)
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Superintendent of Police to see to it that no trading took place on a Sunday (with certain
exceptions)," prohibiting public amusement on Sundays, authorising the police to disperse
people gathered for playing or gambling on a Sunday" and restricting fish sales on a Sunday
to before nine 0' clock." Contravention of these measures was punishable with a fine.
In 1837, an Ordinance of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was passed to promote even stricter
observance of the Sunday." However, this Ordinance encountered opposition and was not, in
the final instance, approved by the Queen." Itwas repealed in the following year, but another
Cape Ordinance," containing much the same provisions, was passed by Sir George Napier in
1838. It prohibited the conclusion of certain contracts of sale and the offer for the sale of
certain merchandise on Sundays. Itwas a crime to "cut or carry any fuel or to engage in field
labour, except for the preservation of the fruits of the earth in cases of urgent necessity, or
(except on some lawful occasion) to discharge any gun or other fire-arm on the Lord's Day". 85
78 (...continued)
relating thereto. The Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette No 1174 of 11 July 1828. This
ordinance was later repealed.
79 S 14.
80 S 15.
81 S 16.
82 Ordinance 4 of 1837 (Cape). It is quoted in full by Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 248-251.
83 This was mainly on account of the severe punishment prescribed by the Ordinance, namely, hard
labour and whipping.
84 Ordinance 10f 1838 (Cape) formally known as the Ordinance for repealing the Ordinance entitled
"An Ordinance for the better Observance of the Lord's Day in the Colony" and dated the 23rd day of
August, 1837. See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 250-253 on the origin of this Ordinance.
Ordinance 1 of 1838 (Cape) has (curiously) not been repealed. The Pre-Union Statute Laws Revision
Act 24 of 1979 s 1(2) read with the schedule explicitly states that the whole of this act remains in
force. It thus theoretically remains in force and applicable. However, as mentioned, it has not been
assigned to the new provinces. Van Niekerk 1969 SALJ34 states with regard to this ordinance: "It has
the distinction of having substantially survived the moral vicissitudes of over 40 percent of European
history in South Africa and ... eloquently bears out Goethe's truism that it is a tragedy 'to be a
grandchild at a time when laws apply which were enacted in our time' " (from Goethe's Faust I, Act
I Scene 4).
85 S 2-4, as amended by the Cape Lord's Day Observance Act 35 of 1888 s 2.
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Itwas also an offence for the owner or occupier of a place of public amusement or recreation
to permit any person to use these facilities on a Sunday. The enactment demanded the closing
of places of public amusement and entertainment on Sundays and, except in certain specified
circumstances, prohibited public performances and exhibitions on Sundays."
2.3.3 The position of Christian minorities
(a) The Lutheran Church
As explained above, the Church Order of De Mist remained in force after the second British
occupation, with the result that the position of the Lutheran Church remained basically the
same. Although the section in De Mist's Order which compels the church to submit the names
of elected church council members and annual financial statements to the governor applied
only to the Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church also complied with them. In 1839 the
Governor informed the Lutherans that they were not required to do so. Subsequently there was
very little contact between the state and the Lutheran church, and after Ordinance 7 of 1843
repealed De Mist's Order, even nominal state control disappeared."
(b) The Roman Catholic Church
In 1806, members of the Roman Catholic church, who numbered 200 at that stage, requested
permission from sir David Baird to erect a church building at their own cost in which they
wished to hold services conducted by their three priests. In that very year, however, Sir Baird
ordered the Roman priests to leave the Colony. The reasons for this conduct are not clear
since, under the Act of Capitulation, Roman Catholics were entitled to existing rights because
they had already been established at the Cape when it was taken over by the British. They were
therefore fully within their rights to ask permission from the Governor to erect their own
church building. Despite the outrage caused by this injustice, nothing was done to rectify
86 S 6 read with Cape Lord's Day Observance Act 19 of 1895 s 3.
87 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 231-232; Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church
History 255-257.
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matters. It took until 1820 before another Roman Catholic priest arrived in the Cape.
Another injustice to Roman Catholics was that they were barred from certain offices in
accordance with a specific English law, said to be applicable to the Cape as well. It eventually
transpired that the act no longer applied. This situation continued until 1830, when sir Lowry
Cole proclaimed Ordinance 68 which provided that it would be lawful for anyone professing
the Roman Catholic religion "to hold, exercise, and enjoy all military offices, and places of
trust or profit... ".88
(c) The Anglican Church
With the arrival of the English in 1795, many Anglicans entered the colony." Services were
initially conducted by chaplains. With the arrival of the British settlers in 1820, the number
of Anglicans increased substantially. Between 1829 and 1846, nine separate congregations
were founded by special Ordinances," which contained detailed provisions on the formation
of the congregation, vestry and its powers. Only in 1848 did the Cape get its own diocese and
Bishop. Under Bishop Gray, the Anglican congregations were soon organised to form "The
Church of the Province of South Africa". The state remunerated the ministers, but the Church
decided not to apply to the Government for a Church Ordinance. Bishop Gray" stated that they
did not wish to admit that the Colonial Government had any right to legislate on the internal
affairs of the church.
(d) Other Christian Churches
In terms of the Toleration Act of England, all other church groups obtained the right to exist
88 Jooste Verhouding tussen KerkenStaat234-236; Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History
255.
89 See Jooste Verhouding tussen Kerk en Staat 236-240; Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church
History 252-253.
90 For example, Ordinance 4 of 1829 (Cape) founded the Anglican Church in Cape Town.
91 From a document by Bishop Gray, the first Anglican Bish?p, as quoted by Jooste Verhouding tussen
Kerk en Staat 240.
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undisturbed and independent of the state. A Presbyterian Church was founded in 1829, and by
1832 they had one cleric in the Colony and received a small government subsidy. A Wesleyan
Church was also formed at the Cape, and the Methodists had commenced work in Cape Town
and among the 1820 Settlers. By 1860 there were 132 Methodist missionaries and ministers
in the Eastern Cape and Natal. English immigrants in the Kimberley and Reefareas increased
the number of Methodists, and the Methodist Church became the largest of the English-
speaking churches in South Africa. The beginnings of the Baptist Church were modest and
consisted primarily of establishing fellowship groups among the 1820 Settlers."
2.4 The Boer Republics
2.4.1 Church and state
In the eighteen thirties, a large exodus of settlers of Dutch and French decent, known as the
"Great Trek", took place. The response of the Dutch Reformed Churches ofthe Boer Republics
to sociopolitical factors differed completely from that of the Church of the Cape", and the
degree of these differences resulted in schisms." The external sign of this difference was the
setting up of state churches in the Boer Republics in the second half of the nineteenth century;
precisely at the time when the official recognition of established churches was being
withdrawn elsewhere in European societies."
92 On these churches, see Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 253-255.
93 It can be said that the separation of church and state in the Cape Province and Natal closely paralleled
British colonial experience in general during the nineteenth century. See Norman Christianity 103.
94 The second half of the nineteenth century saw rifts within the Reformed Church. Today there are three
"branches" of this church in South Africa. The "Nederduits-Gereformeerde Kerk" was bom in South
Africa as a historical continuation of the Reformed Church in the Netherlands. The "Nederduits
Hervormde Kerk van Afrika" also lays claim to this continuation but was in fact a new church which
originated in the Transvaal with the arrival of the Rev Dirk van der Hoff(1814-1881) in 1853. The
"Gereformeerde Kerk" was founded in 1859 by Rev Dirk Postma (1818-1890).
95 Norman Christianity 99.
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The constitution of the first Voortrekker State," the Constitution of Winburg of 1837,
established the Dutch Reformed faith as the national church." In 1846 it was declared" in
Natal that financial aid and legal recognition would only be given to the Dutch Reformed
Church, and in 1850 it was decided that only members of the Reformed Church could serve
in the Volksraad. In the Free State, the Constitution of 1854 proclaimed the Reformed Church
to be the established church of that Republic." The Constitution of the Zuid-Afrikaansche
Republiek of 1858 provided that the Reformed Church ("Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk") was
the established church of that Republic."? The state remunerated the ministers and undertook
to protect the doctrines of the Synod ofDort.!" The franchise was reserved for members of the
Reformed Church, but this provision was short-lived.!'" Roman Catholics and other persons
who did not subscribe to the tenets of the Heidelberg Catechism were denied rights of
residence in the Republic (until 1870);103only members of the Dutch Reformed Church were
permitted to take part in political life; 104 and only the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of this state-
church was recognised. However, there was soon a dire need for certain amendments to be
96 With regard to the relationship between church and state outside the Cape, it should be kept in mind
that Ordinance 7 of 1843 was a Cape Ordinance, thus applying only to the Cape and not to the Boer
Republics.
97 Piet Retief, in the oath administered to him, undertook to "protect and defend the Christian Creed"
according to "the Catechism and liturgies of the Dutch Reformed Church". See Norman Christianity
IlO.
98 "Dat door het Publiek of uit Publiek kas niets tot eenige andere godsdienstige stigting zal worden
toegedaan dan alleen tot de waare Gereformeerde Kerk, en dat ook geen andere Godsdienst onder ons
zal getollereerd dan alleen de zuivere gereformeerde leer". See Scholtz Nederduitse Hervormde Kerk
48.
99 S 22 of the Constitutie van den Oranjevrijstaat of 1854; s 24 of the Gewijzigde Constitutie of 1866.
The "Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk" was the established church until 1866 and the "Nederduitse
Hervormde Kerk" until 1902.
100 S 2 of the Grondwet van die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republic of 1858. This was the position until 1889.
101 S20.
102 S 32. This was the position until a decision by the "Volksraad" on 20 September 1858.
103 S 21. This was the position until the decision by the "Volksraad" on 1 June 1870.
104 S22.
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made to this strict confessionalism. 105
2.4.2 Establishment of Christianity by law
In pre-Union Transvaal and the Free state, as in the Cape, several statutory measures were
adopted which were aimed at the establishment of Christianity in these Republics. This is
illustrated by the considerable amount oflegislation concerned with Sunday observance.!" In
both Republics the conclusion of certain contracts of sale and the offer for sale were also
prohibited.':" A Transvaal law prohibited gardening, public amusement or recreation.!" the
discharge of a gun'" and the shooting of wild and other animals on Sundays. no It likewise
prescribed punishment for "a transport-driver or overseer of a transport wagon who enters the
boundaries of a town on a Sunday, or, being in a town, travels through the town with his
wagon, or loads or off-loads or causes to be loaded or off-loaded freight on a Sunday"."!
Provision was also made for the dispersion of persons gathered on a Sunday for the purpose
of playing or gambling, or to hold dogfights or cockfights or races, or to pit animals to run
against each other for the purpose of betting, or to attend any such sport or amusement.!" The
prohibition was extended to include beer and dance parties held on Sundays by blacks.
105 At the start of the twentieth century, Paul Kruger's government actually gave fmancial aid to a
Catholic educational institution.
106 See Van der Vyver Religion par 223; Downer Sundays par 145, 147-148; Van Niekerk 1969 SAU
27 at 41-50.
107 The Police Offences Ord 21 of 1902 (OFS) s 19. This provision has been repealed. Sections 4, 5, 21
and 26(1) remained in force according to the Pre-Union Statute Laws Revision Act 24 of 1979, and
the General Law Third Amendment Act 129 of 1993 s 84 read with schedule repealed s 26( 1);
Transvaal Sunday Law 28 of 1896 s 2-4. The whole of this Transvaal act, formally known as "Wet
tot Vervanging van Wet NO.2-'88 en Wet No. 16-'94", remained in force according to the pre-Unions
Statute Laws Revision Act 24 of 1979. Although apparently in force, neither of these laws have been
assigned to the new provinces under the 1996 Constitution.
108 Tv1 Law 28 of 1896 s 7.
109 Tv1 Law 28 of 1896 s I(b).
110 Tv1 Law 28 of 1896 s l(c).
111 Tv1 Law 28 of 1896 s 1.
112 Tv1 Law 28 of 1896 s 8.
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2.5 Post-Union South Africa
2.5.1 Church and state
In surveying the relations of church and state in this period, one difficulty is the difference in
experience of the Afrikaans- and English-speaking religious bodies. 113Nevertheless, Norman 114
divides the history of church and state relations in this period into two distinct sequences:
the nineteenth-century movement of the constitutional separation of religion and
government, and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century acceptance by the
churches, of both political gr?UPS, of a mission to political society - an
identification with national ideology in the one case, and a criticism of it in the
other.
The last constitutional establishment of a state church ended in 1910. Thereafter, the practice
of state religion in South Africa had an informal existence. 115 It is significant that the religious
and moral nature of the Nationalist political ideology coincided with that of the Reformed
Church (especially the NG Church). Norman notes that, just as the three Reformed Churches
were settling down and beginning to institutionalise into parallel denominational roles, the
drift of people to the gold and diamond fields placed a large number of people outside the
established ecclesiastical structures. Also, in the twentieth century with its increasing
industrialisation, many Afrikaners found themselves as "poor whites" within an urban,
English-dominated society. The Dutch Reformed Churches responded by providing the moral
and spiritual cohesion for people who required an identity, thereby preserving their "cultural
purity". The commencement ofNational Party rule in 1948 placed the Dutch Reformed Church
113 See the remarks of Niirnberger Impact of Christianity 152-156 on Christianity and the Dutch and
British settlers respectively.
114 Norman Christianity 103.For a discussion of the first sequence, see pp 103-109, and for the second,
see pp 109-115.
115 Norman Christianity 114 notes that this is quite common in societies where there is a "continued
public religiosity and determination to preserve religious equality between the competing
denominations" .
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within "a friendly world of temporal reference"!" and the Reformed churches slowly started
to institutionalise."?
The race question, 118 especially after 1948, caused tension between most denominations and
the state, and the "church-clause"!" caused a major clash between church and state. The
original clause empowered the government to restrict the attendance of blacks at public
worship in white areas. This was regarded as a straightforward infringement of freedom of
worship. The clause was modified and passed by Parliament, but as far as could be determined,
never implemented.?"
2.5.2 Establishment of Christianity by law
After 1910 there were no legal endorsements of specific denominations, but there were several
provisions!" which endorsed the particular creed of Christianity. The Constitution of the
116 Norman Christianity 100.
117 Nurnberger and Tooke Reconciliation 32 states: "The DRC (NG Church) began its history as a non-
racial church, acquired a clearly racial stance towards the end of the 19th century, developed a
legitirnising theology based on ethnic romanticism during the first half of the 20th century and became
one of the pillars of apartheid ideology under nationalist rule." This attitude was bitterly criticised by
other churches both within the country and world-wide, and also by its "daughter churches" among
the coloured community. These criticisms, the voices of reforming theologians within the church and
the ideological shift in the National Party all contributed to a reassessment of its classical stance. Its
earlier official statement "Ras, volk en nasie" (race, ethnic group and nation) was replaced by a
completely new formulation called "Kerk en Samelewing" (church and society).
118 See Norman Christianity 119-145 on "The Churches and the Race Question".
119 S 9(7) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, as amended by s 29( d) of the
Native Laws Amendment Act 36 of 1957. See the commentary of Van der Vyver 2000 Emory Int'!
L Rev 788-789.
120 See the discussion below on racial issues and provisions applicable to blacks.
121 Van der Vyver Religion par 235 classifies rules of law with a religious foundation into three
categories: "(a) rules oflaw that in spite of their religious base maintain a certain neutrality in relation
to denominational differences; (b) rules of law with a religious base and which entail a defmite bias
in favour of a particular creed; and (c) rules of law the religious foundation of which amounts to
differentiation for legal purposes based on faith." He distinguishes between (b) and (c) on the basis
(continued ...)
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Republic of South Africa of 1961,122 for example, described South Africa as a Christian
country.!" Several other rules of law that reflected a bias in favour of the Christian faith also
existed. Van der Vyver'" identifies provisions of publications control, education policy,
Sunday observance, the crime of blasphemy'" and the oath in criminal proceedings!" which
reflected a Christian orientation. Provisions also existed which were intended to protect the
religious beliefs of all sections of the community!" but, where a choice in favour of a certain
121 (...continued)
that the provisions in (b) have a sectional religious base, but apply to all subjects within a particular
territorial jurisdiction, whilst provisions in (c) are attended by a religiously-based classification of
persons where certain provisions apply to one group and a different set of rules apply to the other. The
provisions referred to in (b) are discussed in this dissertation under the heading "Establishment of
Christianity by law" and the provisions in (c) under the paragraph dealing with religious
discrimination.
122 The repealed Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 s 2 contains a reference to the
Trinitarian God. Van der Vyver Juridiese Funksie 148-157, Religion par 236 however questions the
juridical relevance of such a religious "confession" in a legal document.
123 The 1983 constitution (which has also been repealed), however, refers only to the "Almighty God",
which Van der Vyver Religion par 236 argues "was intended to denote a kind of'pot-pourri god' that
can be interpreted by all and sundry to suit their own personal conception of the deity".
124 Van der Vyver Religion par 241-246.
125 See the comparative analysis ofWulfsohn 1964 SALJ93-96 regarding the crime of blasphemy. The
leading case in South Africa on the crime of blasphemy is R v Webb 1934 AD 493.
126 A witness in civil proceedings is permitted to take an oath in the form that most clearly conveys to him
the meaning of the oath and which he considers to be binding on his conscience (Civil Proceedings
Act 25 of 1965 s 39(2)). Before 1977 a witness in a criminal trial was likewise simply required to take
the oath in a form which he considered binding to his conscience. Now, the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977 s 162( 1) prescribes the following oath: "I swear that the evidence that I shall give, shall
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God". Van der Vyver Religion par
246 states that this act makes allowance for the Christian form of the oath only. It could however be
argued that "God" could refer to any deity. Also see Wulfsohn 1964 SALJ 96-99 on oaths.
127 S 25(2) of Ordinance 14 of 1931 provided that a butcher who respects the Jewish Sabbath by closing
his butchery is entitled to open his business till 9 a.m. on Sundays to sell kosher meat. Van Niekerk
1969 SALJ 36 states that this is the only major exception in South Africa's provincial enactments as
regards members of other faiths observing a different day of rest. Before the Union there had been
s 3 of Law 24 of 1878 (Natal) which permitted dealers in Indian foodstuffs to sell such foodstuffs
until 9 a.m. on Sundays; and the Natives Territories' Penal Code 24 of 1886 (Cape) s 120, without
mentioning Sundays, prescribed punishment for a person who disturbed a meeting of people "lawfully
(continued ...)
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religious belief had been made, it was in favour of Christianity. Many, but not all, of the
provisions "endorsing" Christianity have been repealed, as will be shown in the discussion
below. Brief reference will be made to a number of significant "choice of religion" provisions
which concerned publications control, education and Sunday observance. Although this
chapter only covers the period prior to 1993, reference will be made to the current position for
the sake of completeness.
(a) Publications control
Section 1 of the Publications Act'" provided: "In the application of this act the constant
endeavour of the population of the Republic of South Africa to uphold a Christian view oflife
shall be recognized." The criterion of "undesirability" in terms of this act'" entailed two tests,
namely: "if it is blasphemous or is offensive to the religious convictions or feelings of any
section of the inhabitants of the Republic" .130 The second has been held!" to apply to the
religious convictions or feelings of all sections of the community and not only to Christians,
but the first was interpreted to have a definite Christian bias. The publications appeal board
relied, amongst other things, on the first clause for its conclusion that the proscription of
blasphemy in censorship legislation related to the slandering of the God professed by
Christians only.!" This act has been repealed in totO.133 The position is now regulated by the
Films and Publications Ad34 which only provides for the imposition of certain conditions if
127 (...continued)
assembled for religious worship" or disturbed or molested the officiating minister. It also applied to
the Transkei territories.
128 42 of 1974.
129 S 47(2)(b).
130 See Van der Vyver Religion par 238, 242 for comments on the interpretation of these phrases, and
references to decisions of the publications appeal board in this respect.
131 Die Brandwag PAB 6 of 1975 .
132 Die Brandwag PAB 6 of 1975. See Van der Vyver Religion par 245 and the cases he cites there.
133 By the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996, s 33 read with schedule 12.
134 65 of 1996 s 29(1)(c), 29(2)(c), 29(3)(c), 29( 4)(b), 29(6)(c) and schedule 10. Also see s 6(4)(a) which
(continued ...)
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a publication or film "advocates hatred that is based [inter alia] on religion, and constitutes
incitement to cause harm ...".
(b) Education
There have been and still are several references to the exercise of religion in schools.!"
Christian National Education for white children was proclaimed in 1967136 and Christian
education for black children in 1979137• Subsequently, in what seemed to be a contrary manner,
it was provided in 1984138 "that recognition shall be granted both to that which is common and
to that which is diverse in the religious ... way oflife of the inhabitants of the Republic". The
latter section'" was repealed in 1996140 and replaced with directive principles of national
education policy which now direct such things as, "the right of every student to the freedoms
of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression and association within education
institutions"!" and "the right of every person to establish, where practicable, education
institutions based on a common language, culture or religion, as long as there is no
134 (...continued)
provides that members of the board and review board to be appointed by the president shall have
knowledge of one or more of certain matters, one of which is a knowledge of religion.
135 The most important (general) references to religion in the education acts (to be discussed in more
detail below in this paragraph) are to be found in Act 70 of 1988 s 62; Act 90 of 1979 s 8; Act 101
of 1997 preamble; Act 27 of 1996 s 4; Act 84 of 1996 s 7. There are a total of 23 references to
religious matters in educational acts, many of which are contained in private acts of universities or
schools. There are only two references to Christian education: Act 39 of 1967 s 2 and Act 80 of 1993
s 25(1).
136 The Education Policy Act 39 of 1967 s 2(l)(a)-(b), as amended by the National Education Policy
Amendment Act (HA) 90 of 1991 slO.
137 Education and Training Act 90 of 1979 s 3(a). See Van der Vyver Religion par 239 and 243.
138 National Policy for General Education Affairs Act 76 of 1984 s 2(1).
139 S 2. The whole of Act 76 of 1984 was repealed by the Education Laws Amendment Act 100 of 1997.
140 The National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 s 2.
141 S4(a)(vi).
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discrimination on the ground of race". 142 The 1979 provision applicable to black children was
also repealed, 143 but the 1967 provision applicable to white children 144 was replaced 145 and now
reads: "that the education in schools maintained, managed and controlled by the Department
shall have a Christian character, but that the religious convictions of the parents and the pupils
shall be respected in regard to religious instruction and religious ceremonies" .146 This reference
to a Christian character seems to be in conflict with the Education Affairs Act!" which
provides: "No doctrine or dogma which is peculiar to a particular denomination or sect shall
be instructed or promoted at a public school during school hours" .148 Yet, in the same act'" it
is provided: "In every public school there shall daily be a religious ceremony which shall
142 S 4(a)(vii).
143 The above-mentioned s 3(a) of act 90 of 1979 was repealed by s 63(1) of the South African Schools
Act 84 of 1996. Some portions of the act are however still in force. It also still contains references to
black education. S 8(1) provides that "Any person who wishes to provide education to a Black
person, except at a public school, shall apply to the Department for the registration of a school, and
shall not provide such education before the school has been registered in terms of this section". One
of the exceptions to this section is religious schools as described in s 8(3)(b): "a school established,
maintained or controlled by a church solely for the purpose of providing purely theological training
to prospective ministers of religion or evangelists and any school providing exclusively religious
tuition".
144 The long title of this act, however, still reads: "To confer upon the Minister of Education and Culture
certain powers in respect of the policy to be pursued in providing education to white persons in certain
schools and technical colleges ..." (my emphasis). This reference to "white children" seems curious
in view of the new constitutional dispensation, but it seems to be still in force. Inview of the reference
to white persons in this act and the reference to black persons in the previous footnote, it seems that
a distinction is still drawn in educational matters between white and black education.
145 By the National Education Policy Amendment Act 90 of 1991 s 4.
146 The only other reference to Christianity is to be found in the Potchefstroom University (Private) Act
80 of 1993 s 25( 1)which provides: "In appointing academic and non-academic staff, the council shall
ensure that the Christian historical character of the University is maintained: Provided no test with
regard to membership of a specific church shall be applied to any person as a condition of his
becoming or continuing to be a member of the academic or non-academic staff at the university or of
his holding any office or receiving any emolument or exercising any privilege therein."
147 70 of 1988. S 62 is about "Religion in public schools".
148 S 62(3).
149 Ins62(1).
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consist of the reading of a portion from the Bible and the saying of a prayer". It is not clear
how these provisions can be reconciled. ISO
The South African Schools Act!" provides: "Subject to the Constitution and any applicable
provincial law, religious observances may be conducted at a public school under the rules
issued by the governing body if such observances are conducted on an equitable basis and
attendance at them by learners and members of staff is free and voluntary." The preamble to
the Higher Education Act'? also states that it is desirable to respect freedom of religion, belief
and opinion.
(c) Sunday observance
The Christian bias of certain branches of the law is also evidenced by a series of Sunday
observance laws covering a wide range of prescriptive and regulative measures. Even though
the law relating to Sundays'? and religious public holidays!" embodies a common law
tradition, it is wholly statutory in South Africa. As seen above, Sunday observance legislation
started with a placard of Jan van Riebeeck.!" and continued with pre-Union legislation!"
150 The laws on Education are in need of a thorough "cleaning-up" exercise.
151 84 of 1996 s 7. The Act was initially introduced as a Bill of the Gauteng legislature but was
subsequently enacted as an Act of Parliament to apply nationally. The constitutionality of the Gauteng
School Education Bill 1995 was challenged in Ex Parte Gauteng Legislature: In Re Dsipute
Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill 1995,
1996 (3) SA 165 (CC). See the discussion of this case in eh 5.
152 101 of 1997.
153 The law relating to Sundays is summarised in Downer Sundays par 129-162.
154 The law relating to public holidays is summarised in Downer Sundays par 163-188.
155 Of 4 Oct 1652 prohibiting absence from Sunday worship on pain of punishment. Also see Downer
Sundays par 129 n 5.
156 For an exposition of pre-union legislation relating to Sundays, see Downer Sundays par 145-149; Van
Niekerk 1969 SALf 33-50.
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(some of which is apparently still valid, but not strictly enforced)!" and with Union legislation
at national and provincial level.!" The former provinces (Cape of Good Hope, Transvaal,
Orange Free State and Natal) all had Sunday observance legislation until recently.!" The most
important acts containing provisions on Sundays and public holidays are the Business Act,160
Minerals Act,161Public Holidays Act,162Liquor Act,163Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films
on Sunday Act,164Basic Conditions of Employment Act'" and the Interpretation Act. 166There
157 See, however, the cases of S vMacdonald en Atherstone (Edms) Bpk en andere 1968 (2) SA 236 (T)
and S v Steffini 1968 (3) SA 163 (T). In the first case the accused had been found guilty in a
magistrate's court of contravening s 7 of Act 28 of 1896 (Tv1) by holding a concert on a Sunday. On
appeal the accused contended that the music played had been "sacred" music which would render its
performance lawful. Hiemstra J found that tunes such as "Dream lover", "Don't steal my heart away"
etc are primafacie not "sacred" and because the accused had not shown that they were he dismissed
the appeal. In the second case the conviction of a manager of a restaurant was set aside for allowing
a public dance on a Sunday in contravention of s 7 of Act 28 of 1896 (Tv1). Rabie J in an attempt to
mitigate the harsh effect of the act, held that because it had not been proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused had not tried to stop the dancing, the appeal had to succeed, quite apart from
the fact of whether it was public or not.
158 For an exposition of post-Union provincial legislation, see Downer Sundays par 150-162; Van
Niekerk 1969 SALJ32-33.
159 The Natal Law to Provide for the Better Observance of the Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday Act
24 of 1878 was recently repealed by the Businesses Act 71 of 1991. The old ZAR Zondagswet 28
of 1896 has not been repealed, but is not enforced. Furthermore, shop hours ordinances, horse-racing
and betting ordinances (such as the Regulation of Racing and Betting Ordinance 28 of 1957
(Kwazulu-natal) s 4(3)) and other archaic ordinances (such as the Control of Dancing Ordinance 12
of 1957 (OFS) s 1,2) exist which have not been repealed. The ordinances relating to horse racing and
betting and control of dancing were re-enacted by way of assignment to the "new provinces", but no
assignment took place in respect of the shop hours ordinances, nor the colonial or other pre-Union
legislation. See Downer Sundays par 130.
160 71 of 1991.
161 50 of 1991.
162 360f1994.
163 27 of 1989.
164 16 of 1977.
165 30f1983.
166 33 of 1957. S 4 contains provisions on the exclusion of Sundays in the reckoning of a prescribed
(continued ...)
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is also a volume of provincial legislation which concerns Sundays.':" Brief reference will be
made to the significant provisions. 168
Commercial law contains many statutory provisions restricting business transactions and work
or retail on Sundays and on religious holidays.!" A Sunday is deemed to be a "nonbusiness"
day within the meaning of any law relating to bills of exchange or promissory notes. 170 The law
relating to mineral rights contained restrictive provisions pertaining to activities on a
Sunday.": but these provisions have been repealed.!" Sunday is one of the "closed days" in
166 (...continued)
number of days.
167 The position with regard to the provincial ordinances is somewhat complicated owing to the
transitional arrangements in the Constitution 108 of 1996 (section 2 of schedule 6). New provinces
were created by the Constitution. Provincial ordinances enacted prior to the advent of the new
constitution are assigned to the provinces (where new provinces have been created) which then
administer those ordinances. The position with regard to ordinances that have not been assigned is
not clear since "all law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force".
See Downer Sundays par 130.
168 As already pointed out, this chapter actually covers only the period prior to 1993 but, for the sake of
completeness, the current state of the legislation will be mentioned briefly.
169 The Business Act 71 of 1991 currently regulates the position. The distinction between religious and
secular public holidays was abolished with the introduction of the Businesses Act, and some of the
shop hours ordinances have been suitably amended: Schedule 3 amended the Cape Shop Hours
Ordinance 16 of 1976 (Cape) s 4(l)(a)to also include "religious public holidays"; it also amended the
Licences and Business Hours Ordinance II of 1973 (Natal) s 34(1 )(a) to include "Christmas Day,
Good Friday, Easter Sunday, Ascension Day and the Day of the Vow"; the Shop Hours Ordinance
19 of 1952 (OFS) s 3(a) remained unchanged; and the definition of "normal trading times" in the
Shops Hours Ordinance 8 of 1986 s 1 was amended to mean "any other weekday and any other
Saturday than Good Friday, Ascension Day, Day of the Vow or Christmas Day". The Business Act
71 of 1991 also repealed the Law to provide for the Better Observance of the Lord's Day, commonly
called Sunday (Natal).
170 Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 s 3. See Downer Sundays par 143.
171 Mining Rights Act20 of 1967 s48(4)(a), 143(4) and Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964 s 91.
172 The Minerals Act 50 of 1991 s 68 repealed the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 save for a few
definitions and Chapter XVI; and the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964. The 1991 act does not contain
provisions on Sunday observance. See Downer Sundays par 140 for the previous position on the
pegging of claims on Sunday and par 142 for the previous prohibition of certain transactions in
(continued ...)
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terms of the Liquor Act,173together with Good Friday and Christmas Day.174
Labour legislation contains many provisions that set aside a day of rest and favours the one
singled out by the Christian religions. The enactments concerned protect workers as far as
work on a Sunday is concerned.!" The Basic Conditions of Employment Act,176for example,
regulates when factory and shop workers may work on Sundays and what payment they are
to receive.
As far as entertainment and recreation are concerned, the exhibition of any film on any Sunday
or public holiday at any place to which admission is obtained for a consideration is prohibited,
unless the relevant local authority has consented to it.177The amendment of the Prohibition of
the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays Act'" by the Prohibition of the
Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays Amendment Act'" rendered the
distinction between secular and religious holidays nugatory.!" Other restrictions (in terms of
172 (...continued)
unwrought precious metals or rough and uncut diamonds on Sundays.
173 27 of 1989 s I.
174 See Downer Sundays par 141.lnSv Lawrence; SvNegal; SvSolberg 1997 lO BCLR 1348 (CC) the
closed-day provisions were challenged (inter alia) under the freedom of religion clause. The
constitutional court, however, held that closed-day provisions were not unconstitutional. See the
discussion below in eh 6.This act is currently being revised.
175 See Agriculture Labour Act 147 of 1993 s 4; Labour Appeal Court Sitting as Special Tribunal Act
30 of 1995 s 1, sch 1; Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 s 1; Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956
preamble, s 9; and Unemployment Insurance Act s 1. Also see Downer Sundays par 135-139.
176 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983 s 1,2,9, 10, 11, 15, 16,33.
177 Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays Act 16 of 1977 s 1 and 2( 1)
as amended by the Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays
Amendment Act 102 of 1991 s 2. See Downer Sundays par 131-134.
178 160fI977.
179 102 of 1992.
180 The Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays Act 16 of 1977 provides
that Sunday includes any public holiday mentioned in the second schedule to the Public Holidays Act
5 of 1952. The latter act has, however, been repealed by the Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994 and no
(continued ...)
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the Public Holidays Act181) on public entertainment, games contests and functions at places
where admission fees are charged were repealed.!"
3. The position of religious minority groups before 1994
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paragraph is to evaluate the existence of religious freedom in South Africa
before 1994. It therefore focuses on the position of black (Christian) religious groups, Muslim
and Jewish groups and on their right (or restrictions on their right) to freely exercise their
religious beliefs in South Africa before 1994. It will be shown that the law discriminated in
various ways against these groups: in the case of black Christian groups, primarily on racial
grounds; in the case of Jewish groups, on religious grounds and in the case of Muslims, on
racial and religious grounds.
It is very difficult to limit the scope of such a discussion in view of the plethora of
discriminatory statutory provisions which previously existed in South Africa. In addition,
racial and religious discriminations were so closely interlinked that it is difficult to discuss the
one without the other. Much has been written on this subject. However, the purpose of this
paragraph is to briefly set out the relevant legal discriminations against these religious groups
to show that religious pluralism, although it existed de facto, was not protected de jure in
South Africa before 1994.
180 (...continued)
longer contains a second schedule. The distinction previously drawn between religious public holidays
(as set out in the second schedule) and secular public holidays no longer exists. At present only
Christmas Day and Good Friday among the present 12 public holidays can possibly be seen as
religious holidays and fall within the ambit of protection. See Downer Sundays par 134.
181 36 of 1994. Some measure of conformity has been obtained through the introduction of this act.
182 The Public Holidays Act 5 of 1952 was repealed and replaced by the Public Holidays Act 36 of 1994
(as amended by the Public Holidays Amendment Act 48 of 1995). See s 2 and 3, sch 1 and 2.
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3.2 Black Christian groups
3.2.1 The development of separate black churches in South Africa
The African Independent Church (AIC) movement was started by Nehemiah Tile!" when he
founded the Thembu Church in 1884. This movement proliferated'" among blacks and
developed an "Ethiopian" section, a "Zionist" section and a "Messianic" section at the end of
the nineteenth century.!" Today there are more than three thousand!" independent Christian
churches, all with a huge membership."?
The reasons for the rise of the independent black churches are rather complex. With the
meeting of white Christians and Africans, two fundamentally different systems of ideas came
into contact.!" The result of Christian missions!" under Africans eventually resulted in the
"emergence of an African Christianity" which "as it evolve[ d], correspond[ ed] neither to
183 See Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact 102-104.
184 According to Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives 260, there were only three recognised independent
groups with about 25 000 adherents in 1904. In 1925 there were about 130 groups and in 1946, 1300
groups with 1 100000 adherents. In 1980 there were about eight million adherents which constituted
about 35% of the black population.
185 Some recent scholars have questioned the accuracy of these categories.
186 Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact mentions 4000.
187 The rather complex nature of the formation and theologies of these churches falls outside the scope
of this thesis. For an overview, see PiUay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 260-262.
188 See Kiernan African and Christian 9-27 for an analysis. He states that essentially, Christianity
propagates a God-centred view of the universe whereas an African view of the universe in basically
man-centred.
189 For an overview of the early missionary work and the work of missionaries like Schmidt, Van Lier,
Marsveld, Schwinn, Kuhnel and Kohrhammer during the 17th and 18th centuries, see Pillay and
Hofmeyr Perspectives 233-234, 241-245. See Saayman Christian Missions 35 who concludes: "A
stocktaking of the past history and achievements of the Christian mission in South Africa leaves us
therefore with a chequered picture. No single judgement of either good or bad can do justice to this
history".
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missionary nor indigenous hopes or expectations'ï.!" Kiernan'?' states that:
In short, there was a complex exchange of influence between the two. Christianity
has modified the African worldview: on the other hand, Africans have
reinterpreted the Christian message.
In addition to certain ideological differences, the policy of apartheid had a definite influence
on the development of separate black churches in South Africa. A distinct black theology
developed in South Africa which was closely linked with the commitment to political
change."? Maimela'" describes three themes that were prevalent in black Christian theology
during the last century in reaction to white domination in the churches, namely to experience
the message of the Gospel in their own idiom, culture, liturgy and world view and make it
relevant in the sociopolitical struggle; to recover black identity; and to achieve black
liberation.
It is impossible to discuss the subject of black Christian groups in South Africa within the
confines of this thesis.'?' It is, moreover, not the purpose of this study to analyse the
theological and ideological foundations of these movements nor to analyse the subject of
"Christians and apartheid" from a theological perspective. 195 Note should, however, be taken
190 Kiernan African and Christian 13 quotes Ranger T "An Africanist Comment" 1987 American
Ethnologist 14(1) 182-185.
191 Kiernan African and Christian 13.
192 See Mofokeng Black Theology 38, who quotes Itumeleng Mosala asserting that black theology has
to be a theoretical weapon of struggle in the hands of the expoited black masses.
193 Maimela 12 Scriptura 40-53 as quoted by Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact 116.
194 For an overview and the historical context, see Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History
232-273,290-300.
195 See for example Kinghorn Theology of Separate Equality 57-80; Cochrane Christian Resistance to
Apartheid 81-100; Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact 101-121; and Prozesky Implications of Apartheid
for Christianity 122-148. Villa-Vicencio Civil Disobedience and Beyond 14-61 sketches the history
of more than three hundred years of struggle (which started long before 1948). Against this historical
context he sets out certain theological responses (64-117) and evaluates ecclesiastical responsibility.
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of the influence of apartheid laws 196 on black Christian groups and of the polarisation caused
by these laws in and among the churches in South Africa.
3.2.2 The effect of apartheid on religious freedom
(a) The first signs of apartheid in religious matters
Initially, colour played no role in religious matters. During the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, indigenous peoples and slaves were baptised. In fact, the Synod ofDordrecht in the
Netherlands had decreed that baptised slaves were to have the same rights of freedom as all
other Christians. The principle was that every Christian, irrespective of colour, was to enjoy
the same religious and civil advantages. Marriage between whites and baptised slaves was
initially permitted. But although a union between whites and baptised coloureds was still
allowed, marriages between whites and local black people were prohibited in 1685.
Until 1857 no official distinction was made between black and white parishioners at the
sacrament of the Holy Communion, but separate services were then instituted as a concession,
in order to make missionary work among the "heathen" more effective. This practice soon
became the norm, and the church of the time was institutionalised in separate, parallel
congregations, namely a white mother church on the one hand and black, Khoisan and
coloured daughter churches on the other hand. 197
(b) The effect of institutionalised apartheid on religious freedom
The history of apartheid cannot be traced in this study, but it is clear that apartheid laws legally
discriminated against black people on the grounds of race. As mentioned, the consequences
of this discrimination also influenced the religious sphere and constituted state interference in
196 Such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 1949; Population Registration Act 1950; Immorality
Amendment Act 1950; Group Areas Act 1950; Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953; Bantu Authorities
Act 1956; Separate Representation of Voters Act 1956, and the Natives Resettlement Act 1954.
197 See Pillay and Hofmeyr Perspectives on Church History 237,251.
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religious affairs. The Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act,198contained a clause, known
as the "church clause", which authorised a minister to prohibit blacks from attending church
services or functions in any urban areas other than those set aside in terms of the Group Areas
Act'" for the black people. In terms of this act, the criterion for such a decision was whether
the presence of blacks in the (white) urban area would constitute a nuisance to residents or
whether their presence would be undesirable in view of the location of the premises where the
church service or function was to be held. As far as could be established, this clause was,
however, never invoked.?"
Religious bodies were not exempt from security legislation.?" In terms ofthe Internal Security
Act,202the minister of law and order could ban any organisation which engaged in activities
which were deemed to endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of law and order
or if he was satisfied that an organisation had ties with communism. The Christian Institute
of South Africa was, for example, banned for political reasons.i"
Religious bodies were not exempt from the Affected Organisations Acf04 either which
empowered the state president to proclaim an organisation an "affected organisation" ifhe was
198 25 of 1945 s 9(7). This act has been repealed by the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986 s 17.
199 36 of 1966. This act has been repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108
of 1991 s 48(l)(a).
200 For the reaction of the DRC on this clause, see Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact 109-111.
201 Security legislation did not apply exclusively to blacks but is discussed under this heading since they
were frequently affected by it. See the discussion of Van der Vyver 2000 Emory Int'! L Rev 789-795
on the repression of religious institutions and persecution of religious leaders under security
legislation.
202 Internal Security Act 74 of 1981 s 4,6,7, Il, 14. Sections 6-7, Il have been repealed and s 4 has
been replaced by the Internal Security and Intimidation Amendment Act 138 of 1991 ss 6 and 5. See
also United Methodist Church of Southern Africa vMethodist Church of Southern Africa 1991 (2)
SA 138 (Tk).
203 GN R287 Gazette 5784 of 19 October 1977. For the circumstances surrounding the establishment of
the Christian Institute in 1963, with CF Beyers Naudé as its first director, see Pillay and Hofmeyr
Perspectives on Church History 291-292.
204 3Iof1974s2.
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satisfied that it engaged in politics with the aid of or in cooperation or consultation with an
overseas organisation or person. The overall effect of such a proclamation was that the
organisation concerned forfeited all foreign financial support. The Christian Institute of South
Africa was declared an "affected organisation" prior to its banning.?"
(c) The responses of religious groups to apartheid
The responses of religious groups to apartheid and state intervention in matters of religion do
not fall within the scope of this thesis.?" Brief reference is, however, made to the view of
Norman who provides a general perspective in this regard. Ithas become conventional among
interpreters of South Africa's complicated history to equate the attitudes of the Dutch
Reformed Churches'" with racial intolerance and, by contrast, the attitude of English-speaking
missionaries and churches as having shown consistent respect for the indigenous population.
Normarr'" presents a helpful perspective by stating that the history of religious opinion in
relation to race issues is better expressed in three stages (subject to a number of chronological
disparities and some individual exceptions):
In the first half of the nineteenth century the English and Dutch churches were
indeed opposed to each other in their different (and often exaggerated) responses
to the native populations -largely because of the existing political and cultural, as
205 GN Rl32 Gazette 4728 of30 May 1975.
206 For an overview of the responses of religious institutions to state intervention in religious matters
during the apartheid era, see Van der Vyver 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 795-812.
207 The DRC (or "NG Church"), the largest ofthe Afrikaans Calvinist churches," ... began its history as
a non-racial church, acquired a clearly racial stance towards the end of the 19th century, developed a
legitirnising theology based on ethnic romanticism during the first half of the 20th century and became
one of the pillars of apartheid ideology under nationalist rule" (Niirnberger K and Tooke J (eds) The
Cost of Reconciliation in South Africa (1988 Cape Town) 32). This attitude was bitterly criticised by
other churches both within the country and world-wide, and also by its "daughter churches" among
the coloured community. These criticisms, the voices of reforming theologians within the church and
the ideological shift in the National Party all contributed to a reassessment of its classical stance. lts
earlier official statement "Ras, volk en nasie" (race, ethnic group and nation) was replaced by a
completely new formulation called "Kerk en Samelewing" (church and society).
208 On the churches and the race question, see Norman Christianity 119-145, quotation on 120.
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well as religious, antipathies within their joint European inheritance. But attitudes
at that time were really still fairly fluid on some race questions, and within the
churches there was probably less difference of view than in general society.
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the middle of the succeeding one,
however, the white population groups moved towards sharing a common approach:
separation of the races for both humanitarian and cultural reasons. Then, in a third
development, they diverged again, as the ideology of Nationalism externalized the
inherent social and economic insecurities of the urbanized poor whites, and as the
sectarianism of the Dutch Reformed churches, in the areas of urban growth, drew
the Afrikaner element in one direction, and the defeated English nationalism,
together with knowledge of overseas developments and ideas, inside the English-
speaking churches, drew them in another. Mutually exclusive views on the basis
of society and government then emerged.
3.3 Muslims
3.3.1 Muslims in South Africa
The first Muslims to arrive in South Africa were slaves who were imported into the Cape
Colony from the Malayan Archipelagos.?" South African Indians, in their turn, trace their
historical origins to two immigrations. The first is the immigration of indentured labourers
who came to the country in 1860 to work on the Natal sugar cane farms. The second wave was
that of "free passage" Indians, consisting of traders and professionals from Gugerat, Surat and
Porbander, who paid their own way. In 1927, the colonial governments of India and South
Africa concluded the Cape Town Agreement, which allowed for the repatriation of Indians
who chose to return to their country, while an upliftment scheme was introduced for those who
chose to remain in South Africa - provided they assumed Western standards of living. 210
3.3.2 Discrimination against Muslims
The Statutes ofIndia Calaw of the Netherlands) were in force at the Cape until the reforms of
De Mist in 1804. These statutes prohibited Muslims from propagating Islam or practising their
209 See Islamic Council of South Africa Meet the Muslims 14.
210 See also Bhana and Pachai Indian South Africans 150.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER3 107
religion in public on pain of punishment by death. Of particular interest is the clause stating:
Offenders are to be punished with death, but should there be amongst them those
who had been drawn by God to become Christians, they were not to be prevented
or hindered from joining Christian churches."!
Since the majority of Muslims"? were members of "nonwhite races" in terms of the old
apartheid laws in South Africa, they suffered the same civil and political injustices as the black
majority in South Africa."? Muslims therefore never enjoyed equal rights of citizenship and
I
have been discriminated against on racial grounds.
The religious discrimination against Muslims manifested mainly in the area of family law.
According to Sharia, the religious law of Islam, a man may take as many as four wives.
Marriages in accordance with Islamic law were denied recognition on the basis that they were
"potentially polygamous" .214 This was the case even if the person was defacto married to only
one wife. The reason advanced is one of public policy. Although the Marriage Act215 provides
for the recognition of marriages concluded according to the rites of Christian, Jewish, Muslim
and other Indian religions, a marriage could not be concluded according to another system of
religious law. The monogamous marriage of Roman-Dutch law was the only form of marriage
recognised under South African law?" Furthermore, contracting a second marriage in
211 Quoted by Lubbe Religious Pluralism 210.
212 According to the Muslim Council of South Africa there are approximately 500 000 Muslims in South
Africa today.
213 Cachalia 1993 THRHR 392, 398 states that the majority of Muslims have participated in the
antiapartheid struggle for equality, democracy and national unity but that they have also been involved
in a struggle for the assertion of Muslim identity. He states that: "The non-recognition of Muslim
personal laws by the South African law has long been a source of grievance. Thus two potentially,
but not necessarily, conflicting strands of politi cal thought have arisen within the Muslim community:
one emphasizes the struggle for the rights of all citizens, and denounces separate rights; and the other
asserts the rights of the Muslim, qua Muslim."
214 Seedats Executors v The Master of Natal1917 AD 302.
215 S 3(1) of Act 25 of 1961.
216 South African courts have followed the celebrated defmition of a marriage enunciated by Lord
(continued ...)
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contravention of the prohibition of polygyny would constitute a crime."? The effect was that
South African law viewed marriages contracted according to Islamic religious law as void and
did not attach the usual civil law consequences of a marriage to such "unions". Religious
discrimination thus translated to gender discrimination by excluding Muslim women and
dependants from the protection afforded to other married womerr'" and dependants in South
Africa."?
3.4 Jews
3.4.1 Jews in South Africa
The history of the South African Jewry runs parallel with that of the white settlement.?" The
earliest association of Jews with South Africa has been traced to the Jewish cartographers,
astronomers, navigators and sailors who assisted the Portuguese in their sea voyages to India
and the East around South Africa.
The first permanent congregation named "The society of the Jewish Community of Cape
Town, Cape of Good Hope" or Tikvath Israel was established in 1841. The congregation was
almost entirely English and German.
216 (...continued)
Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmanse (1886) LR lP AD 130: "Marriage, as understood in
Christendom, may ...be defmed as a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others".
217 See Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone en Familiereg 467.
218 To name but a few: the wife has no claim for fmancial support, she has no right to claim any property
from her husband, and she cannot inherit from him unless he benefits her in his will.
219 For the present position under the new Constitutional dispensation, see the discussion of Amod v
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D) 1726C-E in eh 5.
220 See Saron and Hotz The Jews in South Africa for the story of the growth and development of South
African Jewry from the earliest days until about 1910. See also Herrman History of the Jews in South
Africa; Hertz The Jew in South Africa; Bernstein My Judaism, My Jews 116-178; and Cohen
Historical Background 1-18. For a contemporary survey, see Arkin South African Jewry and Hoffman
T and Fischer Jews of South Africa: What Future?
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There were Jews among the settlers who settled at the Cape under British rule. As the extent
of British influence increased with the annexation of Natal (1843) and the Orange River
Sovereignty (1848), Jewish pioneers were among those who settled in these territories. With
the discovery of diamonds and gold between 1867 and 1886, people from all over the world
were drawn to South Africa, including many Jews, mainly from Great Britain and Central
Europe. The real influx, however, came from eastern Europe, particularly Lithuania, at the end
of the nineteenth century. This affected the size, structure and direction of the Jewish
community. The influx of Jews from eastern Europe also eroded the equilibrium that had
existed between the Jewish community and the Afrikaner and English population.i" The
immigration of eastern European Jews continued into the twentieth century and was added to
by the refugees from Nazi Germany. These immigrations were, however, not viewed
favourably.i"
3.4.2 Discrimination against Jews
When the Dutch East India Company established a permanent settlement at the Cape in 1652,
it adhered to a policy of only admitting Protestant Christians into its service. This
discrimination against the Jewish religion persisted at the Cape until 1804 when the principle
of religious tolerance was established under the Batavian Republic, as discussed above. This
policy was continued under British rule from 1806.
In the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, Jews were subject to certain civil discriminations,
although the same measures applied to non-Protestant Christians as well?" They were not
allowed to hold public office or attend government schools. These discriminations disappeared
221 See Dubb Demographic Picture 23-44 for a discussion of the development, size and characteristics
of the South Africa Jewish population. Also see Goldberg Community Infrastructure 45-55.
222 For example, when a ship arrived with refugees from Nazi Germany there were demonstrations at the
dock-side against the landing of such refugees; and shortly after the incident the law was changed to
prevent more such refugees coming in meaningful numbers. See Schwarz Political attitudes 133.
223 A policeman had the right to arrest anyone who was not of Protestant faith and to bring him before
the landdrost as a rogue and vagabond (5 41 of the 1864 Act). See Saron and Hotz The Jews in South
Africa 185, 197-198. Also see Cohen Historical Background 4; Schwarz H Political attitudes 133.
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after the Anglo-Boer War in 1902, when the whole of South Africa came under British rule.
The main body of discriminatory measures against Jews can be found in a succession of
immigration laws.?" The Cape Legislative Council passed an Immigration Registration Act
in 1902 which insisted that applications be written out and signed by an immigrant in a
European language. The chief object was to control the influx of Asians but also to curtail
Eastern European immigration. A similar law was enacted in Natal. Although these laws did
not apply in the Transvaal and Free State, they made it difficult for Jews to settle in the
interior. Admission to the Transvaal was further complicated by the requirement of an entry
permit and the difficulties of the subsequent naturalisation procedures. Through the efforts of
two Jewish Boards of Deputies.?" the authorities in the Cape and Natal amended their
Immigration Acts and accorded Yiddish the status of a European language. A similar clause
was incorporated in the Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act of 1907. After unification, the
Immigration Regulation Act226 specified that, for the purposes of the Act, Yiddish would be
regarded as a European language.
In 1923 there was once again general dissatisfaction with certain discriminatory aspects of the
Immigrant Act. The Act included certain Jewish immigrants on economic grounds in spite of
the Government's promises that it would not be applied to Jews. In 1930, Dr DF Malan
introduced the Immigration Quota Act which imposed restrictions on Eastern European Jewish
immigration. Dr Malan contended that uncontrolled immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe
would disrupt the racial homogeneity (sic) of the country and create serious economic
problems.
In 1937, the Alien Act was passed which effectively curtailed the immigration of German
Jews. The stance taken by Dr Malan and his supporters was that until Jewish involvement in
commerce had been checked and Afrikaners had gained a foot in the business world, the
224 See Cohen Historical Background 3-12.
225 Following the unification of South Africa in 1910, the two Boards merged to form the South African
Jewish Board of Deputies. The board fought, inter alia, for the right of Jews to immigrate.
226 22 of 1913
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problem of "poor whites" would remain.
The attitude of the National Party towards Jews during this period was clearly illustrated by
the official decision of the Transvaal branch to disqualify Jews from membership of the party.
The Free State branch soon followed suit. In 1950 the last restriction on Jews to become
members of the National Party was removed.?" Cohen?" ascribes the shift in policy after 1948
to such local political considerations as the political empowerment of the Afrikaners, and to
the fact that the creation of the state of Israel at the time was believed to have solved the
immigration problem.?"
In the nineteen seventies and eighties, instances of anti-Semitism were incorporated in the
policies of ultraconservative parties like the HNP (Herstigte Nasionale Party) and the AWB
(Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging), a racist right-wing organisation. Another factor that
influenced and still influences the position of the Jewish community is the conflict in the
Middle East.
In other words, the Jews in South Africa have to a great exterit been part of the privileged
white minority within the country and benefited from the opportunities that this status afforded
227 This attitude of the government could be seen from the example of the Defense Force, which showed
a willingness to care for the spiritual needs of Jewish national servicemen, including leave on religious
holidays, and postings to units where kosher food was available.
228 Cohen Historical background 10.
229 It is difficult to classify the Jewish response to political events in South Africa. It can actually be said
that there is no common Jewish response to political issues. Individual Jews have participated in
political life in accordance with various political convictions. It has been the policy of the Jewish
Board of Deputies since 1903 (as formulated by its president in 1903) that "...it has no intention to
control your political opinions, nor has it the intention at any time to influence a single Jew in the
exercise of such political opinions as he is sure to hold with his co-citizens in this Colony"; but the
constitution of the Board adopted in 1903 stated: "The Board shall make observations of all
proceedings relating to legislation and municipal enactments and shall use such means as they may
deem requisite in order that no infraction of the religious rights, customs and privilege of the Jewish
community may ensue therefrom" (as quoted in Schwartz Political attitudes 135).
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them.?" Unlike most of the white population, however, they occasionally had to endure
discrimination based on religion.
3.4.3 Concessions to Judaism
Certain concessions to Judaism can be found in South African law. For example, in the Cape
Province an ordinance"! permitted butchers who sold kosher meat and satisfied the local
authorities that they kept their butcher shops closed throughout the year from sunset on Fridays
to sunset on Saturdays to make deliveries of kosher meat at any time before 09hOOon Sundays.
A further example, as mentioned above, is to be found in the Marriage Act232which provides
that marriages must be solemnised according to Christian, Jewish or Islamic rites or according
to the rites of any Indian religion.!" The effect of this provision is that South African law
recognises the formalities for the solemnising of marriages of, inter alia, the Jewish religion.?"
4. Conclusion
4.1 The separation of church and state
In South Africa there are parallels to the histories of church-state relations elsewhere in the
230 It is difficult to make general remarks on the Jewish experience. Cohen Historical background 13 for
example quotes Shimoni G Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience, /9/0-/967 (Cape Town
1980) 302 who states that while "it is correct to say that many white liberals and radicals were Jews,
it is equally correct that not many Jews were liberals and radicals."
231 Shop Hours Ord 16 of 1976 (Cape) s 13.
232 Act250f1961 s3(1).
233 Note that this section only applies to the rites of these different religions, not religious legal systems.
The marriage still has to be concluded according to South African law. In other words, the
solemnising of marriages according to a system of religious law other than the monogamous
(Christian) concept of marriage is not recognised.
234 Vander Vyver Religion par 247,248,250 however, shows that rules oflaw which are "premised upon
the religiously defmed classification of persons" signify the legislature's attempt at religious tolerance,
but ironically, can in a sense also be seen as instances of discrimination based on religion.
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modem world but, as Norman'" puts it, they exist on a modest scale. Theoretically, our dual
heritage from the Netherlands and Britain ought to have enhanced the prospect of a complex
and rich development of religious involvement in the political experience of the country.
Norman ascribes the "relatively quiet history of Church and State relations" in part to a feature
in our political development: throughout the formative period in the nineteenth century, there
was no clearly defined state structure with which the churches were likely to come into
conflict, while, at the same time, there was growing pluralism on the side of the churches.
The Dutch Reformed Church itself was reconstituted, as it were, around three distinct
historical changes: at the Cape after 1800, in the new world of religious pluralism; in the Boer
Republics of the nineteenth century, as a response to the Voortrekker ideals of an order free
of British influence; and in the urban industrialisation of the twentieth century Transvaal, as
symbols of the spiritual authority of Afrikaner cultural purity?"
Itwas shown that the relationship between church and state slowly developed in a direction
away from the idea of a state church. Initially (from 1652 to 1779), the Reformed Church was
the only recognised church at the Cape. In 1780 the Lutheran Church was allowed to erect a
church building and to have a minister of their own. De Mist's reforms in 1804 formally
recognised the idea of a separation of church and state, although he still singled the Reformed
Church out for special treatment and regulation. Ordinance 7 of 1843 recognised the voluntary
nature of religious associations and the independent spiritual jurisdiction of the church, but did
not yet effect a complete separation of church and state. Complete separation of church and
state was attained in 1875 with the introduction of the Voluntary Bill which stopped all
payments to religious bodies. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the
Constitutions of the Boer Republics once again reverted to the idea of a state church, but with
the Union of South Africa in 1910 the last constitutional establishment of a state church
disappeared.i" It could therefore be stated that, in so far as institutional separation of church
235 Norman Christianity 96.
236 Norman Christianity 100-101.
237 In Aronson v Estate Hart 1950 (I) SA 539 (A) 561 Van den Heever JA stated: "We have no .
established church which enjoys preferential treatment" and inR v Webb 1934 AD 493 at 496 Wessels
(continued ...)
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and state is a requirement for the protection of religious rights, this requirement was met in
South Africa after 1910.
4.2 Law and religion
After the concept of a state-church in South Africa had been abandoned Christianity as such
was, to a certain extent, the religious basis for political society. Although a legally endorsed
choice for Christianity was made in South Africa, a definite denominational choice was not
made. Since the nineteenth century, cultural and ethnic conditions had established a pattern
of Christian variation (or limited religious pluralism) which did not allow the acceptance of
an agreed denominational basis for political society. English civil religion was rejected as a
possible rational expression of religion by Afrikaner society, and the religion of the Afrikaner,
though powerful, was never allowed to go so far as the establishment of a formal connection
between church and state after the Union. This statement might be challenged in view of the
"institutionalised" character of the NG Church during the second half of the twentieth century,
but this was more a case of identification with national ideology on the part of the church than
an establishment by law.
It was shown that a variety of statutory enactments protected particular tenets of Reformed
Christianity.?" This was illustrated in different periods with reference to Sunday observance
legislation, provisions of publication control and education policy. It is thus clear that there
was not a separation oflaw and religion in pre-1994 South Africa. However, after 1910, the
establishment of religion by law did not extend to denominational favouritism.
4.3 Religious pluralism
The French Huguenots who arrived at the Cape in 1688 and 1689 (approximately 24 percent
237 (...continued)
CJ stated that Christianity is not part of the law of this country "where we tolerate all religions". Also
see Buren Uitgewers (Edms) Bpk v Raad van Beheer oor Publikasies 1975 (1) SA 379 (C) 419.
238 For an overview of the laws and state action with "establishment implications" see Van der Vyver
2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 783-795.
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of the European population by 1691) were allowed to have their own congregation, but had
to conform to the language and worship of the Dutch Reformed Church. The German settlers,
however (approximately 30 percent of the population), retained their Lutheran faith. The first
sign of religious pluralism was evident in 1780, when the Lutherans were permitted to build
their own church and appoint their own pastor. But, even under British occupation, attempts
were made to enforce the unitary nature of religion by law by preventing churches other than
the Dutch Reformed Church from establishing congregations. De Mist's Ordinance of 1804
with its official policy of toleration and the arrival of the 1820 British Settlers, themselves of
mixed denominational allegiance, represent definite steps towards the recognition of a
practical religious (Christian) pluralism.?" In addition, the Dutch Reformed Church split up
into three different denominations. After these initial steps, South Africa experienced a prolific
growth of denominationalism, and by the middle of the twentieth century there were about
eighty recognised denominations and missionary societies in South Africa.
In the history of South Africa, people ofthe Christian faith have come to represent the majority
of worshippers, not only among whites but also among blacks.?" With the arrival of Muslim
slaves and indentured labourers from the Islamic parts of the East Indies and India from the
middle of the seventeenth century, adherents to the Hindu religion from India in the second
half of the nineteenth century, eastern and western European Jews who made their way to
South Africa at the tum of the nineteenth century, and immigrants from China and elsewhere,
religious pluralism"! became more pronounced.i" Prozesky'" states:
239 Lubbe Religious Pluralism 209 quotes Chidester (1987: 10) pointing out: "The existence of multiple
Christianities is certainly obvious in South Africa".
240 According to the 1980 census 77 percent of the population associates itself with Christianity.
241 In eh 2 it was demonstrated that, in terms of the reigning attitude of the Western (Roman Catholic)
Church before the Enlightenment, "other" religions were regarded as enemies of Christ. After the
Reformation, the idea of the one true faith to the exclusion of all others, remained, albeit in a different
form. It is thus to be expected that the response of the Westerners on encountering the indigenous
peoples on the shores of South Africa was to regard them as' "pagan". In this respect, South African
history followed the tradition of the West.
242 Lubbe Religious Pluralism 209.
243 Prozesky Introduction 3.
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In fact the diversity is so great that of the so-called great world religions only
Buddhism has not had a numerically significant and long-standing following in
South Africa.
The defacto existence of religious pluralism was, however, not protected dejure?" In South
Africa, a rigid group differentiation, enforced by law, obscured the accommodation of
pluralism and equal protection of the religious beliefs of all people.
4.4 Equality of religions before the law and nondiscrimination on the grounds of
faith
We have seen the choice of Christianity by the legislature in this chapter. The Statutes ofIndia
(a law of the Netherlands) were in force at the Cape until De Mist's reforms in 1804. These
statutes prohibited Muslims from propagating Islam or practising their religion in public on
pain of punishment by death.
This reflected the definitive attitude of the state with regard to people of "other" religious
traditions. And the views of the state corresponded with the prevailing attitude of the
Reformed Church at the time. An added difficulty in the South African context was that
political (racial) and religious discrimination overlapped to a great extent.?"
The most unique aspect of religious pluralism in the South African context is that,
with the exception of the relatively small number of Jews, white Muslims and
white Buddhists, all the adherents of religions other than Christianity are black,
that is, African, coloured or Indian.
In terms of the apartheid policy, people of "nonwhite" races were classified as such and
excluded from certain political rights and privileges. And, as people from "other" religions
were almost always "nonwhite", such groups were in effect politically and religiously shunned.
244 Whether or not religious pluralismwas (or is) accepted by the dominant religious group is a different
question, which will not be addressed here. See Van der Vyver 2000 Emory Int'! L Rev 795-812 in
this regard.
245 Lubbe Religious Pluralism 211.
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That political rather than religious considerations dominated in this respect is clear from the
fact that the Jewish presence was tolerated within white political society; and that black
Christians remained, on the basis of their colour. This led to the ironic situation where
adherents of one religion discriminated against one another because "vertical divisions of
confessional allegiance are intersected horizontally by the creation of separate churches for the
different ethnic groups"?" Oosthuizen?" remarks:
In any multi-racial society potential conflict could become a disturbing issue; this
applies also to a multi-religious situation. The difficulties in this connection are
even more complex when racial groups adhering to the same religion discriminate
against one another, as is the case in South Africa. Pseudo-theological arguments
are utilised to rationalise segregated churches within the context of segregated
political structures. White Christianity and racial prejudice have become
practically synonymous in South Africa, especially in the South African brand of
Calvinism.
The Group Areas Act and other apar_theidmeasures had the effect of eliminating any real
awareness of religious pluralism, and precluded equality of religions before the law and
nondiscrimination on the basis of faith.
4.5 Freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion
Persecution based on faith is unknown to South Africa. It could thus be stated that freedom
of conscience has always existed in this country.
The answer to the question of whether the right to exercise religious beliefs freely existed in
South Africa before 1994 would, however, depend on the person who answered the question.i"
On the one hand it could be said that no restrictions were placed on white religious groups as
far as worship and practice of religion were concerned; they could erect buildings of worship;
they were accorded the right to assemble for religious purposes; and there were no objections
246 Norman Christianity 98.
247 Oosthuizen Christianity's Impact 115.
248 See Lubbe Religious Pluralism 213.
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to missionary or proselytising efforts of different religions. However, the position of
"nonwhite" religious groups was different:
Most minority religions find themselves so closely linked to racial issues that
virtually every experience of racial prejudice is also understood and interpreted as
an experience of religious prejudice. The general feeling among adherents of these
religions is that as long as they are not free racially and politically they are not free
religiously.
It could therefore be stated that the racial nature of South African law before 1994 limited the
right of "nonwhite" religious groups to exercise their religion freely: Muslims were denied the
right to live according to the principles of their religious personal and family law and black
religious groups were restricted in their free exercise rights by apartheid laws.
It is therefore concluded that the essential rights and freedoms of religion were not adequately
protected in South Africa prior to 1994.
4.6 Threshold conditions for the emergence of religious freedom
Apart from the fact that the essential rights and freedoms of religion were not adequately
protected in South Africa prior to 1994, this chapter also showed that, although no aggressive
religious persecution or extreme religious intolerance occurred in South Africa during that
time, the essential threshold conditions for the emergence of true religious liberty, as set out
by Durham, were not adequately represented. Although de facto religious pluralism existed,
it was not legally protected.r" In fact, there were several legislative enactments intended to
protect the tenets of Reformed Christianity. There was not sufficient economic stability in all
spheres of society so that it could not be said that this condition was fully complied with. The
likelihood of achieving religious liberty was furthermore reduced to the extent that the
249 Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 102 states: "Religious pluralism, in and of itself, has never been a major
source of inter-individual and inter-group intolerance in South Africa. However, racial and ethnic
contlict (including tensions between modernism and traditionalism), class tension, and political strife
have found expression in the religious life of a nation where the vast majority profess some kind of
religious affiliation."
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apartheid government lacked political legitimacy. In the last instance, it was shown that the
apartheid laws obscured a real awareness of religious pluralism and the need for religious
tolerance. It is therefore clear that the necessary conditions for the emergence of true religious
freedom did not exist in South Africa prior to 1994.
4.7 Evaluation of religious freedom in pre-1994 South Africa
This chapter showed that, despite the existence of freedom of conscience, the institutional
separation of church and state and some degree of separation of law and religion, it cannot be
said that adequate protection of religious freedom existed in South Africa prior to 1994. The
principles of pluralism, equality and nondiscrimination were in fact seriously compromised
by existing laws and policies. It is therefore clear that various factors in South Africa's history
necessitated the constitutional entrenchment of fundamental human rights which would inter
alia promote the fulfilment of the threshold conditions for the emergence of religious liberty
and afford protection of the essential rights and freedoms of religion.
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THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter the history of discrimination and repression in South African and the
impact on the relationship between church and state and law and religion were analysed. Van
der Vyver' points out that this history "serve[s] as a telling example of the consequences that
might emerge in a society where the government qua repository of political power proclaims
a mission to preserve the national, ethnic, cultural, or religiousidentity of the peoples under
its political control." The new constitutional dispensation' which took effect on 27 April 1994
was designed in reaction to that history with the specific object of implementing social,
political and legal structures to address the "evils" of the preceding era.'
This chapter deals briefly with the emergence of the new constitutional era and the
constitutional guarantees of religious rights. A few preliminary observations will be made
about the fulfilment of the threshold conditions of religious freedom in this new constitutional
dispensation. The interpretation of a constitutional text will furthermore be discussed broadly
by way of an introduction to the discussion of the constitutional guarantees of religious rights
in chapters 5 and 6.
See Van der Vyver 1999 BYU LR 643.
2 The new South Africa is depicted in the 1996 Constitution as "an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom", See s 7(1), 36(1) and 39(1).
3 This is supported by several judgments of the Constitutional Court. See, for example, S v
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 822-828. See also Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1)
BCLR 1 (CC) par 51.
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2. The emergence of constitutionalism and the constitutional protection of religious
rights and freedoms in South Africa
2.1 The interim Constitution
South Africa's first justiciable Constitution with an entrenched bill of rights" came into force
on 27 April 19945 - the product ofa long and intense process of negotiation," Itwas clear from
the outset that the protection of fundamental human rights would be an integral part of any
new peaceful dispensation in South Africa. When the Congress for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA I) was convened for the first time on 20 December 1991, the majority of political
parties and major role players signed a declaration of intent to draw up a democratic
constitution which inter alia ensured:
that all shall enjoy universally accepted human rights, freedoms and civil liberties
including freedom of religion, speech and assembly protected by an entrenched and
justiciable Bill of Rights and a legal system that guarantees equality of all before the
law.
After the failure of Codes a,7 the multiparty negotiation process (MPNP) began at Kemptonpark
in March 1993. Seven technical committees, including a constitutional committee and a
fundamental rights committee, were appointed to assist the Negotiating Council during the
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993, which is referred to as the "interim
Constitution" or "1993 Constitution".
5 On the same date the country's first fully democratic elections were held.
6 See De Klerk The process of political negotiation 1-11 who identifies the following main events in
the official process of negotiation: The speech made by President FW de Klerk on 2 February 1990;
the Groote Schuur Summit between the government and the ANC in May 1990; the National Peace
Accord of 14 September 1991, CODESA I (20 and 21 December 1991), CODESA II (16-17 May
1992); the Minute of Understanding of26 September 1992; and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process
(MPNP) which, on 28 November 1993, accepted the interim Constitution. See also Eloff The Process
of Giving Birth 12-19; Du Plessis 1994 SAP L 1-21; Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South
Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 1-59; Van Wyk 1994 THRHR 361-366.
7 See Eloff The Process of Giving Birth 12-13 for possible reasons for the failure of Code sa.
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transition."
The primary responsibility ofthe Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights was to compile
a list of rights which were to be included in the interim Constitution." It is noteworthy that,
from the outset, and despite deep-seated ideological tensions, there was a marked degree of
agreement on the inclusion of religious rights in a bill of fundamental rights. This is illustrated
by the clauses which were proposed and submitted to the Technical Committee by various
political and religious groups for inclusion in the bill of rights: 10
(i) The Freedom Charter (adopted in 1955) referred to religious freedom in two clauses
which provided that "All laws which discriminate on the grounds of race, colour or
belief shall be repealed" and that "The Law shall guarantee to all their right to speak,
to organise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their
children."
(ii) The African National Congress's 1988 Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic
South Africa called for a bill of rights which would guarantee fundamental rights,
irrespective of, inter alia, creed and worship, and which guarantee would only be
qualified by a prohibition of activities which, although ostensibly religious, would in
practice advocate or promote racism, Naziism, fascism, or incitement of hatred or
ethnic or regional exclusiveness. This qualification was later omitted from the 1993
draft Bill of Rights of the ANC.
(iii) The Bill of Rights drawn up by the South African Law Commission in 1989 stated in
article 2 that "there shall be no discrimination on the grounds of religion". Article 21
lay down the right of every person, individually or with others, to practise their culture
. . .
8 See Rautenbach General Provisions 2; see also Eloff The Process of Giving Birth 14-19.
9 See Du Plessis A Background to drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights 89-91; Du Plessis and
Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 39-46.
10 See Abraham 1994 SALJ 345.
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and religion freely and to use their language. II
(iv) The National Party Government's proposals of2 February 1993 regarding a Charter of
Fundamental Rights likewise included the general protection of religious rights. The
proposals made express provision for the rendering of, for example, chaplaincy
services to persons in the service or care of the state and for religious broadcasts by a
body instituted by law, such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Provision
was also made for the protection of religious instruction in schools where this was so
desired.
(v) The Democratic Party's draft Bill of Rights of May 19.93prohibited discrimination on
the grounds of "religion, creed or conscience", and it guaranteed the right of "freedom
of conscience and religion" to everyone and prohibited the State from "favour[ing] one
religion over another".
(vi) As far as submissions from religious groups were concerned, the Technical Committee
was assisted in its task of drafting a clause by a submission from the South African
Chapter of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP-SA) under whose
auspices a diversity of organised religious communities in South Africa held aN ational
Inter-Faith Conference in Pretoria from 22 to 24 November 1992. This conference
."
agreed on a "Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities" and submitted it
to the Technical Committee; the following clause was proposed for inclusion in a
South African bill of rights:"
All persons are entitled:
1.1 to freedom of conscience,
1.2 to profess, practise, and propagate any religion or no religion,
1.3 to change their religious allegiance;
11 Also see articles 17 and 22.
. .
12 See Abrahams 1994 SALJ344-359 for a critical evaluation of the draft declaration of June 1992 and
the declaration of November 1992 ..
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2 Every religious community and/or member thereof shall enjoy the right:
2.1 to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions;
2.2 to have their particular system of family law recognised by the state;
2.3 to criticise and challenge all social and political structures and
policies in terms of the teachings of their religion.
The Technical Committee therefore included religious freedom in all three of its progress
reports." In the first report it was included under "minimal or essential rights which ...had to
be accommodated", in the second report under "basic rights necessary to ensure democracy
during the transition" and in the third report under "rights (which) would of necessity, qualify
for entrenchment". 14 It is clear that, in principle, there was no doubt at any stage about the
inclusion of religious rights and freedoms in South Africa's bill of rights.
After the Negotiating Council had reached agreement on a new constitutional text, Parliament
. .
adopted the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1994 in December 1993
which came into force on 24 April 1994. This Constitution was an interim or transitional one,
but marked the beginning of an area of constitutionalism in South Africa." It "provid[ ed] a
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict,
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans,
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex" .16
.~
13 The Technical Committee, in its First Progress Report, listed the rights which it regarded as basic to
the functioning of a democratic system of government. In its Second and Third Progress Reports it
formulated criteria for the inclusion of rights in the transitional Constitution. The Negotiating Council
at no stage really approved of these criteria, but agreed to the inclusion of the list of rights
recommended for inclusion in the Technical Committee's Third Progress Report.
14 See Du Plessis 1994 SAP L 8-11.
15 See Olivier Constitutionalism and the new South African Constitution 50-74.
16 S 251 of the interim Constitution. These words occurred in the Postscript or Postambie to the 1993
Constitution.
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The interim Constitution contained an explicit guarantee of religious rights" in section 14:
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought,
belief and opinion, which shall include academic freedom in institutions of
higher learning.
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious
observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions under rules
established by an appropriate authority for that purpose, provided that such
religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at
them is free and voluntary.
(3) Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising -
(a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons
professing a particular religion; and
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law
subject to specified procedures.
This Constitution also made "provision for the protection 0'[ other fundamental freedoms
conducive to the realisation of religions rights, such as the right to equality," freedom of
expression," freedom of association," the right of every person to use the language and to
participate in the cultural life of his or her choice," and the right to establish, where
practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion."
17 For an overview of the protection of religiousrights under South Africa's 1993Constitution, see Du
Plessis Religious Rights 441; See also Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa's
Transitional Bill of Rights 155-158.
18 S 8.
19 S 15.
20 S 17.
21 S3!.
22 S 32(c). This right was qualified by the phrase "providedthat there shall be no discrimination on the
ground of race or colour."
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Religious rights were immune from suspension during a state of emergency" and the limitation
of these rights was subject to a stricter form of scrutiny than the limitation of most other
rights."
2.2 The final Constitution
The final Constitution was agreed on by the Constitutional Assembly and adopted by
Parliament after which, as prescribed by the interim Constitution, it had to be certified by the
Constitutional Court in accordarice with the XXVI Constitutional Principles contained in
Schedule 4 of the interim Constitution." The Constitutional court referred the text back to the
Assembly because it was of the opinion that the text did not fully comply with the
Constitutional Principles." An amended text was submitted to the Constitutional Court and
was accepted." The final Constitution 28 came into force on 4 February 1997.
Religious rights are explicitly protected in section 15 of the final Constitution, under the
heading "Freedom of religion, belief and opinion", which provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and
opinion.
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions,
provided that-
(a) those observances follow rule~ made by the .appropriate public
authorities;
23 S 34(5).
24 S 33(1)(b)(aa).
25 S 71(2). See De Villiers The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance 37-49.
26 See the judgment of the Constitutional Court: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa 1996, 1996(10) BCLR 1253 (CC).
27 In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997
(1) BCLR 1 (CC).
28 The Constitution of-theRepublic of South Africa 108of 1996..
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(b)
(c)
they are conducted on an equitable basis; and
attendance at them is free and voluntary.
(3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising -
(i) marriages conclude.d under any tradition, or a system of
religious, personal or family law; or
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.
Other sections of the final Constitution also contain guarantees of religious rights" as well as
guarantees of rights which are conducive to the realisation of religions rights, such as the right
to equality," freedom of expression," freedom of assembly" and association," and the right
to establish independent educational institutions." Religious .rights are, however, no longer
regarded as nonderogable rights in times of emergencies."
Despite its transitional nature, the interim Constitution effectively protected a considerable
range of rights and thus laid the foundation for the eventual protection of rights, including
religious rights, in the final Constitution. Since the interim Constitution has been replaced by
the final Constitution, the further discussion in this chapter will be limited to the provisions
29 See s 9(3) which provides for nondiscrimination origrounds of religion, conscience, and belief and
s 31 which provides for rights of religious communities to practise their religionand to form religious
associations. See also s 6(5) which provides that a Pan SouthAfrican Language Board must promote
respect for languages used for religious purposes arid s 35(2) which provides that every sentenced
prisoner has the right to communicate with his or her chosen religious counsellor.
30 S 9.
31 S 16.
32 S 17.
33 S 18.
34 S 29(3) and (4).
35 S 37.
..
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contained in the final Constitution.
3. Preliminary observations on the fulfilment ofthe threshold conditions of religious
freedom in the new South African constitutional context
3.1 Introduction
Durham's threshold conditions which have to exist before religious freedom can truly emerge
in a society, were mentioned in chapter 1. He maintains that there have to be "some measure
of (1) pluralism, (2) economic stability, and (3) political legitimacy within the society in
question ...[and] some willingness on the part of differing religious groups and their adherents
to live with each other?" before religious freedom can emerge.
With reference to the first condition, Durham states that "until some measure of divergence
in fundamental belief systems emerged in a society, the question of religious liberty does not
even arise". He shows, on the one hand, that "group differentiation" may obscure the
emergence of incipient pluralism. This is possible in a society which maintains its sense of
homogeneity by perceiving dissenters to be strangers or foreigners. On the other hand,
however, he shows that "cultural blindness" can play an analogous role in obscuring the need
for the protection of religious freedom. In the latter case he cites the example of colonial
European groups that often failed to show adequate respect for the belief systems of
indigenous groups.
With reference to the second condition, Durham shows that under difficult circumstances,
religious freedom concerns seem to have lower priority than basic economic needs. He
explains that the likelihood of achieving religious freedom becomes smaller the weaker a
regime's political legitimacy. An illegitimate regime is likely either to exploit the legitimising
power of a dominant religion, or to view religion in general as a threat. In either case, complete
religious freedom is out of the question. Durham mai~ains, finally, that religious freedom for
all is only possible in a society in which religious groups tolerate the beliefs of other groups
and are willing to live with one another. In other words, aspects of religious traditions
36 See Durham Perspectives 13.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER4 129
themselves which call for toleration and respect for other people's divergent beliefs are of
cardinal importance in guaranteeing religious freedom.
As explained in chapter 1, this thesis does not address the de facto presence of these social,
political and economic conditions. However, it is submitted that the constitutional
entrenchment and implementation of certain fundamental human rights can enhance the
achievement or fulfilment of Durham's threshold conditions which are conducive to the ideal
of religious freedom. Without drawing any final conclusions, this paragraph will deal briefly
with the manner in which the current constitutional context facilitates the fulfilment of these
threshold conditions for religious freedom. The constitutional and legal protection of the
essential rights and freedoms of religion can in tum have a positive or negative impact on
patterns of tolerance, economic stability and political legitimacy in a country."
It is also necessary to take note of the "threshold conditions" in so far as they reflect the South
African reality in which religion and, therefore, religious rights are exercised. The state of the
social, political and economic reality and patterns of religious intolerance should be used to
give content to the essential religious rights and freedoms entrenched in the South African
Constitution in a manner which is necessitated by and particularly suited to South African
history and conditions.
3.2 Pluralism
The de facto pluralism, including religious pluralism, which has always existed in South
Africa, is now protected dejure by the Constitution. The specific provisions for the particular
concerns created by a diversity of religious individuals and communities are indicative of the
Constitution's recognition of a religious plurality in South Africa. In section 6(5)(b )(ii) the
Constitution provides that a Pan South African Language Board must promote and ensure
respect for languages used for religious purposes in South Africa. Section 15(3) is a further
example of an attempt to accommodate the plurality of religious beliefs and practices in the
37 See Du Plessis :and Gouws 2000 Emory Int'l L. Rev 657· who state: "In a constitutional state
(Rechtsstaat), guarantees of religious rights and freedoms constitute the highest common 'peace
keeping force' that conditions proselytization.":
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South African context. Sections 29(3), 29(4) and 31 also protect the rights of different
religious groups to practise their religion and to form and maintain religious associations and
independent educational institutions. Although pluralism is concerned with the protection of
a number of "different" religions, it is to a certain extent also protected by the equality
provisions in the Constitution which ensure religious rights to everyone and preclude unfair
favouring of one religion by the state.
3.3 Political legitimacy
Political legitimacy within the South African society has been introduced by the
constitutionally entrenched, democratic process representing all citizens of South Africa." In
addition, the promotion of constitutionalism and democratic values by the Constitution aims
to enhance political legitimacy and stability."
3.4 Economic stability
The constitutional entrenchment of socioeconomic rights" and the statutory reform measures
which have been implemented since the promulgation of the Constitution have raised
awareness of the plight of the poor in South Africa and could be instrumental in promoting
economic stability so as to meet the (l0w41) threshold of this condition.
3.5 Tolerance
The fourth condition set by Durham is that there must be some willingness on the part ofthe
various religious groups and their adherents to live with each other. As shown in chapter 3,
38 See s 1(d) of the Constitution which provides for "universal suffrage, a national common voters roll,
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government ... ". See also s 19 which
guarantees political rights for all citizens.
39 See for example ss 1,2,7,36 and 39.
40 See for example ss 22, 23, 26, 27 and 29.
41 Durham Perspectives 14 has pointed out that the threshold of this condition is not very high .
..:.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER4 131
South Africa has never been subjected to the kind of religious oppression and strife found in
certain contemporary or past fundamentalist societies. However, the political climate of
apartheid fostered an unwillingness on the part of religious groups to live with one another.
That system has been abolished, and although a legal system of equality cannot per se change
attitudes of intolerance, it could definitely contribute to a culture of respect for and tolerance
of differences." The final Constitution has, in many respects, been designed to inculcate
tolerance among South Africans. Some of the general value statements make it clear that
reconciliation of individuals, groups and communities with potentially conflicting interests is
one of the Constitution's priorities. The preamble," for example, recognises the injustices of
the past and states that the Constitution is adopted inter alia to "heal the divisions of the past",
thereby recognising the political necessity of tolerance. The constitutional protection of rights
is furthermore premised on "human dignity, equality and freedom", which foundational values
are mentioned in section 1 and 7 of the Constitution as well as in the general interpretation"
and limitation" clauses. The central place accorded to human dignity emphasises the
importance of promoting respect and tolerance between different peoples. This is also borne
out by some of the substantive rights provisions in the Constitution. For instance, section 16,
which guarantees the right to freedom of expression, is expressly limited by section 16(2)
which provides that this right does not extend to "propáganda for war", "incitement of
imminent violence" or "advocacy of hatred that is-based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion,
and that constitutes incitem~nt to cause harm".These limitations are, arguably, aimed at
promoting tolerance.
It therefore appears that, as far as the threshold conditions for religious freedom are concerned,
the new South African Constitution has paved the way for achieving the ideal of religious
freedom.
42 See Du Plessis and Gouws 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 657-698.
43 The reference to "God".in the preamble will be dealt with in eh 5.
44 S 39(1)(a). See the discussion below in this chapter.
45 S 36(1). See the discussion in eh 6.
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4. Interpretation of the constitutional text
4.1 Introduction
Before interpreting the religious rights provisions in the South African Constitution," a few
introductory remarks on the subject of constitutional interpretation are necessary. This subject
is, however, one of vast proportions and no attempt will be made to discuss it exhaustively
within the confines of this thesis. The aim here is to highlight the most important indications
of how the Constitution should be interpreted before proceeding to interpreting the religious
rights provisions in the South African Constitution.
4.2 General remarks on the interpretation of the Constitution
4.2.1 The uniqueness of the constitutional text
It is clear that the interpretation of a constitutional text differs from the interpretation of
legislation drafted in the common law tradition." This has much to do with the uniqueness of
the constitutional text:" the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic," it is the standard
for the assessment of the validity of law and conduct" and it is drafted in language which is
46 See the discussion below in eh 5 and 6.
47 See the informative discussion of Du Plessis Lawsa par 281.
48 See in this regard the dictum in the Canadian case of Hunter v Southam (1985) 11 DLR (4th) 641
(SCC) 649 which has been approved in SvMhlungu 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) par 84; Park-Ross v
Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) 208G-H; De Klerk v Du
Plessis 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T) 128A-C.
49 See s 2 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 which provides that "This Constitution is the supreme law of
the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be
fulfilled." S 4(1) of the interim Constitution provided that "This Constitution shall be the supreme law
of the Republic and any law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided
expressly or by necessary implication ,in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of
its inconsistency."
50 See, in addition to s 2, eh 8 of the Constitution which contains provisions which are indicative of the
justiciability of the Constitution.
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characteristically broad, inclusive and open-ended." These features of the Constitution are
indeed unique in view of the legal system premised on parliamentary sovereignty which
existed in South Africa prior to the commencement of the interim Constitution.
As will be shown below, these characteristics of constitutions and bills of rights could cause
serious interpretative problems if the conventional approach to the interpretation of "ordinary"
statutory interpretation is followed." A few observations will be made below on possible
approaches to or methods of constitutional interpretation which could assist the reader of the
constitutional text.
4.2.2 The constitution as a text
One should not be blinded by the unique nature of the Constitution in the interpretive
process." Although different views have been and shall be expressed on how creative the
courts 54 may be in interpreting the Constitution, and exactly how a bill of rights should be read,
given effect to or "concretised", the fact remains that the process of interpreting and applying
51 Stem, as quoted by Rautenbach General Provisions 22, identifies five special characteristics of
constitutions, which could be summarised as follows: (a) legal rules in a constitution embody the
foundations of the state and the community and therefore the text has higher legitimacy than other
legal rules; (b) the legal rules in a constitution regulate political action and political decisions and
function within political reality; (c) the interpretation and application of a bill of rights can influence
all aspects of a legal system; (d) the interpretation and application of these texts by the courts are of
conclusive importance; and (e) bills of rights contain many general and undefined words and phrases.
52 For a critical assessment of the Appellate Division's interpretation of constitutional provisions before
April 1994, see Du Plessis The Interpretation of Bills of Rights in South Africa: Taking Stock 1; Du
Plessis and De Ville 1993 Stellenbosch Law Review 63; Forsyth 1991 SAJHR 1; Kruger Towards a
new Interpretive Theory 103.
53 See Rautenbach General Provisions 30-34 who points out that "general concepts in a bill of rights
are binding and enforceable like any other provision of an entrenched and justiciable constitution ...
the norms contained in the general concepts of a bill of rights have to be refmed and developed by the
courts. This amounts to creating legal rules."
54 It is obviously not only the courts which interpret the constitution; all state organs and all concerned
individuals are occupied with this.
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a constitution proceeds from the constitution as an authoritative text. 55 As Du Plessis" puts it,
"the Constitution as text is a linguistic creation ... a law text, that provides data pertaining to
facets of the law and rendering the law intelligible and thus interpretable." This view" has
been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma" where Kentridge J59 stated:
The Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean. Even a
constitution is a legal instrument, the language of which must be respected. If the
language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 'values' the
result is not interpretation but divination ... I would say that a constitution embodying
fundamental principles should as far -as its language permits be given a broad
construction."
4.2.3 Intention of the legislature and clear language
This view should not be confused with the conventional "intention of the legislature" and
55 This is also the case "...in American political-legal culture [where] it is axiomatic that the
constitutional text is authoritative - indeed, supremely authoritative in constitutional adjudication. That
is, it is axiomatic that constitutional cases should be decided on the basis of, according to, the
Constitution." See Perry, as quoted by Rautenbach General Provisions 17 note 6.
56 See Du Plessis Lawsa par 260.
57 See also Du Plessis 2000 Stell LR 201; MOller 1999 Stell LR 269.
58 S v Zuma and others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 650H-65I I.
59 In this regard and with reference to these "values" enshrined in the text of the Constitution, it should
be pointed out that, although one could agree with the remark of Kentridge J that the language of the
Constitution has to be respected, the same is not to be said of his remark that if the language used is
ignored in favour of a general resort to "values" the result is not interpretation but divination. It is, of
course, clear that the language of the Constitution not only writes moral principles into the law, but
also refers explicitly and repeatedly to the need to make value judgments in identifying the law.
60 With regard to the "broad construction", it has been held in several cases that the Bill of Rights,
formulated as it is in expansive terms, has to be interpreted purposively which, although not
synonymous with the most generous meaning; often calls for a generous interpretation. See for
exampleSv Makwanyaneand another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par9, 325; Sv Williams 1995 (3) SA. .
632 (CC) par 51-54; Ferreira vLevin NO and others v Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) par 171, 180, 182,250,252 and257;Rv Big M Drug Mart Ltd(1985) 18 DLR
(4th) 321,356-360; Reitzer Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd vRegistrar of Medicines and Another 1989 (9)
BCLR 1113 (T) 11241-1126E.
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"clear language" point of departure in statutory interpretation." The conventional approach is
based on the assumption that the intention of the legislature is to be found in the words or
language used in the particular statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there can be
no doubt about what the legislature intended, but if the meaning is not apparent from the
language because it is vague and ambiguous, the common law rules and presumptions of
statutory interpretation should be resorted to.
In the constitutional context, an approach of attempting to discover the original intent of the
framers of the Constitution cannot do justice to the constitutional text, "for the simple reason
that the Constitution is sovereign and not the legislature"." Moreover, crucial provisions? in
the South African Constitution are couched in all but clear and unambiguous language. Du
Plessis points out that the Constitution is a value-laden text and that values can hardly be
expressed in clear and unambiguous language. It is moreover a text which is meant to cater for
a host of possibilities over an extended period of time.
In addition to being unsuitable in the constitutional context, the traditional approach would,
in view of the new constitutional dispensation, no longer be adequate for purposes of statutory
interpretation." Such an approach would be incompatible with the supremacy of the
Constitution and the constitutional imperative that all law inconsistent with the Constitution
61 For a general discussion on and an analysis of the decisions of the Constitutional Court in this regard,
see Du Plessis Lawsa par 285.
62 See Froneman J inMatiso v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (3) BCLR 80 (SE)
87E-0.
63 For example, the foundational values of the Constitution are reflected in section 1 in vague and
undefmed terms and the central position of the Bill of Rights and its foundational values are likewise
expressed in vague and undefmed terms in section 7(1). Section 39(1) provides that "When
interpreting a Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - (a) must promote the values that underlie an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; and section 39(2) refers
to the "interests of justice".
,.
64 See Du Plessis Lawsa par 28J for a discussion of the impact of constitutional interpretation on
statutory interpretation. This subject does not, however, fall within the scope of this thesis.
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should be declared invalid." The core question in interpreting a statute would now be: Which
of the possible meanings of the statutory provision conforms with the Constitution?
4.3 Interpreting the South African Constitution
4.3.1 Stages of interpretation
Du Plessis" points out that, owing to its peculiar structure and the presence of a general
provision for the limitation" of fundamental rights, the interpretation of the Bill of Rights
proceeds through a number of stages. He believes that these stages need not follow neatly and
rigidly but are actually elements rather than stages of interpretation, which he recounts as
follows:
(i) Definition of the rights or entitlements entrenched in the Bill of Rights and
determination of their scope.
(ii) Understanding the (statute, common or customary) law or conduct
(administrative action) subordinate to the Constitution~ This includes:
(a) construing "ordinary" legislation and applicable common and
customary law to determine their scope, and
(b) comprehending the effects of administrative action.
(iii) Determining whether the said law or conduct prima facie limits rights or
entitlements entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
(iv) Adjudicating the constitutional tenability or justifiability of the limitation
with reference to, amongst others, the general limitation clause as well as
other relevant provisions of the Constitutio.n. 'The general limitation clause
65 In s 2 of the 1996Constitution. In cases where the constitutionality of a provision is not challenged,
the Constitution remains relevant on account of s 39(2) which provides that statute lawmust be given
effect to in a manner promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
66 Interpretation of the Constitution par 5.
67 The limitation clause will be>dealt with in detail in eh 6.
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contains significant normative formulae for constitutional interpretation and,
in particular, for construing rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, and is
therefore a significant factor in constitutional interpretation.
In the first phase of defining the entrenched right referred to by Du Plessis, the methods of
interpretation described below could be helpful. These methods of interpretation, first
described by Von Savigny, are accepted techniques for constitutional interpretation in many
European jurisdictions. They have been summarised by Rautenbach" as follows:
the grammatical and logical approaches, whereby the linguistic meaning of
words and concepts is determined;
the systematic approach, whereby a provision is interpreted with reference
to all the provisions of the statute and the existing legal order;
the historic and genetic approach, whereby the circumstances in which the
provision was adopted, and the meaning which its creators intended, are
determined;
the teleological approach, whereby the underlying purpose and objectives of
the provisions are taken into account; and
the comparative approach, which applies provisions and case la~ from other
systems.
These methods will be used in this thesis to define the meaning of the constitutional clauses
which protect religious rights in the South African Constitution.
4.3.2 Interpretive indications in the Constitutional text
The Constitution itself contains significant indications as to how it should be construed.
Explicit indications occur in sections 239 and 39 of the Constitution. Section 239, the
definitions clause, contains certain definitions which, in the absence of contextual indications
68 A modem and extended version of Von Savigny's rules of interpretation of the first part of the
nineteenth century, as summarised by Rautenbach General Provisions p 20. Also see Du Plessis
Constitutional Interpretation par 8.3.
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to the contrary, would apply. Section 39, the interpretation clause, contains open-ended
guidelines in the interpretive process. It provides:
(1) When interpreting a Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law;
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the cornmon law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote" the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by the common law, customary
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.
Du Plessis" points out that the Constitution also contains indirect and implicit indicia with
regard to its construction. In the category of indirect indicia, he includes the preamble and
sections 1 and 7 which contain various value statements, as well as the principles of
cooperative government and the basic values and principles governing public administration.
In the second category of implicit indicia, he includes the application clause and the implicit
principles relating to the vertical and horizontal division of powers in the state."
Du Plessis also refers to the indications for interpretation to be found in sources other than the
Constitution, such as precedent and statutes which have been designed to give effect to certain
constitutional provisions. The conventional rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation
69 It has been held that "promote" in this context means to further or to advance. See S v Letoana 1997
(11) BCLR 1581 (W) 159lB-D.
70 Du Plessis Interpretation of the Constitution par 6.2 and 6.3.
71 To illustrate this statement, the author refers to the fact that nowhere in the Constitution is trias
politica explicitly mentioned as a constitutional value, but that it is clear from the scheme of the
Constitution that legislative, executive and judicial powers are defined and treated separately in
separate chapters.
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could obviously be invoked as well.
4.3.3 Judicial restraint
Reference should briefly be made to two important principles associated with constitutional
interpretation which have been endorsed in various decisions of the Constitutional Court.
Although both of them are actually concerned with the interpretation of impugned statutory
provisions and not with the interpretation of the Constitution as such, they are nevertheless
consequences of the justiciability of the Constitution.
The first principle is that constitutional review is to be exercised with restraint. 72 This principle
has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in several decisions." The main reason for
judicial restraint is the importance of maintaining a balance between the respective spheres of
authority of the legislature, executive and the judiciary (trias politica). There would be an
imbalance if an unelected judge could assess and strike down a law adopted by a
democratically elected legislature without the necessary self-restraint. In S v Lawrence" the
Constitutional Court stated:
A Court can strike down legislation that is unconstitutional and can sever or read
down provisions oflegislation that are inconsistent with the Constitution because they
are overbroad. It may have to fashion orders to give effect to the rights protected by
the Constitution, but what it cannot do is legislate.
72 See the discussion ofDu Plessis Lawsa par 260; Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal Democracy and
Constitutionalism 6-19.
73 Itwas held in S vMhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) par 59 per Kentridge AJ (in a minority
judgment) that "I would lay down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case,
civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed".
Also see Zantsi v the Council of State and Two Others 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) 1429A-C; S v
Vermaas 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) 858F-H; S v Bequinot 1997 (2) SA 887 (CC); National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others vMinister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC)
par 21; J T Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another vMinister of Safety and Security and Others 1997 (3)
SA 514 (CC) par 15. See also the discussion ofDu Plessis Lawsa par 260 of the notion of subsidiarity
and the distinction between jurisdictional and adjudicative subsidiarity.
74 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (2) SACR 540 par 80.
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There must, however, be a balance between this principle and "the interests of justice". This
was pointed out in the Zantsi case" by Chaskalson P who observed that the Constitutional
Court would constitutionalise an issue whenever it was necessary to dispose of the matter on
appeal and that that principle could not stand in the way of "the interests of justice"."
Goldstone J in Harksen v Lane N077 stated that there was no "hard and fast rule to the effect
that in no case should referrals be made to this Court where non-constitutional remedies have
not been exhausted"."
4.3.4 Reading in conformity with the Constitution
In the second instance, the principle of "Verfassungskonforme Auslegung" , that is, the reading
of a statute in conformity with the Constitution, is an accepted interpretative technique." It is
an instrument of judicial restraint which allows a Court to interpret a statute in such a way that
it will avoid a breach of the Constitution."
75 Zantsi v the Council of State and Two Others 1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) 1429A-C. See also S v
Manamela and Another 1999 (9) BCLR 994 (W) 618B-E.
76 It is interesting to note that the interim Constitution (s 102(8)) gave the court the power to refer a
matter to the Constitutional Court when.the court "is of the opinion that the constitutional issue is of
such public importance that a ruling should be given thereon." This provision has, however, been
deleted in the fmal Constitution.
77 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) par 27.
78 Also see the judgment in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others; In Re: Ex
Parte Application of President of the RSA and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) where Chaskalson
P proclaimed the sovereignty of the Constitution where and whenever the exercise of any form of
public power became susceptible to judicial assessment. Itwas held that issues directly or indirectly
related to the exercise of such power were invariably constitutional issues.
79 See the general discussion in Du Plessis Lawsa par 284. Du Plessis states that this principle is related
to the injunction in section 39(2) of the. final Constitution that the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights must be promoted by the Courts as well as to the conventional presumption of statutory
interpretation that the legislature is presumed not to enact invalid or purposeless provisions.
80 See, for instance, Nel v Le Roux NO & Others 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) where the Constitutional Court
"read down" the provisions of section 189(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 and Ynuico Ltdv
Minister of Trade and Industry and Others !995 (11) BCLR 1535 (T) 1468 where Van Dijkhorst R
preferred the term "constitutional pruning" to the "awkward foreign" term "reading down". Also see
(continued ...)
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In De Lange v Smuts NO and Others, 81 Ackerm~ J states that the principle of reading in
conformity does -
No more than give expression to a sound principle of constitutional interpretation
recognised by other open and democratic societies based on human dignity, equality
and freedom such as, for example, the United States of America, Canada and
Germany, whose constitutions, like our 1996 Constitution, contain no express
provision to such effect. In my view, the same interpretative approach should be
adopted under the 1996 Constitution."
In The Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others" the Constitutional Court, however, referred to the limits
of this principle:
Limits must, however, be placed on the application of this principle." On the one
hand, it is the duty of ajudicial officer to interpret legislation in conformity with the
Constitution so far as this 'is reasonably possible. On the other hand, the legislature
is under a duty to pass legislation that is reasonably clear and precise, enabling
80 (...continued)
Investigating Director: Serious Economic Offences vHyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd2000 (10)
BCLR 1079 (CC) par 24-26.
81 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) par 85.
82 The interim Constitution explicitly authorised the reading down of statutes in s 35(2) which provided
that "No law which limits any of the Rights entrenched in this Chapter, shall be constitutionally
invalid solely by reason of the fact that the wording used prima facie exceeds the limits imposed in
this Chapter, provided such a law is reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation which does
not exceed such limits, in which event such law shall be construed as having a meaning in accordance
with the said more restricted interpretation." The final Constitution does not contain a similar clause.
It is, however, clear from this decision that the principle of reading in conformity with the
Constitution has remained an accepted and valid interpretative technique.
83 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC).
84 See S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1995 (14) BCLR 1579 (CC) par 28; Mistry v Interim Medical and
Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1.998(7) BCLR 880 (CC) par 32; and National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others vMinister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (10 BCLR 39
(CC) par 23-24.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER4 142
citizens and officials to understand what is expected of them," A balance will often
have to be struck as to how this tension is to be resolved when considering the
constitutionality oflegislation. There will be occasions when a judicial officer will
find that the legislation, though open to a meaning which would be unconstitutional,
is reasonably capable of being read "in conformity with the Constitution". Such an
interpretation should not, however, be unduly strained.
In National Coalitionfor Gay and Lesbian Equality and others vMinister of Home Affairs and
others" the Constitutional Court extended the scope of this principle to a reading of words into
statutory provisions so as to render them constitutional. Ackermann J held that there was no
difference, in principle, between an actual or notional severance of words from an offending
provision and reading words into the provision to the same end."
The problem with "reading in", as opposed to "reading down", is that by reading words into
a statutory provision to render it constitutional, the court assumes a legislative role. Such an
approach appears to be in conflict with the above-mentioned statement in the Lawrence matter
and could blur the separation of legislative and judicial powers. The courts will, most
probably, still lay down guidelines for the proper use of this interpretive strategy.
5. Conclusion
Itwas shown in this chapter that South Africa's interim Constitution with an entrenched bill
of rights had not come into existence overnight but was preceded by a long process of
negotiation. However, despite deep-seated ideological tensions in the negotiation and drafting
85 See Dawood and Another vMinister of Home Affairs and Others, Shalabi and Another vMinister of
Home Affairs and Others, Thomas and Another Ministerof Home Affairs and Others 2000 (8) BCLR
837 (CC) par 47-48.
86 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) par 23-24.
87 This statement appears to have been accepted by the Constitutional Court in the Hyundai matter supra
where it was stated that: "It follows that where a legislative provision is reasonably capable of a
meaning that places it within constitutional bounds, it should be preserved. Only if this is not possible
should one resort to the remedy of reading in or notional severance." Also see the approach of the
majority of the Constitutional Court inSvManamela and others 2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC) par 52-
599.
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processes, there had been a marked degree of agreement on the Inclusion of religious rights.
Religious rights were consequently entrenched in section 14 of the interim Constitution and,
eventually, in section 15 of the final Constitution. Certain aspects of religious rights are also
protected by other clauses in the Constitution.
The constitutional protection of religious rights is part of the broader new constitutional
context introduced by the interim and final Constitutions. Itwas shown, at least provisionally,
that the threshold conditions for the emergence of religious freedom are now formally
complied with as a result of the entrenchment of a number of fundamental human rights in the
Constitution.
In this new constitutional dispensation introduced by South Africa's interim and final
Constitutions, the constitutional text constitutes the supreme law of South Africa and the
standard for the assessment of the validity of all law and administrative conduct. Itwas shown
that constitutional interpretation in this context is therefore fundamentally different from the
traditional concept of statutory interpretation rooted in a system of parliamentary sovereignty
and that it requires different theoretical points of departure and different methods. These
fundamental differences and the interpretive indications in the Constitution form the
framework within which the religious rights provisions in the South African Constitution will
be interpreted and assessed in the next two chapters.
'..
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CHAPTERS
ASSESSMENT OF THE FREEDOM DIMENSION OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
1. Introduction
Chapters 5 and 6 will investigate whether the South African Constitution protects the essential
rights and freedoms of religion which were identified in chapter 21 and how these rights, as
standards, should be interpreted and implemented in the South African constitutional context
to ensure adequate protection of religious rights and freedoms.
This chapter focuses on the specific (essential) rights to freedom of conscience, free exercise
of religion and religious pluralism, and the next chapter deals with the separation of state (or
law) and religion, equality of religion, and the institutional separation of church and state. This
manner of organising the discussion of the essential rights and freedom could be seen as
coinciding with the United States's approach of distinguishing between "free exercise" and
"disestablishment" of religion, as a consequence of the wording its Constitution. The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'. "Free
exercise" essentially entails the "right to be left alone" or the freedom to engage in religious
conduct without hindrance and the issue in this context is whether government action is
directly or indirectly impinging on freedom of religion. In the "establishment"cases the issue
is whether a religion is being accorded preferential treatment by the state and, therefore,
whether coercion or endorsement of a religion is present.
However, confining the discussion to "free exercise" and "establishment" of religion would
Itwas demonstrated in eh 2 that the development of religious rights in the West culminated in theories
of religious rights which included concepts of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion,
religious pluralism, equality, institutional separation of church and state and some separation of state
and religion, and it was argued that adequate constitutional protection of religious freedom includes
these essential rights and freedoms of religion.
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constitute too narrow an approach and would detract from the scope of religious rights
protection. Therefore, all the essential rights and freedoms of religion are discussed in chapters
5 and 6. Although it could be stated in general that in the case of the rights which are discussed
in chapter 5 the question is often to which extent the state is allowed to interfere with religious
convictions and practices; and in the case of the rights discussed in chapter 6 to what extent
the state is permitted to endorse or support religion, it should be kept in mind that many issues
may involve both free exercise and establishment concerns or that, in specific cases, the state
may be expected either to act or not to act.
The difficulty of categorising the essential rights and freedoms can be illustrated with
reference to the similarly problematic classification of religious rights as a particular
"generation" of human rights, which classification is based on the kind of role the state plays
in respect of a particular right. Religious rights could hardly be classified under a particular
category or generation of human rights. In so far as these rights are accommodated and
vouched for politically and constitutionally, they are civil rights and could, from this
perspective, be seen as first-generation rights. However, the exercise of religious rights in a
way that will help alleviate the socioeconomic plight of the marginalised and oppressed could
well be understood as supporting the realisation of second-generation rights. From yet another
perspective, religious rights may be perceived as cultural rights and therefore qualify as
second-generation rights. On the other hand, religious rights as group rights, especially as
protected in section 31, could also be regarded as third-generation rights. However, certain
types of religious rights could more aptly be enforced in a "negative" ("first-generation")
fashion, prohibiting the state from interfering with these civil rights, whilst the realisation of
other religious rights is achievable through their active promotion (in a "second- generation"
fashion) by the state. Although these dimensions are complementary and often overlap, they
do not always yield the same result.
In this chapter, the essential rights of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion and
religious pluralism will be discussed under the freedom dimension of religious rights since
these rights are mostly formulated and protected in a "negative" or freedom-oriented manner.
As stated above, the question in these cases is often the extent to which the state is allowed to
interfere with religious matters since the state is expected to permit the holding of a plurality
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of religious beliefs and practices and not forbid religious practices without justification .. Itwill
be investigated whether the essential rights and freedoms are protected by the South African
Constitution and how they should be interpreted in view of the particular history and
circumstances of the country. The principles of separation of state and religion, equality and
institutional separation of church and state will be discussed in the next chapter. As stated, in
the case of these principles, the issue is often whether or not the state is expected to actively
(positively) protect religious rights and, if it is permitted to protect religious rights, to what
extent it is permitted to endorse or support religion or a particular religion. However, as
already pointed out, this classification is broad and general. The point of departure of the thesis
is that the principles discussed in these chapters are "mutually supportive and mutually
subservient to the highest goal of guaranteeing 'the essential rights and liberties of religion' "
and that, since "no single principle could by itself guarantee such religious liberty", 2 religious
freedom in the South African constitutional context should be interpreted to incorporate these
multiple principles.
2. Defining "religion" in the South African Constitutional context
As this thesis is concerned wit~ the constitutional protection of the essential rights and
freedoms of religion, the first question to be addressed is what meaning should be assigned to
the word "religion'? in the South African constitutional context. Underkuffler-Freund" states:
This is the first, most difficult and (perhaps) most avoided question. It is first,
because until we know what 'religion' (for constitutional purposes) is, any
discussion of its protections or prohibitions is nonsensical. It is most difficult,
because the formulation of a coherent, abstract definition of religion is very
difficult. It is most avoided' because the difficulty in defining religion is often a
mirror of deep cultural, social, and political divisions within a society.
2 Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 530.
3 See Labuschagne 1997 De Jure 118-134 for a discussion of the development of the concept
"religion".
4 1997SAP L 45. See also Witte Introduction xxii-xxvii who illustrates the defmitional problems with
thephrase "religioushuman rights"; and Shelton andKissA Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion
559-592.
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Consideration of this question tends to illuminate dark corners that we would
rather not consider - it forces acknowledgment of the breadth, power, and divisive
potential of conflicting religious and cultural claims.
In a society where different religious identities are old, established, and well tolerated, the
formulation of a definition of religion for constitutional purposes may not be that difficult.
However, in today's heterogenous world such a society is increasingly unlikely to exist; and
it seems equally unlikely that any universal definition can readily accommodate today's
religious heterogeneity. As Chopers remarks,
[t]he scope of religious pluralism ... alone has resulted in such a multiplicity and
diversity of ideas about what is a "religion" or a "religious belief" that no simple
formula seems able to accommodate them all.
The terms "religion" and "religious" must, however, be assigned some limiting and enforceable
meaning to be useful in the constitutional context, otherwise it could be asked why religious
rights are protected at all.6Underkuffler- Freund? points out that such rights cannot encompass -
even as aprimafacie matter - all claims by individuals to act autonomously; she maintains that
there must be some exclusive, distinct meaning for "religious" rights. Witte" states that:
If religion is to be assig~ed a special place in the human rights pantheon - if
religion is in need of special protections and privileges not afforded other rights
provisions - some means of distinguishing religious rights and claims from all
others must be offered.
5 1982 University of Illinois LR 579 .
6 Before the promulgation of the interim Constitution, "religion" was defined very broadly by the
Appeal Board of Publications as "... the relationship between an individual or group and a personal
god or gods in the wide sense of the word, or a godly power or object of a material or spiritualnature,
which has, according to the "viewof the adherents, supernatural powers." Also see Hartman v
Chairman, Board for Religious Objection 1987 (1) SA 922 (0) 933-935 where the nontheistic
Therevada Buddhism was acknowledged as a religion. As will be shown below, in view of the
constitutionalguarantees i~cludingof freedom of conscience, belief, opinion, such a broad defmition
of "religion", does not seem necessary any more.
7 1997SAPL 46.
8 Introduction xxiii. Also see Smith Religion 19-1.
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The question is how wide such a definition should be. On the one hand, it needs to be broad
and inclusive enough so that no legitimate religious claim is excluded. On the other hand, it
should not be so broad that every claim becomes a religious claim with the possible result that
no claim deserves special religious rights protection." A traditional theistic definition might
be sufficient for the protection of "traditional" religions but does not account for nontheistic
religions as well. Yet to accommodate both as was attempted in the United States" by defining
religious belief as one that is "sincere and meaningful", IImight result in such a broad definition
that it would afford no protection at all to religious groups as it could include almost any
belief. To complicate matters, "religion" is, by its very essence, a matter of personal
determination."
9 See Witte Introduction xxiii.
10 In the United States the Supreme Court has not been able to explain the meaning of this critical term
conclusively and it persists to be a difficult area of controversy. Through the years the courts in the
United States have accepted numerous defmitions of "religion". See for example the cases referred
to by Underkufffler-Freund 1997 SAPL 36-37 and her remarks on some of the definitions by the
United States Supreme Court. Also see the cases referred to by Labuschagne 1997 De Jure 124-128.
However, many of these defmitions are a result of the particular formulation of the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution and, apart from pointing out various defmitional problems, would
not necessarily contribute towards reaching a constitutional defmition of religion in South Africa.
Il United States v Seeger 380 US 163 at 176 (1965). In addition to stating that religious beliefs are those
that are "sincere and meaningful", the United States Supreme Court stated that they "occup[y] in the
life of [their] possessor[s] a place parallel to that filled by ...God." In Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205,
215-216 (1972) it has been held that "religious" beliefs must be distinguished from "philosophical"
ones, with protection for the former but not the latter.
12 Compare in this regard, for example, the view of IN Pandey, in his work Constitutional Law of India
who, in his commentary on art 25( 1) of the Constitution of India which guarantees the freedom of
conscience and religion, comments that: "Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities
and it is not necessarily theistic. A religion has its basis in 'a system of beliefs or doctrines which are
regarded by those who profess that religion as conclusive to their spiritual well being'; but it will not
be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine of belief. A religion may only lay down
a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances,
ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and those forms
and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress. Religion is thus essentially a matter
of personal faith and belief. Every person has the right not only to entertain such religious belief and
ideas as may be approved by his judgment or conscience but also to exhibit his belief and ideas by
(continued ...)
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A number of authors have attempted to define "religion". Witte" defines religion, in its widest
sense, as follows:
[Religion] embraces all beliefs and actions that concern the ultimate origin,
meaning, and purpose of life, of existence. It involves the responses of the human
heart, soul, mind, conscience, intuition, and reason to revelation, to transcendent
values, to what Rudolf Otto once called, the 'idea of the holy'. The Protestant
theologian Paul Tillich in similar fashion defined religion as 'One's religion is what
gives one's life ultimate meaning. The ultimate meaning may be different at
different times for the same individual, but, at any given instant, one has, by
definition, one and only one ultimate concern.' 14
Swidler" defines religion in a narrower institutional sense:"
At the heart of each culture is what is traditionally called a Religion, that is: An
explanation of the ultimate meaning oflife, and how to live accordingly. Normally
all religions contain the four C's: Creed, Code, Cult, Community-structure, and are
based on the notion of the Transcendent. 17
He explains that "creed" refers to the cognitive aspect of religion whereby the ultimate
meaning of life is explained. "Code" includes all the rules and traditions which flow from
aspects of the "creed". "Cult" is the rituals or activities which bind the followers of a particular
religion to their Supreme Being, for example prayer, worship or other formal acts of the clergy.
"Community-structure" refers to the relations which exist between followers of a particular
12 (...continued)
such overt acts which are sanctioned by his religion."
13 Introduction xxv.
14 See also Abraham 1994SALJ346.
15 Swidler Religious Liberty and Human Rights in Nations and Religions 143, 153-165.
16 Witte Introduction xxv states that "the functionaland institutional dimensions of religion deserve the
strongest emphasis in defming the province of religious human rights" and is of the opinion that
religious claims that meet the Swidler defmition deserve the closest consideration.
17 See Fellowship of Humanity v County of Alameda 315 P 2d 394 406 (Cal Dist Ct App 1957)where
a Californian Court required these four conditions for qualifying as a religion.
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religion. The "Transcendent" to which Swidler refers can be any spirit, god, personal god,
impersonal god or emptiness. Explanations of the ultimate meaning of life which do not rest
upon the idea of a transcendent or supreme being are called "ideology" by Swidler, for
example secular humanism and Marxism.
Underkuffler-Freund," on the other hand, supports a functional approach to defining religion.
She states:
We should move beyond definitions which are based upon traditional notions of
religious content, and toward an understanding which is based upon the function
and purpose of religious freedom guarantees ...
It is the protection of the exercise of individual conscience - the ability, and
responsibility, of individuals to make personal, reasoned, moral inquiry - that is
the core value ofreligious freedom guarantees. Accordingly, religious guarantees
should focus less on the nature of the asserted belief as conventionally 'religious',
'philosophical', or what-have-you, and more on the protection of acts of
conscience, generally defined, and on the protection of the process of conscience
formation.
Such a functional definition of religious freedom guarantees, with its focus on the protection
of conscience and on the purpose served by the freedom of conscience, might very well
contribute more to understanding the scope of the constitutional rights and freedoms of
religion and beliefthan the "traditional" definitions do.However, in the South African context,
and in so far as the definition of the word "religion" as used in section 15(1) is concerned, the
endorsement of such an approach would mean that the meanings of the words "religion" and
"belief' coincide. This is unnecessary, since section 15(1) protects not only freedom of
"religion", but also the freedoms of "conscience" and "belief'. According to the presumption
of statutory interpretation that different words have different meanings," it would not be a
18 1997 SAPL 46. Also see Underkuffler-Freund 1995 Willliam and Mary LR 827 and Underkuffler
1992DePaul LK93.
19 See Du Plessis interpretation of Statutes 128-129 who states that it is characteristic of statutory
languagethat wordsandphrases arenot employedUnnecessarily.Each unit ofmeaningmust therefore
be afforded its own meaning and given effect to. He points out that this rule is related to the
(continued...)
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logical interpretation for all these words to have the same meaning." Thus if the word
"religion" is interpreted to include only traditional theistic religions, other nontraditional,
nontheistic or atheistic beliefs could still qualify for protection under the freedoms of belief.
or conscience in certain circumstances." It therefore appears that the definition of "religion"
in the South African constitutional context does not extend beyond the Swidler definition to
"what-have-you" beliefs, since the right not to hold a religion or the right to hold other sincere
beliefs would in any event be protected under freedom of belief, conscience or opinion." It is
therefore submitted that, although the terms "conscience, religion, thought, belief and
opinion'!" in the South African Constitution overlap to some degree they are by no means
19 (...continued)
presumption that no enactment contains invalid or purposeless provisions.
20 In the current context this view is supported by the following statement in the Canadian case of
Morgentaler and Others vR (1988) 31 CRR 1 at 91 per Wilson J: "It seems to me, therefore, that in
a free and democratic society 'freedom of conscience and religion' should be broadly construed to
extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded in religion or secular morality. Indeed, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, 'conscience' an~ 'religion' should not be treated as tautologous if
capable of independent, although related, meaning."
21 It is interesting to note that section 4( 1) of the German Constitution (Grundgesezt) provides that
freedom of religion and conscience as well as the freedom of religious and philosopical
("weltanschauliche") beliefs are inviolable. By equating religious and philosophical beliefs, the
section has such a wide scope that "religion" may be accorded the traditional theistic meaning without
limiting the scope of the rights entrenched in section 4(1).
22 Such an approach would not be in conflict with international human rights law. The broad defmition
in art 18 of the I~CPR has left it largely to individual states and individual claimants to define the
limits of religious· rights. Van Boven Economic and -Social Council: Working paper prepared
pursuant to Commission Resolution ]988/55 and Sub-Commission decision 1988/122 (11 July 1989)
states in general that" ... the expression 'religion or belief is used as including th~istic, non-theistic
and atheistic beliefs". Also see October 1992 Belief and State (Published by project Tandem)
"Reporting on issue relating to Article 18 of the United Declaration of Human Rights and to the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms ofIntolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief." Initially the 1981 declaration only contained the word "religion" but
after the socialist states raised the issue of atheism, the word "belief" was added. See in this regard
Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law 80-81.
23 For protection of these rights in international human rights instruments, also see: Art III of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948); Art 9 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); Art 5 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); Art 18(1) and (2) of
(continued ...)
.'
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synonymous and that each of these terms should be accorded a separate meaning.
This approach is supported by the decision in Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria"
as evidenced by the following remarks of Van Dijkhorst J:
The concept 'religion' when used in s 14 of the interim Constitution and s 15 of the
Constitution is not neutral. It is loaded with subjectivity. It is a particular system
offaith and worship. It is the human recognition of-superhuman controlling power
and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship (The
Concise Oxford Dictionary). It cannot include the concepts of atheism or
agnosticism which are the very antithesis of religion. The atheist and agnostic is
afforded his protection under the freedom of thought, belief and opinion part of
this section. There is conceptually no room for him under the freedom of religion
part. Freedom of religion does not mean freedom from religion. Remarks in United
States constitutional case law which tend to describe atheism or agnosticism as
religion are in our context inapplicable.
,
When therefore s 14(2) of the interim Constitution and s 15(2) of the Constitution
permit religious observances, this is a reference to the Jewish, Christian, Moslem,
Buddhist and other faiths practising their religion at State and State-aided
- .
institutions. Religious observances (Afrikaans: 'godsdiensbeoefening') does not
mean a practice which neither Jew, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, Hindu, nor other
faiths recognise as such; where the Supreme Being is neither the God ofIsrael nor
the Holy Trinity nor Allah the Merciful etc but a-vague nonentity.
The findings of the judge in the latter paragraph highlight an important consequence of
accepting the Swidler definition of religion: if it is accepted that the word "religion" in section
15(1) is to be interpreted in terms of the Swidler definition, it would follow that the word
23 (...continued) .
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); Art 12(1) and (2) of the American
Convention on Human Rights (1969); Principle VII of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (1975); Art of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981);
Art 1, 6, 7, and 8 of the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981); and Principle Il and 16 of the Concluding
Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States ofthe Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (1989).
24 1998 (4) SSA 423 (T) 449.
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"religious" as used in the phrase "religious observances" in section 15(2) of the Constitution,
should be given a similar meaning." On the other hand, if this definition of religion is not
accepted and if all beliefs, thought and opinions were to qualify as "religions", it would be
difficult to explain why different words were used to express the same idea.
The same issue arises in interpreting section 31 of the Constitution which refers to "persons
belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic community" who have the right to "enjoy their
culture, practise their religion and use their language". The right to "practise ... religion" as
protected in section 31(1) appears to be closely tied to defined cultural or religious identities"
and therefore reconcilable with a reading which restricts the meaning of "religion" to the
Swidler definition or Van Dijkhorst's statements in the Wittman case. According to this
construction, the holding of sincere beliefs (or nonbeliefs ) which are not of a religious nature
would be protected under freedom of be lief, opinion or conscience, but manifestations thereof
would not likewise be protected by sections 15(2) and 31. The manifestation or practising of
beliefs which do not qualify as religious beliefs as explained above would probably still
qualify for protection under freedom of expression which is entrenched in section 16 of the
Constitution.
The functional approach described above could playa valuable role in so far as it provides
some measure of limitation in order not to include all claims by individuals to act
autonomously under the guise .of freedom of religion or belief. It, however, only becomes
!~
relevant in determining the factual question in each case of whether a person in fact holds a
particular religious or other belief.
In In re Chikweche" a case decided under the Zimbabwean Constitution, the court adopted
a functional approach by concentrating on the applicant's sincerity rather than on the content
of the belief. The applicant (Chikweche) had applied for his registration as a legal practitioner
25 In accordance with the presumption that the sa~e words in the same enactment bear the same
meaning. See Du Plessis Interpretation of Statutes 1.17.
26 Underkuffler-Freund 1997 SAPL 46,
27 1995 (4) BCLR 533 (ZS); 1.-995(4) SA 284 (ZS).·
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in terms of the Legal Practitioners Act 15 of 1981 (Z). Itappeared that the applicant possessed
all the necessary qualifications required by the appropriate regulations and that he had satisfied
the additional requirements laid down in s 5(1) of the Act. When the applicant appeared in
court on the day of the application, the presiding Judge considered him to be "unkempt" and
not "properly dressed", as the applicant, a Rastafarian, habitually wore his hair in the style
known as "dreadlocks". The presiding Judge accordingly declined to permit the applicant to
take the oath of loyalty and office in terms of section 63 of the Act as a preliminary to
registration. As a result of this refusal, the applicant's counsel successfully sought the referral
of the matter to the Supreme Court in terms of section 24(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
In the proceedings before the Supreme Court the applicant deposed that the wearing of
dreadlocks was a symbolic expression of his religious and philosophical world view which
was inspired by Rastafarianism."
It was held" that the reference in section 19(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution to freedom
of conscience was intended to encompass and protect systems of belief which were not centred
on a deity or were not religiously motivated, but founded on personal morality." Itwas further
held" that the status of Rastafarianism as a "religion" in the wide and nontechnical sense had
to be accepted and that the applicant's manifestation of his religion by the wearing of
dreadlocks fell within the protection afforded by section 19(1) of the Constitution. The court,
following a functional approach, pointed out that:"
28 Gunnay CJ referred to a number of cases (at 288-290) as authority for the claim that the wearing of
dreadlocks is a symbolic expression of the religious beliefs of the Rastafarians. In the leading US
case, Reed v Faulkner 842 F 2d 960 (7th Cir 1988) the judge entertained no doubt that Rastafarianism
is a form of religion. InPeople v Lewis 510 NYS 2d 73 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1986) it was
held that a prison regulation which required male inmates to receive an initial haircut infringed on the
beliefs of the Plaintiff, a Rastafarian. InBritain Rastafarians are respected as a religious sect and are
permitted to keep their dreadlocks. Also see the English case where Rastafarianism was debated,
Crown Suppliers (Property Services Agency) v Dawkins (1993) 1 CR 517 (CA).
29 290H-l.
30 See also Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 947.
31 290G.
32 289.
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This Court is not concerned with the validity or attraction of the Rastafarian faith
or beliefs; only with their sincerity.
Inthis respect the court referred" to the words of Justice Douglas in United States vBallard:"
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life
to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they be beyond the
ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law."
Although section 19(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution only protects freedom of conscience,
and the definition of "religion" was therefore not relevant, it is ofinterest for current purposes
to note that McNally JA (one of the three judges who heard the case) expressed his
reservations about the classification of Rastafarianism as a religion; however, he had no doubt
that it was a genuine philosophical and cultural belief, and as such fell under the protection of
s 19(1) of the Constitution. Such an approach would also be appropriate in the South African
constitutional context, provided that the belief is sincerely held."
33 290.
34 322 US 78 (1944) 86-87.
35 In the same vein, the Smith Religion 19-2 also points out that the courts must not require religious
beliefs to be reasonable or sophisticated in terms of an objective standard. In this respect he refers to
Ludwig Wittgenstein and the fact that it may be futile to search for a common denominator in all
religions. He states that it may be more useful to think of the word "religion" as denoting afamily
resemblance amongst different systems of religion, much as the word "game" does in respect of
activities which constitute the referents of that word, although we cannot defrne any feature which is
common to all games.
36 A similar matter came before the Cape High Court and later before the Supreme Court of Appeal and
the Constitutional Court in South Africa. In Prince v President of the Law Society 1998 (8) BCLR
976 (C) the court held that the statutory prohibition on the use of dagga was meant to protect public
safety, order, health and morals and that these considerations outweighed the right of Rastafarians to
practice their religion though the use of dagga. The Appeal was dismissed in Prince v President of
the Law Society 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA). Judgment is still awaited in the Constitutional Court. In both
the Cape High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal the matter was decided on the basis of the
limitation clause without giving much regard to what the free exercise rights of a Rastafarian by
defmition entailed. These matters will be discussed in more detail in eh 7 which deals with the
limitation clause.
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3. Freedom of conscience
Section 15(1) of the final Constitution protects "the right to freedom of conscience". It is
therefore clear that the first essential right of religion, which lies at the heart of religious
freedom protection," is protected by the South African Constitution.
Smith" states that, in the South African context,
[t]he freedoms of thought, belief, opinion, and conscience were made largely
redundant in light of the more general protection afforded by the freedoms of
religions and expression.
It was shown in chapter 2 that freedom of conscience was the first religious right and the
minimum form of religious toleration which had already been accorded to certain religious
outsiders during the age of Constantine and was later used as the cardinal principle in the
protection of religious liberty. It aptly appears first in the South African Constitution. In so far
as freedom of conscience is concerned, one is therefore unable to agree with Smith's
statement. 39
With regard to the modern-day meaning of freedom of conscience, reference could be made
37 Heyns and Brand 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 700summarises the 'importance of the concept of
"conscience" in Western political thinking by stating that: "The 'Stoic-Christian' understanding of the
demands of political obedience dominated political thinking for many centuries, up to the start of the
modem period. The essence of this approach is the notion that one should obey the state, except where
conscience is at stake." The authors furthermore show that it was around this exception that the
Western concept of inviolable human rights evolved in the modem period.
38 Smith Freedom of Religion 19-1.
39 The author, in any event, seems to acknowledge that the presence of the freedom of conscience in the
Constitution "indicates that the drafters meant to protect traditional religious systems via freedom of
religion and to protect some residual set of ethical belief through the freedom of conscience". See the
discussion above where it was argued that each of the rights enumerated in section 15(1) ought to be
given a distinct meaning.
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to Witte's commentary" on the meaning of "liberty of conscience" in the constitutional context
of the United States. He maintains that the concept of freedom of conscience is the cardinal
principle for the American "experiment" in religious freedom, and that several other essential
rights and liberties of religion inthe American context are based directly on this core principle.
Witte shows that liberty of conscience had a distinctive content in the early American
jurisprudence. In the first place, it served to protect voluntarism. He refers in this respect to
Elisha Williams" who stated in 1744, in respect of Christianity:
Every man has an equal right to follow the dictates of his own conscience in the
affairs of religion. Every one is under an indispensable obligation to search the
Scriptures for himself ... and to make the best use of it he can for his own
information in the will of God, the nature and duties of Christianity. As every
Christian is so bound; so he has the inalienable right to judge of the sense and
meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal
right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical.
In the second place, liberty of conscience prohibited religiously-based discrimination against
individuals. This meant that persons could not be penalised for their religious choices, nor
could they be influenced to make certain choices because of the civil advantages attached to
them.
In the third place, Witte shows that, according to certain eighteenth century writers, liberty of
conscience guaranteed "a freedom and exemption from human impositions, and legal
restraints, in matters of religion and conscience"." This meant that persons of faith were to be
exempt from laws that encumbered and discriminated against certain religious believers; and
that they were to be exempt or immune from civil duties and restrictions that they could not,
in good conscience, accept or obey. In other words, Witte states that where general laws and
policies intruded on the religious scruples of an individual or group, liberty of conscience
40 Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 516-521.
4 I Williams Essential Rights and Liberties 61 as quoted by Witte and Green American Constitutional
Experiment 516-517.
42 John Mellen The Great and Happy Doctrine of Liberty (Boston 1795) 17 as quoted by Witte and
Green The American Constitutional Experiment 517.
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demanded protection of these minorities and exemption from general laws.
It could therefore be stated that, in the South African context, freedom of conscience entails
freedom of the individual to voluntarily adopt (or not adopt) a religious belief, and freedom
of religious groups" to associate and organise themselves without coercion or undue burdens
by the state or other individuals. It moreover, in principle, entails that religious individuals and
groups should not be discriminated" against on the grounds of religion and should not be
subjected to general laws and policies which they could not, in good conscience, accept or
obey.
This thesis is concerned with the protection of "beliefs and actions that concern the ultimate
origin, meaning and purpose oflife, of existence" which involve "the responses of the human
heart, soul, mind, conscience, intuition, and reason to revelation, to transcendent values"."
Hence the freedoms of "thought and opinion", which are also protected in section 15(1), will
be treated here as referring to religious thoughts and opinions. In this sense, Smith's remark
quoted above might be true in that protection of freedom of conscience, religion and belief
incorporates the protection of religious thought and opinion. But in another context the
freedoms of thought and opinion might well protect independent rights. Academic, scientific
or political opinion and other thoughts are, however, irrelevant for purposes of this thesis.
4. The right to free exercise of religion
4.1 The right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs in the South African
Constitution
The above discussion apparently exhausts the protection which section 15(1) accords. One
might nevertheless ask whether the protection extends to the essential religious right to
43 With regard to the issue of whether groups are entitled to religious rights, see the discussion in eh 7.
44 In the South African context, religiously-based discrimination is also explicitly prohibited by section
9 of the Constitution. See in this regard the discussion in eh 6.
45 Witte Introduction xxv.
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manifest or freely exercise one's religious beliefs. Could it be that the South Africa constitution
protects only "internal freedom of religion" and limits religious freedom to its "ineradicable
psychological minimum: the freedom to think and believe as one will, so long as absolutely
no external manifestation of such belief occurs"?" Or is free exercise of religion protected by
sections 15(2), 16 and 31747 It seems improbable and indeed inadequate that the only
protection of the right to freely manifest one's religious beliefs is to be found in the reference
to religious observance in section 15(2) or in the right to freedom of expression in section 16,
which does not mention religion by name, or in section 31 which protects the rights of persons
belonging to a religious community to practise their religion."
As was demonstrated in chapter 2, some form offree exercise rights had already been granted
by the Edict of Milan (in 313 AD) and in this thesis the argument was advanced earlier that
this was one of the essential or core elements of religious freedom. Witte" explains that in the
early American Republic, liberty of conscience was inextricably linked to free exercise of
religion:
Liberty of conscience was a guarantee to be left alone to choose, to entertain, and
to change one's religious beliefs. Free exercise of religion was the right to act
publicly on the choices of the conscience once made, without intruding on or
obstructing the rights of others or the general peace of the community.
He states that the phrase "free exercise" generally connoted various forms of public religious
action, including religious speech, worship, assembly, publications and education. It also
embraced the right of the individual to join or associate with other believers in religious
associations and meant that these religious associations were free to devise their own modes
46 In the words of Durham Perspectives 27.
47 S 15(2)which regulates religiousobservances at State or state-aided institutionsdoesprotect an aspect
of the free exercise of religion; itwill be discussed inmore detail in eh 6. S 16which protects freedom
of expression falls outside the scope of this thesis. S 31 will be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
48 These protections are, nevertheless, necessary and valuable extensions of the right to freely exercise
one's religious beliefs.
49 Witte and Green American'Constitutional Exper:iment 521.
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of worship, articles of faith, standards of discipline, and patterns of ritual. The drafters of the
First Amendment therefore guaranteed protection from laws "prohibiting" the free exercise of
religion.
In other words, there is no doubt that the exercise or manifestation of religious beliefs is
constitutionally protected in the United States. However, in spite of the wording ofthe First
Amendment, a "belief-action?" debate revived when religious freedom was restricted to
freedom of conviction in Reynolds v United States:" In this case a United States federal law
which criminalised bigamy was upheld in spite of the fact that a Mormon's beliefs required
him to have more than one wife. However, the United States Supreme Court later granted
protection for religiously motivated acts."
Section 4(2) of the German Constitution expressly protects the right to externally manifest
religious beliefs ("auBere Freiheit"). It is also protected by article 18 of the Universal
Declaration" and in most other modem international human rights instruments. 54
50 For a brief discussion of this dichotomy in the US jurisprudence, see Freedman 1996 THRHR 667-
674.
51 98 US 145, 25 Led 244 (1878) .
52 See Cantwell vConnecticut 310 US 296, 60 Set 900 (1940) where a conviction for religious soliciting
was reversed. However, in 1990 the "belief-action" dichotomy was reaffirmed by the US Supreme
Court in Employment Division v Smith 494 US 872 (1990). This decision evoked enormous criticism
and prompted Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 which overrules the
approach in Smith.
53 Art 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance."
54 See, for example, art 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 9
of the European Convention, art 12(1) of the American Convention and art 1(1) of the 1981
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief. It could be stated that it reflects the emerging consensus on religious liberty.
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As Durham" points out, without this extension into the external world, religious liberty is
largely meaningless. It is therefore submitted that the right to "freedom of conscience, religion,
thought, belief and opinion" in section 15(1) of the South African Constitution also includes
the right to act upon or publicly manifest or practise one's religious beliefs. Many religions,
as an integral part of their religious doctrine, contain a moral imperative to act, for example
to proselytise. To artificially draw lines and exclude acts, but not beliefs, under freedom of
religion, would be too restrictive an approach. Acting under a religious belief is, of course, not
unlimited. 56 Religious acts may be limited in accordance with the limitation clause (section 36
of the Constitution) which will be dealt with in chapter 7.
The definition of religious freedom, which includes religious practices as opposed to only
internal beliefs, appears to have been accepted in principle by the Constitutional Court. In S
v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg" Chaskalson P accepted the definition of religious
freedom enunciated by Dickson J in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd" which includes the "right to
manifest belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination". In Christian
Education South Africa v Minister of Education'? Sachs J, after also accepting the above
mentioned definition of R vBig M Drug Mart Ltd, held that "[t]his broad approach highlights
that freedom of religion includes both the right to have a belief and the right to express such
belief in practice. "60
55 Durham Perspectives 30.
56 In terms of art 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and similar
provisions of other human rights documents, freedom of religion including internal freedom of
religion, freedom of the hearth, and the freedom to change one's religion or belief, may not be
regulated by the state in any manner. It is only the manifestations of religion that may be regulated in
accordance with the restrictive conditions contained in the above mentioned subsections.
57 1997 (2) SACR 540 (CC) 568e-g.
58 (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321, 353; (1985) 13 CRR 64.
59 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 19.
60 Sachs J deferred to the meaning that Chaskalson P had given 'freedom of religion' in the Lawrence
case and stated, par 18 note 15 that there was no dissent in this respect. However, as pointed out by
Smith 2001 SALf 1-9 there was division on the very nature of freedom of religion in the Lawrence
case. Five of the nine judges who decided the Lawrence case did not hold Chaskalson P's view of the
(continued ...)
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That brings one to the question of how broadly this right to freelyexercise religious rights
should be interpreted in the South African constitutional context. In this regard an analysis of
the wording of section 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights" proves useful.
The first part of section 18 protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
The second part, whilst not purporting to be a numerus clausus, includes the following specific
rights:
(i) the right, alone or in community with others, to privately manifest one's religion;
(ii) the right to change one's religion;
(iii) the right to manifest one's religion in worship;
(iv) the right, alone or in community with others, to publicly manifest one's religion;
(v) the right to manifest one's religion in teaching, practice and observance.
Durham? points out that these rights reflect how conceptions of religious freedom have been
"deposited" in the course of history until the modem expansive protections have been attained.
The author's analysis of these rights contributes to a better understanding of the scope and
meaning of free exercise rights in a modem constitutional context.
He shows? that the right to privately manifest one's religion or "freedom of the hearth", alone
or in community with others, is the type of "house" freedom that was at times available to
dissenters. It is a slightly broader protection of religious freedom than the mere protection of
60 (...continued)
extent of the right. It was thus only the Chaskalson judgment that treated the Dickson dictum as
exhaustive of the scope of freedom of religion. In any event, the Dickson defmition which has been
accepted by Chaskalson P and Sachs J in the above mentioned cases, is only quoted here in support
of the argument that the Constitutional Court has accepted, in principle, that religious freedom also
entails free exercise of religion. As far as the scope of freedom of religion in general is concerned,
it was argued in eh 1 of this thesis that freedom of religion entails a bundle of essential rights and
freedoms.
61 This formulation was repeated in a number of subsequent international instruments as shown above.
62 In analysing art 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights which is similar to s 18. See
Perspeatives 26-30.
63 Durham Perspectives 28.
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"internal freedom of religion", in that internal beliefs can at least be externally exercised within
the privacy of one's home, but this is obviously inadequate from a contemporary perspective.
The right to change one's religion is but a short step from the right to have a religion and to
practise it in the privacy of one's home. This clause gave tise to much discussion and
controversy when the Universal Declaration was drawn up and it still leads to considerable
controversy in international human rights law." This subject, however, does not fall within the
scope of this thesis, and for present purposes it will be accepted that the right to change one's
religion is part of freedom of religion.
The freedom of worship, narrowly construed, protects the right to worship or pray alone or
with others within the privacy of someone's home. At a more expansive level, it would permit
communal services in churches or other buildings without allowing any manifestation of belief
outside these buildings. Worship includes only the actual formal acts or rituals of worship as
opposed to other religiously motivated behaviour. As Durham" points out, the presence of the
term "worship" constitutes a significant achievement at an earlier stage in the unfolding of
religious liberty but now reflects an excessively narrow conception of what religion entails.
It may be just as important to religious believers to engage in other religious practices or
observe dietary rules and days of rest as it is to formally attend worship services.
Article 18 extends religious liberty to the public sphere: The protection of religion in any
modem country should accordingly protect religion in public or private.
Finally, article 18 protects not only internal religious beliefs or their manifestation in worship,
but also the "teaching, practice and observance" thereof. In the first instance and by protecting
"teaching", religious individuals shoul? be permitted to teach their religion to the young
generation, new converts and students in accordance with the tenets of the specific religion.
64 See for example the discussion in Gildenhuys 2001 SAPL 151-175 which deals with the right to
change one's religion or belief in international human rights law. Also see the contributions in the
special (summer) edition of2000 Emory Int'l L Rev (edited by JD van der Vyver) which deal with the
problem of proselytization in Southern Africa.
65 Durham Perspectives 29.
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This would also mean that religious groups, including theological seminaries or other
institutions where clergy are being trained, should enjoy this right. The right to freedom of
expression will protect many of these practices but, in addition, the right to religious freedom
particularly includes the protection of religious institutions in which religion is taught and
transmitted. Secondly, protecting the practice and observance of religious beliefs would entail
the right to carry out the beliefs and instructions of a particular belief, such as dietary
prescriptions, religious holidays, festivals and Sabbaths, and to participate in communal
services and rituals such as ordinations and the holding of church courts.
Witte" summarises the modem content of the right to manifest or practise one's religion as
follows:
More fully conceived, religious entitlements embrace an individual's ability and
means to engage in religious assembly, speech, worship, to observe religious laws
and rituals, to pay religious taxes, to participate in religious pilgrimages, to gain
access to religious totems, and the like. They also embrace the religious group's
power to promulgate and enforce internal religious laws of order, organisation, and
orthodoxy, to train, select, and discipline religious officials, to establish and
maintain institutions of worship, charity, and education, to acquire, use and
dispose of property and literature used in worship and rituals, to communicate with
co-believers and proselytes, and many other affirmative acts in manifestation of
the beliefs of the institution.
It could therefore be stated that free exercise rights in the South African Constitution should
be interpreted to include the following rights and freedoms enumerated in article 6 of the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief (1981):
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to
establish and maintain places of worship for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate· charitable or humanitarian
institutions;
66 Introduction xxviii.
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(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and
•
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from
individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called
for by the requirement and standard of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in
accordance with the precepts of one's 'religion or belief;
(1) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and
communities in matters of religion or belief at the national and international
levels.
4.2 The right to establish educational institutions based on a common religion
Itwas argued in the previous paragraph that the right to teach religious beliefs is included in
the right to manifest one's religious beliefs. Parents' right to direct their children's education
in conformity with their own religious convictions is moreover an internationally
acknowledged right. 67
67 Art 18(4)of the InternationalCovenant onCivil and PoliticalRights provides that "TheStatesParties
to the present Covenantundertake to have respect for the libertyof parents and,when applicable, legal
guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions". Art 13(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
provides that "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents and when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those
established by the public authorities, which conform to suchminimumstandards asmaybe laid down
or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions". Art 2(b) of the Convention against Discrimination in
Education (1960) provides that: "When permitted in a State, the following situations shall not be
deemed to constitute discrimination, within the meaning of Article 1 of this Convention: (b) The
establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, of separate educational systems or
(continued ...)
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Section 32(c) of the South African interim Constitution provides:"
Every person shall have the right -
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common
culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination
on the ground of race.
This section was interpreted by the Constitutional Court in the case of Ex Parte Gauteng
Provincial Legislature: In Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions
of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995.69 The petitioners inter alia" argued that sections
67 (...continued)
institutions offering an education which is in keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents or legal
guardians, if participation in such systems or attendance at such institutions is optional and of the
education provided conforms to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent
authorities, in particular for education of the same level;" Also see art 2 of Protocol NO 1 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1952); art 5
of the Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1960); art 4 of the American Convention on
Human Rights (1969); and art 5 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms ofIntolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
68 The equivalent section, s 29(3) in the fmal Constitution, differs from this section as will be shown
below.
69 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC).
70 It was also argued that s 19 of the Gauteng School Education Bill was unconstitutional since, on a
proper interpretation ofs 32(c) of the Constitution, government was not entitled to prohibit language
competency testing as an admission requirement. This issue is, however, not addressed in this thesis.
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21(2), 21(3?l and 22(3)72of the Gauteng School Education Bill were unconstitutional since,
on a proper interpretation of section 32(c) of the Constitution, government was not entitled to
direct what religious policy should be developed or who should or should not attend religious
classes at schools established in terms of section 32.
Mahomed DP stated that it was crucial to the petitioners' case to determine whether section
32(c) of the Constitution indeed imposed a positive obligation on the state to accord every
person the right to have established schools, where practicable, based on a common culture,
language or religion subject only to the qualification that it was practicable and that there was
no discrimination on the grounds of race. He found" that what was provided for in section
32(c) was that every person would have the right to establish such educational institutions. The
section, however, provides a defensive right to persons who wish to establish such educational
institutions and protects that right from invasion by the State, but does not confer an obligation
on the state to establish such educational institutions.
Itwas contended by the petitioners that, if section 32(c) was only intended to protect the right
71 S 21(2) and (3) of the Gauteng School Education Bill read as follows: "(2) The religious policy of a
public school shall be developed within the framework ofthe following principles: (a) The education
process should aim at the development of a national, democratic culture of respect for our country's
diverse cultural and religious traditions. (b) Freedom of conscience and of religion shall be respected
at all public schools; (3) If, at any time, the Member of the Executive Council has reason to believe
that the religious policy of a public school does not comply with the principles set out in ss (2) or the
requirements of the Constitution, the Member of the Executive Council may, after consultation with
the governing body of the school concerned, direct that the religious policy of the school be
reformulated in accordance with ss (1) and (2)."
72 S 22(3) reads: "(3)(a)(i) Every learner at a public school, or at a private school which receives a
subsidy in terms of s 69, shall have the right not to attend religious education classes and religious
practices at that school. (ii) In this regard the department shall respect the rights and duties of parents
to provide direction to their children in the exercise of their rights as learners, in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacity of the children concerned. (b) The right conferred by par (a) on a learner
at a private school which receives a subsidy in terms of s 69, may be limited where such limitation is
necessary to preserve the religious character of the private school concerned. (c) Except as is provided
for in par (b) no person employed at a public school, or at a private school which receives a subsidy
in terms of s 69, shall in any way discourage a learner from choosing not to attend religious education
classes or religious practices at that schoo1."
73 Par 7.
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of persons to establish their own educational institutions, it would not be necessary to qualify
such a right by making it subject to the requirement that it should be practicable. Mahomed
DP rejected this argument on the basis that the requirement of practicability was sensible in
both interpretations of section 32(c) and of neutral value in the proper interpretation of the
subsection.
Sachs J concurred with Mahomed DP, but was specifically concerned in his judgment with
internationally recognised principles relating to the protection of minorities to establish what
bearing, if any, they would have on the interpretation of section 32, and more particularly of
section 32(c) of the interim Constitution. He eventually reached the same conclusion as
Mahomed DP. The question that he sought to answer was-
whether there is a current trend towards supplementing individual rights,
expressed mainly by the principles of non-discrimination and equality, with
additional group rights claimable against the State in the form of obligatory State
support for fostering cultural, linguistic and religious diversity.
In considering the broad South African context, Sachs J located the minority rights enquiry
(under the interim Constitution) in the context of three important considerations highlighted
by that Constitution." The first relates to constitutional claims by the different language
communities and the third to the rights of children. For current purposes, only his second
consideration is of importance, namely that immense inequality continues to exist in relation
to access to education in our country. After examining a variety of international law
instruments, the judge stated in summary that the South African Constitution would be entirely
consistent with the principles of international human rights law if it:
prevented the State from embarking on programmes intended or calculated
to destroy the physical existence or to eliminate the cultural existence, of
particular groups;
required the State to uphold the principles of non-discrimination and equal
rights in respect of members of minority groups;
......
74 Par 50-54.
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permitted and possibly required the State to take special remedial or
preferential action to assist disadvantaged groups to achieve real equality;
permitted but did not require the State to establish communal schools, or to
support such schools already established;
permitted members of minority groups to establish their own schools.
It is thus clear that section 32(c) of the interim Constitution was interpreted strictly as a
"freedom" which requires the state to permit the establishment of communal schools, and not
as imposing any obligation on the state to promote or foster religious diversity."
In the final Constitution, the reference to religion in the clause on education was deleted."
Section 29(3) of the Constitution now provides:
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense,
independent educational institutions that-
(a) do not discriminate on the basis ofrace;
(b) are registered with the state; and
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable
public educational institutions.
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational
institutions.
The position of religiously based educational institutions seems to be conclusively defined by
the finding in the Gauteng School Education Bill case and by the newly formulated section
29(3) which leave no doubt that "everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own
75 This is a clear example of the different results of the "first generation right" and "second generation
right" approaches.
76 All references to specific grounds were, in fact, deleted from s 29(3) in the fmal Constitution. This
was probably done in order not to unnecessarily limit the application of the section. It was, for
example, problematic under the interim Constitution that "a common sex" was not specifically
included as one of the grounds upon which an educational institution could be based, thereby
excluding single sex schools.
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expense, independent educational institutions". This does not, however, preclude state
subsidies for independent educational institutions. One is nevertheless left with the impression
that religious group rights are not available to all but merely to those who can pay their own
way.77This is demonstrated by the concurring judgment of Kriegler J in the Gauteng School
Education Bill case where he stated: 78
Subartikels (a) en (b) van art 32 van die Grondwet boekstaafen bevestig die reg
van iedereen op basiese onderwys, gelyke toegang tot onderwysinstellings en,
waar redelikerwys uitvoerbaar, onderrig in die taal van die leerling se keuse ...
Daarop brei subart 32(c) dan uit. Soos my KollegaMahomed AP aandui - en ek
wilonderstreep - hou die Grondwet daarmee die deur oop vir diegene vir wie die
Staat se onderwysinstellings ontoereikend geag word wat betref gemeenskaplike
kultuur, taal of godsdiens. Dit staan hulle vry om eendragtig die erwe van hul
vaders vir hul kinders te behou. Daar is egter 'n prys, naamlik dat so 'n
bevolkingsgroep daarvoor die hand in eie sak moet steek. In 'n sin gaan die huidige
geskil dus nie om volksgoed nie maar om geld.
This result appears to be reinforced when one reads sections 29(3) and 15(2) of the final
Constitution" in conjunction with each other. As has just been explained, section 29(3)
provides for the establishment of independent educational institutions on the basis of, for
example, a communal religious belief. Section 29(4) states that this does not preclude state
subsidies for independent educational institutions. However, section -15(2) could be read to
imply that as soon as an educational institution receives a state subsidy, it is a "state-aided"
institution and that religious observances at such an institution then have to follow the rules
made by the appropriate public authorities and be conducted on an equitable basis, and that
attendance of these observances has to be free and voluntary. This result seems to contradict
the purpose of section 29(3). Itwill therefore be argued in chapter 6 that the phrase "religious
observances" in section 15(2) must be defined narrowly to include only religious practices in
the true sense of the word.
77 SeeMurdock v Pennsylvania 319 US 105 at Ill.
78 Par 41and 42.
79 See the discussion below in eh 6.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER5 171
The above-mentioned interpretation of the provisions of section 32 of the interim Constitution
(now section 29(3)) in the Gauteng School Education Bill case is not the most benign and
accommodative approach to religious rights but it cannot be said to be unduly restrictive of
religious freedom. It appears that the Constitutional Court has chosen to interpret religious
rights in a strictly "freedom" oriented manner. As shown above, the right to teach religious
prescripts is often formulated in "freedom" terms. It would, however, be more accommodating
of religious rights if the state were to promote and foster religious diversity by subsidising
independent educational institutions based on a common religion as permitted by section 29(4)
and one could hope that the constitutional jurisprudence would proceed to such an active
approach. Du Plessis" also expresses his concerns in this regard:
The ... concern iswhether, in light of SouthAfrica's post- 1994 constitutional case
law, it is realistic to expect that judicial constructions of religious freedommight
proceed beyond the mere allowance of a passive toleration of individual free
exercise rights. Is it realistic to hope that constitutional warranties may be
forthcoming in order to sustain the identity and integrity of dissimilar religious
groups and communities, in a country where incongruities intertwined with
religious life are rife? This expectation is premised on the cultivation of active
religious tolerance in a state that abstains from favoring any particular religious
communities or sentiments.
5. Religious pluralism
South Africa indisputably has a vast religious diversity," and the provisions of the South
African Constitution appear to protect the essential principle of religious pluralism or
diversity. Section 15(1) protects a plurality of religious beliefs by according freedom of belief
to "everyone". Pluralism and the group dimension of religious rights are moreover protected
by section 15(3) which provides for the recognition of religious systems under any tradition,
by section 17 which protects freedom of association, by section 31 which protects religious
80 Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 102.
81 For a summary of the religious demography of South Africa, see Du Plessis Religious Human rights
in South Africa 442. For statisties of religious affiliation in South Africa, see Gouws and Du Plessis
2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 657, 659-661. On the reality of cultural and religious diversity within South
Africa, see Dlamini Culture, Education and Religion 573-598.
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communities and by section 29(3) which entrenches the right to establish independent
educational institutions." Inthis regard Sachs J in Christian Education South Africa vMinister
of Education" stated:
There are a number of other provisions designed to protect the rights of members
of communities. They underline the constitutional value of acknowledging
diversity and pluralism in our society and give a particular texture to the broadly
phrased right to freedom of association contained in section 18. Taken together,
they affirm the right of people to be who they are without being forced to
subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight
the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has been
called "the right to be different". In each case, space has been found for members
of communities to depart from a general norm. These provisions collectively and
separately acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by civil society, indicating in
particular that language, culture and religion constitute a strong weave in the
overall pattern.
Sections 15(1), 31 and 15(3), which deal specifically with religious rights, deserve closer
analysis.
5.1 "Everyone" in section 15(1)
As shown in chapter 2, the extension of religious rights to everyone was one of the most
important achievements of the law pertaining to religious freedom in this century. Itmeans that
religious rights protections are not limited to members of a particular religion, to religious
believers" only or even to citizens - it is extended to everyone. By protecting the right of
"everyone" to religious freedom in section 15 (1), the South African Constitution is thus, in
principle, protecting the essential religious right of pluralism.
82 Also see s 30 which recognizes the right to use a language and to participate in the cultural life of
one's choice and s 211(3) which recognizes customary law.
83 2000(I) BCLR 1051 (CC)par24.
84 As shown above, it has come to be accepted in international human rights law that the right to
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion" extends to philosophical "Weltanschauungen" as well
as to more traditional religious orientations.
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An important aspect of religious pluralism is that it protects not only religious individuals to
hold a variety of religious beliefs, but also the existence of various religious groups. In this
regard, a distinction can be drawn between confessional and social pluralism:" confessional
pluralism can be described as the maintenance and accommodation of a plurality of forms of
religious organisations in the community, and social pluralism as the maintenance and
accommodation of a plurality of associations, in addition to churches, synagogues, mosques
and so forth, to foster religion, for instance schools and charities in the broader community or
civil society.
Section 15(1) of the South African Constitution should be construed as not applying only to
natural persons, but also to juristic persons or religious associations. Such an approach would
be in line with the historical development of religious rights. It was shown in chapter 2 that,
after the Edict of Milan, religious rights were primarily protected as group rights and only later
extended to all individuals. This aspect will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 7.86
5.2 The rights of persons belonging to religious communities in section 31
Religious human rights, as explained in chapter 2, comprise an individualistic as well as a
collective or associational dimension." The first dimension encompasses the right of
individuals to decide what they want to believe and whether and how they want to express
these beliefs." In this sense, coercion, the antithesis of voluntarism, is the enemy of the
autonomous individual. The collective or group dimension, on the other hand, focuses on the
85 See Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 522-524 who explains that eighteenth
century writers in America regarded "multiplicity", "diversity" or "plurality" as an essential principle
of religious rights and liberties. In other words, it was a constitutional condition for the guarantee of
true religious rights and liberties. Two kinds of pluralism were distinguished, namely, confessional
pluralism and social pluralism.
86 See the discussion of the application clause (more specifically section 8(4)) in eh 7.
87 Heyns and Brand 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 703-704 state that these dimensions are two opposing, but
complementary components: one is the need to be left alone; the other. the need for engagement by
others and also to engage others.
88 The individualist orientation of human rights norms is grounded in Enlightenment reasoning. See the
discussion in eh 2.
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interests of the group or community. Itproceeds from the premise that religion and conscience
are not matters which are entirely free and the outcome of individual choice; Communal
definitions of religious human rights imply that not only individuals, but also religious
associations and communities (such as churches, temples, mosques, families, religious
publishers and suppliers and religious schools) have the right to express their religious beliefs
and values.
Elements of both individualist and communal perspectives of religious rights are present in
any legal system, and ajurisprudence of religious human rights has to balance these concerns
and define their respective limits." This is also the case in South Africa as illustrated by the
following comment of Sachs J in Christian Education South Africa vMinister of Educationi"
Just as it is difficult to postulate a firm divide between religious thought and action
based on religious belief, so it is not easy to separate the individual religious
conscience form the collective setting in which it is frequently expressed.
Religious practice often involves interaction with fellow believers. It usually has
both an individual and a collective dimension and is often articulated through
activities that are traditional and structured, and frequently ritualistic and
ceremonial.
The interim Constitution did not distinguish between personal and communal religious
observances and practices. The final Constitution, however, makes specific provision in
section 31 for the practice of religion in community with others. Under the heading "cultural,
religious and linguistic communities", section 31 of the Constitution provides:
Cl) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not
be denied the right, with other members of that community-
89 Issues of cultural self-assertion and cultural relativism versus individualism are part of the ongoing
international debate. This subject is therefore part ofthe much broader issue of religious and cultural
diversity in a single nation state and the corresponding quests for constitutional solutions. One can
agree with Huntington 1993 Foreign Affairs no 3 22 that in current world politics "the dominating
source of conflict will be cultural". This aspect will also be referred to when dealing with section
15(3) of the Constitution later in this chapter.
90 2000 (1) BCLR) 1051 (CC) par 19.
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(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their
language; and
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic
associations and other organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Minority rights" will not be analysed in detail in this section. Minority rights issues in South
Africa constitute a subjeet of vast proportions with a strong international law" component and
91 S 31 does not refer to minorities, but to those who belong to a cultural, religious or linguistic
"community". It is, however, submitted that the section caters to "minority" rights, as understood in
international human rights law. The section closely follows the wording of section 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which provides: "In those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise their own religions, or to use their own language". See the remarks of Sachs J in
Christian Education South Africa vMinister of Education 2000 (1) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 23 where
he pointed out the differences between the two texts. The reason for using the word "communities"
is probably, as pointed out by Sachs J in par 25, that "the interest protected by section 31 is not a
statistical one dependent on a counter-balancing of numbers, but a qualitative one based on respect
for diversity".
92 There are many other provisions in international human rights law which protect religious minorities,
groups and indigenous populations. See for example art II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); Art 6 of the Convention No 106 Concerning Weekly
Rest in Commerce and Officers (1957); Art 4 of Convention No 107 concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries
(1957); Art 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961); Recommendation 3 of the
Recommendation Concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and
education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1974); Art 12 of the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981); Principles 16 and 19 of the Concluding Document of
the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (1989); Art 29 and 30 and Principles 30, 32, 33, 35, 36 and 40 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); Par 3 and 6 of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe
(1990); Art 1-9 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities (1992); Art 5, 7 and 32 of Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1989); Par 19,33 (part I) and 25, 26 and 27 (Part
II(b )(2» of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993); Art 4 of the Statute of the
International tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
(continued ...)
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justify an independent study." The discussion here will be confined to the protection of
religious group rights by the Constitutional Court.
Up to now there has been two Constitutional Court decisions involving section 31 and
religious group rights. The Gauteng School Education Bil! case which was discussed above
was decided in the context of section 32 of the interim Constitution (the right to education)."
Some of the arguments raised by the Court deserve further attention in the context of religious
group rights on account of their underlying assumptions, rather than their bearing on section
32(c). In the first instance, the remarks made by Sachs J on a "hierarchy ofrights" in the South
African (interim) Constitution call for comment. He stated that:"
[t]he very first fundamental right to be specified, preceding even the rights to life
and dignity, is the right to equality. We are further enjoined to interpret the whole
of chapter 3, including s 32, in a way which promotes the values of an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality. The theme of diversity has
markedly less constitutional pungency .... Thus, the dominant theme of the
Constitution is the achievement of equality, while considerable importance is also
given to cultural diversity and language rights, so that the basic problem is to
secure equality in a balanced way which shows maximum regard for diversity. In
my view, the Constitution should be seen as providing a bridge to accomplish in
a principled yet emphatic manner, the difficult passage from State protection of
minority privileges, to State acknowledgement and support of minority rights. The
objective should not be to set the principle of equality against that of cultural
diversity, but rather to harmonise the two in the interests of both. Democracy in
a pluralist society should accordingly not mean the end of cultural diversity, but
rather its guarantee, accomplished on the secure bases of justice and equity.
92 (...continued)
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
(1993); and Art 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
such Violations Committed in the Territory of theNeighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and
31 December 1994 (1994).
93 See for example Strydom 1997 Loy LA Int'! & Camp LJ 873-9 ~4.
94 S 29 in the fmal Constitution.
95 Par 52.
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Despite the well-considered remarks of the judge, it is obvious that the gist of this statement
is that equality is the touchstone of the Constitution: as long as equality is secured, diversity
will be accorded maximum regard. Such an approach would, however, imply that equality
concerns will usually dominate minority rights because, in nearly all instances of disputes
involving minority rights, equality is the "opposing" interest against which such rights will
have to be balanced. If the "dominant theme" of the Constitution is equality and diversity has
"markedly less constitutional pungency", the reality is that equality will almost always prevail
over minority rights. This is what an unqualified acceptance of individual equality as the
dominant theme of the Constitution implies.
In the second instance, and in the context of equality and equal access to educational
institutions, there are several references to "affluent schools and their defensive postures" or
schools that were "well-endowed because of past state support". Such a, narrow understanding
of equality as merely a socioeconomic equality would imply that the meaning of equal
treatment of groups will always be dominated by economic considerations and, as Strydom"
points out, "[w]hat has affluence, after all, to do with the protection of a right?".
In the third place, Sachs J's definition of groups which are entitled to protection IS
fundamentally suspect. He concluded that:"
[T]he central theme that runs though the development of international human
rights law in relation to the protection of minorities, is that of preventing
discrimination against disadvantaged and marginalised groups, guaranteeing them
full and factual equality and providing for remedial action to deal with past
discrimination .... The weight of international law ... should be in favour of the
dominated and not the dominating minorities.
Strydom" shows that, in thus arguing, Sachs J relied heavily upon the dated works of
Capotorti on minority rights in international law. He makes the following valid remarks in this
96 1997 Loy LA Int'! & Comp LJ 891.
97 Par 87.
98 1997 Loy LA Int'/'& Comp LJ 891-892.
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regard:
In relation to the state, a cultural or ethnic group is neither a minority nor a
majority. As equal partners in rights, all cultural groups irrespective of their
numerical, linguistic, religious, economic or other differences, have rights to equal
treatment by the state in accordance with the demands of justice, of which the state
is essentially an agent. This ideal vanishes once the state is perceived to be the
embodiment of a specific societal group.
Thus, from a juridical and state theory perspective, Capotorti's categorical
statement that dominant minority groups do not need protection lacks foundation.
The republican idea of the modern state refers to ajuridically qualified, communal
bond between citizens and government that transcends all non-juridically qualified
social relations. Thus, the numerical, political, economic or cultural dominance of
one group or another is irrelevant for the protection of rights. The integration of
rights and interests in the state by public law is inclusive, neither excluding nor
favouring a particular group. After all, that is why the modern state is referred as
a res publica, a public matter. Significantly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe stated the following in a recommendation on the rights of
minorities:
'In a democratic state there can be no ~econd class citizens: citizenship is the
same for all .... Within this common citizenship, however, citizens who
share specific characteristics ... with others may wish to be granted and
guaranteed the possibility of expressing them'
Once we link the need for protection to extraneous considerations such as
dominance or non-dominance, this equal and common citizenship is refuted. From
a legal rights perspective, the sole question is whether a group has a right or
interest which inherently qualifies for protection. Nonetheless, the manner in
which the state provides protection for certain groups may of course differ, despite
the principle of equity receiving due recognition.
It appears from section 31 that the state chose to,protect religious group (or minority) rights
in a rather liberal style: In other words, "the state's obligation begins and ends with
demonstrating a liberal tolerance towards the collective goals and aspirations of certain
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cultural communities.t'" In this regard, the hope expressed above with regard to the right to
establish independent educational institutions, namely that constitutional jurisprudence will
proceed to a more active protection and promotion or fostering of religious diversity is
repeated here. Despite questions as to the appropriateness of such a model for a diverse South
African society, the conclusion cannot be drawn that the Constitution does not protect the
principle of plurality. 100
However, the same cannot be said of the approach of the Constitutional Court to minority
rights in the Gauteng School Education Bill case. It is submitted that the Court's distinction
between dominant and nondominant groups (apparently based on economic considerations)
for the purpose of qualifying for group rights protection does not adequately protect the
principle of pluralism or, for that matter, equality.
InChristian Education South Africa vMinister of Education, 101 an organisation of Christian
parents approached the High Court to strike down section Itlof the South African Schools Act
which proscribes corporal punishment in any public or private school. The applicants
contended that corporal punishment was part of the religious beliefs of its members as
protected by sections 15(1) and 31(1) of the Constitution and sought to have it reinstated in
at least those Christian private schools under its auspices. The application was refused in the
99 Strydom Loy LA Int'l & Camp LJ 890.
100 In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA fn (CC) it was argued that the
wording of s 31 did not comply with the requirements of Constitutional Principle (CP) XII. The Court
noted that: "CP XII does not indicate how the collective rights of self-determination are to be
recognized and protected. That was a matter for the [Constitutional Assembly] to decide. Having
regard to the CP's as a whole, the '(c)ollective rights of self-determination' mentioned in CP XII are
associational individual rights, namely those rights which cannot be fully or properly be exercised by
individuals otherwise than in association with others of like disposition. The concept 'self-
determination' is circumscribed both by what is stated to be the object of self-determination, namely
'forming, joining and maintaining organs of civil society' as well as by CP Iwhich requires the State
for which the Constitution has to provide, to be 'one sovereign State'. In this context 'self-
determination' does not embody any notion of political independence or separateness. It clearly relates
to what may be done by way of the autonomous exercise of these associational individual rights, in
the civil society of one sovereign State."
10 1 1999 (9) BCLR 951 (SE).
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High Court!" and then taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court.'?'
In a more carefully reasoned judgment the Constitutional Court once again indicated its
preference for the liberal, freedom oriented approach to religious group rights as illustrated by
the following remarks of Sachs J on section 31 :
The rights protected by section 31 are significant both for individuals and for the
communities they constitute. If the community as community dies, whether
through destruction or assimilation, there would be nothing left in respect of which
the individual could exercise associational rights. Moreover, if society is to be
open and democratic in its fullest sense it needs to be tolerant and accepting of
cultural pluralism. At the same time, following the approach used in article 27, the
protection of diversity is not effected though giving legal personality to groups as
such. It is achieved indirectly through the double mechanism of positively enabling
individuals to join with other individuals of their community, and negatively
enjoining the State not to deny them the rights collectively to profess and practise
their own religion.'?'
Sachs J assumed that section 10 limited the parents' religious rights both under section 31 and
section 15 but dismissed the appeal on the basis that a statute which precludes parents from
authorising a school to administer corporal punishment does not, if all relevant considerations
are taken into account, impose a constitutionally untenable limitation on the parents' free
exercise of their religious beliefs. lOS This case will be dealt with in more detail in chapters 6
102 See the discussion of Liebenberg J's decision in the High Court in eh 6. Only the ConstitutionalCourt
decision will be discussed in this chapter.
103 Christian Education South Africa vMinister of Education 2000 (1q.) BCLR 1051 (CC).
104 S 31 expresses the right of communities to practise their religion or to form, join and maintain
religious associations in individual terms by referring to "personsbelonging to" religious communities
instead ofto the communities themselves. S 15(1), s 16(1)and s 18which protect everyone's right to
religious freedom, freedom of expression and freedom of association respectively and which could
bolster group rights are likewise expressed in individual terms. The exercise of the rights in s 31 is
also subject to the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. S 31(2) of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he rights in subsection (1) maynot be exercised in amanner inconsistent with any provision of the
Bill of Rights".
105 Par 29-52.
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and 7.
5.3 The recognition of systems of religious personal and family law in section 15(3)
5.3.1 Introduction
Religious pluralism or diversity is also protected by section 15(3) of the Constitution. As. .
shown in chapter 3, the political power in South, Africa was mainly in the hands of people of
the Christian faith before 1994. This was evident in many laws.'?' Marriages contracted in
terms of a system of religious law which permitted polygyny, such as Islam, were not
recognised by South Africa law.'?' This had negative legal implications for such matters as
intestate succession, the patrimonial consequences of marriage, the legal status of the children
born from such unions'" and maintenance after divorce,'?" as pointed out by Mahomed DP in
Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North and Others:"?
Unions which have been solemnised in terms of the tenets of the Islamic faith, for
example, are not recognised in our law because such a system permits polygamy
in marriage. Itmatters not that the actual union is in fact monogamous. As long as
the religion permits polygamy, the union is "potentially' polygamous" and for that
reason, said to be against public policy. The result must therefore be that the father
of a child born pursuant to such a religious union would not have the same rights
as the mother in adoption proceedings pursuant to s 18 of the Act. The child would
106 See the discussion above in eh 3. Also see Van der Vyver Religion par 236.
107 The refusal of the South African law to recognise Muslim marriages has long been a cause of
grievance in the Muslim community. See Cachalia 1993 THRHR 398; also see the remarks of Sachs
J in S v Lawrence; S vNegal; Sv Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) par 149-152.
108 In Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 2~ 1 (CC) Mahomed J found that the fact
that fathers of children born from Black customary unions have greater rights than similarly placed
fathers of children born from marriages contracted according to the rites of religions such as Islam,
constituted a clear violation of the equality clause of the interim Constitution.
109 It even affected the law of evidence. In S v Johardien 1990 (1) SA 1026 (C) it was held that the
privilege that one spouse cannot be compelled to disclose communications made to him or her by the
other spouse during marriage, does not apply to a marriage according to Muslim rites.
110 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) par 21 .
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not have the status of "legitimacy" and the consent of the father to the adoption
would therefore not be necessary, notwithstanding the fact that such a union, for
example under Islamic law, might have required a very public ceremony, special
formalities and onerous obligations for both parents in terms of the relevant rules
ofIslamic law applicable.
Section 15(3) of the Constitution now states that section 15 does not prevent legislation from
recognising marriages concluded under a system of religious personal or family law, or from
recognising systems of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular
religion.
Section 15(3) permits legislation which recognises systems of personal and family law and
marriages concluded under any tradition. Since the subject matter in the current context is
religious rights, and since section 15(3) appears to have been inserted with a view to
specifically address the problems of Muslims, III only the nonrecognition of Muslim marriages
and the statutory enactment of Muslim personal and family law will be discussed. The same
principles would, however, apply mutatis mutandis to systems of personal and family law
under any other tradition.'"
5.3.2 The effect of section 15 on the recognition of Muslim marriages
In Kalla and Another v The Master and Others.:" it was argued on behalf of the second
respondent that, since the advent of the new Constitution and in terms of section 14(1) of the
Constitution, every person had the right to freedom of religion, that the mores of society had
changed accordingly and that the Ismail case, which regarded a potentially polygamous union
to be contra bonos mores, was no longer valid in the new South Africa.!" The applicants
III Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 157 state that s 14(3)
was included at the behest of a Muslim jurist claiming to represent the Muslim community in South
Africa and with the support of diversely affiliated politicians.
112 It should be noted that "tradition" is not limited to religious traditions.
113 1994 (4) BCLR 79 (T).
114 85B.
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contended that the marriage between the deceased and the second respondent according to
Muslim rites was a potentially polygamous union and accordingly not valid and enforceable
as a marriage in terms of South African law.
The facts were briefly that the applicants were the sole testate heirs of the deceased. In 1948
the second respondent had become the deceased's wife in India by entering into a marriage
celebrated according to the tenets and customs of the Muslim faith. The deceased had
bequeathed R20 000 to the second respondent and R20 000 to a mosque. The residue was left
to the applicants. The executor rejected the claim by the second respondent for half the assets
of the joint estate. The second respondent lodged an objection against the liquidation and
distribution account, and the Master decided that the marriage between the deceased and the
second respondent had been valid and, according to legislation, in community of property. This
was based on the fact that the particulars of the said marriage had been entered in the
computerised population register. It was clear, however, that the marriage had never been
validated in terms of the Indians Relief Act. 115 The applicants sought to review the Master's
decision to uphold the second respondent's contention that her marriage to the deceased had
been valid under South African law. It was common cause that, on the basis of the Ismail
case, 116 the marriage had been invalid prior to the new Constitution which became operative
on 27 April 1994.
The case was decided on the basis that the Constitution did not have retrospective effect and
that the Constitution did not apply since the date of death on which the rights of heirs vest, the
decision of the Master and the application for review all predated the promulgation of the
Constitution on 27 April 1994. Van Dijkhorst Jl17 nevertheless made the following remarks
about the argument that Islamic marriages were no longer invalid:
... the argument that Islamic polygamous marriages are no longer invalid in our
law in view of section 14(1) of the Constitution may well flounder on the
115 22 of 1914.
116 Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A).
117 89B-C.
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provisions of section 14(3) as it could be argued that these would not have been
necessary had the draftsmen of the Constitution foreseen that section 14(1) would
validate such unions. In fact the draftsmen adopted the approach of Seedat's
Executors v The Master (Natal) at 309 and provided for specified procedures.
Apart from that, the principle of gender equality embodied in sections 8(2) and
119(3) and constitutional principles I, ill and V (read with section 232(4» may
well lead to the conclusion that polygamous (and potentially polygamous)
marriages are as unacceptable to the mores of the New South Africa as they were
to the old.
This judgment was criticised by Bonthuys and Du Plessis!" on the grounds that it amounted
to a literalist approach and did not reflect an inclusive understanding of section 14(1) by the
court. The authors argued that a number of South Africans believed that freedom of religion
included the right to recognition of marriages under religious law and that, since international
instruments did not reflect the recognition of marriages under religious freedom, section 14(3)
had been inserted. This, however, did not imply that recognition of such marriages by virtue
of section 14(1) was necessarily excluded. The authors maintained that, if the right to have
such marriages recognised was a manifestation of religious freedom, it would, in any event,
be subject to the same limitations as religious rights, including the limitation clause and other
provisions of the Constitution, such as gender equality.·
The issue came to the fore again after the promulgation of the Constitution. In Ryland v
Edros, 119 the plaintiff (the husband) who had married the defendant according to Muslim rites
instituted action against her and demanded her eviction from the home where they had lived
for some years after their marriage. The marriage had terminated earlier in accordance with
Islamic law. The eviction claim was settled. However, the defendant instituted a counterclaim
against the plaintiff and, relying on the contractual relationship arising from the Muslim
marriage, sought arrears maintenance, a consolatory gift and the transfer of an equitable share
of the increase in the plaintiffs estate during their marriage.!"
118 Bonthuys and Du Plessis 1995 SAPL 200-210.
119 1997(2)SA690(C).
120 The Defendant was successful in claiming arrears maintenance for the three years before her claim
(continued...)
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Farlam J had to consider the decision in Ismail v Ismail'" where the Appellate Division held
that, because the conjugal union between the parties had been potentially polygamous, "[t]he
customs and the contract in question are contrary to public policy and are, consequently
unenforceable". Farlam J found that it was not contra bonos mores to enter into a marriage
contract in terms ofIslamic law. The judge based his judgment on the fundamental amendment
of the basic values on which our civil polity is based and which resulted from the enactment
of the new Constitution."? In considering whether the values underlying chapter 3 (the
fundamental rights chapter in the interim Constitution) conflicted with the views on public
policy which were expounded and applied in the Ismail case'" and the series of cases
preceding it, Farlam J stated that,':"
it is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to
impose its values on another and that the Courts should only brand a contract as
offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which are shared by the
community at large, by all right-thinking people in the community and not only by
one section of it. It is clear, in my view, that in the Ismail case the views (or
presumed) views of only one group in our plural society were taken into account.
The judge specifically referred to the importance of the principles of equality, tolerance and
accommodation as found in the preamble and sections 8, 10, 14,21,32 and 33 of the interim
Constitution, as well as in the constitutional principles and the "postamble". He stated:
I agree with the submission that the values of equality and tolerance of diversity
and the recognition of the plural nature of our society are among the values that
underlie our Constitution. In my view those values radiate ... the concepts of
public policy and bani mores that our courts have to apply.
120 (...continued)
was served (the rest of the claim had prescribed); she was also held to be entitled to a consolatory gift,
but did not succeed in claiming an equitable share of her contribution to the growth of the Plaintiff's
estate.
121 1983 (I) SA 1006 (A) 1025F-G.
122 87E ..
123 See Ismail v Ismail supra 1024D-E; 1024E-I025B.
124 1020B-G.
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In the event the judge effectively "redefined" public policy and the bani mores to bring them
in line with the values enshrined in the new Constitution.!" He held that, under the new
Constitution it could not be said that a Muslim union could be regarded as contra bonos
mores, not even in the wider sense of the phrase. J26
This approach was endorsed 127 by the Supreme Court of Appeal inAmod vMultilateral Motor
Vehicle Accident Fund.128 It was held that a new ethos existed which differed substantially
from the ethos which had informed the determination of the bani mores of the community
when the cases holding that "potentially polygamous" marriages were legally invalid were
decided.!"
The facts of this case are that the appellant instituted an action in the court a quo against the
respondent (the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund) for the payment of damages suffered by her as
a result of the death of her Islamic husband in a motor vehicle accident. The deceased and the
appellant had been married according to Islamic law, but the marriage was not registered as
a civil marriage under the provisions of the Marriage Act of 1961. The appellant lodged a
claim against the respondent for compensation for loss of support as a result of the death of
her husband. The respondent did not object to the claim made on behalf of the children but
nevertheless repudiated the appellant's own claim for loss of support. The court a quo decided
that the respondent was not legally liable to compensate the appellant for the loss of support
of her deceased husband to whom she had been married by Islamic rites since the duty to
support was a contractual consequence and not an ex lege consequence of the marriage, seeing
that the union between them had not enjoyed the status of a marriage.
125 He did, however, stress (at 92C) that what he had said did not necessarily apply to contractual terms
which were agreed to in the context of a marriage that was actually, as opposed to merely potentially,
polygamous.
126 93I.
127 In par 22 reference is made with approval to Ryland v Edros.
128 1997 (12) BCLR 1716 (D) 1726C-E.
129 Par 21-23.
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The Supreme Court of Appeal asked whether or not the appellant's legal right to support from
the deceased during the subsistence of the marriage was a right which deserved recognition
and protection by the law for the purposes of the dependant's action. It was held that the
deceased had in fact had a contractual duty to support the appellant in terms of the Islamic
marriage contract and that it was a legally enforceable duty.!" Itwas held that:
In my view, it does, ifregard is had to the fact that at the hearing before us it was
common cause that the Islamic marriage between the appellant and the deceased
was a de facto monogamous marriage; that it was contracted according to the
tenets of a major religion; and that it involved 'a very public ceremony, special
formalities and onerous obligations for both parents in terms of the relevant rules
ofIslamic law applicable'. The insistence that the duty of support which such a
serious de facto monogamous marriage imposes on the husband is not worthy of
protection can only be justified on the basis that the only duty of support which the
law will protect in such circumstances is a duty flowing from a marriage
solemnised and recognised by one faith or philosophy to the exclusion of others.
This is an untenable basis for the determination of the bani mores of society. It is
inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom
which had consolidated itself in the community even before the formal adoption
of the interim Constitution on 22 December 1993. 13I
Itwas therefore held 132 that the bani mores which existed at the time when the cause of action
arose supported an approach which gave the duty of support following a de facto marriage in
terms of Islamic law the same protection under common law'" for the purposes of the
130 Par 20.
131 It is interesting to note that the cause of action in this case arose before the promulgation of the
interim Constitution. However, in par 23 Mahomed AJ specifically extended the "new ethos of
tolerance" on which the bani mores are founded, to the period before the interim Constitution.
132 Par23.
133 The judge also made the significant remark in par 23: "This important shift in the bani mores of the
community must also manifest itself in a corresponding evolution in the 'relevant parameters of
application in this area. 'The common law is not to be trappedwithin the limitations of the past.' If it
does not do this it would risk losing the virility, relevance and creativity which it needs to retain its
legitimacyand effectiveness in the resolution of conflict between and in the pursuit of justice among
the citizens of a democratic society. For this reason the common law constantly evolves to
(continued...)
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dependant's action as would be accorded to a monogamous marriage solernnised in terms of
the Christian faith.!"
The judge expressly left open the question of whether parties to unions, which were in fact
polygynous, would fail in a dependant's action. He foreshadowed possible conflict between
equality and religious freedom in this respect when he observed: 135
Arguments arising from the relationship between the values of equality and
religious freedom ... might influence the proper resolution of that issue.
One can thus conclude that, although no legislation in terms of section 15(3)(a)(i) has been
passed, marriage contracts concluded under a system of religious law which permits polygyny
but which are, in fact, monogamous, are no longer branded as contra bonos mores by South
African law. As stated by Mahomed Al in the Amod case above, this change was brought
about by "the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom" in the Constitution.
5.3.3 Legislative reform in the wake of the Constitution
Since the interim Constitution came into operation, there has been some legislative reform in
this area of the law. Since the commencement of section 1(2) of the Births and Deaths
Registration Act,136African customary marriages and marriages concluded according to
religious rites are considered to be "marriages" for purposes of this Act. Children born from
these marriages are therefore no longer illegitimate and women in such marriages may now
assume their husbands' surnames or add it to theirs. Spouses in African customary and
133 (...continued)
accommodate changing values and new needs."
134 Itwas not held that the marriage entered into had actually been a valid marriage; but this was not the
question. The questions, in the context of the action of the dependant, were whether the deceased had
a duty to support the dependant, whether the duty arose from a solemn marriage and whether the duty
deserved recognition and protection.
135 Par 24.
136 51 of 1992.The section was inserted by the Births and Deaths Registration Amendment Act 40 of
1996 which came into operation on 5 September 1996~
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religious marriages are also included in the protection afforded by the Prevention of Family
Violence Act.137
Section 5A of the Divorce Amendment Act,138however, calls for comment. It provides:
If it appears to a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of a decree
of divorce by the court the spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the
prescripts of their religion or the religion of either one of them, not be free to
remarry unless the marriage is also dissolved in accordance with such prescripts
or unless a barrier to the remarriage of the spouse concerned is removed the court
may refuse to grant a decree of divorce unless the court is satisfied that the spouse
within whose power it is to have the marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so
removed, has taken all the necessary steps to have the marriage so dissolved or the
barrier to the remarriage of the other spouse removed or the court may make any
other order that it finds just.
Mahomed!" claims that:
The Divorce Amendment Act is ... geared toward creating a harmonious co-
existence between our secular laws and various religious and cultural affiliations.
With this move, our legislature has taken religious freedom, and individual human
rights to new heights ...
... the court is effectively empowered afortiori to impose equitable and democratic
values upon social relationships
.... [the Act] ushers in a new era in the relationship between our legal system and
diverse religions ... and it poses a direct challenge to the exclusivity and internal
independence of religious institutions such as the Church, Islamic tribunals and
Jewish bodies regulating marital affairs. In short, it places church-state relations
on a new plane of justiciability regulated by common standards and democratic
values.
137 1330f1993.
138 950f1996.
139 1997 DR 49.
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Barker'" has expressed criticism of these claims. One could agree with him that the effect of
this section is indeed not as claimed by Mahomed. If it did have that effect, it would in any
event be challengeable under the freedom of religion provisions. Section 5A is concerned with
the prescripts of religions which preclude a woman from obtaining a divorce from her
husband!" and which would have the effect that, should a civil court grant a divorce, she
would be divorced in terms of the law of the land, but remain married according to her
religious law. However, as Barker'? points out:
By investing the courts with the power to refuse or grant a decree of divorce in
circumstances where, prior to the enactment of the Act, it would in law have been
obliged to grant it, the Act gives statutory recognition to those very inequitable. and
patriarchal precepts. It does so by enacting that such precepts are to be satisfied
before it will grant the desired decree.
Barker points out, with reference to Project 76 and Working Paper 450fthe South African
Law Commission which dealt with Jewish divorces in 1992, that the Act is a compromise in
an attempt to solve a partly insoluble problem. The fact is that, for doctrinal reasons, the
traditional religious prescripts remain unalterable.
This amendment to the Divorce Act is an indication of the difficulties involved in attempting
to draft and implement an Islamic personal and family law statute in South Africa.
6. Conclusion
It was argued in Chapter 2 that freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion, religious
pluralism, equality and separationism were the essential rights and freedoms of religion and
140 1998 DR 55-56.
141 In Jewish law an Aqunah is a wife who has been secularly divorced but remains bound to her husband
in terms of Jewish law, until he delivers a "get" to he!'. A get is a letter of divorce which only the
husband can deliver. In Islamic law, the husband has the right to terminate the marriage unilaterally
by simply issuing three ta/aaqi. The wife can only obtain a divorce if she can satisfy the Mou/ana that
he husband has been guilty of misconduct.
142 Barker 1998 DR 56.
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that adequate protection of religious freedom would include these basic concepts. In this
chapter, the religious rights of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion and religious
pluralism were assessed under the "freedom" dimension.
Before the specific rights and freedoms of religion were discussed, the difficulty of defining
"religion" in the constitutional context was demonstrated. It was pointed out that, in the South
African constitutional context, different words were used to protect religion, belief and
conscience respectively and that "religion" was therefore not to be defined so broadly as to
include all beliefs whatsoever. It was proposed that the Swidler definition of religion be
accepted which defines "religion" as having a code, a creed, a cult, a community structure and
as being based on a belief in a Transcendent. The freedom to have atheistic, agnostic or other
beliefs would be protected by the freedom to belief, conscience, thought or opinion.
It was also shown that acceptance of this definition would imply that the reference to religion
in sections 15(2) and 31 be given a corresponding meaning. In other words, the freedom to
manifest "religious" beliefs in section 15(2) and 31 would be limited to the protection of
religious acts in terms of this (limited) definition of religion. Other expressions of beliefs
which are not religious would be protected by the freedom of expression.
The religious rights provisions contained in sections 9,15 and 31 of the Constitution were then
considered with a view to ascertaining whether the essential rights and freedoms of religion
were indeed constitutionally protected. The relevant religious rights provisions in the South
African Constitution were subsequently analysed in order to reach a more comprehensive
understanding of the meaning and role of the essential rights of religion in South Africa. In
thus ascertaining what adequate protection of religious freedom in the South African implies,
we looked briefly at the protéction of some of these essential rights in other countries and in
current international human rights instruments.!"
The first religious right, freedom of conscience, is protected by section 15(1) of the
Constitution. Its core meaning is that every person has the right to follow the dictates of his
143 S 39(1) of the Constitution provides that "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum - ... (bj.must consider intemationallaw; and (c) may consider foreign law."
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or her own conscience in matters of religion. Itwas argued that, in a modern constitutional
context, this implied that every person be accorded the right to adopt a religious belief of his
or her choice and that religious groups be free to associate and organise themselves. It also
means that there should be no discrimination on religious grounds and that people should not
be subjected to laws which they could not, in good conscience, obey.
Itwas argued that free exercise of religion was also protected by the Constitution. Although
section 15(1) seemingly protects only the internal freedom to have a religion or belief,
religious rights would be largely meaningless unless the protection extends to the
manifestation of religious beliefs as well. It was therefore argued, with reference to the
international understanding of religious rights, that the freedom of "conscience, religion,
thought, belief and opinion" in section 15(1) included protection of the manifestation of
religious beliefs. This interpretation is sustained by sections 15(2), 16, 18, 29 and 31, all of
which protect different manifestations of religious beliefs. Free exercise of religion entails,
more particularly, the right of individuals and groups to manifest their religious beliefs in
worship, teaching, practice and observance thereof.
The right to establish educational institutions based on a common religion is a free exercise
right which is explicitly protected by section 29(3) of the Constitution (section 32 of the
interim Constitution). This right has, however, been interpreted by the Constitutional Court
in a liberal, freedom-oriented manner and not as an entitlement imposing any positive
obligations on the state. The conclusion is that the section is not unduly restrictive of the right
to free exercise of religion in that it does not preclude state subsidies of such educational
institutions. The hope was expressed, however, that the state would eventually adopt an
approach of more actively promoting and fostering religious diversity.
Religious pluralism is also protected by the Constitution. Section 15(1) protects the right of
"everyone" to freedom of religion, conscience and belief. It was argued that "everyone" in
section 15(1) should be interpreted to include religious groups. Section 31 protects the rights
of persons belonging to religious communities to practise their religion and to form, join and
maintain religious associations. Although this right has also been framed in a liberal manner
it cannot be stated that it does not protect the principle of religious pluralism. Itwas, however,
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argued that the approach of the Constitutional Court to minority rights (albeit in the context
ofthe right to education) and which distinguished between dominant and nondominant groups,
was unduly restrictive ofthis principle. In accordance with the principle of religious pluralism,
section 15(3) also provides that legislation recognising marriages contracted under a system
of religious law or systems of religious personal and family law would not be unconstitutional.
Itwas demonstrated that in a number of cases, marriage contracts entered into in accordance
with the religious law of Islam, which were de facto monogamous, were recognised by the
courts for various purposes. This was, however, not done on the basis of section 15(3) but on
the basis of religious freedom in general and the value's enshrined in the Constitution. It was
further argued that legislation envisaged in section 15(3) would be extremely difficult to
formulate.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATION OF STATE AND RELIGION
AND OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION
1. Introduction
This chapter will investigate whether the final Constitution protects the essential principles of
the separation of state and religion, the equality of religions and the institutional separation of
church and state and how these principles, as standards, should be interpreted and
implemented in the South African constitutional context to ensure adequate protection of
religious rights and freedoms.
It was demonstrated in chapter 2 that the state could playa number of different roles in respect
of religion. At the one extreme the state could be hostile to the idea of religion by not granting
religious individuals or groups a right against interference with the free exercise of religion.
The state could also be strictly secular by granting a right against interference with the free
practice of religion, but by not allowing any meaningful support to religion. The state could
also be semi-secular by allowing some state support to religion, usually subject to certain
conditions. The last possibility is that of theocracy, where the state directly and indirectly
supports one particular religion, to the exclusion of others. That could, but does not
necessarily, entail interference in respect of religious convictions. I
As explained by Heyns and Brand 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 705-706. Van der Vyver Introduction xx
is guided by four distinct dogmatic presuppositions reflected in the Constitutions of the world: "As
extreme positions, (1) the American notion of the impermeable wall between state and church, and
(2) the Islamic Shari'a proclaiming the identity of law and religion; and somewhere in between, (3)
the scholastic adage of subsidiarity alongside (4) the typical Calvinistic doctrine of sphere
sovereignty. "
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Durham' describes at least eight approaches by the State in respect ofreligion: (1) absolute
theocracies, such as is possible in Muslim theory, where religion is the central feature of
political life; (2) established churches, where one particular religion receives preferential
treatment; (3) endorsed churches, where, without formally affirming that one particular church
is the official church of the nation, the state acknowledges that one particular church has a
specific place in the country's traditions; (4) cooperationist regimes, where the state grants no
special status to dominant churches but continues to cooperate closely with churches in a
variety of ways; (5) accommodationist regimes, where, although the state may insist on
separation of church and state, a benevolent neutrality is retained towards religion; (6)
separationist regimes, which insist on a more rigid separation of church and state; (7)
inadvertent insensitivity, in the case of legislative or bureaucratic insensitivity to religious
needs; and (8) hostility and overt persecution where religious freedom (of especially smaller
religious groups) is significantly impaired by various forms of persecution.'
There is no single universal formula for reconciling religious rights and state authority' and
within any of the above-mentioned categories, a range of possibilities with different
implications for religious freedom exist. 5 Whilst it is evident that there are some configurations
of state and religion which are more conducive to ensuring religious freedom than others, it
2 Perspectives 19-23.
3 Also see Van Dyk Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (Westport CT, 1985) 53-77 as quoted
by Van der Vyver in Introduction xix who distinguishes between systems where religious
communities are afforded representation in government, those where the government supports
religious activities, theocracies and systems that recognise the autonomy of religious groups. Mojzes
Religious Human Rights in Post-Communist Balkan Countries 263-284 distinguishes (I) ecclesiastical
absolutism; (2) religious toleration; (3) secular absolutism; and (4) pluralistic liberty. Shelton and
Kiss Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion 559-592 classify the relationship between state and
religion in terms of (l) state control over religion; (2) state neutrality toward religion; (3) theocratic
political perceptions; (4) state hostility toward religion; and (5) division of authority between state and
church by religious institutions.
4 See Noonan Tensions and the Ideals 593-605.
5 In this regard Justice Frankfurter in People of the State of Illinois ex rei McCollum v Board of
Education of School District No 7/, Champaign County, Illinois, et al333 US 203 (1948) at 216
remarked: "A totally different situation elsewhere ... only serves to illustrate that free societies are not
cast in one mould ... Different institutions evolve from different historic circumstances."
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is apparent that religious freedom is not necessarily directly parallel to the degree of separation
between state and religion which exits in a country. Total religious freedom does not
necessarily occur in the case of complete separation between state and religion, nor is
religious freedom necessarily totally absent in the case of some identification of the state with
religion or the establishment of religion by law.
After assessing religious freedom in what he calls "differing types of church-state" systems",
Durham' provides a helpful perspective in this regard by reconceptualising the "church-state
identification continuum" as a loop that correlates with the religious freedom continuum."
At the "positive identification" end of the spectrum of religious freedom one finds absolute
theocracies. Established churches, endorsed churches and cooperationist regimes constitute
"some identification" of state and religion in varying degrees. Accommodationist regimes and
separationist regimes constitute separation of state and religion "in varying degrees". And at
the negative side of the spectrum one finds "total separation" of state and religion in cases of
inadvertent insensitivity, hostility and overt persecution of religion.
In other words, his model reflects that both strongly positive and strongly negative
identification of state and religion correlate with low levels of religious freedom, because in
both cases the state adopts a sharply defined attitude towards one or more religions, leaving
little room for dissenting views. One can thus not simply assume that a more rigid separation
6 Durham uses the term "church-state" to also include the relationship between "state and religion". It
has to be kept in mind that a distinction is drawn in this thesis between the issues of "church and state"
and "state and religion". See in this regard the discussion in eh 1.
7 See Perspectives 15-25. The author states that "the degree of religious liberty in a particular society
can be assessed along two dimensions - one involving the degree to which state action burdens
religious belief and conduct and another involving the degree of identification between governmental
and religious institutions." In the United States these dimensions are known as the "free exercise" and
"establishment" aspects of religious liberty owing to the formulation of the First Amendment of the
US Constitution. He states that "for comparative purposes it is useful to think more broadly in terms
of varying degrees of religious freedom and church-state identification".
8 See the graphic representation at Durham Perspectives 18.
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of state and religion will necessarily enhance religious freedom." As Durham says, "At some
point aggressive separationism becomes hostility toward religion." Total religious freedom on
Durham's "loop" thus lies somewhere between "some identification of church and state" and
"separation of church and state".
It should thus be kept in mind that religious freedom is not necessarily directly parallel to the
degree of separation between state and religion which exits in a country. Total religious
freedom does not necessarily occur in the case of complete separation between state and
religion, and neither is religious freedom necessarily totally absent in the case of the state
supporting religion to some extent.
2. Separation of state and religion 10 in the South African Constitution
2.1 Absence of an establishment clause in the South African Constitution
In the United States the central ideas of official enforcement of religious toleration, the
equality of persons and religions before the law, and the separation of religious and
government institutions Il were put into place with the enactment of their federal religious
9 This is illustrated by, for example, the finding that the institution of an established church (the
Lutheran Church in Sweden) does not violate the religion clauses of the European Convention of
Human Rights. See Gunn Adjudicating Rights of Conscience under the European Convention on
Human Rights 305-330.
10 As explained in ch 1, the terms "state and religion" (or "law and religion") and "church and state" are
accorded different meanings in this thesis. The term "church and state" is used for the institutions of
church and state respectively and the interaction between them. The effect of the South African
constitution on the relationship between church and state will be examined later in this chapter. This
paragraph is concerned with "state and religion" or "law and religion" which term is used as referring
to instances where the state via its conduct or its laws plays a role in religious issues.
Il In Lemon v Kurtzman 403 US 602 (1971), the locus classicus of "establishment" jurisprudence in the
United States, the court held that to satisfy the establishment clause, a law must: (a) have a secular
legislative purpose; (b) have a principal or primary effect which neither inhibits nor advances religion;
and (c) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. The interpretation of the
"establishment clause" of the First Amendment of the American Constitution clearly established a
strictly secular state in the United States.
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guarantees." The importance of the "establishment clause?" and the separation of "church and
state" in the American context can in part be attributed to historical reasons." Witte" points
out, however, that in the minds of the framers of the First Amendment to the American
Constitution, the principle of the separation of church and state mandated neither the
separation of religion and politics nor the secularisation of civil society. He states that none
of the framers, save for the most radical separationists, intended to preclude religion altogether
from the public square or the political process. He emphasises that the principle of
separationism was directed to the institutions of church and state, not to religion and culture.
The principles of pluralism, equality and separationism served to protect religious bodies, not
only from each other but also from the state. Yet it was an open question whether such
principles precluded state support of religion altogether. Some evangelical and enlightenment
thinkers viewed these principles as an absolute bar to state support of religious beliefs, whilst
Puritan and republican writers regarded them merely as a prohibition against preferential state
support of religion but that general support for religion was licit, and indeed necessary for
good governance. However, United States jurisprudence on the establishment clause has
developed to a point where the even-handed treatment of religions has often come to mean the
"non-treatment" of any religious matters by the state."
Although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" does not contain an establishment
12 See Underkuffler-Freund 1997 SAPL 35.
13 The relevant part of the First Amendment of the US Constitution (made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment) reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof".
14 Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment analyse the American "experiment" of applying
constitutional principles for the regulation of religious freedom and depict the theological forces
which moulded the experiment and culminated in the adage of separation of "church and state". This
separation of "church and state" as currently applied by the United States Supreme Court seemingly
inspires far more criticism than praise.
15 Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 525.
16 Religious observances at state educational institutions are, for example, prohibited. See Engel v Vitale
370 US 421 (1962); Wallace, Governor of Alabama v Jaffree 472 US 38 (1985).
17 S 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads: "Everyone has the following rights and
(continued ...)
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clause, the Canadian court has generally followed the separation principle. This has resulted
in, for example, the removal of Bibles and prayers from schools and the restriction of religious
observances in public institutions.
In Germany, 18 in contrast with the position in the United States, the notion of religious freedom
does not preclude the state from financing faculties of theology and religious education,
recognising religious institutions as public law corporations, levying church taxes, sanctioning
religious holidays, or providing for religious care in state prisons and in the military." Thus,
although there is an institutional separation of church and state," there is not a complete
separation of state and religion."
In the South African constitutional context, the drafters of the Constitution consciously
avoided the strict separation ("disestablishment") of state and religion in drafting the religion
clauses." The "wall of separation" model, which has been accepted in the United States, is not
endorsed by the South African Constitution." The text of the final South African Constitution
17 (...continued)
freedoms: (a) Freedom of conscience and religion."
18 See s 4( 1) and 4 (2) of the German Constitution.
19 See in general Heckel The impact of religious rules on public life in Germany 191-204.
20 S 137 of the Weimar Constitution, which forms part of the German Constitution as a schedule,
provides that there is no state church.
21 See, however, the decision in the Crucifix matter (BverfGE 93, 1 (1995)) where the Court expected
more neutrality in religious matters.
22 Du Plessis Religious Human Rights in South Africa 457.
23 In this regard Van Dijkhorst J pointed out in Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein. Pretoria 1998 (4)
SA 423 (T) 440 that: "In respect of the interpretation of the clause in our interim Constitution dealing
with religion, the constitutional law of these countries is singularly unhelpful and may lead the unwary
astray. I say this without intending disrespect. The plain fact is that their constitutional development
through the courts is, as ours will also be, guided by the particular wording of the clause interpreted
by them. As I shall demonstrate the clauses dealing with religion in American, Canadian, German and
other constitutions differ materially from ours. Our religious clause is a unique vase carefully
fashioned from South African clay. Yet there is this benefit to be gained from reference to the
constitutional law of those countries pertaining to religion: it illustrates the problems which were
(continued ...)
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in fact creates room for the state to take positive measures to ensure an even-handed
accommodation of religious concerns." For instance, the Constitution," expressly provides
for the possibility that religious observances be conducted at state or state-aided institutions
in certain circumstances. It is, however, clear that a law which required everyone to adopt
some religion would be as unconstitutional as a law which forbade any religious adherence."
In other words, the South African Constitution does not prohibit state support of religion in
express or implied terms and it contains no declaration of secularism. Rather, it recognises and
endorses the important role played by religion in society." In this regard, and after discussing
the establishment clause in the United States," Van Dijkhorst J commented in the Wittmann
case:"
23 (...continued)
known to exist in this context with reference to various formulations of religious freedom principles.
The conclusion is then inescapable that our different formulation seeks to attain a different end." Also
see Dickson CJ in Big M Drug Mart Ltd 18 DLR (4th) 321, 356 who stated that he feIt that recourse
to the categories of Americanjurisprudence was not particularly helpful in the Canadian context since
the Canadian Charter (like the South African Constitution) had no establishment clause.
24 The provisions of s 7(2) of the Constitution moreover provide that the state must inter alia promote
the rights in the Bill of Rights.
25 S 15(2).
26 In the United States case of Torcaso v Watkins 367 US 488,81 Set 1680 (1961), a public employment
oath requiring a declaration of a belief in God was struck down for violating religious liberty in terms
of the free exercise clause. The court held that the provision imposed an invalid test for public office
which violated freedom of belief and religion.
27 Compare in this regard the following remark of Sachs Jin S v Lawrence, S vNegal; S v Solberg 1997
(2) SACR 540 (CC) par 162 : "... a reasonable South African is a person of common sense immersed
in the cultural realities of our country and aware of the amplitude and nuanced nature of our
Constitution. He or she neither attempts relentlessly to purge public life of even the faintest
association with religion for fear of otherwise descending the slippery slope to theocracy, nor, at the
other extreme, regards the religiously-based practices of the past to be as natural and non-sectarian
as the air one breathes simply because of their widespread acceptance."
28 The judge mentioned (447) that the provisions of the German constitutional law relating to religion
stand much nearer to ours than those of the United States or Canada.
29 446.
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I have dealt with the United States constitutional law on their religious clause
perhaps too extensively in view of my conclusion that it cannot be followed. My
reason is that I thereby strive to demonstrate what the options were which
confronted the drafters of our Constitution. Instead of taking the American option
they unequivocally turned their backs on it.
A comparison of the text of our religious freedom clause with the 'three main evils'
(see Lemon v Kurtzman (supra)) against which the establishment clause in the
United States Constitution was intended to afford protection, immediately
evidences that what was there regarded as an evil is not so regarded in our
Constitution, in fact it is accommodated or actively promoted. Religious
observances in State institutions are permitted and regulated by rules established
by the appropriate authority. This entails the use of State facilities (schools) and
State personnel (teachers) for religious purposes during time for which the State
pays. The practice of these religious observances is regulated by the State. All of
this would in the United States flaunt the three evils of Lemon vKurtzman (supra)
as it would amount to State sponsorship, financial support and active involvement
(entanglement) of the State in religion.
It is clear therefore that the drafters of our Constitution steered our constitutional
ship on a religious course diametrically opposed to that of the United States. This
is not surprising. Our country has a long history of religious observance in public
schools of all sectors of our population. Ours is not a society of atheists or
agnostics. Those who profess their belief in the Supreme being are an
overwhelming majority. I doubt if any settlement could have been possible at the
constitutional negotiations had the abolition of all religious observances in State
schools and State-aided schools been on the table.
South Africa could thus be described as a semisecular state or as an "accommodationist
regime" in Durham's terminology:"
A regime may insist on separation of church and state, yet retain a posture of
benevolent neutrality toward religion. Accommodationism might be thought of as
cooperation ism without the provision of any direct financial subsidies to religious
or religious education. An accommodationist regime would have no qualms about
recognising the importance of religion as part of national or local culture,
accommodating religious symbols in pub lie settings, allowing tax, dietary, hoIiday,
30 Perspectives 21.
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Sabbath, and other kinds of exemptions and so forth. Many scholars in the United
States argue that the United States religion clause should be construed to allow a
more accommodationist approach to religious liberty. Note that the growth of the
state intensifies the need for accommodation. As state influence becomes more
pervasive and regulatory burdens expand, refusal to exempt or accommodate
shades into hostility.
The absence of a United States style "establishment clause" in the South African Constitution
does not imply that the state may interfere freely in religious matters or freely support any or
all religious practices. It is clear that the Constitution provides for some "separation" of state
and religion or "disestablishment" in the sense that the state has certain constitutional
obligations in respect of religion," In terms of the South African Constitution, state support
of religion is subject to:
(i) the principle of the free exercise of religion, as protected by section 15(1) of the
Constitution, which means that state support of religion may not constitute undue
interference in the free exercise of religion;
(ii) the principles in section 15(2) of the Constitution if the activity can be defined as a
"religious observance" at a state or state-aided institution; and
(iii) the principle of equality as protected by the equality clause (section 9).
The principle of free exercise of religion has already been dealt with in chapter 5. The
provisions of section 15(2) and section 9 will be discussed in this chapter.
31 In this regard one can agree with Malherbe 1998 TSAR 687 who states: "Vir die onderhawige
doeleindes word daarom aan die hand gedoen dat in die lig van die feit dat die sogenaamde
'establishment clause' vermoedelik bloot betrekking het op die staat se verpligtinge ten opsigte van die
reg op godsdiensvryheid, die reg in daardie sin per defmisie altyd 'n 'establishment clause' insluit. Die
vraag is dus nie of die reg 'n 'establishment clause' bevat, al dan nie, maar (a) wat die staat en ander
gebondenes se verpligtinge ten opsgite van die reg presies behels en (b) wanneer die staat regmatig
met die uitoefening van die reg mag inmeng."
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2.2 Religious observances at state or state-aided institutions
That a degree of endorsement of religion is allowed by the South African Constitution is
affirmed by section 15(2) which creates room within which religious activity can be conducted
at state or state-aided institutions such as schools, prisons and state hospitals subject, though,
to three conditions. Section 15(2)32provides:
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions,
provided that -
(a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public
authorities;
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.
This provision makes it possible" for the state to acknowledge and accommodate religious
sentiments and practices, without subscribing to them. Du Plessis" concludes:
[t]he Constitution, in other words, allows the state's 'proactive tolerance' of
religious practices in public and semi-public institutions, and safeguards action
taken to achieve this objective against constitutional challenges alleging religious
bias. At the same time, section 15(2) seeks to counter conduct that could further
religious intolerance by laying down the very conditions referred to.
It is clear that section 15(2) applies only if a specific activity can be defined as a "religious
observance" and is conducted at a "state or state-aided institution". It was argued in chapter
5 that the phrase "religious observance" in section 15(2) would follow the interpretation of the
word "religion" in section 15(1) and that it was probably confined to acts of religious
character.
32 S 14(2) in the interim Constitution.
33 As is evidenced by the word "may" in the introductory sentence to s 15(2) (religious observances
"may be conducted").
34 2001 BYU-LR 119.
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Section 15(2) was interpreted in the case of Wittmann vDeutscher Schuiverein, Pretoria and
others" where the court had to decide, amongst other things, whether the German School was
acting in conflict with the Constitution by enforcing attendance at its religious instruction
classes. VanDijkhorst J stated that "religious observance" in section 14(2) of the interim
Constitution and in the similarly worded section 15(2) of the final Constitution referred to an
act of religious character, a rite, but that religious education was not a "religious observance". 36
He pointed out that, whereas the interim Constitution and the final Constitution provided for
"religious observances", both were silent about religious instruction in state or state-aided
institutions. He therefore held that neither a Bible period nor the study of the Koran would be
forbidden. He added:"
Of course, the right of freedom of religion (in the case of religious minorities) and
the right to freedom of thought, belief and opinion (in the case of atheists and
agnostics) entails that attendance may not be enforced. It must be voluntary. The
right of non-attendance is expressly recognised in ss 14(2) of the interim
Constitution and 15(2) of the Constitution. Attendance must be 'free and
voluntary'. There may be no coercion, neither by rules nor by action on the part of
the authorities.
Itwas held, therefore, that neither the morning assembly and opening prayer session nor the
religious instruction (education) classes at the German school would be unconstitutional even
if they were of a confessional nature and that this would hold true whether the German school
was a State-aided institution or not. This is correct, obviously provided that attendance at such
(confessional) religious observances is free and voluntary if the school is a state or state-aided
school.
With regard to the question of whether the association by its constitution could enforce
attendance at the morning assembly and religious instruction classes," the judge rejected the
35 1998 (4) SA 423 (T).
36 438.
37 449.
38 Itwas assumed that the plaintiffs allegations were correct and that the subject "religious instruction"
(continued ...)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER6 205
argument that the German school was not a state-aided institution. However, he decided that
the interim Constitution had only vertical application" and that it therefore only bound "all
legislative and executive organs of state" and not private citizens inter se. The argument that
the German school was an organ of state and therefore subject to the interim Constitution was
also rejected. The judge held that, in terms of the control test enunciated in Directory
Advertising Cost Cutters vMinister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting." the
German school was not an organ of State and therefore not bound to the provisions of section
14(2).
If the drafters of the interim Constitution had intended to make rules for religious observances
at organs of state, they would have used the term "organ of state" in section 14. Instead it was
provided that certain rules would apply to religious observances at "state-aided" institutions.
If the control test is accepted as the test for an organ of state," a situation could arise (under
the interim Constitution), as it did in this case, where a state-aided institution is not an organ
of state and therefore, according to section 7(1), not subject to the Constitution, specifically
to section 14(2) which applies to state-aided institutions. This is clearly an illogical result. It
is submitted that section 14(2) should have been applied to "state-aided institutions", that is,
institutions which receive state aid whether they are organs of state or not. Religious
observances at organs of state would in any event have to be conducted on an equitable basis
on the strength of other provisions of the Constitution, such as the equality provision.
It is submitted that the German school should have been held to be bound to the provisions of
section 14(2). The real question seems to have been whether the religious instruction classes
38 (...continued)
was of a confessional nature. The judge later remarked at 450 that, should the assumption be invalid,
the question falls away as any school may enforce attendance at its secular educational activities.
39 As decided by the Constitutional Court in Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA
850 (CC).
40 1996 (3) SA 800 (T) 808-811.
41 The control test is widely accepted, even under the fmal Constitution, as the test for whether an
institution is an organ of state, as will be shown below in eh 7.
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or morning assembly was a "religious observance"? in terms of section 14(2)).
As far as the issue of state organs is concerned, the Wittmann case was decided under the
interim Constitution, in terms of which constitutionally entrenched rights could only in limited
circumstances be enforced against nonorgans of state. Section 8(2) of the final Constitution
now clearly provides that "a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right". It is therefore doubtful whether the same result will
be reached under the 1996 Constitution."
The judge further stated obiter that, even if he were wrong in his interpretation of section
14(2), the waiver of the freedom of religion, for the limited duration of one's membership and
within the limits of the institution's constitution, is not contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution in the case of private educational institutions. He emphasised that the debate was
not whether there could be a waiver of a fundamental right, but whether one could waive the
right of abstention from attendance when others exercised their right to abstain. He stated that
the right was merely an ancillary right and amounted to no more than (contractually) saying:
"I have the right to walk out but (in deference to you) I will not". It was therefore held that
even if the German school was a state-aided institution and an organ of State, the right of
nonattendance in section 14(2) could validly be waived and the plaintiff had done just that by
subjecting herself to the association's constitution and the school's regulations.
The right to abstain from attendance cannot be understood as an "ancillary right". It has been
shown in chapter 2 that, from the outset, voluntarism and the right to "exit" inherently formed
part of religious rights. The question is in fact whether one could contractually waive a
fundamental right. No attempt will be made to answer this question here but it appears that a
person may voluntarily decide and agree not to exert or exercise a certain fundamental right.
42 Itwas argued earlier herein that" observance" only includes religious observances in the normal sense
of the word, that is, purely religious exercises and not all acts of religious people.
43 The application issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
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It is submitted that in this case, a learner attending a state-aided educational institution cannot
be forced to attend religious observances or religious instruction of a confessional nature. It
is an entirely different matter if the religious education is nonconfessional or the educational
institution a private institution which receives no aid from the state.
3. Equality of religions
3.1 Introduction
In the South African constitutional context, the central idea is that of equality," and the
guarantee of religious freedom is expressly subject to notions of human dignity, equality, and
freedom" as well as judicial enforcement of the same values." The essential" guarantee of
religious equality is protected by section 9( 1)ofthe South African Constitution which provides
that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection by and benefit from
the law, and by section 9(3) which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of inter alia
religion, conscience and belief."
44 Equality is one of the comer stones of the new South African era, as opposed to and in reaction to the
apartheid regime which preceded it.
45 S 36(1) of the Constitution.
46 S 39(1) of the Constitution.
47 Itwas shown in eh 2 that the principle of the juridical equality of religions was already present in the
Edict of Milan which inter alia stated that "This has been done by us to avoid any appearance of
disfavour to anyone religion". Witte and Green American Constitutional Experiment 524-525 also
explain that, in early American jurisprudence, liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion and
confessional pluralism were understood to depend for their efficacy on a guarantee of equality of all
peaceable religions before the law: "For the state to single out one pious person or one form of faith
for either preferential benefits or discriminatory burdens would skew the choice of conscience,
encumber the exercise of religion, and upset the natural plurality of faiths."
48 S 9(3) provides: "The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth."
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As pointed out by Du Plessis," the courts have not really had the opportunity (or have
declined) to fully explore the safeguarding potential ofthe constitutional guarantee of religious
equality. The tendency so far has been to approach religious rights issues in a freedom-oriented
manner or by refraining from classifying the dispute as a religious rights dispute. 50 This
paragraph is specifically concerned with the principle of equality in the South African
Constitution which ensures even-handed treatment of diverse religions and of religious groups,
communities and institutions with potentially conflicting interests."
In the South African context, as explained above, the mere fact that the state in some way
supports a particular religious practice would not automatically render it unconstitutional as
would be the case in some interpretations of religious freedom in, for example, the United
States. However, the equality clause with its implication of even-handed treatment of religions
presents its own difficulties. In such a case it could be quite difficult to determine what should
be placed on either side of the scales. 52
3.2 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg
In the case of Sv Lawrence; Sv Negal; Sv Solberg" the Constitutional Court for the first time
had the opportunity to consider the protection of freedom of religion under the interim
Constitution. 54 The relevant facts were that three employees (the appellants) of a Seven Eleven
49 2001 BYU-LR 112.
50 See the judgment in Prince v President of the Law Society 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA); Case vMinister
of Safety and Security 1996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC) and Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa
vMinister of Health 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T). Also seethe commentary of DuPlessis 2001 BYU-LR
117-118.
51 See Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR III who states that a broadly conceived establishment clause can play
a significant role in guaranteeing such treatment and that the equality clause in the South African
Constitution arguably caters for such expansively understood establishment concerns.
52 Such cases will probably be decided on the basis of the limitation clause.
53 1997 (2) SACR 540 (CC).
54 It is unfortunate that the full record of the evidence before the court a quo was not before the
Constitutional Court because the appellants did not follow the proper procedure in bringing their cases
(continued ...)
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store were convicted of selling wine in contravention of the provisions of the Liquor Act 27
of 1989. Seven Eleven had obtained a grocer's wine licence in terms of this Act which
permitted them to sell wine except on "closed days", that is, Sundays, Good Fridays and
Christmas Days." One of the Appellants, Ms Solberg, was convicted of selling wine on a
Sunday."
Solberg contended that the prohibition on the sale of wine on Sundays constituted a violation
of section 14 of the interim Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religion, belief and
opinion. She argued that the purpose of prohibiting wine sales on closed days was "to induce
submission to a sectarian Christian conception of the proper observance of the Christian
Sabbath and Christian holidays" that "coerced individuals to affirm or acquiesce in a specific
practice solely for a sectarian Christian purpose" and was inconsistent with the freedom of
religion of those persons who did not hold such beliefs and did not wish to adhere to them."
Solberg maintained that the closed days had been introduced into the Liquor Act for a religious
purpose since all three days were of particular significance to the Christian religion. The issue
that came to the fore was thus whether the provisions of the Liquor Act violated religious
freedom as embodied in section 14 of the interim Constitution by giving undue preference to
Christian values.
It is rather difficult to determine the ratio of the case. It was heard by nine judges, and three
separate judgements were given: Chaskalson P, supported by Langa DP, Ackerman J and
Kriegler J, held that section 14 was not infringed and that the appeal had to be dismissed;
Sachs J, supported by Mokgoro J, held that section 14was infringed but that such infringement
was justified and that the appeal had to be dismissed; and, 0- Regan J, supported by Goldstone
J and Madala J, held that section 14 was infringed and that it was not justified. The appeal was
54 (...continued)
to the Constitutional Court.
55 Only that part of the case which is concerned with the constitutionality of the provisions of the Liquor
Act on the basis of religious rights will be considered.
56 In contravention ofs I59(a) read with s 2 which contains the definition ofa closed day, s 90(1)(a)
which deals with the time when table wine may be sold and s 163(1 )(a) of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989.
57 Par 85.
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thus dismissed by six against three. However, the three separate judgements represent three
completely different approaches, and this leaves some doubt as to what constitutes the majority
decision. The six justices who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed were divided 4 to
2 with regard to the reasons for their decision. The three justices who held that the appeal
should be allowed used essentially the same arguments as the minority (2) in the first group
who found that there was an infringement. It thus seems that the justices were divided 5 to 4
in respect of their approaches: in essence the group of four held that equality concerns were
not at issue because the appellants did not rely on the equality provision, whereas the group
of five held that equality concerns had to be catered for at any rate. However, the five justices
were split 3 to 2 in respect of their value judgments: whereas three found the infringement to
be unjustifiable, two found it to be justifiable. It therefore appears that the majority decisions
are: (a) that there was an infringement of the right to religious freedom (5-4) and (b) that the
appeal had to be dismissed (6-3).
There seemed to be agreement that the issue was whether section 15(1) of the Constitution
prohibited state support of religion and if so, whether the facts indeed constituted an
infringement of religious freedom. In this regard the 5 to 4 division is significant because it
reflected a difference of opinion on questions of religious freedom vis-a-vis religious equality,
or between "free exercise" and "establishment" concerns.
Chaskalson P, writing on behalf of the four, emphasised that section 14 did not contain an
"establishment clause" as in the United States and that principles pertaining to the
advancement or inhibition of religion by the state should not be read into section 14. He added
that the interim Constitution dealt with unequal treatment and discrimination under section 8
(the equality clause), but that religious equality was not really at issue because Solberg relied
solely on the freedom of religion clause in section 14(1» of the interim Constitution and not
on section 8, the equality clause, as well. He concluded:"
Whatever s 14(2) might mean ... it cannot in my view be elevated to a
constitutional principle incorporating by implication a requirement into s 14( 1)
that the State abstain from action that might advance or inhibit religion.
58 Par 103.
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This justice further remarked:"
There may be circumstances in which endorsement of a religion or a religious
belief by the State would contravene the 'freedom of religion' provisions of 14.
This would be the case if such endorsement has the effect of coercing persons to
observe the practices of a particular religion, or of placing constraints on them in
relation to the observance of their own religion. The coercion may be direct or
indirect, but it must be established to give rise to an infringement of the freedom
of religion. It is for the person who alleges that s 14 has been infringed to show
that there has been such coercion or constraint.
He therefore remarked" obiter that he would have no difficulty in holding that a law which
compels sabbatical observance of the Christian Sabbath offends against the religious freedom
of those who do not hold such beliefs." But, he distinguished the position from the Canadian
Lord's Day Act and stated that:
This does not mean that the selection of a Sunday for purposes which are not
purely religious and which do not constrain the practice of other religions would
be unlawful simply because Sunday is the Christian Sabbath.
He held? that, in South Africa, Sundays have acquired a secular as well as a religious
character. 63
The effect of this judgment appears to be that state support of a religion is prohibited only to
the extent that it constitutes an infringement of the right to freely exercise one's religion. The
justice found the connection between the Christian religion and the restriction too tenuous for
59 Par 104.
60 Par 89.
61 In this regard he quoted Dickson CJC in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 13CRR 64 at 93, 99: "If
I am a Jew or a Sabbatarianor a Muslim, the practice of my religion at least impliesmy right to work
on a Sunday ifI wish ....Any lawpurely religious inpurpose, which denies me that right, must surely
infringe my religious freedom."
62 Par 95.
63 It is ironic that religious rights have to be protected with reference to their secular purpose.
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the infringement to be characterised as an infringement of religious freedom.
By stating that the appellant failed to rely on the equality clause, the justice declined to decide
a real issue in the case, namely the equality of different religions. Whether Chaskalson P
should have decided the equality issue without it having been raised by the appellants is a
difficult question. On the one hand, it could be stated from a litigation point of view that the
justice should only decide what is at issue between the parties and that it would be undesirable
to make a finding on an issue which has not been raised and without the benefit of hearing full
argument on such an issue. Constitutional issues, par excellence, should be thoroughly
researched and presented. On the other hand, if the facts support an application of legal
principles which have not been raised by the parties, it could be argued that ajustice hearing
the matter should raise such principles mero motu. In my view, however, it is undesirable that
a justice who raises certain issues mero motu should decide on the issue without hearing full
argument. The parties should have been asked to supplement their papers and file
supplementary heads of argument to present a complete picture to the justices. In any event,
this was not done and this question of judicial policy cannot be dealt with in this thesis.
O'Regan J disagreed with the final conclusions of Chaskalson P and Sachs J about the
challenge arising from section 14. Whilst acknowledging" that the position under the South
African constitution clearly differed from that of the United States on "establishment" and that
the absence of an express establishment clause meant that our Constitution did not require a
strict separation between religious institutions and the State, O'Regan J stated:"
On the other hand, it also seems plain from the provisions of s 14(2) that State
endorsement of religious practices is subject to certain qualifications.
Whilst this is true, the judge seemed to argue that a kind of qualified establishment clause
should be read into the provisions of section 14(2). It is, however, clear that section 14(2) only
applies to religious observances "at state or state-aided institutions". The justice seems to
suggest that wherever religion is observed, the State may never be seen to act in contravention
64 Par 118-119.
65 Par 120.
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with section 14(2)(a), (b) and (c). This, with respect, does not reflect the true meaning of
section 14(2). One can therefore not agree with O'Regan J in so far as she implied that section
14(2) imposes the duty to act even-handedly even in the case of religious observances not held
at state or state-aided institutions." O'Regan J further stated:"
The explicit endorsement of one religion over others would not be permitted in our
new constitutional order. Itwould not be permitted, first, because it would result
in the indirect coercion that Black J adverted to in Engel v Vitale. And secondly
because such public endorsement of one religion over another is in itself a threat
to the free exercise of religion, particularly in a society in which there is a wide
variety of religions.
Although one could agree with this finding, it is unsatisfactory in so far as it implies that a
qualified establishment clause can be read into section 14. If there were indeed such a
"qualified establishment clause" in any section of the Constitution, it would be in respect of
section 9 (section 8 under the interim Constitution), the equality clause. It is therefore
submitted that the enquiry in the current case should have been approached under the equality
clause. In this regard one can agree with O'Regan J's statement:"
We will also have to be satisfied that there has been no inequitable or unfair
preference of one religion over others ...
I also cannot agree with Chaskalson P when he concludes that because the
provisions do not constrain individuals' right to entertain such religious beliefs as
they might choose, or to declare their religious beliefs openly, or to manifest their
religious beliefs', there is no infringement of s 14 (at para [97]). In my view, the
requirements of the Constitution require more of the Legislature than that it refrain
from coercion. It requires in addition that the Legislature refrain from favouring
one religion over others. Fairness and even-handedness in relation to diverse
66 O'Regan stated (par 129) that the appellant did not argue that the provision in the Liquor Act was in
breach of s 8(2), the right not to be discriminated against unfairly on the grounds of religion. She
therefore found it unnecessary to consider whether the section would constitute a breach of that
constitutional provision as well.
67 Par 123.
68 Par 123.
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religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion.
O'Regan J further found the infringement of religious freedom unjustifiable because it had to
be both reasonable and necessary under section 33 (the limitation clause) of the interim
Constitution."
If it is assumed that the equality clause was in fact raised by the appellants and that the justice
based her latter remarks not on the premise that section 14 prescribes even-handedness in the
treatment of diverse religions in all circumstances, but on the premise that such treatment is
mandatory under the equality clause, with the additional requirement that the discrimination
be unfair, one can agree with the last statement quoted above. However, the enquiry should
have been conducted under section 8 (now section 9) of the interim Constitution with the
additional requirements imposed by that section."
According to Sachs J11 there are only two ways in which the determination of Sundays as
closed days for the sale of liquor might involve violations of section 14 of the interim
Constitution. The first relates to the impact which the State's choice of the Christian Sabbath
as a closed day might have on non-Christians liquor sellers. They are placed at a competitive
disadvantage because not only does their religion oblige them to cease trading" on a different
(their own) Sabbath but they also have to observe the statutory limit on trading on the closed
day." The second relates to the "radiating symbolic effect" that State endorsement of the
69 O'Regan J was not convinced that the state has established that the secular reasons for the
infringement of s 14 were necessary, as required under the interim Constitution. Under the fmal
Constitution the requirement in the limitation clause is merely that the limitation must be reasonable.
It could perhaps be that O'Regan J would consequently be more easily persuaded under the present
dispensation.
70 See in this regard, for example, the decision of the the Constitutional Court in Prinsloo v Van der
Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC).
71 Par 137.
72 The justice pointed out (par 139) that the challenge based on s 14 came not from believers whose faith
was being threatened but from traders whose profits were being limited.
73 The justice in this regard referred to the case of Braunfeldv Brown 366 US 599 (1961) at 616 where
(continued ...)
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Christian faith might have. In this regard the justice referred to the United States case of
Lynch, Mayor of Pawtucket v Donnelly" where it was stated that "[e]ndorsement sends a
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favoured members of the
political community". The justice accepted this metaphor and stated that the question in the
present case was whether the prohibition of the sale of liquor on Sundays amounted to such
a message of inclusion for some or exclusion for others. He stated:"
What is at issue is the authority of the State to impose a particular religious view
on the whole of society.
It is, however, problematic to accept authority of the United States, especially on the question
of the state endorsement of religion. As pointed out above, the United States and South
African constitutional clauses differ fundamentally on this point. In the United States, state
endorsement of religion is explicitly prohibited, whilst that is not the case in the South African
Constitution."
Sachs ]77 further pointed out that, although section 14 was the central provision as far as the
enquiry was concerned, it by no means exhausted the text of the Constitution with regard to
questions of religion, belief and opinion. He concluded: 78
73 (...continued)
it was found that it was unconstitutional to, in effect, compel an Orthodox Jew to choose between his
religious faith and his economic survival.
74 465 US 668, 687 (1984).
75 Par 138.
76 Sachs J seemed to realise this as evidenced by his remarks on the decision of the Constitutional Court
in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) par 18-20 where it was held that it
was dangerous to simply transplant into our jurisprudence formulae, modes of classification and legal
doctrine developed in other countries where constitutional texts and sociohistorical situations were
different from ours; and at the same time, take account of problems shared with all humanity.
77 Par 142-147.
78 Par 148.
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To my mind, read in the context of all of the above provisions and the Constitution
as a whole, s 14 was intended at least to uphold the following principles and
values: South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian State
that guarantees freedom of worship; is respectful of and accommodatory towards,
rather than hostile to or walled-off from religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and
multi-belief nature of the country; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal
truth above another; accepts the intensely personal nature of individual conscience
and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and non-coerced character of belief;
respects the rights of non-believers; and does not impose orthodoxies of thought
or require conformity of conduct in terms of any particular world view. The
Constitution, then, is very much about the acknowledgement by the State of
different belief systems and their accommodation within a non-hierarchical
framework of equality and non-discrimination. It follows that the State does not
take sides on questions of religion. It does not impose belief, grant privileges to
or impose disadvantages on adherents of any particular belief, require conformity
in matters simply of belief, involve itself in purely religious controversies, or
marginalise people who have different beliefs.
In view of the above, Sachs J was not persuaded that the selection of Sunday as a closed day
imposed unacceptable commercial disadvantage on non-Christians in a constitutionally
significant sense. He also found that the mere fact that the closed day coincided with a day that
had its origins in Christian practice did not automatically mean that it continued to serve the
sectarian purpose of compelling observance of that day as a Christian day of rest. He was
therefore not persuaded that the closed day resulted in state-imposed observance of the
Christian Sabbath in any significant way. However, the fact that all the closed days for
purposes of selling liquor are religiously based holidays motivated the judge to hold that such
a practice did in fact imply an endorsement by the state of the Christian religion in a manner
that was problematic in terms of section 14.
As stated above, such a finding on the basis of the equality clause read in conjunction with the
religion clause would have been more sound in view of the fact that neither section 14 of the
interim Constitution nor section 15 of the final Constitution involves any curtailment of "state
endorsement" of religion other than in state or state-aided institutions. Inany event, he found
the choice of the closed days to be an infringement of section 14 by reason of the inescapable
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message it sent out. 79
In Sachs J's VIew, the application of the limitation clause (section 33 of the interim
Constitution) resolved the matter. He applied the proportionality test in considering whether
the intrusion against the right qualified as reasonable,justifiable and necessary in the particular
case. He held that, on the one hand, the scope and intensity of the invasion of section 14 rights
were relatively slight and, on the other hand, that the dangers of excessive drinking were grave
and that the legislative restrictions were therefore both reasonable and necessary."
In summary, as far as the issue of state support of religion or "establishment" is concerned, the
following approaches emerged:"
(i) Chaskalson P holds that section 15(1) of the Constitution deals with the free exercise
of religion only, but that laws sanctioning establishment could possibly be contested
under the equal protection and nondiscrimination provisions of section 9;
(ii) O'Regan J agrees that section 15(1) does not deal with establishment per se, but holds
that freedom of religion as such requires fairness and even-handedness and could
therefore be invoked to strike down religious favouritism; and
(iii) Sachs J assumes, without proper motivation, that section 15(1) includes proscription
of the establishment of religion.
It is clear from the above analysis that it is no easy task to deal with the principle of equality
in the context of religion and, at the same time, reconcile it with the clear intention of the
Constitution not to erect a wall of separation between the state and religion but to
79 Itwas remarked obiter (par 164) but not decided that if Christmas Day and Good Friday were severed
from the rest of the defmition of closed days, the identification of Sunday only would not implicate
s 14.
80 It has to be kept in mind that in the "fmal" constitution the limitation clause no longer contains the
reference to "necessary" in relation to certain rights.
81 See Van der Vyver 1999 BYU-LR 652-656.
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accommodate religion. Du Plessis" states that the approach of the five judges in incorporating
an equality analysis in the application of section 14 is more conducive to the promotion of
religious tolerance than the approach of the four judges who adjudicated the matter purely on
free exercise grounds:
The approach of the five is more conducive to the promotion of religious tolerance
than that of the four. Putting up with (often esoteric) manifestations of religious
beliefs is not the hallmark of tolerating religious eccentricities. In political terms,
a state's evenhanded treatment of divergent religious convictions and the
realisation of the convictions and their effects in societal life probably does more
to evidence (and enhance) positive tolerance. The real freedom of religion issue
in the Seven Eleven case was how to accommodate certain Christians' objections
to the sale of liquor on their holy day against the acquiescence of Christians and
non-Christians who do not really mind.
Du Plessis further states that, in addition, the four attempted to purge the Sunday of its
religious significance by labelling it as a general day of rest. Such an approach "secularises"
the dispute and thereby sidesteps the issue instead of adjudicating a religious rights issue."
As Epp Buckingham" states, this case is an example of bad cases making confusing law. The
applicants used the wrong procedure, which resulted in the case being appealed to the
Constitutional Court with an incomplete record and the court basing its decision on the
constitutional issues on little or no evidence. Furthermore, the case dealt with commercial
interests rather than religious freedom." As far as the religious rights issues were concerned,
no religious groups appeared before the court to make representations on the nature and ambit
of religious freedom, and the appellants' failure to raise section 9 as a ground for declaring the
relevant sections of the Liquor Act unconstitutional, led to the somewhat artificial
82 Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 114.
83 Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 115 refers to this strategy as "secular sanitization". See his discussion of
other examples at 115-118.
84 See the case discussion of Epp Buckingham 1999Stell LR 117-125.
85 Sachs J stated (par 154): "As I have said, although the section 14 issue of principle is real, the way
it came to us was artificial.The objectivewas to abolish a commercial restraint, not to secure religious
freedom."
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interpretation of section l5( 1) to also include a proscription of establishment. It is indeed
unfortunate that the court chose such a poor case to articulate its views on religious freedom.
3.3 The Preamble to the South African Constitution
The last paragraph of the Preamble to the 1996 Constitution reads as follows:
May God protect our people. Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa
heso. God seën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa. Mudzima fhatutshedza
Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.
The argument could be advanced that the Preamble supports theistic religions, and therefore
discriminates against nontheistic religions or atheism."
Van der Vyver87 describes the legal position with regard to the reference to "Almighty God"
in section 2 of the 1983 Constitution" as follows:
It should also be noted that the present constitutional provision amounts to a
confession of faith and as such does not constitute a rule of law. It consequently
altogether lacks juridical relevance.
The Constitutional Court appears to have departed from this approach when dealing with the
preamble of the Western Cape Constitution. In Ex Parte Speaker of The Western Cape
Provincial Legislature: in Re Certification of The Constitution of The Western Cape" the
86 Heyns and Brand 2000 Emory Int'l L Rev 750 state that these references do not amount to unfair
discrimination since there are good secular reasons for such discrimination, namely the unifying
symbolic value of the phrase "Nkosi sikelel'iAfrika". It is, however, problematic to distinguish
between secular and religious reasons. Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 106on the other hand states that the
multilingual reference to "God" can be seen to favour monotheistic beliefs and that, although it is
doubtful whether this is an intentional gesture of intolerance towards polytheists and atheists, it is
nonetheless inconsiderate.
87 Religion par 236.
88 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 110of 1983.
89 1997 (4) SA 795 (CC) par 28.
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question was raised of whether the Preamble to the Western Cape Constitution, which
commences with the phrase "In humble submission to Almighty God", was inconsistent with
section 15 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court held:
The invocation of a deity in these prefatory words to the preamble of the WCC
[the Western Cape Constitution] has no particular constitutional significance and
echoes the peroration to the preamble to the NC [the National Constitution]. It is
a time-honoured means of adding solemnity used in many cultures and in a variety
of contexts. Thus, in the United States with its explicit Establishment Clause
separating Church and State, the use of the national motto ('In God we trust') and
the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag have been
characterised as 'ceremonial deism'. Such words have no operative constitutional
effect nor are they fundamentally hostile to the spirit and objects of the NC. They
could also not be used to interpret the provisions ofNC 15 restrictively. These
words could therefore have no effect on the rights of believers or non-believers.
In the circumstances there is no inconsistency between the preamble of the WCC
and the NC.
Du Plessis" sharply criticises the finding of the court that the contested phrase is religiously
neutral. He states that a more realistic and credible finding would have been that the phrase
expresses religious sentiments but that these are consistent with guarantees of religious
freedom in the national Constitution. Vander Vyvefll likewise criticises the decision and states
that the degradation of references to "Almighty God" to the "ceremonial" level where it has
no meaning is blasphemy in probably all theistic religions of the world.
In so far as the reference to God in the National Constitution is concerned, Van der Vyver
maintains:"
The preambular references to "God" ... is offensive to at least Christians, atheists,
and persons adhering to a nontheistic religion (such as Buddhism).
Atheists and persons professing a nontheistic religion might well, and with good
90 2001 BYV- LR 115.
91 1999 BYV-LR 651.
92 1999 BYV-LR 650.
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cause, regard the reference to "God" in the preamble of the constitution as a sign
of religious favoritism that leaves them out in the cold. Christians would find the
preambular testimony to "God" objectionable exactly because it seeks to maintain
a certain neutrality in regard to all religions; it thus depersonifies the deity and
therefore, from the Christian perspective, pays homage to an idol. A constitutional
confession of faith in a nondescript god is as good an example as one might wish
to find of taking God's name in vain.
In any event, these references (in the National Constitution) form part of the Constitution itself
and are therefore not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
4. Separation of church and state
4.1 Introduction
Itwas shown in chapter 2 that the essential rights and freedoms of religion include (a) freedom
of conscience (b) the freedom to practise (exercise) religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching, (c) pluralism, (d) equality and nondiscrimination on the grounds of
religion or belief, (e) separation of state and religion and (e) institutional separation of church
and state. This paragraph will investigate whether the institutional separation of church and
state is protected by the South African Constitution and what the effect of this protection
would be on the courts' view of churches and intrareligious disputes.
4.2 Separation of church and state in the Constitution
The Constitution does not explicitly protect the institutional separation of church (or religious
communities) and state. It is, however, clear from the discussion in chapter 2 that the
separation of church and state or "[fjreedom of the church from control by the state is one
important part of modem religious liberty?" and that this has been the case since, at least, the
Middle Ages. It is therefore inconceivable that the constitutional entrenchment of religious
93 Tierney Religious Rights 24. The author pointed out that the libertas ecclesiae demanded by medieval
popes was not freedom of religion for each individual person but the freedom of the church as an
institution to direct its own affairs.
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rights in the South African Constitution does not include the institutional separation of church
and state."
In the matter of Ryland v Edros." the first case where this issue was raised in the new
constitutional dispensation, the judge seemed to accept the implicit separation of church and
state. He based the separation of church and state on the religious freedom guarantees of
section 14(1) of the interim Constitution (section 15(1) of the final Constitution). Farlam J
stated:"
... it seemed to me that there was a distinct danger that by making rulings on the
issues before the court Imight unwittingly become entangled in doctrinal matters
which it is inappropriate and indeed undesirable, for the reasons given in the
American decisions (see, eg Jones v Wolf 433 US 595 (1979)), for a judge in a
secular court to do in a country which has a constitution which entrenches every
person's 'right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion ...'
(as ours does in section 14(1)).
It is true that our Constitution, unlike the Constitution of the United States, does
not have an establishment clause but it seems clear that, although the American
rule against doctrinal entanglement is to some extent prompted by establishment
concerns, the rule also rests on independent free exercise clause grounds as was
explained in United States v Ballard 322 US 78 (1944) ...
It is submitted, for the historical reasons set out in chapter 2, that the entrenchment of religious
freedom in section 15(1) of the Constitution should be read to include the protection of the
institutional separation of church and state and thus as precluding interference in the sovereign
sphere of churches, religious institutions or religious communities.
94 Institutional separation of church and state was part of South African law even before 1994, as
appears from the discussion in eh 3.
95 1997 (1) SA 690 (C) 702G.
96 86C.
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Vander Vyvef17writes that interference in the sovereign sphere" of religious institutions might
be rendered constitutionally tenable by imposing on persons other than the state the obligation
to refrain from unfair discrimination as envisaged in section 9(4) ofthe Constitution. He points
out that the interim Constitution excluded the decisions taken and the acts performed by
"private" persons and the conduct and internal rules of conduct of institutions other than the
state, from constitutional scrutiny." Section 9(4) of the final Constitution, however, expressly
makes the proscription of discrimination applicable to persons other than the state or state
organs.!" This would imply, for example, that a constitutional obligation is imposed on the
Roman Catholic Church not to discriminate against women and to ordain them as priests. As
Vander Vyver'?' puts it, "the mere fact that the Roman Catholic Church might be constrained
to justify its internal ruling before a secular tribunal smells of totalitarianism of the worst
kind"."? Such an interpretation of section 9(4) would moreover be contrary to the international
understanding of religious freedom.
f
97 1999 BYU-LR 665.
98 According to the doctrine of sphere sovereignty, according to which church and state are "distinct
social entities" as described by Van der Vyver, the institutions of church and state are not subject to
one another, each has its own internal structures and each has original inherent powers to inter alia
lay down internal legal rules to which members are subject. See Van der Vyver Juridiese Funksie and
Introduction xli-xliv for a brief English explanation of the theory. Whilst this is admittedly a Calvinist
theory, it remains an acceptable and valuable scientific theory to explain the interaction of church and
state, and of state and religion. The theory was specifically developed to explain the legal relationship
between church and state. This dissertation is not concerned with any other application of the theory.
99 S 33(4) of the interim Constitution, however, made provision for civil rights legislation to prohibit
unfair discrimination by persons and institutions whose conduct escaped the application of its
provisions.
100 S 9(4) provides that "No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit
un fair discrimination".
101 1999 BYU-LR 667.
102 It could also be argued that, since s 15(2) specifically provides that religious observances at state or
state-aided institutions (which need not be state organs) may only be conducted on an equitable basis,
religious observances at private institutions need not be conducted on an equitable basis and that s
8(2) will not make the constitutional norms applicable to such a case.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER6 224
Section 9(4) provides that legislation be promulgated to give effect to the right enunciated in
the subsection. Itmight have been the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to leave it
up to the political representatives to decide what type of "private" discrimination is unfair and
should be proscribed. And, in the event of such legislation infringing upon religious freedom,
it could well have been declared to be unconstitutional. That would mean, however, that the
subsection was poorly formulated because the right as formulated in section 9(4) is not
dependent upon such legislation. As it now stands it simply provides that "no person may
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of
subsection (3)". As already shown, such an interpretation would, in the case of justifying an
interference in the sovereign sphere of religious institutions, be in contravention of the
historical development ofthe concept of religious freedom as well as the current international
and foreign understanding of it. Such interference would, moreover, not have been possible
in the preconstitutional era in South Africa. It is therefore submitted that section 9(4) should
not be interpreted to sanction interference in the internal sphere of religious institutions or
churches on the grounds of the historical development of religious freedom and as entrenched
in section 15(1) and 31(1).103 It is submitted, as will be argued in chapter 7, that the provisions
of section 9(4) should be read in conjunction with the provisions of section 8(3) and that, in
certain cases, the "right'"?' contained in section 9(4) should be limited accordingly.
4.3 The effect of the constitutional entrenchment of religious freedom on the
adjudication of religious disputes
4.3.1 Introduction
The issue of doctrinal entanglement was raised for the first time under the interim Constitution
in Ryland v Edros?" The court was asked to make a finding on the terms of a marriage
contract which incorporated Muslim family law. The court had to decide which Islamic family
103 S 31(2), however, provides that "that right may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any
provisions of the Bill of Rights".
104 S 9(4) does not contain a right but a prohibition.
105 1997 (1) SA 690 (C) 7020.
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law was incorporated in the parties' marriage contract, but not what the meaning of any
Muslim family law was. Nevertheless, Farlam J mero motu raised the point of doctrinal
entanglement by asking whether it would be appropriate for a court to pronounce upon matters
of religious law. He raised the point with reference to an article by Cachalia'" which discussed
the nature oflslam and Islamic law. The judge stated.'?'
Prior to the coming into force of the Constitution our courts 'would not adjudicate
upon a doctrinal dispute between two schisms of a sect unless some proprietary
or other legally recognised right was involved (Allen and Others NNO v Gibbs
and Others 1977 (3) SA 212 (SE) at 218A-B). It seemed to me that section 14 of
the Constitution might well have changed the position and that the doctrine of
doctrinal entanglement may now be part of our law. (My emphasis.)
This statement expresses the same doubt as Klaaren'" does in his commentary on
administrative justice in the Constitution:
A few bodies previously covered [by administrative law] may no longer be. For
instance, religious bodies were covered by the rules of administrative justice but
may escape coverage as a result of the entrenchment of religious freedom in the
Bill of Rights. (My insertion.)
For example, see Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in Suid-
Afrika en andere 1976 (2) SA 1 (A). Religious bodies have been susceptible to
review as other associations by reason of contract. The value of religious freedom
introduced by the Interim Constitution section 14 and Final Constitution section
15 may lead to a change in this common law doctrine.!"
Itwill be argued in this paragraph that the internal rules of church and religious communities
or institutions are, as a general rule, not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
106 Cachalia 1993 THRHR400.
107 86C.
108 Administrative Justice 25-6.
109 In the footnote to the above mentioned text.
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4.3.2 The position of churches in South African law
In South African law, churches are classified as voluntary associations based on contract. In
Theron v Ring van Wellington NG Sendingkerk:" the Appellate Division held: III
Trouens, op hierdie terrein is kerke nog altyd in ons regspraak op dieselfde
grondslag as sodanige genootskappe behandel. Dit is 'n benadering wat reeds in
1843 deur die wetgewer aan die Kaap met Ordonnansie 7 gevestig is. Artikel8 het
onder andere bepaal dat die reëls en regulasies van die kerk 'shall be regarded in
law in like manner as the rules and regulations of a merely voluntary association,
and shall be capable of affecting the persons or properties of such persons only as
shall be found in the course of any action or suit before any Competent Court to
have subscribed, agreed to, adopted or recognized the said rules and regulations
or some of them in such manner as to be bound thereby in virtue of the ordinary
legal principle applicable to cases of express or implied contract.
Pienaar!" points out that this was the result ofa confusion of Roman Dutch law and English
law concepts. In Roman Dutch law a distinction was drawn between a universitas (a juristic
person) and a societas Camere association of individuals based on contract). A universitas
originates if it complies with the requirements for such a juristic person, without any other
formal requirements.!" It is nowhere stated that the basis of a universitas is contractual. In
110 19762SAI(A)25.
111 See also Longv Bishop of Cape Town (1863) 4 Searle 162176; De Waalv Van der Horst 1918TPD
277,289; Bredell v Pienaar 1922 CPD 578, 581; Du Plessis v The Synod of the Dutch Reformed
Church 1930CPD 403, 414; De Vos v Ringskommissie NG Kerk 1952 (2) SA 83 (0) 93; Odendaal
vLoggerenberg 1961(1) SA 712 (0)714; Van Vuuren vKerkraad Morelig Gemeente NG Kerk 1979
(4) SA 548 (0) 557; Bamford Voluntary Associations 117-119, 126-131; Caney and Brooks
Associations 304.
112 Pienaar Gemeenregtelike Regspersoon 167-176, 184.
113 The two main requirements for the existence of a common lawjuristic person was set out in Webb v
Northern Rifles 1908TS 462, 465 as follows: "An universitas personarum in Roman- Dutch law is
a legal fiction, an aggregation of individuals forming a persona or entity, having the capacity to
acquire rights and incurring obligations to a great extent as a human being. An universitas is
distinguished from a mere association of individuals by the fact that it is an entity distinct from the
individuals forming it, that its capacity to acquire rights or incur obligations is distinct from that of
(continued...)
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English law, on the other hand, three kinds of associations are recognised, namely incorporated
associations, unincorporated associations and quasi-corporations. Juristic personality,
however, has to be granted by statute or royal charter and cannot originate as a result of a
contract. There are consequently two kinds of churches in England: first, the Church of
England and the Established Church of Scotland, which are both incorporated associations
with juristic personality by way of state grants, and secondly, all other churches, which are
classified as voluntary associations based on contract because they cannot obtain legal
personality.l"
On the basis of these principles of English law, the principles of voluntary associations or
clubs were applied to churches in the Cape'" and Natal. According to Ordinance 7 of 1843
(Cape) the regulations of the Hervormde kerk had the legal status of rules and regulations of
a voluntary association. Although the Transvaal and Free State courts initially applied Roman
Dutch law, the principles of English and Roman Dutch law later merged. This led to the
anomaly that a "club" or voluntary association based on contract, which in terms of English
law could not obtain legal personality, could be seen as a common law juristic person under
South African law. It is completely alien to Roman Dutch law that a common law juristic
person could be based on contract. 116
113 (...continued)
its members, which are acquired or incurred for the body as a whole, and not for the individual
members. Among the most important rights appertaining to an universitas is the right to acquire and
hold property. It continues to exist though the individual members comprising it change, so long as
one member remains in whom the rights of the universitas can vest. It has what is sometimes called
perpetual succession."
114 If a church were to be recognised as a juristic person under English law, the position would be the
following: "A clergyman is dismissed from his post. What right does he have? Ifhe belongs to the
Church of England or the Church of Scotland then an appeal lies to the relevant ecclesiastical courts.
These courts are constituted by statute and are as supreme in their own sphere as the civil and criminal
courts are in theirs. Clergymen of the non-established church are in a different position. They belong
to what are in effect voluntary associations. Dismissal under the disciplinary procedure of the church
in question can be scrutinised by the courts to ensure that there has been no procedural irregularity
or breach of the rules of natural justice." See Woolman 1986 LQR 356-359.
115 See for example Long v Bishop of Cape Town 1863 4 Searle 162, 176.
116 See for example De Waal v Van der Horst 1918 TPD 277, 289 where the church was described as a
(continued ...)
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Pienaar!" convincingly argues that a common law juristic person does not have a contractual
nature. The legal relationships between the juristic person and the members are governed by
the "internal (private) law" (ius constitutum and ius constituendum) set out in its
constitution.!" Itwould be more suitable to apply the rules of statutory interpretation, if any.
An unlawful breach of the internal law would also give rise to a delictual action rather than to
a contractual action.'!"
The relevance of the above in the current context is that the power of judicial review of the
decisions of church or religious tribunals is based on the contractual nature of the
"associations'"!" The courts view the Church Order ("Kerkorde") or the constitution of the
church as a contract between the members and the church and accordingly regard themselves
as competent to pronounce on or interpret this contract according to the ordinary rules of the
interpretation of contracts in review proceedings.!"
116 (...continued)
juristic person and a voluntary association based on contract.
117 Pienaar Gemeenregtelike Regspersoon 215-216; 254-255. Also see Van der Vyver Juridiese Funksie
182 who also refers to "huishoudelike verbandsreg wat in en vir die lede van die betrokke
samelewingskring geld."
118 Pienaar Gemeenregtelike Regspersoon 210, 255 explains this as follows: "By toetrede onderwerp In
lid hom aan die objektiewe reg soos vervat in die doelstellings, statute of konstitusie van die
regspersoon. Dit is dus nie 'n kontraktuele verhouding wat tussen gelyke kontrakspartye bestaan nie
maar 'n onderwerping aan die objektiewe reg wat die onderlinge regsverhouding tussen lede en
regsverhoudinge tussen die regspersoon en buitestaanders reël. Die nuwe lid se belange word
ondergeskik aan die belange van die samelewingsverband soos dit in die doel, statute of konstitusie
uiteengesit is. Die lede se belange, hoewelondergeskik aan die van die regspersoon, word egter steeds
deur die goeie trou en billikheid wat tussen die regspersoon en sy lede moet bestaan, beheers en
beskerm."
119 Pienaar Gemeenregtelike Regspersoon 207-216. Also see Fourie NG Kerk as Regspersoon 267.
120 See Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court which provides that "Save where any law otherwise
provides, all proceedings to bring under review the decision or proceedings of any inferior court and
of any tribunal, board or officer performing judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative functions shall
be ... ".
121 Bamford Voluntary Associations 110; Theron v Ring van Wellington NG Sendingkerk 1976 (2) SA
1 (A) 27; Long v Bishop of Cape Town 4 Searle 162, 176; In De Vos v Ringkommissie NG Kerk 1952
(2) SA 83 (0) 93 the judge remarked that: "Myns insiens maak dit geen verskil nie, wat die vertolking
(continued ...)
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The unreserved acceptance and application of the legal principles of voluntary associations
based on contract to South African churches by the courts deserve criticism. It does not take
into account the nature of churches as religious institutions nor the way in which they function.
It is moreover incorrect to say that churches have always been characterised as voluntary
associations based on contract.!" Not one of the cases in which the requirements for a common
law juristic person are set out, makes mention of the fact that a juristic person is based on
contract. The Roman Dutch concept of a juristic person provides a far more suitable basis and
explanation for the legal position of churches than the English law of voluntary associations.
If a church continues to exist notwi thstanding the fact that the individual members change, and
if it exists as an entity distinct from its members, it would be recognised as a common law
juristic person.
In classifying a church on the basis of contract, a number of practical problems arise such as
the absence of a contractual explanation for members joining and leaving the church. In
addition there are valid theological objections to this view. In any event, and from a practical
perspective, the constitution of a church is not used as a contract, but as a church law. It
constitutes the objective norms to which members have to conform.
Apart from the above objections, the interpretation of the constitutions of churches or religious
bodies and a review of their decisions have now become even more susceptible to criticism
in terms of the Constitution. It is submitted that it would constitute an impermissible
infringement of religious freedom if a court were to interpret religious doctrine in order to
reach a decision or pronounce upon the decision of a religious body or tribunal. The
constitutional arguments will be dealt with in more detail below.
121 (...continued)
van die Kerkorde betref, of die NG Kerk 'n regspersoon of 'n onderlinge vereniging is".
122 Venter v Den Kerkeraad der Gereformeerde Kerk te Bethu/ie 1879 OFS 4; Dutch Reformed Church,
Van Wijksvlei v Registrar of Deeds 1918 CPD 375, 377; Louvis and others v Oiconomos and others
1917 TPD 465, 476; Peach and Co v The Jewish Congregation of Johannesburg 1894 1Off Rep 345;
Prinsloo and others vNederduitsch Hervormde ofGereformeerde Church 1889-1890 3 Barber 220
223. In all these cases the church was characterised as a common law juristic person (universitas) and
distinguished from a societas based on contract.
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4.3.3 Extension of the grounds of review
In the preconstitutional era religious freedom was, to some extent, protected by the difference
between appeal and review.!" This meant that a court would not lightly have substituted its
opinion for that of the administrative tribunal on the merits of a religious matter.!"
However, in the Theron case the Appellate Division introduced the "extended formal" test
("uitgebreide formele maatstaf') for reviewing decisions of administrative tribunals.!" The
effect is that the merits of the matter are interpreted narrowly and that the greater part of the
decision is consequently reviewable. This case was welcomed by the legal community since
it opened the door for the recognition of reasonableness as grounds for review. This
development eventually culminated in the constitutional entrenchment of administrative justice
which extended the grounds for review to include reasonableness and justifiability. However,
in the Theron case the decision resulted in the finding by the Appellate Division, on the basis
of three reasons, that it could interpret the church's constitution. With the extension of the
administrative grounds for review under the Constitution.!" it is likely that a court, in
123 The line between appeal and review is often very difficult to draw, especially where the exercise of
a discretion is involved.
124 The classical formulation of the preconstitutional era can be found in National Transport Commission
v Chetty's Motor Transport 1977 (3) SA 726 (A) 735: "There is no appeal against the decision of the
commission. The legislature appointed it as the final arbiter in its special field and, right or wrong,
for better or worse, reasonable or unreasonable, its decision stands - unless it is vitiated by proof on
review in the Supreme Court that - (a) the Commission failed to apply its mind to the matter in
accordance with the behests of the statute and the tenets of natural justice; in other words, that dejure,
it failed to decide the matter at all. Such failure could be established by reference to mala fides,
improper motive, arbitrariness or caprice. The list is not exhaustive; or (b) the Commission's decision
was grossly unreasonable to so striking a degree as to warrant the inference of a failure to apply its
mind as aforesaid - a formidable onus".
125 The part of Jansen lA's decision on the extended formal test (and unreasonableness as independent
grounds for review) did not form part of the majority decision. On this point the appellate judges were
divided 2-2-1.
126 Afrisun Mpumalanga (Pty) Ltd v Kunene No and Others 1999 (2) SA 599 (T); Deacon v Control/er
of Customs and Excise 1999 (2) SA 905 (SE) 918F-G; Roman v Williams NO 1998 (1) SA 270 (C)
281 E; Kotzé vMinister of Health and Another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T); Premier, Eastern Cape, and
(continued ...)
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interpreting a church's constitution and reviewing the decision of a religious body, would in
fact be encroaching upon the principles of (corporate) religious freedom.
In view of these arguments, it is submitted that the decision in Theron vRing van Wellington'"
should be reconsidered. The dispute in this case was mainly about the correct interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the "Kerkorde". The respondents argued that the court could not
interpret these provisions of the church's constitution since, in terms of the formal test, the
court could not on review decide on the merits of the matter. The respondents, however, did
not maintain that the church had greater immunity from judicial review than any other
voluntary association by virtue of the fact that it was a church. The Appellate Division held
that:
Dit kan egter wees dat 'n kerk algehele outonomie oor leerkwessies besit, maar
hieroor hoef geen mening uitgespreek te word nie; ook is dit, gesien die standpunt
van die Respondent, onnodig om verder by die kwessie van kerklike immuniteit
(indien enige) of die verhouding tussen die Staat en kerk stil te staan.
Nevertheless, the failure by the Respondents to raise the point of doctrinal entanglement
should nevertheless, not have provided sufficient grounds for the court to interpret religious
doctrine.
4.3.4 The position in the United States with regard to judicial intervention in
intrachurch disputes
The position in the United States, where a clear institutional separation of church and state is
maintained by virtue of the wording of the First Amendment to the Constitution, offers a
126 (...continued)
Others v Cekeshe and Others 1999 (3) SA 56 (Tk) 72; Tseleng v Chairman, Unemployment Insurance
Board, and Another 1995 (3) SA 162 (T)(1995 (2) BCLR 138); Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana
Ltd v Reynolds NO and Others 1995 (3) SA 74 (B) (1995 (3) BCLR 305); Pennington vMinister of
Justice and Others 1995 (3) BCLR 270 (C); Maharaj v Chairman, Liquor Board 1997 (1) SA 273
(N) (1997 (2) BCLR 248); and in the Land Claims Court, Farjas (Pty) Ltd and Another v Regional
Land Claims Commissioner, Kwazu/u-NataI1998 (2) SA 900 (LCC) (1998 (5) BCLR 579».
127 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) 14.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER6 232
number of principles which could be useful to South African courts in dealing with the issue
of judicial intervention in religious disputes.
In the United States, judicial intervention m disputes within ecclesiastical structures
(intrachurch disputes) takes the form of three basic tests.!"
(a) The "departure from doctrine" test
The "departure from doctrine" test is based on the "Catholic model" of church-state relations
in which the church is typically treated as an institution within the jurisdiction of the court or
as a sort of state entity. This test was devised when there was an establishment regime in the
United States. The court, assuming that it is competent to do so, interprets religious doctrine
in order to identify the faction which departed from orthodox doctrine and then reaches its
decision on that basis and, for example, divides the church property accordingly. For present
purposes it would suffice to say that this test was declared unconstitutional in the case of
Presbyterian Church in the United State v May Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church:'?' It has, however re-appeared in 12 lower court cases.
(b) The "deference" test
The "deference" test, on the other hand, treats the church as an alien institution which is
beyond the purview of civil courts. lts basic premise is that of the "Puritan model" which
maintains that the church is separate from this world. Religious matters are thus not to be
interfered with, but are constitutionally protected. The method of this test, as demonstrated in
Watson v JonesP? is that the highest locus of authority within the ecclesiastical structure has
128 These tests can be seen as representative of judicial responses to disputes between church and state
or political and religious interests. It has been stated that one way of looking at the American
constitutional law of church and state, is to view it from the perspective of principles present in the
body of law governing intrachurch disputes over property. In this "microcosm" one finds a miniature
representation of the recurrent themes of "deference" and "neutral principles".
129 393 US 440 (1969).
130 13 Wallace 679 (I872).
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to be found, and the court has to enforce what it says.
The main criticism is that the court defines the character of the church polity and that the
minority group is often denied standing. This test was developed after the 1941 incorporation
doctrine in the United States and the creation of national free exercise rights (in their
individual and corporate dimensions), as seen in Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral.ï" Itwas
held that the free exercise clause demands that religious people themselves should be allowed
to choose the highest authority. Corporate free exercise rights were held to be superior to
individual free exercise, by giving the church itself the right to define its own law and polity,
and by arguing that since the highest authority spoke on it, the State could not countermand
the free exercise clause, even if it appeared in a state constitution. The deference test as applied
in the Watson and Kedroff cases above, was affirmed in the Presbyterian Church case. In
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Doicese for the United States vMilivojevich'" the court, still using
the basic deference test, argued that it was natural for human beings to join communities,
thereby giving up certain state rights and subscribing to others. The law respects these
voluntary assembly patterns and the rules of internal communities, but will get involved when
matters go beyond certain limits. The court held that in the case of a church, the law would not
undermine the institutional structures, because of the corporate free exercise "halo" of the First
Amendment, but would intervene if voluntary exit were restricted or if life and limb of a
member were compromised, thereby developing deference to include the basic notion of
voluntarism.
(c) The "neutral principles" test
The "neutral principles" test had its origins in the Gonzalez vArchbishop'" case where it was
obiter stated that, even if the deference test was used, courts could maintain marginal review
in the case of arbitrary or fraudulent conduct. In the Milivojevich case in 1976, this principle
131 344 US 94 (1952).
132 426 US 696 (1976).
133 (1929). As quoted in the Milivojevich case supra at 711.
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was used to supplement the deference test. InJones v Wolf,134 however, a fully- fledged neutral
principles test, premised on the "Evangelical model", was used. The church is seen as a
dualistic institution, having both a worldly and a sacred dimension. The method followed is
thus one of classifying the dispute. If the dispute deals with doctrine or spiritual matters at the
heart or core (as opposed to the periphery) of the religion, the courts will defer. However, in
instances where the dispute is simply secular or if the dispute really comes down to secular
documents and can be resolved on these documents alone, the court is permitted to adjudicate
according to neutral principles.
The problem with this test is twofold. With regard to the characterisation of the dispute, the
disputants will characterise it as secular or sacred according to the result they wish to achieve.
The main, and grave, criticism is the artificial line-drawing in which the courts indulge. If a
religious body is involved, disputes are essentially theological, and the issues cannot be
separated by a civil court. In a holistic theology, the drawing of lines between "secular" and
"sacred" or between religious core concepts and peripheral issues is a highly artificial exercise
by a civil court and would be unacceptable in view of the fundamental freedom of religion
guarantees.
Deference as firstly used in the above-mentioned American cases is the test which commands
judicial deference to the religious governmental structures in intrachurch disputes and, as such,
is sufficiently protective of corporate religious freedom. It represents a broader judicial
hermeneutical approach founded on a specific theory of the autonomy of social institutions and
a correlative view of the role of the judiciary. In application it would result in a more
purposive and generous approach in interpreting the constitution, as opposed to a more
mechanical, literalist approach as in the neutral principles approach. This approach has led the
courts in some instances to take proactive steps to protect religious freedom in accordance with
the principle that the state cannot countermand the constitutional free exercise guarantee. It
could perhaps be labelled as a political model of "constitutional supremacy" following the role
of the judiciary as custodians of the Constitution.
134 443 US 595 (1979).
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In my view then, deference as used here is representative of a broader theory of social
institutions, requiring the state not to interfere in nonstate institutions (like churches). This
does not mean that the state has no role to play in religion, but its duty at a religious level is
coloured by the inherent and typical nature of the state, that is, of maintaining order between
citizens on an equal basis. Such an approach could therefore be accepted by the South African
courts in the new constitutional dispensation.
The second sense in which "deference" is used is in conjunction with the neutral principles
approach. As seen above, a court applying the deference test in the first sense is not interested
in neutral principles, but a court using neutral principles will defer if the issue is of a "sacred"
(as opposed to a secular) nature. Deference in this second sense is characterised by the basic
hermeneutical approach of viewing the role of the judiciary as limited to "applying"statutes;
and the task of the legislature as limited to making law. This results in a much more literalist
interpretational method (in statutory as well as constitutional analysis). In my view this
approach lacks a proper social theoretical basis and defies the basic notions of
constitutionalism. The traditional approach in South Africa, as set out above, of reviewing
decisions of religious bodies save for the area defined as "merits" corresponds with a neutral
principles approach, coupled with deference for the merits.
4.4 Separation of church and state in cases decided after the commencement of the
new South African Constitution
In Ryland v Edros." Christian Education SA v Minister of Education'" and Schreuder v
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit & Othersl" the courts had to deal with the
issue of the separation of church'" and state in the new constitutional dispensation.
135 1997 (1) SA 690 (C).
136 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE).
137 (1999) 20 ILJ 1936 (LC).
138 As mentioned in eh 1, "church" should also be understood to include religious institutions,
communities and groups.
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4.4.1 Ryland v Edros
In this matter Farlam J approached the matter cautiously:
It follows that if that is so and a decision on the points in issue between the parties
in the present case will, regard being had to the fact that Islam is a 'revelational
culture', involve the court in deciding points of doctrine, then it would be
inappropriate for the court to endeavour to find the answer to the questions posed for
decisions in this case.
Inthis case, however, both parties agreed that the particular issues arising for adjudication did
not require any religious doctrines to be interpreted; for example, they agreed that the rules of
the Shaji'i school would be the applicable rules which the parties must be taken to have
incorporated in their contract. The judge accordingly held that he was satisfied that there was
nothing in section 14 of he Constitution which would preclude him from deciding the issues
arising in the matter. He made it clear, though, that the position might be different in cases
where issues arose which involved matters of doctrine, even should proprietary or other legally
recognised rights be involved.
4.4.2 Christian Education SA vMinister of Education
The approaches adopted in the cases of Christian Education SA vMinister of Educaiion'" and
Schreuder vNederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit & Others, 140 on the other hand, can
be criticised as being insensitive to the above-mentioned issues and incompatible with the
notions of freedom of religion and separation of church and state as set out above.
In Christian Education SA v Minister of Education the Applicant, a voluntary association
representing 196 constituent independent schools which maintain an active Christian ethos,
brought an application to have the provisions of section 10 of the South African Schools Act
84 of 1996 declared unconstitutional. In terms of section 10, the Legislature, on pain of
139 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE).
140 (1999) 20 ILJ 1936 (LC).
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criminal sanction, prohibits the administration of corporal punishment at all schools, including
independent schools within the Republic.
The first ground relied upon by the applicant was that section 10 offended its religious and
cultural rights as protected in the Constitution. 141 The applicant stated in its founding affidavit:
Whilst applicant and its member schools are completely opposed to child abuse in any
form, they are unanimously in favour of correction, using biblical guidelines. Whilst
such correction does contain a punitive element, the corrective element is paramount.
As such it is seen as a vital element of the Christian religion.
The applicant relied on varIOUS biblical passages found In the Book of Proverbs,'?
Deuteronomy!" and Matthew!" for this contention.
Although the end result of the judgment is not necessarily being criticised here, the method
of the court in reaching its decision is, in my view, a clear example of the "neutral principles"
approach or even "departure from doctrine" as described above and unacceptable from a
constitutional religious rights perspective.
At the outset, the court referred to certain American authorities on the approach which should
be adopted by a court of law in order to decide the question of whether a person's right to
freedom of religion had been infringed.!" The judge specifically referred to the case of
Presbyterian Church in the United States vMary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church'" where it was held by the United States Supreme Court that:
141 Applicant relied on s 15of the Constitution, and also on s 29, 30 and 31 for this contention.
142 Proverbs 22:6, 22:15,19:18,23:13-14.
143 Deuteronomy 6:4-7.
144 Matthew 28:19-20.
145 1100.
146 393 US 440 (1969) 451.
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Secular authorities may not resolve civil disputes that engage them in the forbidden
process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.
However, the judge proceeded to engage in precisely this process. He found that:
A consideration of the aforegoing has led me to the conclusion that in cases of this
nature a Court will in the first place consider whether the belief relied upon in fact
forms part of the religious doctrine of the religion practised by the person concerned.
Once it is found that the belief does form part of that doctrine, the Court will not
embark upon an evaluation of the acceptability, logic, consistency or
comprehensibility of the belief. But the Court will then inquire into the sincerity of
the persons claiming that a conflict exists betweenthe legislation and the beliefwhich
is indeed burdensome in the person.
It is submitted that in order to ascertain "whether a belief relied upon in fact forms part of the
religious doctrine of the religion practised" involves an impermissible interpretation of
religious doctrine. It is clear that, in order to ascertain what forms part of a religion and what
not, a judge would have to enter into a theological debate and attempt to define the religion.
Liebenberg J found:
Although I do not question the sinceritywithwhich the applicant attempts to maintain
the right to administer corporal punishment at its constituent schools, I have not been
persuaded that it has been shown to be a sincere belief on religious grounds that
teachers and schools should be empowered to administer corporal punishment.
He found this on the basis that no biblical guidelines were relied upon by the applicant which
suggested that persons other than the parents had the right or obligation to use the rod in order
to correct a child. To expect from an applicant in such a case to justify his religious beliefs
would conflict with the principle enunciated in the United States case of Thomas v The
Review Board 450 US 707 (1981), quoted by the judge himself in this case, where it was
stated:
Religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.
The judge further held that, even ifhe accepted that the applicant had shown the existence of
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER6 239
a sincere religious belief in the administration of corporal punishment by teachers and at
schools, section 10 did not infringe on such a belief since it did not "substantially burden"
religious freedom. Whilst that might be the case, the judge, to reach this conclusion, found: 147
It can be stated without fear of contradiction that after a few thousand years of
development of civilization this guideline [Deuteronomy 21: 18-21] to parents is no
longer appropriate, nor does it form part of religious doctrine; and
I have therefore come to the conclusion that, on the applicant's own showing, corporal
punishment as a means of correction for boys is a peripheral issue in the whole
context of the exercise of its religion.""
It is submitted that for a civil court to make a finding on what forms part of Christian doctrine
for a specific group of people and, furthermore, to state what lies at the core or periphery of
a religion, are constitutionally unacceptable. It is suggested that a better approach would have
been to find, on the basis of the deference test described above, that the court has to accept
what the religious group describes as their religious beliefs. An Act which precluded them
from freely exercising these religious beliefs would constitute aprima facie infringement of
religious freedom. However, on the basis of the limitation clause, it could have been found to
be a justifiable limitation.
The case was taken on appeal to the Constitutional COurt149 but the appeal was dismissed.
Sachs J indeed found that section lOof the Schools Act imposed a limitation on parents' right
to freely exercise their religious beliefs, but that the limitation was justifiable in terms of the
general limitation clause. However, he did not criticise the court a quo's interpretation of the
Bible verses, namely that the scriptures did not sanction the delegation of the parents' authority
to administer corporal punishment to teachers. In any event, the approach of the Constitutional
Court is commendable in so far as it did not transgress the principle of the separation of church
and state (as was done by the court a quo by interpreting the scriptures) but adjudicated the
matter on the basis that the state had a role to play in respect of religion subject to the religious
147 1102.
148 1103.
149 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC).
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being sovereign it its domain, as evidenced by the following remarks of Sachs J:150
To the extent that the two orders can be separated, with the religious being sovereign
it its domain and the State sovereign in its domain, the need to balance one interest
against the other is avoided. However religion is not always a matter of private
individual conscience or communal sectarian practice. Certain religious sects do tum
their back on the world, but many major religions regard it as part of their spiritual
vocation to be active in the broader society. Not only do they proselytise through the
media and in the public square, religious bodies playa large part in public life,
through schools, hospitals and poverty relief. They command ethical behaviour from
their members and bear witness to the exercise of power by State and private
agencies; they promote music, art and theatre; they provide halls for community
activities, and conduct a great variety of social activities for their members and the
general public. They are part of the fabric of public life, and constitute active
elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution.
Religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of a way of life, of a
people's temper and culture.
The result is that religious and secular activities are, for purposes of balancing,
frequently as difficult to disentangle from a conceptual point of view as they are to
separate in day-to-day practice. While certain aspects may clearly be said to belong
to the citizen's Caesar and others to the believer's God, there is a vast area of overlap
and interpenetration between the two. It is in this area that balancing becomes doubly
difficult, first because of the problems of weighing considerations of faith against
those of reason, and secondly because of problems of separating out what aspects of
an activity are religious and protected by the Bill of Rights and what are secular and
open to regulation in the ordinary way.
The answer cannot be found by seeking to categorise all practices as religious, and
hence governed by the factors relied upon by the appellant, or secular, and therefore
controlled by the factors advanced by the respondent. They are often simultaneously
both. Nor can it always be secured by defining it either as private or else as public,
where here, too, it is frequently both. The underlying problem in any open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which
conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness,
is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious
communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. Such
a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and
150 Par 33-35, footnotes omitted.
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standards are binding. Accordingly believers cannot claim an automatic right to be
exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At the same time, the State
should, whenever reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely
painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else
respectful of the law.
4.4.3 Schreuder v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit
The Schreuder case involved a labour dispute between a minister in the Dutch Reformed
Church (the applicant) and his "employer", the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit.
The second respondent was the "Ring van Roodepoort van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde
Kerk" and the third respondent, the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church in Western
Transvaal. The applicant had been dismissed from office by the respondents in terms of section
120ftheir Church Order"! because of his inability to adapt in the congregation which led to
an irretrievable breakdown of the relationship between the ministers ofthe parish.
Itwas held that the applicant was an employee of the congregation (and that the Presbytery and
the Synod were his secondary employers) for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act of
1995. The mere fact that he was called to the ministry did not, in view of the church rules and
his letter of employment, affect his employment relationship. Basson J found that his dismissal
was both procedurally and substantively unfair and he reinstated the applicant retrospectively
in the employ of the second and third respondents.
It is submitted that this decision is based on a misconception of, or a failure to take into
account, the principles of the separation of church and state as they existed in this country even
before the Constitution came into operation, as well as the principles of religious freedom as
enshrined in the Constitution.
Traditionally this kind of dispute would have been instituted as an application to review the
151 S 12(1) provides: "Indien 'n leraar nie sy gemeente verder tot stigting kan dien nie, mag die ring na
ondersoek, waarin beide die kerkraad en die betrokke leraar aangehoor word, die band tussen die
leraar en gemeente losmaak indien daar, volgens die oordeel van die ring, billike voorsiening vir die
leraar gemaak is."
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decision of the specific congregation, Presbytery or Synod. It is improbable that, even on the
extended principles of review of a decision of a religious body, a court would have substituted
its opinion for the opinion of the religious body on the merits of the matter to find that the
religious body had made a wrong decision, as the court did in this case.
Furthermore as set out above, since the advent of the constitutional era, questions have been
posed as to the effect of the constitutional principles of religious freedom on the acceptability
of even light judicial review. It is submitted that, in the present case, the court could, at the
most, have found that the religious bodies had acted procedurally unfairly or in contravention
of their own church order and referred the matter back to the relevant religious authority. A
court would not be in a position to assess the abilities or shortcomings of the pastoral duties
of a minister. To assume such jurisdiction and to define the ambit of a minister's
responsibilities and moreover, to measure and to pronounce on his conduct or competence
would be unacceptable in view of the principles of religious freedom. It could even be that,
in terms of the specific religious doctrine, the minister is not in the "employ" of any of the
respondents. As set out above, it is an essential feature of religious freedom that the power to
define religious institutions, including the office of the minister, lies with the religious body
only. Nor would the application of the principle of fault or the absence thereof be competent
in such a case. Where the relationship between a minister and the congregation or other
ministers had irretrievably broken down, it is of no use to find that it had not been occasioned
by the fault of the minister (non constat that he could not be awarded damages). The fact
remains that, in terms of the tenets of that religion, the minister can no longer work
successfully in such a congregation. Furthermore, to reinstate such a minister (even if only in
the employ of the presbytery or synod) would be to assume a jurisdiction the court does not
have.!?
152 Even in England where no Bill of Rights was in force at the time, the a judgment of the Queen's
Bench in Regina v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of Great Britain and the Ricardo
Commonwealth, Ex part Wachmann (1992) 1 WLR 1036 (QB) 1042 held that a court would not
interfere with internal church matters, especially not where the functions of a rabbi were in dispute,
since that was clearly a religious matter. Itwas held: "The court must inevitably be wary of entering
a self-evidently sensitive area, straying across the well-recognized divide between church and state."
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5. Conclusion
It was shown that the South African Constitution does not contain an "establishment clause",
in the United States sense of the word, which proscribes any and all state support of religion.
The strict separation of state and religion which is applied in the United States therefore does
not form part ofthe South African Constitution and, in view ofthe international understanding
of religious freedom and the theory of Durham, it is not necessary to interpret the South
African Constitution in such a manner. The Constitution does, however, provide for the
separation of state and religion to some extent in that state support of religion is subject to
certain constitutional principles, such as those enunciated in sections 15(1), 15(2) and 9.
Section 15(2) clearly provides that attendance at religious observances at state or state-aided
institutions must be free and voluntary. This provision, which does not strictly separate state
and religion, is not in contravention of religious freedom norms since total religious freedom
is possible in the case of "some identification of state and religion. This provision also accords
with the essential requirements of voluntarism and noncoercion in religious matters.
In applying section 15(2) it is important to establish whether a particular activity could be
defined as a "religious observance" and whether it is conducted at a "State or state-aided
institution". It was shown earlier that the phrase "religious observance" would have to
correspond with the meaning attributed to the word "religion" in section 15(1) and that
"religion" in section 15(1) refers to the Swidler definition of religion. It is therefore maintained
that "religious observance" is confined to typically religious activities which flow from
adherence to a certain religion.!" If a specific activity cannot be defined as a "religious
observance", then such an activity would, in any event, not be proscribed at state or state-aided
institutions. Whether an institution can be labelled a state or a state-aided institution is a
factual question depending on whether the state is in control of or financially aids an
institution.
It was shown that section 9 prescribes even-handed treatment of religions and not, in view of
153 This is supported by the Afrikaans text which refers to "godsdiensbeoefening".
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the fact that there is no establishment clause in the Constitution, "no treatment" of religion. In
this regard reference was also made to the provisions of section 7(2) which provides inter alia
that the state must promote the rights described in the Bill of Rights. Despite the absence of
an "establishment clause" in the South African Constitution, the equality clause thus prohibits
unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion. An important difference between the
constitutional principle of the equality of religions (as protected in section 9) and reading an
establishment clause into section 15(1) is that, in terms of section 9, discrimination between
different religions would have to be unfair before it can be said to be unconstitutional, whereas
under a deemed establishment clause mere state support of religion would be unconstitutional.
It is clear that the requirements of section 9 as interpreted by the Constitutional Court will have
to be complied with before it can be said that state support of a particular religious practice is
discriminatory .
The adjudication of equality in the context of religious rights is, however, no easy task as
illustrated by the divergent approaches to the matter in the Lawrence case. It is submitted that,
in reconciling the equality (section 9(3)) and religious freedom clauses (section 15(1)) (in
cases not involving state or state-aided institutions), these sections have to be read together to
determine whether a provision unfairly discriminates on the grounds of religion and whether
declaring it invalid would infringe on free exercise rights. If the provision unfairly
discriminates and a declaration of invalidity will not impose on the right to free exercise of
religion, the provision would probably constitute an unjustifiable infringement of religious
freedom. If, on the other hand, the provision constitutes unfair discrimination on the grounds
of religion but declaring it invalid would result in a restriction on free exercise rights, these
concerns need to be balanced in terms of the limitation clause. It is probable that most matters
of this kind will be decided with reference to the limitation clause. The limitation clause will
be analysed in detail in chapter 7.
Itwas shown that the institutional separation of church and state is an inherent part of religious
freedom and as such protected by the South African Constitution. A church, religious
institution or community is an entity with its own internal structure and laws and should be
free from state control.
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Section 9(4) of the Constitution is problematic in this respect since it makes proscription of
discrimination applicable to persons other than the state or state organs. Itwas argued that it
appears from the wording of this section that it could have been the intention of the drafters
of the Constitution to have specific instances of unfair private discrimination set out in
legislation but that the section is not clear in this respect. Discrimination within any religious
institution or community will almost always depend on a specific interpretation of its doctrine
and it would constitute an infringement of religious freedom if religious laws or doctrine were
to be interpreted by a court and subjected to constitutional norms. Itwas therefore argued that
section 9(4) should not be interpreted to sanction interference in doctrinal matters. It is
moreover submitted that section 9(3) should be read in conjunction with section 8 (the
application clause), which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
The effect of religious freedom and of the constitutional protection of the separation of church
and state on the administrative review of church decisions was also analysed. Itwas argued
that in the preconstitutional era, the South African courts used a kind of "neutral principles"
test. However, a proper application of the constitutional principles of freedom of religion,
would require the courts to defer, limited only by the considerations set out in the limitations
clause. This will call for a re-evaluation of the manner in which religious bodies and their
decisions are dealt with in South African law. As demonstrated above, continuing to view
churches as voluntary associations based on contract irrespective of their true nature and
reviewing decisions of religious bodies on the basis of the extended principles of
administrative justice, will be in disregard of the freedom of religion provisions in the South
African Constitution.
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EFFECT OF THE OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
1. Introduction
In the process of constitutional interpretation, the Constitution's operational provisions play
an important role. These provisions are usually understood to include the application clause
(section 8), the limitation clause (section 36) and the interpretation clause (section 39). The
interpretation clause has already been discussed in chapter 4, and only the application and
limitation clauses will be dealt with in this chapter. These two clauses determine such matters
as who is entitled to religious rights protection, who is bound to the provisions of the
Constitution, and what the limits of constitutional protection in specific cases are. It can thus
be said that they codetermine the scope ofthe constitutional protection of a specific right under
the Bill of Rights. An analysis of the application and limitation clauses in the Constitution is
therefore an instrinsic part of the inquiry into the adequacy of the constitutional guarantees for
the protection of religious rights. Therefore the operational provisions, in so far as they impact
on religious rights, should also be interpreted in the context of the understanding of religious
freedom as described in the previous chapters. This chapter does not purport to be an
exhaustive discussion of the application and limitation clauses since the focus of the thesis
remains religious rights. The clauses are therefore only discussed in general and in so far as
they impact upon the protection of religious rights.
2. The application clause
2.1 Introduction
Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
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(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or ajuristic person if, and
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right
and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic
person in terms of subsection (2), a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation
does not give effect to that right; and
(b) may developrules of the common law to Iimit the right, provided
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent
required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.
In specific circumstances, chapter 2 of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) Imposes
constitutional obligations on the state, state organs, natural or juristic persons not to infringe
upon the fundamental rights of other natural or juristic persons. It furthermore protects the
fundamental rights of not only natural but also juristic persons to the extent that the nature of
the right and the nature of the juristic persons make it applicable to juristic persons. The
application clause (section 8), in so far as it concerns religious rights issues, will be analysed
to ascertain the nature and extent of the constitutional rights and obligations relating to
religious individuals, institutions, groups or communities.
The present paragraph is concerned, on the one hand, with the binding effect of the
Constitution and, on the other hand, with the question of which persons or institutions are
entitled to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. The focus is specifically on the impact of
the application clause on religious individuals, groups, institutions and communities.
2.2 The binding effect of the Constitution
2.2.1 ~IIlavv
The interim Constitution provided in s 7(2) that the Bill of Rights "shall apply to all law in
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force and all administrative decisions taken and acts performed". With reference to this section
in the interim Constitution, Van der Vyver' maintained that, in so far as the application of the
Chapter on Fundamental Rights was concerned, the South African (interim) Constitution was
based on the classification oflaw into the law of the state (which includes statutory law, the
common law and customary law and which comprises both public and private law) and the
legally enforceable internal rules of conduct of institutions other than the state. Vander Vyver
thus explained this provision in terms of the distinction between state imposed law ("staatlike
reg") and the internal rules of conduct of nonstate institutions ("nie-staatlike reg"). The interim
Constitution, he stated, was applicable to all law of the state, that is, common law, statutory
law and customary law but only administrative decisions and acts of the state and state organs
would be subject to the Bill of Rights. In this regard he pointed ouf that the South African
interim Constitution was unique and distinguishable from the position in the constitutions of
America, Canada and Germany. He explained that the position in respect of the application
of the constitution to private entities was dealt with in Canada on the basis of the distinction
between statutory and common law; in America on the basis of the concept of state action and
in Germany on the basis of the distinction between private and public law.
The wording of the 1996 Constitution, however, differs from that of the interim Constitution
in this regard. Section 8(1) provides that the "[t]he Bill of Rights applies to all law". Section
9(4) of the Constitution also appears to deviate from the position as previously set out by Van
der Vyver.3
There can be no doubt that the 1996 Constitution applies to statutory law, common law and
customary law, irrespective of the nature of the parties involved in the dispute (that is, whether
they are private persons or state organs) and irrespective of whether it is private or public law.
The question is, however, whether "nonstate law" is subject to the 1996 Constitution. It
appears from the wording- of the new Constitution that whenever the constitutionality of
See Van derVyver 1994SAL/569-576; VanderVyver 1994 THRHR 378; VanderVyver 1995 SAL/
587.
2 1995 SAL/577-579.
3 See the commentary of Van der Vyver 1999 BYV-LR 666.
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"nonstate law" is in issue, the provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3) will determine whether the
Constitution applies. In other words, it appears that, insofar as the application of Constitutional
norms is concerned, the Constitution now treats "conduct" and "law" of nonstate institutions
in a similar manner. Sections 8(2) and 8(3) will be discussed in detail below.
2.2.2 State organs
Section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary
and all organs of state. That means that the conduct of these entities are subject to
constitutional scrutiny. When dealing with bodies, institutions or entities which do not form
part of one of the three branches of government, the binding effect of the Constitution on them
would depend, in the first instance, on whether they are organs of state.'
In the current context, the question of whether an institution is a state organ would become
relevant in the case of, for example, a religious educational institution established in terms of
legislation.' Such institutions are usually based on specific religious tenets and often, in
principle, discriminate on religious grounds for various purposes. If such a religious institution
is held to be a state organ, its acts would be subject to constitutional scrutiny. In other words,
it would be bound by the Constitution in all respects.
The phrase, "organ of State ", is defined as follows in section 239 of the Constitution:
In the Constitution, unless the context indicates otherwise, 'organ of state' means-
(a) any department of state or administration in the national provincial or local
sphere of government; or
4 Itwas stated in Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltdv Transnet Ltd 1999 (4) SA 989 (W) 997B-D, a case decided
under the interim Constitution, that "The Constitution has had a profound effect on the relationship
which every organ of State ... has in its dealing with other persons or bodies and in the manner in
which it conducts its business activities. S 217, read together with s 32(1) and 33, makes it plain that
in addition to his common-law rights, any person dealing with a State organ ... is entitled to expect
fairness, openness and equitable conduct from it is all its actions".
5 Such as, for example, the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.
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(b) any other functionary or institution -
(i) exercising a power or performing a public function in terms of the
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in
terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial
officer.
Under the interim Constitution," the position regarding state organs was regulated by sections
7 and 233 of that Constitution. Section 7(1) limited application of the Constitution to
"legislative and executive organs of State at all levels of government" and was held not to
apply to private bodies or citizens inter se,' According to section 233(1), an organ of State
included "any statutory body or functionary"."
.,'
Inorder to interpret these phrases of the interim Constitution, the courts mostly subscribed to
the "control test"." In Directory Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister for Posts,
Telecommunications and Broadcasting and others." a case decided under the interim
Constitution, Van Dijkhorst J dealt specifically with the question of whether Telkom was an
organ of State, and he described the "control test" under the interim Constitution as follows: 11
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 .
7 Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). See the critical discussion of
this case by Van der Vyver 1995 SALf 572-602.
8 See Baloro and others v University of Bophuthatswana and others 1995 (4) SA 197 (B) where the
court adopted three tests and held that 'organs of State' in the context of section 7(1) of the interim
Constitution must be interpreted widely to include, inter alia, universities and law societies. However,
in Directory Advertising Cost Cutters vMinister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting
and others 1996 (3) SA 800 (T) Van Dijkhorst J found this approach to be too wide and declined to
follow it.
9 For other views see also Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of
Rights 110; Du Plessis 1994 TSAR 709; Rautenbach General Provisions 54.
10 1996 (3) SA 800 (T) 807H-8Il D. Also see Lebowa Granite (Pty) Ltd v Lebowa Mineral Trust and
Another 1999 (4) SA 375 (T) 38IF-H.
Il 810F-H.
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The concept as used in s 7( I) of the Constitution must be limited to institutions
which are an instrinsic part of government - ie part of the public service or
consisting of government appointees at all levels of government - national,
provincial, regional, and local - and those institutions outside the public service
which are controlled by the State - ie where the majority of the members of the
controlling body are appointed by the State or where the functions ofthat body and
their exercise is prescribed by the State to such extent that it is effectively in
control. In short the test is whether the State is in control.
It appears from the wording of section 239 of the Constitution that the test laid down by the
final Constitution is less restrictive than the one under the interim Constitution" and that it is
not necessary for an organ of state to be an instrinsic part of government." Section 239(b )(ii)
clearly indicates that the test is now whether an institution exercises a public power or
performs a public function in terms of any legislation."
12 See SA Agricultural Plantation &Allied Workers Union and other v Premier of the Eastern Cape and
others (1997) 18 IU 1317, 1323D-F; Claase v Transnet Bpk en 'n ander 1999 (3) SA 1012 (T)
1019C-I; Inkatha Freedom Party and another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission and others
CPD 15 December 1999 Case no 6879/99 (per Davis J).
13 The Canadian Courts rejected a functional link with government as being the test to determine
whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms applied to a body or institution, and applied the control
test to determine whether a public body was bound by the Charter. In terms of this, it was irrelevant
whether a body performed a "public service", as long as it was done independently of government.
See Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 34-13; McKinney v University of Guelph (1990) 3 SCR 229;
Harrison v University of British Columbia (1990) 3 SCR 451; Stoffman v Vancouver General
Hospital (1990) 3 SCR 483.
14 Olivier 1997 TSAR 340, 343-344 also expresses this view when he states: "Wat ookal die posisie
onder die vorige grondwet was, die posisie onder die nuwe grondwet word myns insiens uitdruklik
gereël ... Artikel 8(1) bepaal dat die handves van regte van toepassing is op alle reg en die
wetgewende, die uitvoerende en die regsrpekende gesag en alle staatsorgane bind. 'n Staatsorgaan
word in artikel239( 1)(b)(ii) omskryf om ook 'any other functionary or institution exercising a public
power or performing a function in terms oflegislation' in te sluit. Hierdie bepaling is veel wyer as die
van die oorgangsgrondwet wat 'n staatsorgaan bloot omskryf het as 'ook 'n statutêre liggaam of
funksionaris' (a 233(1». Ingevole die nuwe omskrywing word die uitoefening van openbare
bevoegdhede of die uitoefening van 'n funksie ingevolge wetgewing as die deurslaggewende kriteria
gestel ... Kontrole deur die uitvoerende gesag of deur tipiese staatsorgane word nie as sodaning vereis
nie". Also see Carephone (Pty) Ltd vMarcus NO and others 1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) where the same
reasoning was applied to conclude that the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
was an organ of state. Also see Chaskalson Constitutional Law of South Africa 10-62A - 10-63.
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However, the courts have accepted the control test to be the authoritative test for a state organ
under the final Constitution. IS InKorf v Health Professions Council of South Africa" Van
Dijkhorst J found that the law on state organs had not changed fundamentally under the final
constitution: 17
The 1993 definition 'statutory body or institution' has not [should read 'now']
become 'any other functionary or institution'. I do not think that therein lies a
material difference. The latter phrase is further limited in the definition, whereas
the 1993 definition was limited by the nature of an organ of State as explained in
Direct Advertising Cost Cutters.
Has the description set out in subpara (b) now extended the mean ing of organ of
State? Subparagraph (i) limits it to a power or function in terms of the national and
provincial constitutions. This does not bring about a difference. Subsection (ii)
limits it to a public power or public function in terms of any legislation. It does not
bring about a difference insofar as the reference to public power is concerned. The
remaining question then is whether the reference to a public function in terms of
legislation takes the concept 'organ of State' out of the control test.
The answer depends on the meaning given to the words 'public function'.
The three pillars of the State, legislative, executive and judicial, are referred to in
s 239. The latter is expressly excluded. The executive arm is expressly mentioned
in subpara (a) and the legislative one falls under subpara (b)(i) which can also
encompass, for example, the auditor-general, public protector, etc. They are all
15 In Claase v Transnet Bpk en 'n Ander 1999 (3) SA 1012 (T) the court applied the control test as set
out by Van Dijkhorst J in conjunction with the "public service" test under the final Constitution. It
was held that "Na my oordeel, is dit duidelik dat eerste respondent deur die Staat beheer word en 'n
openbare funksie verrig". Van Dijkhorst's control test was also applied in Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltd
v Transnet Ltd 1998 (4) SA 989 (W) another case involving Transnet and decided under the fmal
Constitution. It was held that the real basis for the fmding by Van Dijkhorst J that Telkom was an
organ of State,was that that bodywas ultimately controlled by the State throughthe relevantMinister
and that it exercised a public function in that sense. Itwas therefore held that Transnet was an organ
of State in the sense that it was subject to the provisions of the Constitution relating to such bodies.
16 2000 (1) SA 1171 (T) 1177D-1178A.
17 This decision was recently confirmed by Van der Merwe J in the unreported judgment in NCON
Civils CC v Telkom SA Ltd TPD 23 May 2000 Case No 25076/99. In this case the control test was
applied and Telkomwas held to be an organ of State under the fmal Constitution.
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part of the machinery of the State. So is a functionary (or institution) exercising
a public power. There is no reason to give the word 'public' when used in
conjunction with 'function' in para (b)(ii) a meaning that would take it outside the
context of 'engaged in the affairs or service of the public' and give it the meaning
of 'open to or shared by all the people'. (Both these meanings are given in The
Concise Oxford Dictionary for the word 'public'.)
It follows that the more precise defmition of 'organ of State' in s 239 of the
Constitution was not intended to differ materially from the 1993 definition.
That definition was interpreted in Direct Advertising Cost Cutters to include the
element of control. I adhere to that decision. The Supreme Court of Appeal also
appears to favour the control test (in a different context) in the unreported
judgment in Umfolozi Transport (Emds) Bpk v Die Minister van Vervoer en
Andere ... 18
The proper test for establishing whether an entity is an organ of state under the final
Constitution thus remains the control test. Whenever the constitutionality of the conduct or
internal rules of a religious institution, association or group is challenged, the first question is
therefore whether such an institution, association or group is controlled by the state. If it is, the
Constitutional norms will apply. If it is not, the provisions of section 8(2) and 8(3) will
determine whether such a nonstate institution would in particular circumstances be bound to
the Constitution.
2.2.3 Application of the Constitution to entities which are not organs of state
In terms of the provisions of section 8(2) of the Constitution, a natural person or juristic person
which is not an organ of State would be bound by the Constitution "if, and to the extent that,
it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed
18 In Umfolozi Transport (Edms) Bpk vMinister van Vervoeren andere 1997 (2) All SA 548 (A) the
relevant question was whether the State tender board was an organ of State. This question was not
decided but the Supreme Court of Appeal (seemingly obiter) applied the control test. Also see the
judgment in Transnet Ltdv Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA) par 14per Schutz
JA where s 217 of the Constitutionwas relied upon byGoodman as an alternativebasis for relief, but
where it was held that it was not necessary to decide whether Transnet was an "organ of State".
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by the right"." At the outset reference should be made to Van der Vyver's comment:"
Autonomy is a juristic person's right to privacy and is to such entities what the
right to life is to natural persons. Avoiding state intervention in the internal affairs
of non-state institutions, albeit through bill of rights constraints, is therefore in
itself a constitutional value to be cherished and a political principle to be nurtured
in defence of the kind of freedom that opposes totalitarianism.
It is submitted that in applying the provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3), this important principle
of restraint should be kept in mind.
When dealing with the binding effect of the Constitution in respect of nonstate entities, a
distinction should be drawn between provisions of the Bill of Rights which accord rights to
certain recipients" and provisions which impose obligations or prohibitions on nonstate
entities, such as section 9(4).22 The provisions of section 8(2) imply that a provision which
accords a right to "everyone" will only be enforceable against nonstate entities "if, and to the
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any
duty imposed by the right". It seems that the enquiry in terms of section 8(2) would be an
enquiry into the right itself rather than an application enquiry. The nature of the right would
therefore be the focal point in such an enquiry. However, if a provision of the Bill of Rights,
such as section 9(4), already binds private entities, only the provisions of section 8(3) will be
applicable. In other words, when a section of the Bill of Rights imposes an obligation on a
nonstate entity, a court, in applying such a provision, must do so in terms of section 8(3) and
may give effect to or limit such a right. It is therefore submitted that the sections in the
19 For a summary of the application of ch 3 of the interim Constitution to private entities see Cockrell
Private Law and the Bill of Rights par 3A6. The position under the interim Constitution was unclear
until the matter was resolved in Du Plessis vDe Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). For a critical discussion
of this matter and the problem of application, see Van der Vyver 1995 SALJ 572-602.
20 See Van der Vyver 1994 THRHR 392.
21 Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights accord rights to "everyone".
22 An argument could perhaps be made out that a section such as s 9(4) does not form part of the Bill
of Rights since it does not contain a separate right, but is merely a prohibition flowing from the right
which is entrenched in s 9(1).
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Constitution which impose obligations on entities other than the state (or state organs), such
as section 9(4), should be read in conjunction with the provisions of section 8(3) and, of
course, the limitation clause.
In the case of, for example, the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (the
PU for CHE), and assuming that it is not a state organ," the question could arise of whether
it is bound by the proscription of discrimination in section 9(4).24 It could be argued that the
provision in the relevant 'Act" that the Council of the University "shall ensure that the
Christian historical character of the University is maintained" in the appointment of academic
and nonacademic staff, the PU for CHE is exercising its religious rights and freedom of
association" in terms of section 8(4), 15(1) and l ê of the Constitution. It could therefore be
argued that section 9(4) should be limited in terms of section 8(3) and that this university
would therefore not be bound to the equality provisions as far as discrimination on religious
grounds" is concerned. The same arguments could be advanced in respect of the binding effect
of the Constitution on churches, religious communities or groups.
There is not much guidance to be found in the decisions of the courts on this issue. So far there
23 It appears that universities would not qualify as state organs in terms of the fmal Constitution since
they are not controlled by the State. See contra Motala & Another v Universoty of Natal 1995 (3)
BCLR 374 (D) where Hurst J simply assumed that internal university regulations were subject to the
interim Constitution.
24 See Pienaar 1993 THRHR 210-228 for a comparative discussion of the position with regard to
religiously based education in the Netherlands and America and freedom of association.
25 S 25 of the Potchefstroomse Universiteit Vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys (Private) Act (House of
Assembly) 80 of 1993 provides that: "(I) In appointing academic and non-academic staff, the Council
shall ensure that the Christian historical character of the University is maintained: Provided that no
test with regard to membership of a specific church shall be applied to any person as a condition of
his becoming or continuing to be a member of the academic or non-academic staff at the University,
or of his holding any office or receiving any emolument or exercising any privilege therein. (2) No
person shall be prevented on the ground of his religious belief from becoming or continuing to be a
student of the University or from obtaining or holding a degree or diploma.G).;"
26 See Pienaar 1993 ei/sa 147-171.
27 It is however clear from a contextual reading of the Constitution that no juristic person would be
permitted to discriminate on the basis of race.
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have been very few occasions when the courts have pronounced upon the interpretation of
section 8(2) of the Constitution." In Jooste v Botha" VanDijkhorst J held:
In determining whether a horizontal right is intended one has to have regard to the
nature of the proposed right, its enforceability, the practicalities of the human
relationships involved and whether public policy or public mores require such
moral obligation to be converted into a legal obligation. It is important to bear in
mind that the proposed horizontal right will not operate in a void. Itwill invariably
infringe upon and curtail the rights of others ...
The comments on section 8(2) in other cases amount to mere obiter remarks, a fact which
highlights the difficulty of interpreting section 8(2).30 It therefore remains to be seen how the
courts will interpret this section. In the context of religious rights, however, the principle of
institutional separation of church and state lends support to the above-mentioned interpretation
of the relevant sections.
28 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 (4) SA 744 (CC) par 53-56 where the objections raised to
the text of s 8(2) were dismissed.
29 2000 (2) SA 199 (T) 205.
30 In Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd And Another vMatus And Others; Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd And Another
vMurphy And Others 1998 (2) SA 617 (C) par 84 it was remarked that "Even more difficult to answer
will be the questions that arise from the provisions of s 8(2) of the 1996 Constitution, namely, to
which Ch 2 rights does the doctrine of direct horizontality apply, to which does it not apply and how
are we to distinguish the one category from the other ...". In Ward v Cape Peninsula Jee Skating Club
1998 (2) SA 487 (C) it was stated that "Counsel for both parties have addressed me at length on this
issue and the related question whether, in this regard, the provisions of item 23(2)(b) of Schedule 6
to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 ('the Constitution'), read with s
8(2) of the Constitution or the provisions of s 39(2) of the Constitution, have brought about, or
require, any changes to our common law. All that I need to say in this regard is that, had it been
necessary for me to decide this principal issue, I would probably have regarded it as a 'difficult
question oflaw"'. InAmod vMultilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC) it was
stated that the provisions of s 8(2) and (3) of the 1996 Constitution will also be relevant to the way
in which the common law is developed under s 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution.
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2.3 The bearers of constitutionallyprotected rights
Section 15 provides that "everyone" shall be the bearer of the constitutionally entrenched right
of religious freedom. The question which is considered in this paragraph is whether the term
"everyone" includes, in addition to natural persons," also religious institutions, churches,
groups and communities.
Itwas demonstrated in chapter 2 that religious rights have both an individual and associational
(or corporate) character. After the window of individual freedom in the Edict of Milan" had
been closed, religious rights as such were conceived as corporate rights, the rights of a body
of people. The canon law system provided groups of people with all kinds of protection and
the history of religious rights can be seen as a process of extending the corpus of people
entitled to religious rights until eventually, all individuals were included in the class entitled
to protection." It was furthermore shown that the international human rights instruments
accord the right to religious freedom to "everyone". The term "everyone" seemingly applies
only to natural persons but the current international understanding also construe the term to
protect the rights of religious associations as entities or groups, for religious freedom can often
best be protected by recognising the rights of religious communities to autonomy.
2.3.1 Juristic persons
Whilst the formation, existence and functioning of juristic persons are protected by the right
to free association contained in section 18 of the Constitution," section 8(4) formally
recognises juristic persons as bearers of rights by providing that a juristic person is entitled to
the rights described in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and
31 Malherbe 1998 TSAR 678-679 shows that the right of religious freedom of children under parental
or alternative care may be limited to the extent that parents have a right to bring their children up in
accordance with their own religious beliefs. See in this regard Malherbe 1993 TSAR 691.
32 For a discussion of the Edict of Milan's provisions, see the discussion in eh 2.
33 Witte Introduction xxii note 18.
34 See Pienaar 1993 ei/sa 147-171.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7 258
the nature of that juristic person."
The Constitution seems to confirm the accepted position in South African law that juristic
persons are real entities,
wat meer is as die somtotaal van die ledelbestuurders op 'n gegewe oomblik,
aangesien dit voortbestaan ongeag die wisseling van die lede/bestuurders en draer
is van regte en verpligtinge afsonderlik van die regte en verpligtinge van die
individuele lede/bestuurders waaruit dit saamgestel is."
It therefore appears that all entities acknowledged as juristic persons by South African law
would, in principle, be entitled to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, subject to section
8(1) and 8(4). In other words, all common law juristic persons and statutory juristic persons,
in addition to organs of state, would be entitled to fundamental rights where the nature of the
right and the nature of the juristic person would not make the protection of the fundamental
right inapplicable."
This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Exparte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.38
Objections to the text of section 8(4) were lodged on the basis of the language of
Constitutional Principle II, which provides that "everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted
fundamental rights and freedoms". It was argued that "everyone" referred only to natural
persons, and that, by extending the rights to juristic persons, the rights of natural persons were
diminished. The Court stated:
35 See Rautenbach General provisions 37et seq for a comparative discussion of this clause.
36 See Pienaar 1994 THRHR 92-98.
37 See Rautenbach General Provisions 37 et seq who mentions the following examples of rights which
would probably not be susceptible to being held by a juristic person: right to human dignity (s 10),
the right to life (s Il), freedom and security of the person (s 12), protection from slavery, servitude
and forced labour (s 13), citizenship (s 20), the right to housing (s 26), the right to have access to
health care, food, water and social security (s 27), and childrens' rights (s 28). Also see Pienaar
Regspersoon en Regsubjektiwiteit 101-102.
38 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) par 57.
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[57] ... We cannot accept the premise: many 'universally accepted fundamental
rights' will be fully recognised only if afforded to juristic persons as well as natural
persons. For example, freedom of speech, to be given proper effect, must be
afforded to the media, which are often owned or controlled by juristic persons.
While it is true that some rights are not appropriate to enjoyment by juristic
persons, the text of NT 8(4) specifically recognises this. The text also recognises
that the nature of a juristic person may be taken into account by a court in
determining whether a particular right is available to such person or not.
[58] The objectors were also concerned that affording rights to powerful and
wealthy corporations would result in detriment to individual rights, given that
powerful corporations have greater resources to enforce their rights through
litigation. But the same could be said of powerful and wealthy individuals.
Moreover, the objection wrongly equates juristic persons with powerful and
wealthy corporations. In South Africa there are countless small companies and
close corporations that need and deserve protection no less than do natural
persons. The CA was entitled to retain the provision in IC chap 3 that provides that
juristic persons are entitled to the benefits of the entrenched fundamental rights.
The objection therefore has no basis in the CPs.
The question therefore is what the nature of a juristic person has to be to qualify for
constitutional protection and whether juristic persons of a religious nature can be bearers of
constitutionally entrenched rights. There seems to be no proper basis for distinguishing
between the way in which juristic persons are established, that is, whether they are common
law or statutory juristic persons. The kind of activity that ajuristic person engages in, will play
a role in an enquiry into the nature of the right, rather than into the nature of the juristic person.
It therefore seems that the reference to the "nature of the juristic person" in section 8(4) of the
Constitution" probably bears only on the question of whether a juristic person is a state organ
or not, since state organs are bound to the constitution in terms of section 8( 1).
In this respect it is interesting to take note of the position in Germany. In German law a
distinction is drawn between private and public juristic persons, with churches and religious
institutions being regarded as public juristic persons. The general view is that public juristic
39 The interim Constitution contained no reference to the nature of the juristic person. The equivalent
of s 8(4) in the interim Constitution, s 7(3), provided that "Juristic persons shall be entitled to the
rights contained in this Chapter where, and to the extent tharsthe nature of the right permits".
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persons are not in principle bearers of rights in terms of the bill of rights; yet, an exception is
made in respect of churches and religious associations. The South African Constitution does
not draw a distinction between private and public juristic persons, but differentiates between
private juristic persons and state organs and provides that state organs will be bound by the
Constitution (in section 8(1». However, the position will in effect be the same as in German
law when section 8(4) is taken to mean that private juristic persons are entitled to the rights
contained in the Bill of Rights if the nature of the right permits and ifit is accepted that j uristic
persons can be bearers of religious rights.
It is clear from section 8(4) that juristic persons cannot be the bearers of all rights but that the
nature of the right, besides the nature of the juristic person, would determine to which rights
in the Bill of Rights a juristic persons would be entitled."
With regard to religious rights, Woolman" in his commentary indicates that "Corporations
have neither conscience nor religion within the meaning ofs 14".42 He adds that the fact that
corporations cannot invoke these rights in order to obtain a remedy does not mean that a
corporation can never invoke one of these rights as a defence. In this regard he cites as
authority the Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd" in which the Canadian Supreme
Court held that a corporation might invoke the right to freedom of religion described in section
2(a) of the Canadian Constitution as a defence against a criminal charge of selling goods on
a Sunday.
40 Rautenbach General Provisions 41-42 refers to the position in German law and lists the rights on
which agreement more or less exists which private juristic persons may not be bearers of and the
rights which juristic persons may be bearers of, subject to certain qualifications.
41 Woolman Application 10.8.
42 S 14 is a reference to the interim constitution; this section is s 15 of the [mal Constitution. See Pienaar
1997 THRHR 581 who is also of the opinion that a church cannot have a belief or a conscience
("geloof of gewete") and that, in the light of s 31, s 15 applies only to individuals. See contra
Malherbe 1998 TSAR 679 who states: "Aangesien regspersone geregtig is op die regte in die Suid-
Afrikaanse handves in die mate waarin die aard van die betrokke reg en die aard van die regspersoon
dit vereis, kan onomwonder verklaar word dat kerkgenootskappe die draers is van sulke aspekte van
die reg op godsdiensvryheid".
43 (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321, (1985) 1 SCR 295.
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Inview of the historical development of religious rights, the view that a juristic person cannot
have the rights enumerated in section 15 is incorrect. Itwas shown in chapter 2 that religious
rights had been protected as the rights of a group of people even before they developed into
individual rights.
With reference to the German Federal Constitutional Court, Rautenbach" refers to two
considerations which should be taken into account in determining whether a juristic person is
the bearer of a constitutionally protected right: first, whether the conduct or interests protected
by a certain right could also be performed or managed by a juristic person and secondly,
whether juristic persons could find themselves in a situation in which these interests or acts
could be restricted by state organs. With regard to the question of whether the conduct or
interests protected by section 15 could also be performed or managed by a juristic person, a
distinction has to be drawn between the various rights mentioned in section 15. It can be
accepted that a religious corporation or association as such could not have freedom of
conscience and thought since these are uniquely human attributes. Yet it cannot be said that
a church or religious association does not have a certain religion or even, a belief. Churches
or religious groups often express their religious beliefs in one or more Confessions of Faith
("geloofsbelydenis") which are regarded as the religious beliefs of that church.
As shown above, religious freedom comprises more than freedom of belief. The right to
freedom of religion includes the right to act in accordance with a religious belief. It was argued
above that religious beliefs and the concomitant religious acts cannot be separated. Churches
can certainly exercise their religious beliefs in a variety of ways, for example by having
services and by teaching the tenets of their religion." It is therefore clear that religious groups
44 General Provisions 40 .
45 Compare in this regard principle 16(d) of the Vienna Concluding Document (1989) which provides:
"[Participating States will] respect the right of religious communities to establish and maintain freely
accessible places of worship or assembly, organise themselves according to their own hierarchical and
institutional structure, select, appoint and replace their personnel in accordance with their respective
requirements and standards as well as with any freely accepted arrangement between them and their
State, and solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions".
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or churches which are juristic persons cannot be denied the right to religious freedom." A
situation could indeed be imagined where a church could find itself in a situation in which
these acts could be restricted by the state.
In this respect, reference could once more be made to the position in Germany. The German
constitutional provision" which is equivalent to section 8(4) of the South African Constitution,
provides that juristic persons have basic rights to the extent that the nature of the right makes
it applicable." With regard to religious rights, it has been decided in Germany that religious
and ideological organisations are bearers of freedom of confession, but not of freedom of
conscience" and that religious organisations without juristic personality are bearers of the right
to the free exercise of religion. 50
It is thus clear that, under German law, churches and religious associations (acknowledged as
public juristic persons in German law) are bearers of the right to freedom of religion. In my
view religious juristic persons should also be accorded the right to freedom of religion and
belief under the South African Constitution.
2.3.2 Associations which are not juristic persons
In the case of associations which are not juristic persons, one has to draw a distinction between
the protection claimed, locus standi, and the procedure. The first question is whether a group
or association which is not a juristic person could be the bearer of rights in terms of the
46 S 31 of the Constitution strengthens the view that this was not the intention of the drafters of the
Constitution.
47 "Die Grundrechten geIten auch fur inlandische juristische Personen, soweit sie ihrem Wesen nach auf
diesen anwendbar sind."
48 The German provision does not refer to the nature of the juristic person.
49 BverfGE 19, 132.
50 See BverfGE 42,322. Stem III/I 1128 states: "Das mag angesichts des Umstands uberraschen, dass
juristischer Personen weder einen Glauben haben noch Gewissensentscheidungen treffen kënnen.
Aber sie kënnen den Glauben ihrer Mitglieden verkiinden und fërdern sowie religiose Aktivitaten
entfalten und Zwecke verfolgen. "
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Constitution. This is a question of substantive law. The second question is whether such a
group or association has locus standi, that is, a sufficient interest in the matter to allege an
infringement or claim relief. This is a question of fact and of substantive law. The third
question is how such a group or association can sue or be sued, and this is a question of
procedure.
With regard to the first question posed above, Rautenbach" argues that the protection under
section 8(4) should be extended to associations without legal personality. He argues that there
is an increasing tendency in German law to recognise associations as bearers of rights even
though they are not formally recognised as juristic persons. Since the constitution does not
define fixed categories of bearers of rights (the formulation normally used is "everyone has the
right... ") and since section 8(4) deals only with the position of juristic persons, one could agree
with Rautenbach that this would be a logical development. He adds that the right to freedom
of association not only protects the right of natural persons to freely form and join
associations, but also guarantees the associations as such particular rights, whether they are
juristic persons or not.
With regard to the second question pertaining to locus standi, or "a direct and substantial
interest in the right which is the subject matter of the litigation and in the outcome of the
litigation"," the matter is explicitly regulated by the Constitution itself in section 38 which
provides:
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court
may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who
may approach a court are -
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own
51 General Provisions 40.
52 See Harms Civil Procedure C l-C2. This defmition is simplistic; this is, however, not an exhaustive
discussion oflocus standi. For cases on "direct and substantial interest" see Harms Civil Procedure
E22 n 4.
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name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
With regard to the third question, and in terms of common law, one has to be a person, that
is, a natural or a juristic person, to be able to sue or be sued. An association of natural persons
may thus sue or be sued in its own name in cases where it is a juristic person (universitas
personarum), that is, an entity distinct from the members constituting it and one which has
perpetual succession and the capacity to own property apart from its members. But, unless
each individual forming part of an unincorporated body of persons is joined and cited by name,
the summons will, as a matter of procedure, be bad for misjoinder."
In an attempt to simplify this method of citation, rule 14(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court
provides: "A partnership, a firm or an association may sue or be sued in its name."
"Association" is defined in subruie (1) as "any unincorporated body of persons, not being a
partnership". Rule 14(9) further provides: "A plaintiff suing an association may at any time
before or after judgment deliver a notice to the defendant calling for a true copy of its current
constitution and a list of the names and addresses of the office bearers and their respective
offices as at the relevant date."
It therefore seems that an association without juristic personality can be the bearer of
constitutional rights, has locus standi and is able sue or be sued.
53 See Erasmus Superior Court Practice BI-IlO - B 1-117 for the rules regulating the conduct of the
proceedings of the several Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa
published under Government Notice No. R 48 of 12 January 1965, as amended. These rules apply to
matters heard in any high court, also if they are of a constitutional nature. In this regard it has to be
kept in mind that, apart from matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Court in terms ofs 167(3) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is not usually a court of first
instance, and that direct access is only allowed in terms of s 167(6) of the Constitution and rule 17.
Cases are usually referred to the Constitutional Court for confrrmation or it sits as a court of appeal,
in terms of the Constitution and according to the Constitutional Court Rules.
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2.3.3 Groups or communities
Groups or communities are given a constitutionally protected right by section 31. This section
makes it clear that persons belonging to a religious community have the right to practise their
religion and to form,join and maintain religious associations and other organs of civil society.
In other words, they have "the right to be left alone" and the right to engage in religious
activities, both being aspects of "free exercise" of religion. In this sense then, at least, groups
or communities are awarded substantive rights by the Constitution and can be bearers of rights.
A group or community can also have locus standi in terms of the broadly formulated section
38 as set out above.
The problem is, however, that a group or community which does not have legal personality
and which is not an association cannot as a group, and in its own name, sue or be sued for an
alleged infringement of a right or for relief. There simply exists no procedural means for this.
An entity which can sue or be sued in its own name will have to litigate on behalf of such a
community or group. The individual claimants will therefore all have to be cited or they could
cede their claims to another entity.
In the last instance it has to be pointed out that, once an applicant has a sufficient interest in
the outcome of constitutional litigation, the inquiry is objective." It is, in other words,
sufficient to show that a right in the Bill of Rights has being violated by a law or by conduct;
it is not necessary to show that the rights of the specific applicant have been violated. This
ought to enable a juristic person or an association to invoke the rights of a natural person to
attack laws or conduct which violate the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.
3. The suspension of religious rights
Section 370fthe South African Constitution provides for the suspension of fundamental rights
54 The doctrine of objective constitutionality is accepted in South Africa. In other words, if a law is
unconstitutional because it violates a section of the Constitution, it is objectively invalid and any
applicant with an interest in setting aside the law has standing to challenge its constitutional validity.
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during a state of emergency. Some rights are not suspendable or "nonderogable", 55 but section
15 rights have not been included in this category. In the transitional Bill of Rights, all the
section 14 (now section 15) rights were nonderogable, and religious rights could therefore not
have been suspended during a state of emergency. In this regard the transitional Constitution
conformed more strictly to international standards than the final Constitution. 56 Article 4(2)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that religious rights as
entrenched in article 18 may not be derogated in time of a public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation. 57 Du Plessis" states that the suspension of section 15 during an
emergency will, for instance, exclude constitutional protection for nonconformist
conscientious objectors to conscription.
4. Limitation of religious rights
4.1 Introduction
The adjudication of religious freedom issues hinges largely on the courts' understanding of the
effect of the general limitation clause. The South African jurisprudence of the constitutional
protection of religious rights and freedoms can therefore not be understood in isolation from
the effect which the general limitation clause can have on the adjudication of religious rights
Issues.
Fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, including religious rights, may be limited
in terms of the general limitation clause (section 36), which provides:
55 See s 37(5)(c).
56 Du Plessis 2001 BYU-LR 110 points out that the rule ofnonderogability has probably become part
of customary international law binding on every state irrespective of whether it is a party to any
international convention or covenant.
57 Also see art 27(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) which states that the
suspension provision does not authorise suspension of art 12which entrenches freedom of conscience
and religion.
58 2001 BYU-LR 110.
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(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the
Constitution," no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
4.2 A proportionality test
The South African Constitution followed the example of Canadian," German" and European
59 S 36(1) is not the sole constitutional source of conditions pursuant to which fundamental rights can
be limited. Du Plessis 200 I BYV-LR 108 points out that rights can, for instance, also be demarcated
by internal modifiers (see eg s 17), specific limiting provisions (see eg s 16(2», the effect of other
rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights and constitutional provisions outside the Bill of Rights. The
specific limiting provisions which occur in s 15(2) and 15(3) have already been discussed where these
sections were dealt with in eh 5 and 6. This chapter is only concerned with the general limitation
clause.
60 The American constitutional order does not work with a general limitation clause, but makes use of
defmitional exclusions. The difference between the approach in America and in Canada is explained
in Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope, and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C)
981B-982B.
61 Rautenbach General Provisions 98-99 states: "The German proportionality principle is applied in
Canada and by the European Court of Human Rights and its basic elements are present in the criteria
developed by the American Courts for the application of the equality principle. It seems unavoidable
that the proportionality principle will also be applied in South Africa." The author then sets out the
three elements ofthe German proportionality principle, namely that the limitation of a particular right
must be capable of achieving the object of limitation; the object of the limitation may not be realised
as effectively by means of a less drastic measure and an appropriate relationship has to exist between
the nature and extent of the limitation and the nature and importance of the rights and community
interests concerned. The appropriate relationship is determined by taking into account the nature and
gravity of the factual limitation, the nature and importance of the right that is limited and the nature
(continued ...)
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Council jurisprudence which relies on general limitation principles" combined with a
proportionality test to decide the justifiability of specific limitations of fundamental rights."
The drafters of section 33 of the interim Constitution" were strongly influenced particularly
by the Canadian example of a general limitation clause," and the Canadian decision in R v
Oakes." As a result, the Constitutional Court indicated that it was going to follow the
61 (...continued)
and importance of the public interest that is protected or promoted.
62 See Rautenbach General Provisions 82-85 for a discussion of general approaches in bills of rights
to the limitation of rights and elements of limitation clauses.
63 Many international human rights instruments also contain general limitation clauses. Art 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms,
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirement of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights
and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations." Art 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides: "(3)
Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others." Also see: Art 9 and 18 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); Art 12 and 30 of the American Convention on
Human Rights (1969); Art 8 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981); Art ofthe
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms ofIntolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief (1981); Principles 17 and 21 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of
Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(1989); Art 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); Principles 9 and 24 of the
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(1990); and para 28 of the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1991).
64 S 33(1) of the interim Constitution stipulated more strict conditions for the limitation of some
specified rights, including religious rights. The limitation of these rights, in addition to being
reasonable, also had to be necessary. The notion of a more strict limitation test is absent from the 1996
Constitution.
65 Slofthe Canadian Charter "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
66 (1986) 26 DLR 4th 200.
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Canadian "two stages" approach." The first stage of the enquiry is to ascertain whether law
or conduct," by its intent or impact, infringes a right protected by the Constitution. If it does,
the second stage" of the enquiry ensues which entails an investigation of whether the
infringement is justified under the limitation clause of the Constitution."
67 Sv Zuma and others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) par 21; Sv Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC) 100-102; S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) par 54; Coetzee v Government of the Republic of
South Africa 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) par 9; Ferreira v Levin NO and Others, Vryenhoek and Others
v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 26 H; De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (7)
BCLR 779 (CC) 815E-820D. Also see Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope
and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C) 982E-G.
68 When the conduct of an entity or a person (as opposed to a law) is the subject of constitutional
scrutiny, the limitation clause plays a cardinal role in the interpretation process from the outset. The
reason is that a section in legislation which authorises the conduct might be too wide. In order to
ascertain what the scope of the conduct is that would pass constitutional muster, it is necessary to
apply the limitation clause to the particular section. An interpretation of the particular section which
passes the limitation test will then determine the conduct which is constitutionally permissible. If the
particular section of the legislation does not pass the limitation test, and if it cannot be read down, the
legislation itself is unconstitutional. See in this regard also Rautenbach General Provisions 87-88 who
states: "It has to be accepted that 'limitation by law of general application' in section 33(1) also
includes the authorisation by law of executive organs to limit rights and that this authorisation may
include the exercise of a discretion. The capacity of the legislature to authorise an executive organ to
limit rights is restricted by the bill of rights".
69 It has been held that during the second stage, the onus of proving that the limit on a fundamental right
is permissible in terms of the limitation clause, rests upon the party seeking to uphold the limitation.
See S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) par 35-39; S vMakwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 102.
Furthermore, it has been held that justification "must be established clearly and convincingly". See
S vMbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293 (CC) par 19per Langa J. Also see Brink vKitshojJNO
1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC); R v Oakes 26 DLR (4th) 200 SCC 226-227; S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA
1176 (CC) par 132 per O'Regan J; Lotus River, Ottery, Grassy Park Residents Association and
Another v South Peninsula Municipality 1999 (2) SA 817 (C).
70 There has been some debate about the effect of "special" limitation provisions in certain sections of
the Constitution. See in this regard Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275-330 who regards the general
limitation provision as the basis of a proportionality test which is used to test the justifiability of all
limitations and specific limitation provisions in a specific clause as extensions, qualifications or
further explications of the general limitation clause. Itwas accordingly held in Prince v President of
the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C) 981B-982B that s 36 was an integral
provision that always had to be considered when determining whether a law was contrary to any of
the provisions in the Bill of Rights.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 7 270
In its first decision under the interim Constitution, S v Makwanyane and Another," the
Constitutional Court's approach to the limitation clause was largely based on the Oakes
decision, and this still forms the basis of its approach to section 36 in general." In
Makwanyane" Chaskalson P stated that the limitation clause involved a process involving -
the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on
proportionality ... which calls for the balancing of different interests."
Chaskalson P further stated that the balancing of interests had to be done on a case-by-case
basis and then set out the relevant considerations that could be taken into account in
determining whether a limitation was reasonable and necessary. 75 Itis these considerations that
were ultimately written into section 36 of the final Constitution of 1996.
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice and
others," decided under the final Constitution, it was accordingly stated that
71 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 436B-439E.
72 Par (a) to (e) of s 36(1) in fact derive from dicta of the President of the Constitutional Court in S v
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
73 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 104.
74 Also see Case and Another vMinister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) par
49 where it was held: "To determine whether a law is overbroad, a court must consider the means used
(that is, the law itself, properly interpreted), in relation to its constitutionally legitimate underlying
objectives. If the impact of the law is not proportionate with such objectives, that law may be deemed
overbroad. The Canadian case of Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario v Rocket offers an
example of this analysis in the free expression setting. The Canadian Supreme Court struck down as
overbroad a ban on dentists' advertising, using an analysis conducted under the Canadian Charter's
limitation clause. The Court held that while there was no doubt a legitimate government interest in
preventing irresponsible and misleading advertising by dentists, the blanket ban challenged also struck
at legitimate advertising, with the result that the test of proportionality between the effect of the
legislative measure and its purpose was not met." Also see Reitzer Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd v
Registrar of Medicines and Another 1998 (4) SA 660 (T).
75 Par 104.
76 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) par 34.
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the relevant considerations in the balancing process are now expressly stated in
section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution to include those itemised in paragraphs (a)
to (e) thereof. Inmy view this does not in any material respect affect the approach
expounded inMakwanyane, save that paragraph (e) requires that account be taken
in each limitation evaluation of'less restrictive means to achieve the purpose [of
the limitation].' Although section 36( I) does not expressly mention the importance
of the right, this is a factor which must of necessity be taken into account in any
proportionality evaluation.
The Court further stated: 77
The balancing of different interests must still take place. On the one hand there is
the right infringed; its nature; its importance in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; and the nature and extent of the
limitation. On the other hand there is the importance of the purpose of the
limitation. In the balancing process and in the evaluation of proportionality one is
enjoined to consider the relation between the limitation and its purpose as well as
the existence of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose.
In De Lange v Smuts NO and Others" Ackermann J confirmed that the Constitutional Court
viewed the limitation issue as one that had to be decided in the second of the two stages of
constitutional analysis and that it still regarded the limitation issue as a balancing of interests
as described earlier in Makwanyane.
One could agree with Van der Walt" who concludes in the context of constitutional property
rights:
The result of the development from section 33 of the interim Constitution to
section 36 of the final Constitution is that it has become reasonably clear that the
justifiability of limitations will be tested in terms of a proportionality test which
must reflect the interests of society and the interests of those affected by a
limitation ... This development not only suits the general tenor of the South African
77 Par 35.
78 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) par 86-101.
79 Constitutional Property Clauses 358.
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Constitution, but also brings the possible interpretation and application of the
property clause into line with a very strong tendency in other jurisdictions, where
the focus is placed on questions about the constitutional reasonableness and
justifiability of limitations on the protected property right rather than the exact
definitions and scope of the right itself."
The final Constitution now specifies that in the application of the proportionality test all
relevant factors have to be taken into account including "(a) the nature of the right (b) the
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the
relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose". Since the application of these factors will depend on the facts of each particular case,
each of them will not be discussed separately in this thesis."
The application of the proportionality test in the context of religious rights was thoughtfully"
conducted by Sachs J in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education. 83 The
justice assumed but did not come to a decision in this regard, that section 100f the Schools
Act limited parents' religious rights under both sections 15 and 31.84 He proceeded to
determine "whether, under section 36, the negative impact which the Schools Act has on the
practice of corporal correction in the schools of the appellant's religious community, is to be
80 See also De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook411 who states that the requirement ofs 36 that limitations
of rights should be reasonable and justifiable involves a three-part inquiry, namely firstly, the
evaluation of the reasons for the law that limits rights; secondly, the determination of whether there
is a rational relationship between these reasons and the limitation; and thirdly, the determination of
whether there is an acceptable degree of proportionality between the benefits to be obtained by the
limitation and the harm that limitation of the rights entails.
81 In Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C)
984-990 the Cape High Court applied the limitation test in the context of religious rights by taking
the respective factors mentioned in s 36(1) (a) - (e) as subheadings and discussing each in tum. Also
see Malherbe 1998 TSAR 692-695 for a discussion of each of these factors in the context of the
limitation of religious rights.
82 As illustrated, for example, by his comments in par 33-35 on the difficulties of proportionality
analysis in the area of religious rights owing to the fact that the competing interests to be balanced
belong to completely different conceptual and existential orders.
83 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC).
84 Par 27.
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regarded as reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, freedom and equality"." The justice rejected the strict scrutiny test taken from
American jurisprudence and affirmed that section 36 of the South African Constitution
required a "nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing''."
He conducted the proportionality analysis by dealing with the relevant factors under two
headings: "The nature of the rights and the scope of their limitation'!" and "The purpose,
importance and effect of the limitation, and the availability ofless restrictive means"." In the
first instance he held that there could be no doubt that freedom of religion, belief and opinion
was important and that the appellant's members sincerely believed that they were obliged by
scriptural injunction to use corporal correction as an integral part of the upbringing of their
children. However, parents were not being deprived by the Schools Act of their general right
to bring up their children according to their Christian beliefs. They were merely prevented
from empowering the schools to administer corporal punishment. In the second instance, he
held that the state was under a constitutional duty to protect children from degradation and
indignity in the institutional environment of a school, which was quite different from corporal
punishment in the home environment. Sachs J found:"
The parents are not being obliged to make an absolute and strenuous choice
between obeying a law of the land or following their conscience. They can do both
simultaneously. What they are prevented from doing is to authorise teachers,
acting in their name and on school premises, to fulfil what they regard as their
conscientious and biblically-ordained responsibilities for the guidance of their
children. Similarly, save for this one aspect, the appellant's schools are not
prevented from maintaining their specific Christian ethos.
When all these factors are weighed together, the scales come down firmly in
favour of upholding the generality of the law in the face of the appellant's claim
85 Par 28.
86 Par 29-31.
87 Par 36-38.
88 Par 39-49.
89 Par 51.
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for a constitutionally compelled exemption.
Du Plessis" states that, in adopting this line of reasoning, justice Sachs neglected to deal
sufficiently with what schools and teachers should be permitted to do in a country where a
modem-day constitution guarantees adherence to values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. He points out that it would have been
commendable to do so because it would have proceeded beyond the adjudication of a religious
rights issue in a strictly libertarian and individualistic free exercise vein.
In any event, as pointed out by Smith," Sachs J's application of the limitation provision in this
matter is consistent with recent ideas about the limitation of rights in general and of freedom
of religion in particular.
In a much less considered judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Prince vPresident of the
Law Society" gave little regard to what the free exercise right of a Rastafarian entailed by
definition and proceeded to limit the right before defining and determining its scope. The
question was whether there should be an exemption for the use of cannabis by Rastafarians for
bonafide religious observance. As far as the right is concerned the Court contented itself with
holding that the Appellant attempted to introduce an additional ground of exemption and that
it could not legislate." Such an approach does not acknowledge that religious freedom may
demand exemptions from generally applicable laws in particular cases;" although it might be
90 2000 BYV-LR 116.
91 See discussion of the case in Smith 2001 SALf 6-9.
92 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA).
93 Par 11.
94 See, for example, the statement of Sachs J in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of
Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 42 where he acknowledges (albeit in a different context)
that religious freedom may demand exemptions from generally applicable laws in particular cases: "To
grant respect to sincerely held religious views of a community and make an exception from a general
law to accommodate them, would not be unfair to anyone else who did not hold those views."
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limited in accordance with section 36. As Du Plessis" points out, a judgment which took
Prince's religious rights more seriously but nonetheless concluded that it could not sanction
a prospective attorney's consumption of dagga for religious purposes, would have been a more
valuable contribution to the evolution of a constitutional jurisprudence on religious rights."
4.3 Meyerson's theory on the limitation of constitutional rights
Following a different approach, Meyerson" points out that the concepts invoked in the
limitation clause in the phrase "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom" are inherently contested and therefore open to
a variety of interpretations. 98 The Bill of Rights, for example, recognises the rights to equality,
dignity and particular freedoms and it seems contradictory that infringements of these rights
could be justified in the name of the very same values which the rights function to protect.
Furthermore, these concepts, now married in one comprehensive phrase, sometimes conflict
with one another, thereby making a choice between them inevitable. This, in tum, would
indicate some kind of a hierarchy of rights, a matter which raises serious interpretational
questions.
Meyerson states that it is possible to supply an interpretation of the phrase mentioned III
section 36(1) which avoids the problems mentioned above by arguing that"
... the problem of conflict would evaporate if these concepts were capable of
playing a role at a much higher level of generality than when they function to
95 2000 BYU-LR 117.
96 Prince has thereafter appealed to the Constitutional Court, South Africa's fmal court of appeal in
constitutional matters, but at the time of fmalising this thesis the Constitutional Court's judgment in
this matter was still pending.
97 Meyerson Rights Limited xxiv.
98 The phrase in s 36(1) (this phrase is also found in s 1, s 7(1) and s 39(1» was referred to in eh 4 in
the context of constitutional interpretation, as an example of "general and undefmed words and
phrases" which could present enormous interpretive difficulties.
99 Rights Limited xxvi.
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assert specific rights, and if there were a single moral general requirement for
which they could plausibly be said to be standing in.
Drawing considerably on theories of political philosophy, 100 the author argues that the phrase
"an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" should be
understood at a sufficiently general level so that it provides a distinctive and principled test for
determining which limitations of constitutionally entrenched rights are competent. She
believes that this phrase should be used to test the state's purpose before the inquiry into the
relevant factors mentioned in section 36(1) can take place.
In the first instance she argues 10 I that the phrase "an open and democratic society" is the
opposite of an authoritarian society and that government action should therefore, in such a
society, be justified by reference to something other than pure political power. It has to be
justified by reasons. In other words, openness requires that public policies should be justified
in public by furnishing the actual reasons which guide them. In evaluating whether a particular
limitation to a right is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, a judge is
therefore obliged to scrutinise whatever reason the state offers in order to make sure that it is
not just a disguise for the exercise of raw power.
The further reference to "dignity, equality and freedom" in section 36 builds on the previous
phrase of "open and democratic" but requires even more. The author demonstrates this by
stating that the need for restrictions to be based on something more than the exercise of raw
power does not preclude a restriction on religious freedom which is justified, for example, on
the basis that a particular religion is false. This leads her to state that the inclusion of the
phrase "dignity, equality and freedom" suggests that the conduct or law should be justified not
only in terms of reasons, but also in terms of reasons of a certain kind.
The kind of reasons that would be permissible that is, the considerations which, in justifying
restrictions on religious freedom, would respect the values of dignity, equality and freedom,
100 Especially on the work of the philosophers such as John Locke and particularly, John Rawls.
101 Rights Limited 3.
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are captured by her interpretation of the phrase "freedom and equality". 102 She interprets it in
terms of Locke's notion that "equal" and "free" mean that there are no natural or preordained
hierarchies of power, and that people are not naturally subordinate to anyone. In this scheme,
theorists in political philosophy say that if the exercise of political power is to be consistent
with the recognition that there are no natural hierarchies of power, then it must be such that
the political institution "would be accepted by all reasonable people". She therefore finds that
the Constitution -
[i]n disabling the majority from taking up any position about the scope of
constitutional rights which is inconsistent with respect for equality and freedom,
it is demanding that the justification for whatever position is taken up should be
one which would win the consent of all reasonable citizens.
The requirement of "free and equal" therefore means that when the state limits an entrenched
right, it has to offer a justification for such limitation to which all reasonable people would
(hypothetically), if asked, accord some degree of force.
In discussing the requirement of dignity, the author builds on Kant's account of the intrinsic
dignity"? of human beings by virtue of their capacity of rational choice and quotes'?' his
categorical imperative to
act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end.
This leads her to the conclusion that, besides confirming the ideal of unanimous consent
expressed by the words "equal and free" as explained above, inclusion of the word "dignity"
makes it clear that any limitation of a constitutionally protected right must respect our inherent
102 Rights Limited 10.
103 Also see the judgment of O'Regan inS v Makwanyane 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) par 328: "Recognizing
a right to dignity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of human beings."
104 Rights Limited 12, quoting from Kant I The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals (trans HJ Paton) (London 1963) 96.
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moral status or the fact that we are ends in ourselves.'?' This means that the limitation clause
does not test the legitimacy of restrictions on protected rights with reference to what all
reasonable people would agree to from the perspective of their own self-interests but by asking
what all reasonable people would agree to from the perspective of everyone's inherent and
equal moral status.
Meyerson!" then applies her theory to religious rights to ascertain which restrictions on the
right to religious freedom would weigh with all reasonable people who relate to each other as
possessors of equal moral status. She distinguishes between two kinds of debates which she
refers to as "public reason" and "personally reasonable beliefs". The first comprises only
"presently held beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and
conclusions of science when these are not controversial". 107 In other words, the participants
have a common code or a common reason in terms of which they can argue, even though they
might not convince the other side. By contrast, there are debates where no "evidence" could
shake the beliefs of the participants and where the divergent beliefs could not be explained
with reference to a universally accepted code. The beliefs in the latter case are clearly
incompatible personal points of view. Meyerson!" states that these beliefs may be objectively
reasonable but could not be publicly demonstrated to be objectively reasonable. She calls these
matters "intractable".
This distinction forms the basis of her theory that in limiting a constitutionally entrenched right
the state may not appeal to a justification whose normative force depends on an intractably
disputed point of view or way of reasoning. Such a view would be disqualified from serving
as ajustification for limiting a constitutional right, irrespective of its objective soundness. In
other words, it would not be consistent with respect for everyone's equal moral status if, in
limiting constitutional rights, the majority were permitted to appeal to reasons which they
believed to be sound without being able to publicly demonstrate that their claims were true.
105 Rights Limited 14.
106 Rights Limited 15-20.
107 Rawls Political Liberalism 224 as quoted by Meyerson Rights Limited 15.
108 Rights Limited 16.
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She states that views about such matters as the correct path to salvation or whether God exists
are examples of views that are not backed up by publicly accessible evidence and ordinary
modes of inquiry and that there are no public way to debate disagreements about religious
matters.
On this basis she distinguishes between two kinds of "harm" that may be caused by religious
conduct:
On the one hand, there are harms which would not be suffered were it not for the
holding of an intractably disputed belief that the conduct in question is wrong from
the religious point of view.'?" And on the other hand, there are harms whose
harmfulness is independent of intractably disputed religious beliefs. IlO
The author illustrates this distinction by means of two examples: (a) a law that prohibits
attendance at the services of all religions except for one which is seen as the true religion and
(b) a law that prohibits the followers of a particular religion from making human sacrifices at
their ceremonies. In the first example the harm which the law seeks to prevent is that of
practising an unworthy religion. In accordance with her theory such a law is not justifiable
since the harm depends on the intractably held religious view and would not have been
suffered in the absence of the belief that there is only one true religion. In the second example,
by contrast, the harm of involuntary loss of life would be accorded at least some weight by all
reasonable people regardless of their religious beliefs. The reason for limiting the religious
right is therefore independent of intractably disputed religious beliefs. In other words, that
which reasonable people cannot be expected to agree on in rational dialogue is taken off the
list of possible justifications for limiting a constitutionally protected right, but an appeal to
objectives that all reasonable citizens would unite in affirming would pass the threshold test
set by the limitation clause.
109 Also referred to as "non-neutral harms".
110 Also referred to as "neutral harms".
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Conduct "within the sphere of each individual's rightful control", III in other words, conduct
outside the purview of state interference in these terms, is conduct which, though it may cause
real harm, causes only "non-neutral harm", that is, harm that would not exist were it not for
certain religious beliefs on the part of those who suffer harm.
The theory expounded above espouses a benevolent approach to the free exercise of religion. 112
It implies that if a person or group could prove that certain conduct is based on an intractable
religious belief (a sincerely held belief) and that the harm it causes to other people would not
exist but for their different religious beliefs, the state would not be entitled by legislation or
conduct to interfere with the nonneutral harm by limiting their right to freely exercise such
religious rights.
Other ways of restricting religious freedom include giving a preferred status to a specific
religion or religions, unduly favouring certain religious institutions or exempting some from
common duties and standards on the grounds of religion ("establishment concerns"). By
conferring a benefit upon one or supporting religion, other religious or irreligious groups might
complain of discrimination against them. This is a decidedly more complex and controversial
subject which raises not only equality concerns but also concerns about religious freedom in
the sense that preferral could indirectly coerce citizens to conform to the officially approved
religion. The added difficulty is that the claim to be exempted from ordinary laws for religious
reasons may, whilst serving the right to free exercise of religion on the one hand, raise
questions about discriminatory conduct on the other hand.
Meyerson does not seem to be able to deal satisfactorily with the latter Issue. She
acknowledges: 113
Another fear which a devout majority is likely to have is that if the state refrains
from supporting religion the result will be a victory for atheism ... [W]hen the state
III Rights Limited 8.
112 See Epp Buckingham 2000 Stell LR 133who criticises Meyerson's proposals as being too freedom-
centered.
113 Rights Limited 50.
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refuses to promote either religion or atheism ... it might have the effect, in
particular, that atheism is de facto strengthened.
Meyerson apparently suggests that this has to be accepted, and that the fact that a neutral
approach to religion could produce nonneutral results is not a valid argument against such a
policy. In this regard Malherbe!" comments:
Die probleem kan me so met 'n skouerophaling afgemaak word nie. Die
godsdiensbewuste Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap sal dit waarskynlik nie aanvaar
nie en dit is ook nie die korrekte benadering tot die toepassing van die grondwet
me.
One could agree with Meyerson'!' that it would be a mistake to suppose that the phrase "[an]
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" does no real work
in the limitation clause.!" But, in view of the decisions of the Constitutional Court on the
limitation clause mentioned above, there is no authority for Meyerson's approach to the above-
mentioned phrase as a kind of "threshold test" which has to be passed before the inquiry into
the relevant factors mentioned in section 36(1) can take place. The limitation issue remains,
in essence, a proportionality!" enquiry as set out in the Makwanyane case, and a court is
enjoined in the balancing process to take into account all relevant considerations, including
114 1998 TSAR 690.
115 Rights Limited xxv.
116 Rautenbach General Provisions 93 points out that these concepts have to be considered as a whole
in South Africa and that other systems do not usually employ them individually.
117 Dickson CJC in R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR 4th 200 described the components of proportionality as
follows: "There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the
measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to
the objective. Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this fust sense,
should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question: R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd at 352.
Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for
limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 'sufficient
importance'. "
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those described in section 36(1).118From the development of section 33 to section 36, and if
regard is had to the Makwanyane case, it appears that the specific factors enumerated in
section 36 were specifically included to assist a court in adjudicating whether a specific
limitation were indeed "reasonable andjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom" and that the whole of section 36(1) has to be read
together in order to make such a judgment.!" Meyerson's interpretation ofthe phrase could,
however, playa valuable role in balancing the interests of the community and of the persons
affected by the limitation in the greater proportionality analysis.!"
5. Conclusion
Inthe analysis of the application clause (section 8) of the Constitution, a distinction was drawn
between the binding effect of the clause and the entitlements according to it in terms of the
Constitution. As far as the binding effect is concerned, section 2 of the Constitution provides
that any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. In any legal proceedings
the constitutionality of either a law or conduct can thus be challenged."! The question whether
all law and all conduct are subject to constitutional scrutiny was therefore addressed in this
chapter.
As far as "law" is concerned, section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights applies to the law
118 See Malherbe 1998 TSAR 691-695 who also maintains that all relevant factors, including the five
factors mentioned in s 36(1) must be taken into account to determine whether the limitation is
"reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom". See the author's discussion of the five factors of s 36(1) in the context of the limitation of
religious rights.
119 See Rautenbach General Provisions 93 who points out that although the precise wording differs to
some extent these concepts are also used in other systems and that "...all systems have one pervasive
theme: a particular relationship has to exist between the factual limitation imposed and a public or
community interests which may be protected and promoted by the state ".
120 Meyerson's approach was referred to with approval by Sachs J in Christian Education South Africa
vMinister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 33 n 35.
121 S 2 of the 1996 Constitution provides: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled" (my
emphasis).
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in its entirety. Under the interim Constitution, the application of the Chapter on Fundamental
Rights was based on the classification oflaw into the law of the state (which includes statutory
law, the common law and customary law and which comprises both public and private law)
and the legally enforceable internal rules of conduct of institutions other than the state. The
wording of the 1996 Constitution (in section 8(1)), however, differs from that of the interim
Constitution (section 7(2)) in this regard. Section 9(4) of the Constitution also appears to
deviate from the previous position. There can be no doubt that the 1996 Constitution applies
to legislation, common law and customary law, irrespective of the nature of the parties
involved in the dispute (that is, whether they are private persons or state organs) and
irrespective of whether it is private or public law. On the question of whether "nonstate law"
is subject to the 1996 Constitution, the provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3) appear to
determine whether the Constitution applies. The provisions of section 9(4) should therefore
be read in conjunction with the provisions of section 8(3) in order to limit the section 9(4)
"right" in cases where a strict application thereof would conflict with the principle of
separation of church and state.
The same principles apply in determining which conduct would be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and all organs of state. With regard to the conduct of organs of state, it was shown
that the control test has been accepted by the court to determine whether an entity is an organ
of state. Thus, if an entity is found to be controlled by the state as defined by the courts, it
would be bound by the Bill of Rights. But when the constitutionality of the conduct of nonstate
entities is at issue, the provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3) will become relevant to determine
whether it is subject to Constitutional norms.
In other words, the general principle in the application of the final Constitution is reflected in
sections 2 and 8(1) of the Constitution. Section 8(2) and 8(3) specifically make provision for
the (exceptional) cases where the Bill of Rights would bind the laws or the conduct of natural
and (private) juristic persons "ifand to the extent that it is applicable taking into account the
nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the right". It was argued, with
reference to Van Dijkhorst J's decision in Jooste v Botha, that "the nature of the proposed
right, its enforceability, the practicalities of the human relationships involved and whether
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public policy or public mores require such moral obligation to be converted into a legal
obligation" would stand central in applying sections 8(2) and 8(3). In the context of religious
rights the principle of institutional separation of church and state would require that, say,
church laws should not be subject to constitutional norms. This principle of separation would
furthermore serve as a guiding principle in determining whether the conduct of religious
individuals or groups should be subject to Constitutional scrutiny.
With regard to the entitlement to certain protections in terms of the Bill of Rights, it was
shown that section 8(4) provided that juristic persons would be bearers of constitutionally
protected rights if required by the "nature of the right" and the "nature of the juristic person".
The "nature of the juristic person" could refer to the question of whether the juristic person
was a state organ, in which case it would not be entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights, but
bound to the Constitution in terms of section 8(1). Itcould also mean that the fact that ajuristic
person is, for example, a church or religious institution, should be taken into account. With
regard to the nature of the right it was argued, with reference to the position in German law
and the historical development of religious rights, that juristic persons such as churches and
religious associations could be the bearers of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The
protection under section 8(4) could even be extended to associations without legal personality.
It was, however, shown that, although groups or communities which do not have legal
personality or are not associations could have a substantive right to practise their religion as
well as locus standi, they would, procedurally speaking, not be able to litigate in their own
names.
Without attempting a complete discussion of the limitation clause, it was shown that the South
African Constitution had adopted the two stage approach of Canada, Germany and the
European Council. After determining the scope of the entrenched right and establishing
whether a prima facie infringement has taken place, the limitation clause is applied in the
second stage to determine whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable.
The Constitutional Court's approach to the limitation clause, which commenced in the
Makwanyane matter, entails the application of a proportionality test. In view of the fact that
the issue of the limitation of rights is an "ineluctably discretionary judgment by a court, which
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cannot easily be captured in any verbal formula", 122 as well as ineluctably tied to the facts of
a specific matter, no attempt was made to set general principles for the limitation of religious
rights.!" It is clear that in each individual matter the judge will have to evaluate the
justifiability of the limitation of rights and balance the various interests with reference to
section 36(1). The fact that "the nature ofthe right" has to be taken into account in terms of
section 36(1)(a) means that the essential rights and freedoms of religion, as explained earlier
in this thesis, must also be taken into account at this level of Constitutional analysis. The
approach ofthe Constitutional Court in the Christian Education matter and the Supreme Court
of Appeal in the Prince matter was evaluated in these terms. It was shown that the approach
of the Constitutional Court to the limitation of freedom of religion in the former matter was,
in contrast to the approach of the Supreme Court in the latter matter, a promising start.
Meyerson's alternative approach, although not totally in line with the approach of the
Constitutional Court, was also discussed. Itwas argued that her theory and its application to
religious rights issues could be incorporated in the balancing process.
122 Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 15-16.
123 Regarding the limitation of manifestations of religious beliefs, it was held in R v Big M Drug Mart
(1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321, (1985) 1 SCR 295 that: "Every individual [is] free to hold whatever
religious beliefs his or her conscience dictates, provided, inter alia, only that such manifestations do
not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of
their own".
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that religious rights are, by their very nature, complex and multifaceted. The
protection of the ideas underlying religious human rights often involves a balancing of
different and sometimes conflicting interests. This is partly the result of the fact that
religious human rights ... must find their source and sanction simultaneously in
morality, history, and politics.'
It is therefore not surprising that the members of the South African Constitutional Court do
not yet have even broad agreement on the meaning of the religious freedom provisions found
in the Constitution.'
This thesis endeavours to determine what freedom of religion means in South African law. It
is argued that the complex and multifaceted nature of religious freedom is, in part, to be
explained by recognising that religious freedom is, in fact, a bundle of rights and freedoms.
The essential rights and freedoms of religion which constitute this "bundle" are identified and
it is shown that no single principle could by itself guarantee religious freedom and that the
essential rights and freedoms of religion are mutually supportive and mutually subservient to
the highest goal of guaranteeing religious freedom. It is argued that these essential rights and
freedoms constitute minimum standards for the protection of religious freedom and that
Witte "Introduction" xxix explains this to mean that religious rights are rooted, morally speaking, in
the natural qualities of the person and community, in the creation order, natural law, divine covenant
or in sacred statements of morality; historically speaking, in the customs and traditions and historical
experiences of peoples; and politically speaking, in the laws and constitutions of states and the
international community. The sanction is likewise rooted in moral condemnation; communal
condemnation and social stigmatising; and legal punishment of violators.
2 Smith 2001 SALf shows, with reference to the decisions in Christian Education South Africa v
Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) par 18 and Sv Lawrence; Sv Negal; Sv Solberg
1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC), that the Constitutional Court was markedly divided on the very nature of
freedom of religion. See the discussion of the Christian Education and Lawrence cases in eh 5 and
6.
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religious freedom as protected in the South African Constitution should be interpreted to
incorporate these multiple principles. The religious rights provisions in the South African
Constitution are assessed to determine whether and how these essential rights are protected
and how, as standards, they should be interpreted and implemented in the South African
constitutional context to ensure adequate protection of religious freedom.
The thesis commences with a historical analysis to identify the constituting elements of
religious freedom. It is shown in chapter 2 that, in the course of Western history, certain
religious tensions gave rise to the development of a bundle of "essential rights and freedoms
of religion". The Edict of Milan already introduced the concepts of freedom of conscience,
freedom to practise religion, religious pluralism and equality of religions. Although these
rights were subsequently (during the Middle Ages) only de facto protected as the rights of a
group of people, theories of religious rights continued to build on these concepts. The
medieval church insisted on freedom from state control of the church as an institution, thus
introducing the concept of institutional separation of church and state. The value of the
individual conscience and the idea that everyone had natural rights also originated during the
Middle Ages. During the Protestant Reformations ofthe sixteenth century and the introduction
of nominalistic egalitarian theologies, the duty to obey the individual conscience was accepted
in principle ..Moreover, since everyone was believed to be priest, prophet and king, religious
rights could no longer belong only to the clergy, but also to every individual. The ideas of
institutional separation of church and state found expression in the writings of Calvin, and the
idea of a separation of state and religion was expounded by the Anabaptist theology. Certain
minimum religious rights which protected groups with religious beliefs different from those
of the majority were consequently incorporated in peace treaties after the sixteenth and
seventeenth century religious wars in Europe and subsequently in certain domestic statutes and
constitutions. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the individual was the focal
point, freedom of conscience came to be regarded as one of the natural rights of each
individual. Thus individual religious rights came to be protected in the constitutions of most
countries of the world and in international human rights instruments.
It is concluded that the essential rights and freedoms of religion which emerged during this
historical development of religious rights are freedom of conscience, freedom to practise
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religion, accommodation of religious pluralism, equality of different religions, institutional
separation of church and state and some separation of state and religion.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the protection of these essential rights and freedoms of religion
in South Africa before the 1993 Constitution came into effect. The position with regard to
religious freedom prior to 1994 is analysed with reference to the relationship between the state
and the (Christian) church and the establishment of the Christian religion by law in the eras
of the Dutch East India Company (1652-1795), Batavian Republic (1803-1806), British rule
(1806-1910), the Boer Republics and post-Union South Africa, the latter including the Union
of South Africa (1910-1961) and the Republic of South Africa from 1961 until 1994. The
position with regard to religious freedom prior to 1994 is also analysed with reference to the
legal position of religious minorities, namely black Christian Groups, Muslims and Jewish
groups in South Africa.
With regard to the requirement of institutional separation of church and state it is shown that
the relationship between church and state developed from a stage where, from 1652 tol779,
the Reformed Church was the only recognised church at the Cape to a stage where complete
separation of church and state was attained in 1875 with the introduction of the Voluntary Bill.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Constitutions of the Boer Republics once
again reverted to the idea of a state church, but with the Union of South Africa in 1910 the last
constitutional establishment of a state church disappeared. In so far as institutional separation
of church and state is a requirement for the protection of religious rights, this requirement was
met in South Africa after 1910.
With regard to the requirement of separation of law and religion, it is shown that, after the
concept of a state church in South Africa had been abandoned, Christianity as such was, to a
certain extent, the religious basis for political society. Although a legally endorsed choice for
Christianity was made in South Africa, a definite denominational choice was not made. It is
shown that a variety of statutory enactments protected particular tenets of Christianity. This
is illustrated in different periods with reference to Sunday observance legislation, provisions
of publication control and education policy. It is thus clear that there was no separation of state
and religion in pre-1994 South Africa.
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With regard to the requirement of religious pluralism, it is shown that a practical religious
(Christian) pluralism was recognised from 1780. Religious pluralism became more
pronounced after the arrival of Muslim slaves and indentured labourers from the Islamic parts
of the East Indies and India from the middle of the seventeenth century, adherents to the Hindu
religion from India in the second half of the nineteenth century, eastern and western European
Jews who made their way to South Africa at the tum of the nineteenth century, and immigrants
from China and elsewhere. The de facto existence of religious pluralism was, however, not
protected dejure. In South Africa, a rigid group differentiation, enforced by law, obscured the
accommodation of pluralism and equal protection of the religious beliefs of all people.
Similarly, religions were not equal before the law. Before 27 April 1994, South African law
had a distinct Christian bias. The choice of Christianity by the legislature reflected the
definitive attitude of the state with regard to people of "other" religious traditions. The
constitutional entrenchment of religious rights since that date has made religiously biased
provisions in both statutes and common law vulnerable to constitutional challenges.'
Moreover, political (racial) and religious discrimination overlapped to a great extent. In terms
of the apartheid policy, people of "nonwhite" races were classified as such and excluded from
certain political rights and privileges. And, as people from "other" religions were almost
always "nonwhite", such groups were in effect politically and religiously sidelined. The Group
Areas Act and other apartheid measures had the effect of eliminating any real awareness of
religious pluralism, and precluded equality of religions before the law and nondiscrimination
on the basis of faith.
Freedom of conscience has always existed in this country. However, the right to exercise
religious beliefs freely did not exist for all people. This right was limited in the case of
"nonwhite" religious groups before 1994.
3 Although not many of these laws have been challenged thus far, Parliament has in some instances
submitted new legislation for religiously biased legislation. See for example the Films and
Publications Act 65 of 1996 which replaced the Publications Act 42 of 1974 and the Choice of the
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 which replaced the Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of
1975.
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It is therefore concluded that the essential rights and freedoms of religion were not adequately
protected in South Africa prior to 1994.
Chapter 3 further shows that, although no aggressive religious persecution or extreme religious
intolerance occurred in South Africa during that time, the essential threshold conditions for
the emergence of true religious freedom were not adequately represented. The threshold
conditions, as identified by Durham," which have to exist before religious freedom can truly
emerge in a society, were described in chapters 1,3 and 4: "Some measure of(1) pluralism,
(2) economic stability, and (3) political legitimacy within the society in question ...[and] some
willingness on the part of differing religious groups and their adherents to live with each
other." Although defacto religious pluralism existed, it was not legally protected. Infact, there
were several legislative enactments intended to protect the tenets of Christianity. There was
not sufficient economic stability in all spheres of society to say that this condition was fully
complied with. The likelihood of achieving religious liberty was furthermore reduced to the
extent that the apartheid government lacked political legitimacy. The apartheid laws also
obscured a real awareness of religious pluralism and the need for religious tolerance. It is
therefore clear that the necessary conditions for the emergence of true religious freedom did
not exist in South Africa prior to 1994. Chapter 3 shows that various factors in South Africa's
political history necessitated the constitutional entrenchment of fundamental human rights
which would inter alia promote the fulfilment of the threshold conditions for the emergence
of religious freedom and afford protection of the essential rights and freedoms of religion.
Chapter 4 commences with a brief overview of the emergence of South Africa's first
Constitution with an entrenched Bill of Rights and the inclusion therein of religious rights
which, despite deep-seated ideological tensions, were never disputed. However, no agreement
on the meaning of the religious rights clauses has so far been reached in the South African
constitutional context.
The constitutional protection of religious rights is part of the broader new constitutional
context in which the constitutional text constitutes the supreme law of South Africa and the
4 Perspectives 13.
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standard for the assessment of the validity of all law and administrative conduct. It is shown
that constitutional interpretation in this context is fundamentally different from the traditional
concept of statutory interpretation rooted in a system of parliamentary sovereignty. The most
important indications, in the Constitution and in general, of how the Constitution should be
interpreted are briefly dealt with in order to provide a framework within which the religious
rights provisions in the South African Constitution could be interpreted and assessed in the
next two chapters.
Chapters 5 and 6 assess the religious rights provisions in the South African Constitution to
determine whether and how the essential rights and freedoms of religion are protected and
how, as standards, they should be interpreted and implemented in view of the particular history
and circumstances of the country.
In chapter 5 the religious rights of freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion and
religious pluralism are assessed under the "freedom" dimension since these rights are mostly
formulated and protected in a freedom-oriented manner. First, the necessity for and, at the
same time, the difficulty of defining "religion" in the constitutional context are demonstrated.
It is pointed out that, in the South African constitutional context, and since different words are
used to protect "religion", "belief' and "conscience" respectively, it is not necessary to define
"religion" in such a broad manner as to include all beliefs. Since the freedom to have atheistic,
agnostic or other beliefs would be protected by the freedom to belief, conscience, thought or
opinion, it is proposed that the Swidler definition of religion be accepted which defines
"religion" as having a code, a creed, a cult and a community structure and as being based on
a belief in a Transcendent. The acceptance of this definition would imply that the reference to
"religion" or "religious" in sections 15(2) and 31 be given a corresponding meaning. According
to this construction, the holding of beliefs which are not of a religious nature would be
protected under freedom of belief, opinion or conscience, but the freedom to manifest these
nonreligious beliefs would not be protected by section 15(2) and 31. However, expressions of
beliefs which are not religious would probably be protected by the right to freedom of
expression (section 16).
The religious rights provisions contained in sections 9, 15 and 31 of the Constitution are then
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considered with a view to ascertaining, in the first instance, whether the essential rights and
freedoms of religion are indeed constitutionally protected and, in the second instance, to
investigate their interpretation and implementation in the South African constitutional context.
The first religious right, freedom of conscience, is explicitly protected by section 15(1) of the
Constitution. It is argued that this right has not been made redundant by the more general
protection afforded by the freedom of religion but that the right of every person to follow the
dictates of his or her own conscience in matters of religion, still lies at the basis of the essential
rights and freedoms of religion. In a modem constitutional context, this freedom implies that
every person be accorded the right to voluntarily adopt a religious belief of his or her choice,
that religious groups be free to associate and organise themselves, that there should be no
discrimination on religious grounds and that people should not be subjected to laws which they
could not, in good conscience, obey.
It is argued, with reference to the historical development and international understanding of
religious rights, that the freedom of "conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion" in
section 15(1) includes the right of individuals and groups to manifest their religious beliefs in
worship, teaching, practice and observance thereof (the free exercise of religious beliefs).
Religious rights would be largely meaningless unless the general' protection extends to the
manifestation of religious beliefs as well. This construction has been accepted in principle by
the Constitutional Court." It is argued that free exercise rights in the South African
constitutional context should be interpreted to include the rights enumerated in article 6 of the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on
Religion or Belief (1981).
It is shown, with reference to the right to establish educational institutions based on a common
religion which is protected by section 29(3) of the Constitution (section 32 of the interim
Constitution), that the Constitutional Court has chosen to protect religious free exercise rights
in a liberal, freedom-oriented manner and not as an entitlement imposing any positive
5 S 15(2), 16, 18, 29 and 31 all protect particular manifestations of religious beliefs.
6 In S v Lawrence; S v Nega/; S v So/berg 1997 (2) SACR 540 (CC) 568.
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obligations on the state. Although it could not be stated that such an approach is unduly
restrictive of the right to free exercise of religion, it is proposed that the Constitutional text
could be interpreted in a manner which is more accommodating of free exercise rights. The
hope is expressed that the state would eventually adopt an approach of more actively
promoting and fostering religious diversity.
It is shown that the provisions of the Constitution protect the essential principle of religious
pluralism or diversity. It is (at least) protected by sections 15(1), 15(3),29(3) and 31. Section
15(1) protects the right of "everyone" to freedom of religion, conscience and belief. It is
argued that "everyone" should include religious groups. Section 31 makes provision for the
practising of religion in community with others. The right has, however, been formulated in
a liberal manner by not protecting religious groups as such but by protecting the rights of
persons belonging to religious communities to practise their religion and to form, join and
maintain religious associations. The Constitutional Court has also opted to protect section 31
rights in a liberal freedom-oriented manner. However, the hope is once again expressed that
constitutional jurisprudence would proceed to a more active protection and promotion of
religious diversity. Minority rights are not analysed in detail in this thesis, but as far as
religious group rights in the context of section 31 are concerned, it is argued that the approach
of the Constitutional Court (albeit in the context of the right to education) which distinguishes
between dominant and nondominant groups, is unduly restrictive of the principle of pluralism.
Religious pluralism is also protected by section 15(3) of the Constitution which provides that
legislation recognising marriages contracted under a system of religious law or systems of
religious personal and family law would not be unconstitutional. It is shown that the legislation
envisaged in section 15(3) would be extremely difficult to formulate. However, in a number
of cases, the principles of religious freedom, religious pluralism and the values enshrined in
the Constitution have led to the recognition of marriage contracts which were entered into in
accordance with the religious law of Islam and which were de facto monogamous.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the essential principles of the separation of state and religion, the
equality of religions and the institutional separation of church and state in the South African
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constitutional context. It is firstly shown, with reference to the theory of Durham,' that both
strongly positive and strongly negative identification of state and religion correlate with low
levels of religious freedom and that one cannot simply assume that a more rigid separation of
state and religion would necessarily enhance religious freedom. The strict separation of state
and religion which exists in the United States jurisprudence is not endorsed by the South
African Constitution. The Constitution thus does not contain a United States-style reason to
interpret the South African Constitution in such a manner. In fact, the South African
Constitution creates room for the state to take positive measures to ensure even-handed
accommodation of religious concerns. The Constitution does, however, provide for the
separation of state and religion to some extent in that state support of religion is subject to
certain constitutional principles, such as the free exercise of religion (section 15(1)), the
provisions of sectionI5(2) and the principle of equality as protected by the equality clause
(section 9).
Section 15(1) and free exercise concerns are discussed in chapter 5. Section 15(2) provides
that attendance at religious observances at state or state-aided institutions must be free and
voluntary. This provision, which does not strictly separate state and religion, is not in
contravention of religious freedom norms since, as pointed out above, total religious freedom
is possible in the case of "some identification" of state and religion. This section moreover
provides for the essential requirements of voluntarism and noncoercion in religious matters.
In applying section 15(2) it is important to establish whether a particular activity could be
defined as a "religious observance" and whether it is conducted at a "State or state-aided
institution". Itwas argued earlier that the phrase "religious observance" in section 15(2) would
follow the interpretation of the word "religion" in section 15(1) and that "religion" in section
15(1) refers to the Swidler definition of religion. "Religious observance"
("godsdiensbeoefening") will therefore probably be confined to typically religious activities
which flow from adherence to a certain religion and will not include all acts of religious
people. If a specific activity cannot be defined as a "religious observance", then such an
activity would not be proscribed at state or state-aided institutions. Whether an institution can
be labelled a state or a state-aided institution would depend on whether the state is in control
7 Perspectives 15-25.
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of an institution or provides financial aid to it.
The principle of equality of religions is protected by section 9( 1) of the Constitution which
provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection by and
benefit of the law, and by section 9(3) which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of inter
alia religion, conscience and belief. It is shown that section 9 prescribes even-handed
treatment of religions and not "no treatment" of religion. A consequence of the protection of
the principle of the equality of religions by section 9 is that, in terms of section 9,
discrimination between different religions would have to be unfair before it can be said to be
unconstitutional, whereas under a deemed establishment clause mere state support of religion
would be unconstitutional. Therefore, before it can be said that state support of a particular
religious practice is discriminatory, the requirements of section 9 will have to be complied
with. So far, the courts have not fully explored the safeguarding potential of the constitutional
guarantee of religious equality. The tendency has been to approach religious rights issues in
a freedom-oriented manner or to refrain from classifying the dispute as a religious rights
dispute. However, the adjudication of equality in the context of religious rights is no easy task.
In the case of conflict, free exercise rights and equality concerns will need to be balanced in
terms of the limitation clause.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly protect the institutional separation of church and
state, it is shown, with reference to the historical development of religious rights, that the
institutional separation of church and state is an inherent part of religious freedom and as such
protected by section 15(1). The state would therefore be precluded from interfering in the
sovereign sphere of churches, religious institutions and religious communities.
Section 9(4), which makes proscription of discrimination applicable to persons other than the
state or state organs, presents interpretative problems in this regard. The section which refers
to legislation which must be enacted is not clear. Differentiation or discrimination within any
church, religious institution or community often depends on a specific interpretation of its
doctrine and it would constitute an infringement of religious freedom if religious laws or
doctrine were to be interpreted by a court and subjected to constitutional norms. It is therefore
argued that section 9(4) should not be interpreted to sanction interference in doctrinal matters
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but that it should be read in conjunction with the provisions of section 8(3) and that, in such
cases, the "right" contained in section 9(4) should be limited accordingly.
The effect of religious freedom and of the constitutional protection ofthe separation of church
and state on the administrative review of church decisions is also analysed in this chapter. It
is argued that in the preconstitutional era, the South African courts used a kind of "neutral
principles" test. However, a proper application of the constitutional principles of freedom of
religion would require the courts to defer, limited only by the considerations set out in the
limitations clause. This will call for a re-evaluation of the manner in which religious bodies
and their decisions are dealt with in South African law. As demonstrated above, continuing
to view churches as voluntary associations based on contract, irrespective of their true nature,
and to review decisions of religious bodies on the basis of the extended principles of
administrative justice, will be in disregard of the freedom of religion provisions in the South
African Constitution.
Chapter 7 considers the effects of the operational provisions on the understanding of the
constitutional sections in which religious rights and freedom are entrenched. In the analysis
of the application clause (section 8) of the Constitution, a distinction is drawn between the
binding effect of the clause and the entitlements according to it in terms of the Constitution.
As far as the binding effect is concerned, it is considered whether all law and all conduct are
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights applies to the
law in its entirety. The 1996 Constitution therefore applies to legislation, common law and
customary law, irrespective of the nature ofthe parties involved in the dispute (that is, whether
they are private persons or state organs) and irrespective of whether it is private or public law.
Section 9(4) of the Constitution, however, appears to subject "nonstate law" to constitutional
norms. It is argued that whenever the constitutionality of "nonstate law" is in issue, the
provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3) should be used to determine whether the Constitution
applies. The provisions of section 9(4) should be read in conjunction with the provisions of
section 8(3) in order to limit the "right" in section 9(4) in cases where it would result in an
unacceptable contravention of religious freedom and the autonomy of religious institutions,
groups or communities.
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According to section 8( 1), the Bill of Rights binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary
and all organs of state. With regard to the conduct of organs of state, it is shown that the
control test has been accepted by the courts to determine whether an entity is an organ of state.
Thus, if an entity is found to be controlled by the state as defined by the courts, it would be
bound by the Bill of Rights. It is argued that when the constitutionality of the conduct of
nonstate entities is at issue, the provisions of sections 8(2) and 8(3) will become relevant to
determine whether the conduct is subject to Constitutional norms. Sections 8(2) and 8(3)
specifically make provision for the (exceptional) cases where the Bill of Rights would bind
the laws or the conduct of natural and (private) juristic persons "ifand to the extent that it is
applicable taking into account the nature ofthe right and the nature of the duty imposed by the
right". It is argued that "the nature of the proposed right, its enforceability, the practicalities
of the human relationships involved and whether public policy or public mores require such
moral obligation to be converted into a legal obligation'" would stand central in applying
sections 8(2) and 8(3). In the context of religious rights the principle of institutional separation
of church and state would require that church laws should not be subject to constitutional
norms.
With regard to the entitlement to certain protections under the Bill of Rights, it is shown that
section 8(4) provides that juristic persons would be bearers of constitutionally protected rights
if required by the "nature of the right" and the "nature of the juristic person". If the "nature of
the juristic person" were that of a state organ, it would not be entitled to the rights in the Bill
of Rights, but bound to the Constitution in terms of section 8(1). With regard to the "nature
of the right" it is argued, with reference to the position in German law and the historical
development of religious rights, that juristic persons such as churches and religious
associations could be bearers of the right to freedom of religion and belief. The protection
under section 8(4) could even be extended to associations without legal personality. It is,
however, shown that, although groups or communities which do not have legal personality or
are not associations could have a substantive right to practise their religion as well as locus
standi, they would, procedurally speaking, not have the right to litigate in their own names.
S Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T) 205.
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The adjudication of religious freedom issues hinges largely on the courts' understanding of the
effect ofthe general limitation clause (section 36). The South African Constitution has adopted
the two-stage approach of Canada, Germany and the European Council: After determining the
scope of the entrenched right and establishing whether aprima facie infringement has taken
place, the limitation clause is applied in the second stage to determine whether the limitation
is reasonable and justifiable. The Constitutional Court's approach to the limitation clause,
which commenced in theMakwanyane matter, also followed the example ofthese jurisdictions
which rely on general limitation principles combined with a proportionality test to decide the
justifiability of specific limitations of fundamental rights.
Section 36(1) specifies the factors which have to be taken into account in the application of
the proportionality test. The fact that "the nature of the right" has to be taken into account in
terms of section 36(1)(a) means that the essential rights and freedoms of religion must also be
taken into account at this level of Constitutional analysis. The approach of the Constitutional
Court in the Christian Education matter and of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Prince
matter is evaluated in these terms. It is shown that the Constitutional Court's approach to the
limitation of freedom of religion in the former matter, in contrast to the Supreme Court's
approach in the latter matter, is consistent with recent ideas about the limitation of rights in
general and of freedom of religion in particular.
Meyerson's alternative approach to the limitation clause implies that the phrase "an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" functions as a kind of
threshold test which has to be passed before the inquiry into the relevant factors mentioned in
section 36(1) can take place. Although this approach is not in line with the Constitution or the
approach of the Constitutional Court, her theory and its application to religious rights issues
could be incorporated in balancing the interests of the community and of the persons affected
by the limitation in the greater proportionality analysis.
It can be concluded that the emergence of the new constitutional dispensation and the
constitutional protection of fundamental human rights have contributed to the fulfilment of
Durham's threshold conditions for religious freedom. The Constitution contains specific
provisions for a great diversity of individuals and communities in South Africa and recognises
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the particular concerns created by this diversity. The constitutionally entrenched, democratic
process representing all citizens of South Africa has introduced political legitimacy into South
African society. In addition, the promotion of constitutionalism and democratic values by the
Constitution aims to enhance political legitimacy and stability. The constitutional
entrenchment of socioeconomic rights and the statutory reform measures which have been
implemented since the promulgation of the Constitution have raised awareness of the plight
of the poor in South Africa and could be instrumental in promoting economic stability so as
to meet the (low) threshold of this condition. The fourth condition set by Durham is that there
must be some willingness on the part of the various religious groups and their adherents to live
in harmony with each other. As illustrated in chapter 3, South Africa has never been subjected
to the kind of religious oppression and strife found in certain contemporary and past
fundamentalist societies. However, the political climate of apartheid fostered an unwillingness
on the part of religious groups to live with one another. That system has been abolished, and
although a legal system of equality cannot per se change attitudes of intolerance, it could
undoubtedly contribute to a culture of respect for and tolerance of differences. The final
Constitution has, in many respects, been designed to inculcate tolerance among South
Africans. Some of the general value statements make it clear that reconciliation of individuals,
groups and communities with potentially conflicting interests is one of the Constitution's
priorities. The preamble, for example, recognises the injustices of the past and states that the
Constitution is adopted inter alia to "heal the divisions of the past", thereby recognising the
political necessity of tolerance. The constitutional protection of rights is furthermore premised
on the foundational values of "human dignity, equality and freedom"." The central place
accorded to human dignity emphasises the importance of promoting respect and tolerance
among different peoples. 10
It therefore appears that, as far as the threshold conditions for religious freedom are concerned,
the new South African Constitution has paved the way for reaching the goal of religious
9 S 1, 7, 36(1) and 39(1)(a).
10 This is also borne out by, for example, s 16 which guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but
provides that the right does not extend to "propaganda for war", "incitement of imminent violence"
or "advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes
incitement to cause harm". These limitations are, arguably, aimed at promoting tolerance.
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freedom.
The constitutional entrenchment of religious rights can in tum have a positive impact on
patterns of pluralism, political legitimacy, economic stability and tolerance in a diverse society
such as ours. In this regard Durham I I reminds us that for much of human history it was
assumed that "religious truth required state implementation of religious beliefs and that
political stability presupposed religious and cultural homogeneity". 12 However, in this regard
he refers to Locke who contends that, far from destabilising a regime, toleration and respect
could have exactly the opposite effect. The idea is that in the context of a pluralistic society,
a regime which respects divergent beliefs will win support from those it respects, resulting in
much greater stability than can be achieved by favouring the dominant group. Locke maintains
that respect for freedom of choice in matters of religion is a source of both legitimacy and
stability for political regimes. As a result there is general growing consensus that the protection
of freedom of religion is conducive to stability and peace."
An assessment of the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom shows that religious
freedom as protected in the Constitution can be interpreted as a bundle of rights and freedoms
and that the new constitutional text opens up the possibility for the protection of the bundle
of essential rights and freedoms of religion in South Africa. It is important that the clauses in
the Constitution which pertain to religion be interpreted and implemented in such a manner
as to ensure the protection of freedom of conscience, freedom to practise religion,
accommodation of religious pluralism, equality of different religions, institutional separation
of church and state and some separation of state and religion. As a consequence we should not
only be able to attain the greatest degree of religious freedom in South Africa, but also to
ensure stability, tolerance and peace among a religiously, ethnically, economically and
politically diverse population.
Il Perspectives 7-12.
12 This impression was reinforced by the religious wars that ravaged Europe until the Lockean era. See
the discussion in eh 2.
13 In the South African constitutional context Du Plessis 2001 BYV-LR 104 states that "[t]he explicit
protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to religious equality must be understood
as part of this project of cultivating tolerance".
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